

COLLECTED ESSAYS

of

ELIJAH JORDAN

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CONTENTS

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THE CONSTITUTIVE AND REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES IN KANT

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose[1] of this essay is to inquire into Kant's reasons for the classification of principles as constitutive and regulative, and to find, if possible, how far and in what sense the distinction holds. The method employed will appeal to the use of the principles in experience. The inquiry will not extend beyond the limits of the application of the principles of the understanding, it being assumed that any other use of the principles as constitutive or regulative has its basis within those limits.

Kant is asking in what the certainty of knowledge consists. He assumes that knowledge, when conceived of as the whole of our recorded and present subjective experience, has somewhere a stable point with reference to which changes have significance, and from which progress takes its direction. This point is called the object, and the certainty of knowledge is established when its relation to the object is determined. All difficulties which arise in connection with the description of the knowledge process are just questions of the nature of this relation; and they may all be summed up as the problem of the definition of the object. What constitutes the difficulty in the case of any definition of the object, is the tendency, on the one hand, to put the definition in terms of our particular subjective experiences, and on the other, to have left as unaccountable a realistic remainder after the subjective definition has been made.

The first of these tendencies suggests the "construction" of the object; the second the discovery of the object indirectly and in a "regulative" way. Kant's justification of construction claims a basis in the fact of the *a priori* certainty of mathematical knowledge; and his justification of regulation in the fact of the practical certainty of empirical knowledge. At the outset he claims that "one part of this knowledge, namely, the mathematical, has always been in possession of perfect trustworthiness; and thus produces a favorable presumption with regard to other parts also, although these may be of a totally different nature."[2] It is probable that the other parts here referred to are the knowledge of morality, but the real difficulty is whether the presumption

[1] Results are summarized on the last page of the essay.

[2] A., p. 4; B., p. 8.

holds favorable with respect to perceptual experience. The purpose of this essay may be stated again as an inquiry as to how far this favorable presumption may be said to hold good.

To examine the process of construction calls for an examination of the concept of quantity, and the results obtained here will lead us to notice the nature and extent of the application of the regulative principles. When the latter have been established in their logical connections, it will be necessary to show their identity with the constitutive principles, not, however, through the complicated machinery employed by Kant, but through the simple characters of objects in experience.

Construction is in pure intuition. Many questions arise, however, in connection with pure intuition, as e.g., What is pure intuition? What does construction in pure intuition mean? Kant's answer to the first of these questions is that pure intuition is space and time, and as such, is valid as an object, and is definable as a rule of synthesis in the time relations of representations. This answer does not simplify matters, for it answers the epistemological question perhaps too hastily, in any case, abstractly. The intuitions are now referred to the real in sensation, and the question is whether the latter may be constructed quantitatively. Looked at more closely, quantity is seen to have connections with all the other categories through time.

For Kant there is a pure consciousness of quantity, or a consciousness in which no other character is involved; but of quantity in this sense there are no axioms, and hence no general certainty. Where there are axioms, *quantitas* becomes *quanta* and is schematized as number. It is the fact that *quantitas* becomes *quanta* which brings it into relation with the other categories; and if the principles involved here are constitutive, they are also regulative.

At this point Kant abandons quantity for its schema number, which again raises the question of the relation of sense and thought. Its definition involves time and the consciousness of succession as a synthesis. But succession in time with regard to objects involves phenomena in relations of space; this again involves substance and the permanent, with reference to which time is constitutive, and an act, which would decide the question in favor of construction. Time, however, constructs only possibilities, to which there are: (1) realistic objections with the argument of evolution; and (2) skeptical objections. To (1) Kant would say that evolution is merely a "predicable" of time-quantity, and does not apply. To (2) there is appeal to the transcendental concept of the possibility of experience.

Kant at this point seems to realize that as time and number, quantity ends in abstraction and does not touch objects. If quantity is to be a valid concept a content must be discovered for it, so a distinction must be made. Quantity is extensive quantity; and if the possibility of experience and hence the transcendental argument is to hold good, it must be remembered that the possibility of experience is just what makes the synthesis of the homogeneous a quantity. This synthesis as abstract quantity is empty conception and the bare possibility. To find a content for the synthesis we must appeal to the homogeneous in space. Generalized time formulas involve space; but the generalized synthesis is the object as the permanent substance, hence space and time are both necessary to quantity, that is, space is the schema of time just as time succession as number is the schema of quantity. Time as a schema applies to objects in only a computative sense, and provides for succession only. But the real phenomena demand their coexistence, so quantity must be schematized as space also. Quantity schematized as both time and space involves the permanent.

But if space as well as time is involved in construction we are carried beyond the idea of quantity as merely extensive. To construct the object of experience, quantity must be definitely limited, and as such becomes intensive quantity. For knowledge, differences of extensity are immaterial, and to make a knowledge difference extensity must be qualified. As qualified by a line of approach to the real, quantity is characterized by differences of degree. Quality has a statement in terms of *a priori* possibilities, for it must be *a priori* if there is to be formal construction. In what sense is quality *a priori?* The *a priori* in the sensuous intuition with respect to quality is the mathematical principle that it must have a degree. As such it is described as (1) a conceptual mean in a series; (2) a moment of consciousness; and (3) a subjective fact. Neither of these descriptions is consistently worked out by Kant.

A reconstruction may begin here upon the basis of results thus far reached. The principle of the possibility of experience, if the reference is to the concrete actuality of experience, is applicable only to those principles which operate only in a regulative way. The distinctions drawn so rigidly between sense and understanding and space and time must be ignored; and whatever principles were found applicable to experience after those distinctions are made, must be regarded merely as special applications of the principles which operate within experience taken as a whole and with all its connections intact. In this way the constitutive principles are analytic only, and serve to exemplify the

method of the regulative principles. They do not construct the object, but merely represent to consciousness the object as the purpose of the complex of the representations in consciousness. While we allow an independent function to the constitutive principles, our notion of the object is the crudely realistic one, and we have upon our hands the ambiguous question of representation. This question disappears as meaningless when the constitutive principles are shown to apply only to the imaged stage of a purpose, which is completed as an object when upon the method of the regulative principles it is connected at all points with experience.

The nature of the regulative principles is then to be understood from a proper estimation of these experience connections, and these connections can be corrrectly estimated only when approached from the point of view of their unity of purpose. It thus simplifies our method when we regard all experience connections as instants of causation, while all other regulative principles will come out in the account as corollaries of this one principle. It is just from this general point of view that the first result prohibits application of causality to the sequence in time only, for that sequence never reaches the consequent which we call the object. Causation regarded as merely temporal shows by its failure that some other idea is needed to complete it. This qualifying character is found to be the very connectedness of experience itself. Causation in experience is thus seen to involve more than time, in fact every general characterization of experience is involved in any concrete instance of it.

How are objects known, is the fundamental question for Kant, and his famous formulation of it as, How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible, arises from a recognition of the fact that all judgments that are significant get their significance from a point of reference beyond the individual intent from which they start—in other words from reference to an object. That significant judgments are "objective" is true, however it may be necessary to define the object. The relation of thought to its object is the locus of all questions of validity, and therefore the proper object of all philosophical investigation. That same famous question was less formally and more intelligibly stated before the form of the *Kritik* was worked out, as is shown by the letter to Herz,[1] in which its form is, "Wie können sich Begriffe *a priori* auf Objecte beziehen?" Questions of the nature and limits of thought are unintelligible apart from considerations of the nature of the objects.

There have been various explanations of the relations which thought

[1] See Riehl, *Der philosophische Kriticismus*, Vol. I, p. 329.

bears to its object—that the object participates in the nature of the idea, that the object is represented in the idea, that the object is unreal and a miscarriage of the idea, that the relation between the two is unique and must be taken without explanation, that the object is the construction of the idea—the latter having various interpretations. For instance, the object is constructed out of a perfectly undifferentiated original matter through the process of time; or the object is made by the idea out of the original elements of the latter. All of these Kant reduces to two general doctrines,[1] namely, representation and construction, and he accepts the latter. It requires, however, the whole of the *Kritik* to explain in just what sense he holds to construction. Briefly, the object is constructed by the idea out of original forms; but the freedom of indifference is not given the active thought principle, since the latter has itself a definite constitution within which only it can operate. Thought is limited by itself; has its own bounds set for it in its own nature. Within these bounds it is free to construct its object, to say what it will mean, to determine its own direction.

Thus there are objects of the understanding and "ideals" of the reason; and if the latter are as objects problematical, it is because objects are needed when the forms of space and time do not lie in the direction in which the need becomes intention. The former are determined after the analogy of mathematics by or according to principles that are constitutive; the latter on the analogy of experience by or according to principles that are regulative.[2] It will be shown below, however, that the distinction between constitutive and regulative is not so much one of principles as one of objects; and that all principles, in that they relate to objects, are both constitutive and regulative.

A distinction might here be made between principles of thought and principles of knowledge. The former get their distinctive character as the active agencies at work in the process of thought, or, if the different faculties of mind are not differentiated so sharply, represent only the different directions or means by which thought seeks its object. The latter have value, after the object is obtained and defined, in comparing and organizing the objects of thought in the system of experience as a whole. The former are subjective, principles of mind, and are active and constitutive in determining objects.[3] The latter are objective,

[1] A., p. 92. See also the letter to Herz, February 21, 1772, Kant's *Werke*, Kirchmann's ed., Vol. VIII, pp. 402–9.

[2] A., p. 179; B., p. 221.

[3] A., pp. 126, 300, 718–19; B., pp. 356, 746–47.

principles of the determined object, and relate to those characters which allow the object to be used as a term of the comparative judgment, and to be fitted into a tentative whole of knowledge. They are more than this, however, in that when the idea of a conditional whole is justified through a comparison of objects, these principles may go on from the suggestion of the structure of the whole to the determination of the direction in which objects may be sought; that is, they find characters in the objects organized which suggest the grounds of the possibility of objects, find the conditions in general according to which the object must conform, and so determine *a priori* what may, in a given direction, be an object of thought at all.

Thus the conditions of the possibility of experience are laid in the constructive capacity of thought in experience, and this idea of the possibility of experience becomes the guide to the disposition of objects in knowledge or their arrangement in science, as well as to the actual character and constitution which the object must have if it is to be an object of thought at all. These regulative principles are thus not without influence upon the object, either as to form or content, since they indicate the direction in which construction is possible; and, besides, in the opposite direction, or after construction is determined as possible, they determine the extent to which it is valid.

The regulative principles are therefore indirectly or mediately constitutive. They are, when operative, synthetic *a priori* judgments in which the appropriation of the new is mediated by the idea of the old in experience. And they determine content, since they define the constitution of things in such a way as to be able to say that if there is to be a content at all, it must be found in this or that direction and under these or those conditions. This is no more than saying that the sense experience as the "real" in a possible experience is determined *a priori* as under the bounds of a constitution which is or may be known, and that, within these bounds, content is determined upon or selected with respect to characters of the known constitution which are then and there the object of the speculative purpose. In other words, sense is under the law imposed by the understanding, its forms are also concepts of the understanding, and its content therefore dependent upon the purpose of the understanding. And the inclusion of the forms of space and time within the system of the concepts is just what is meant by the "ideality" of space and time, or the transcendental idealism. This point is also the basis of the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles, and for the idea of a constitutive function of mind.

Constitutive principles are constitutive of objects directly; the exercise of the understanding under them gives the object in its reality, not merely in answering to their form but in producing their content. The forms represented by constitutive principles are grounds or reasons for experience, or characters of the constitution of experience—experience being assumed as having a definite constitution. These grounds are active as "causes,"[1] since no object of knowledge can be conceived except in its distinction from its ground.[2] And it makes no difference here if the "causality of the cause" is freedom, since the event distinguished as object could not occur except as it is recognized as necessarily related to something else.[3] If no object can stand alone in experience, that is, if no object is possible except as it has relations which determine it an object, these relations show its dependence upon something else as necessary (as under the conception of possible experience), and the something else must be looked upon as a cause or reason for the object.[4] The causes are in this case the forms of the understanding, and they are the grounds which determine *a priori* the possibility of there being an object. They say that if there is to be an object at all (and the first act of consciousness assumes that objects can be) that object must conform to the limits, or be within the bounds, or square with the general reasons why there can be an object. This calls attention to the fact that the determination of the object carries with it the recognition that there are certain conditions upon which the object depends, which conditions not only may be but are known, and may be known independently of the particular object as the condition of the object in general. The main question here is whether these conditions are "merely subjective" or really objective, so that our mere intention toward the object may be distinguished from the actual construction of the object—whether our dreaming can be distinguished from our thinking. For Kant, this distinction can be made with absolute confidence: some objects can be known completely, both as to form and matter, so there is knowledge of absolute certainty. This knowledge is mathematical.

Regulative principles are constitutive of the possibility of objects,

[1] A., p. 202; B., p. 247. [2] A., p. 125.

[3] A., p. 227; B., p. 279.

[4] That the idea of construction involves the regulative principles of causation and community will be shown later (chap. iv). That is, principles of the quantitative and qualitative nature of objects are insufficient to show that objects can through their individual content be conceived as under the conditions of possible experience, or belong to a world of experience. As under the mathematical principles, when rigidly applied, the object becomes a little world in itself, and the plurality of objects the aggregate world of monads which "have no windows."

which, if actualized, would have as attributes characters corresponding to and known from the more general relations of objects in experience. These relations are imperfectly conceived because of the limitations of the understanding to the *a priori* forms of objects. If the intuitions of objects in experience were identical with the conceptual forms of those objects, as is assumed in the mathematical principles, there would be no need of regulative principles, since the ideal object would not be necessary, being realized in the actual. All principles would be constitutive if the intuition were given with the concept. But the field wherein such occurs is limited to objects of a particular kind; so that if there be principles beyond that field, they must be merely regulative, or guides for the thought toward a region where, in the absence of intuition, there may be objects known by certain necessities due to the characters of objects known actually in both intuition and conception. The ideal is of course to identify the two kinds of principles by finding that their fields of operation coincide in the idea of the unity of the world. This ideal is that of the speculative purpose, and the character of its knowledge is mathematical, where the intuition loses itself by inclusion in the conceptual. Subjectively, or on the anthropological side, the ideal would include objects of will and feeling, where quality gets its own,[1] and where the conceptual is exhibited in intuition. On the side of the grounds of such an ideal, the unity would represent the identity of the sense with the understanding in an "intuitive understanding" whose methods of operation would be principles constitutive completely and without limitation, that is, principles not only of objectivity in general, but also *of the object* in the concrete.

In our own experience, according to Kant, the mathematical is an instance of the completely valid knowledge. This knowledge may therefore be taken as the type of all knowledge upon either of two conditions. The first of these is that knowledge as such, in so far as valid, is purely a matter of quantity, and the quantitative relation an adequate statement of its law. The second is that knowledge as such, and as including the quantitative, is uniquely qualitative, and capable of formulation in other than mathematical terms. Quantity, then, is a narrow abstraction.[2]

[1] Later, this question becomes that of the possibility of the identity of extensive and intensive quantity.

[2] It will turn out that quantity is a thought term, with reference only to the use of the intellect in laying plans; while quality (instead of being merely, as for Kant, intensive quantity with reference to the synthesis in space and time) is a knowledge term, with reference to thought as objectified, or to objects in their character of fitness for becoming centers of reference in experience. Or, briefly, quality refers to the significance of objects for knowledge.

It is the purpose to show that in the development of the mathematical ideal, Kant had in mind not the quantitative character of reality, but a character that is unique and qualitative, which we may call significance for knowledge. Upon this character rest Kant's faith in the ultimate rationality or knowability of the world, his postulation of the intelligible as beyond and above the sensible, and his doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason as the faculty through which objects are known without the instrumentality of the sense.

CHAPTER II

THE IDEALITY OF TIME AND SPACE AS THE SOURCE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONSTITUTIVE AND REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES

We have seen that the relation of the forms of time and space to the concepts of the understanding is the locus of the distinction between the constitutive and the regulative principles. It is therefore in connection with the Aesthetic that the discussion of that distinction should begin. It may seem that since time and space are called perceptions, and therefore regarded as inactive and as having no function but to await a content from sensation, there is no suggestion in the Aesthetic of any active faculty which might have constitutive force. Yet the mere fact of the separation of perception and its "given," from the faculties which are operative, is in itself significant while we are engaged in the search for the object of knowledge.

It is clear that sensation of itself does not give an object,[1] neither as a single sensation nor as a sum of sensations can it do this. For the particulars composing a sum can only be thought analytically and consecutively, and the sum as representing the particulars is only a mark which suggests their enumeration. Such a sum gives no clue to the qualitative character of the particulars, nor indeed do these characters enter into the sum. Qualities are independent of enumeration, they cannot be counted, but only the instances or times in which they occur. Or, at best only kinds of qualities can be enumerated, that is, abstracted from the concrete in the particulars. But these abstractions are no objects, since when they are found in experience they are recognized as mere instruments.

This does not mean that there may not be qualitative combinations, or syntheses; but only that so long as combination is numerical the result is no more than a symbol, or abstract representation of things, whereas to produce a new thing there must be qualification of qualities, or the fusion of qualities into a whole, which, as a whole, shows characters different from those of the elements. Besides the sense elements there are others which, instead of adding to the determinations of sense in such a way as to make the object at once intelligible, give rise to the

[1] A., p. 772; B., p. 800.

very question as to how the representations of sense can enter into the idea of the object at all. That is, the question arises out of the relation of the mathematical or space-time character of sensation to certain other representations of the objects, which have significance for consciousness, and are distinguishable from the sense characters, but yet are indubitable characters of the object. Such a supersensible character is, for Kant, objectivity itself.[1] Thus so far as the Aesthetic is concerned, no objects have as yet entered into the discussion.

If by the sum of sensations it is meant that the idea of the object is complex, and that there is a number of distinguishable characters in it, then there can be agreement; but agreement on the possibility of distinction is itself a suggestion toward a condition more promising of the concrete than mere aggregation. But the question is, What is the nature and the source of the complexity ?[2] Can the complexity be resolved ? and, if so, What does its resolution add to the explanations which we seek ? To say that the object is complex is merely to qualify the object yet further, that is to add to the complexity, unless in the statement there is the key to the solution of the complexity in terms of the sources and conditions under which the object exists and is known. In any case, the object does not come to us through sense, and it is Kant's recognition of this fact that calls for the investigations of the Analytic. So long as the forms of space and time are forms *of* intuition, that is, so long as they are the contentless receptacles of individual qualities or groups of qualities, furnished through sense, there is no going on toward the definition of the object. And while sensibility is regarded as a distinct compartment of mind which hands over a finished product, there is not only no contribution to the solution of the question of the consciousness of objects, but that question is ruled out as not of possible solution, since the relation between the two compartments of mind is declared irrational.

Thus it is not a satisfactory solution of the question of the consciousness of objects to say that one department of mind furnishes one part, another department another. For in this case the question is merely restated as that of the unity of mind. To say that the relation of representation obtains among different departments of mind does not make our theory of knowledge non-representational. It is true that in this form the question is somewhat more compactly put, but its discussion is attended with many difficulties, among which the chief is the tendency to subjectivism. But the difficulty which arises in connection

[1] A., p. 290; B., p. 346.

[2] *Prolegomena*, Mahaffy and Bernard's trans., p. 5.

with Kant follows upon the interpretation of the notion of time and space as forms of the intuition. Interpreted passively as forms of the sensibility which by the mere accident of their form mould sense content into stereotyped shapes and mechanically drop it into the hopper of the understanding, the forms of time and space render the question of the relation of consciousness to its object inexorably insoluble. But regarded not as forms *of* sensibility alone; but as forms or schemes of the understanding *for* the sensibility, thus including the sensibility within the same circle of purposes as the other faculties, where its relation to the rest is explicable in terms of a purpose in common with the rest, the question of the unity of mind is not so hopeless. In this sense, however sensuous the application of the time and space, they are categories[1] of the understanding, and they are different in character from the other categories only in that they have a more highly specialized function.

Thus the forms cannot hold out as mere forms, as merely "ideal." They are real "for experience"; and if experience is meant here to include possible experience, little more reality could be asked for them. The forms of time and space are realities, and are principles that are operative in the determination of objects.[2] In the merest intuition, therefore, there are activities tending toward the construction of objects since there can be no intuition except as it is "pure" or related to thought. At this point of the discussion the aim is merely to show the futility of the idea of a mechanical relation between sense and thought. That the forms of space and time must be regarded as of the same sort as the categories will get consideration later. But enough has been said to show that one result of the Copernican discovery is the necessity of the assumption that with regard to objects there must be principles whose operation is constructive, and that these principles must be operative in sense.

Kant takes the apparent duality[3] of the real and subjects it to a rigid examination, and he quite appropriately begins with the objective part of the situation.[4] The most general determining characters of the object are its geometrical or space-time determinations. The object in a common-sense view seems to be constituted of them; but since the object, when known, is known within a situation which is also character-

[1] A., pp. 85, 720; B., pp. 118, 748. See also Riehl, *Der philosophische Kriticismus*, Vol. I, pp. 350 ff.; for space and time as intuitions, p. 346.

[2] A., pp. 110, 120, 156, 224; B., pp. 195, 271.

[3] Cf. Watson, *Kant and His English Critics*, p. 314.

[4] Even if it must be admitted that his starting-point is psychological.

ized as other than objective, the question occurs, To which part of the situation do the space-time determinations belong? It might be that they belong by nature to the knowing or conscious part of the situation. Kant assumes the latter and sets about proving the ideality of space and time. It is worth while to notice that space and time are "ideal" only with regard to the objective character of reality; but since the objective part of the situation is irrefragably bound up with the conscious part; and since what belongs to the conscious part as having special reference to the objective is real, then space and time are real. They belong to mind as real, i.e., actual characters of mind; and they belong to mind as "ideal," i.e., as thought-of objects. But the ideality or reality of space and time is a distinction which has significance only when the dual character of reality is under consideration, that is, real and ideal are correlative opposites only after abstract dichotomizing of the reality situation, and would not appear if that situation were left intact or were not thought apart.[1] Thus in another sense they are ideal, in that their distinction arises only upon the conscious examination of the conditions under and within which consciousness itself "occurs," or appears in its opposition to the non-conscious "given." Space and time are not, then, real characters of a supposed world independent of its being known, but are such as appear in the act of knowing the world. They are real characters of the situation which we might call the world-being-known, and if we can identify this conception with the common-sense reality from which we started, we have them established as real characters of both the objective and the subjective.

Kant has recognized this real character of space and time as a universal character of reality in his definition of the object, in which the reality of the object is made necessarily conformable to the conditions of knowing.[2] This is true even of the thing-in-itself when that specter is defined negatively, since it is then that which does not conform to the conditions of knowing, and of which we can neither assert existence nor non-existence. Now if we call the event of knowing an object an experience, and the conditions under which such an event may occur a possible experience; and if we agree with Kant that "it is possible experience alone that can impart reality to our concepts";[3] then space and time as part of these conditions are real for experience, and as such are real for the whole situation. In fact, Kant's proof of the ideality of space and time is a proof of their reality for experience, since they are

[1] A., pp. 27, 28; B., pp. 43, 44. [2] A., p. 197; B., p. 242

[3] A., p. 489; cf. also pp. 28, 156; B., pp. 517, 44, 195.

of the conditions under which alone the experience of objects is possible. And the proof does not merely leave them real for experience, as if there were a wider sphere of reality where they do not have determining force; it establishes them in their right as formative factors[1] in the activity of consciousness to determine limits for what may and what may not be experienced.

The ideality of time and space has little significance in a scheme in which the subject and object are divorced. Nothing is contributed to their explanation when they are held as applying to either alone and without reference to the other. If they are regarded as forms of the mind, "as such," they merely restate the general question of construction, since they are emptied of any instruments of approach to the matter they are supposed to limit; if they are "objective," that is, characters of a reality independent of any relation to mind, the object which they determine is by their attribution to it cut off from all communication with mind, and what is declared as possibly unknowable is put out of the sphere where explanations can be demanded. As characters of either side alone, they can only show the subject and object staring blankly at each other across a hopeless void. An independent object cannot exist in space and time, since such an object is completely undetermined; nothing at all can be said of it, not even that it occupies or is in space or time, since these are characterizations which belong only to the object as known or as knowable; and as such the object is not independent. The attribute of independence closes the argument with regard to the object.

Space and time are determinations which arise and are valid only in the situation of an object being known. They cannot belong either to the object or to the knowing alone, since alone there is no object and no knowing. Nor are they attributes of a mystical relation assumed between the object and its being known. Space and time *are* that relation, and they vanish with the disappearance of either term of the relation. The "ultimate reality" is the object-being-known, and the being known is a determination of the object by space and time. This instance of determined existence is an experience, and it is of the whole situation that space and time are "real." The ideality of space and time, then, since it is proved by isolating the ideal element, is proved *real of the whole of a real situation* when the ideal is shown to be meaningless if out of relation to the objective element. The ideality argument is thus a device for proving their reality for experience, that is, for the "ultimate reality."

[1] Cf. O'Sullivan, *Old Criticism and New Pragmatism*, p. 12.

CHAPTER III

KANT'S CONCEPTION OF QUANTITY AS A CONSTITUTIVE PRINCIPLE

There is no question, for Kant, but that objects as phenomena may be given in intuition; the important matter is "how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity, that is, become conditions of the possibility of the knowledge of objects."[1] But when the object as given in intuition is regarded in its relations to the understanding, there arises the question of the complete sum of the conditions under which objects are adequately known, since an estimation of this relation is demanded by the idea of possible experience.[2] In so far as the idea of construction is concerned this is a quantitative relation, and its condition is, that all concepts be exhibited or constructed *in concreto* and yet *a priori* and still on a basis of pure intuition. This relation is found as fact in mathematical knowledge.[3]

If the concept of the object as constructed in pure intuition gives us an object, and if the pure intuition allows the predicate to be joined with the concept before all experience or individual perception,[4] then what is the difference between the pure intuition and the concept? We have here, as it seems, not advanced beyond the original assumption that in some cases (the mathematical) the concept of the understanding fits onto the sensuous experience by some kind of pre-established harmony. Kant's clearest statement of construction in intuition is made in the *Discipline of Pure Reason* where he discusses that question: "Philosophical knowledge is that which reason gains from *concepts;* mathematical, that which it gains from the *construction* of concepts. By constructing a concept I mean representing *a priori* the intuition corresponding to it. For the construction of a concept, therefore, a *non-empirical* intuition is required. . . . ."[5] Here the non-empirical intuition, as space and time, has the general validity of an object, since it represents the formal conditions according to which an act of thought must proceed. But these conditions as relations to an object are "nothing but the rendering necessary the connection of representations

[1] A., p. 89; B., p. 120.

[2] A., p. 88; B., p. 122.

[3] *Prolegomena*, sec. 6.

[4] *Ibid.*, sec. 7.

[5] A., p. 713; B., p. 741.

in a certain way, and subjecting them to a rule"; they receive their objective character "only because a certain order is necessary in the time relations of our representations."[1] It is clear that Kant is here making the pure intuition approach pretty near the "consciousness and its internal form time." It is an act that operates within a condition or limit, but it approaches that final act of distinction which discovers the object in general as the ground of the distinction between the possible and the impossible.[2]

It seems that it is assumed here that concepts meet objects directly, the consequences of which assumption Kant seeks to avoid by deciding that ultimately the relation of sense to thought is one of degree rather than one of kind.[3] But if knowledge is a constructive process and if thought works constitutively upon objects in knowing them, that knowledge must include and organize sense data, and that thought must be sensuous in an essential part of its nature. This Kant would always admit, since his final appeal is always to possible experience; and that possible experience is not a mere concept is shown in the statement that "all our knowledge relates, in the end, to possible intuitions, for it is by them alone that an object can be given."[4] As it is idle to talk about knowledge or consciousness except as the relation to objects is involved, so it is irrelevant to speak of thought except as it involves sensuous matter. "There is no intuition *a priori* except space and time, the mere forms of phenomena."[5] And while we remember that, for experience, the "mere" forms of space and time are as real as anything else, we see that for either mathematical or philosophical cognition (which latter results in knowledge analytically from concepts), they must be conceived in their ordinary experiential sense, and as such they relate to the object in its real character in perception, as Kant admits. "The matter of phenomena, however, by which *things* are given us in space and time, can be represented in perception only, that is, a posteriori."[6] Now if the object is to be constructed, since "only quantities can be constructed,"[7] the possibility must be considered whether there can be a

[1] A., p. 197; B., p. 242.

[2] A., p. 290; B., 346.

[3] Kant attempts to explain this relation through the use he makes of the concept of degree, when he makes degree the schema of quantity and defines it as the quantity of intensity in sensation. But since he would not allow of intensity being defined in empirical terms, the schema of degree is a purely conceptual matter, and the relation concept and sense is still untouched.

[4] A., p. 719; B., p. 747.

[5] A., p. 720; B., p. 748.

[6] A., p. 720; B., p. 748.

[7] A., p. 714; B., p. 742.

purely quantitative interpretation of quality and the data of space and time.

If construction is a matter of quantity, then an examination of the notion of quantity is required before we can proceed further. There must be some interrelation among the categories, either as a point of development or of mutual purposiveness with respect to the content to which they are supposed to apply. This interrelation is regarded by Kant as effected through the relation which each of the categories bears to time,[1] and as a mutual relationship through time it would seem a matter of development. This development, however, does not refer to the concepts as themselves forms, since a development of mere forms in time as contentless change can have no significance; but rather to the development of the degree of adequacy in the consciousness of the object, as that consciousness advances from the homogeneous in perception to generality and *Regelmaessigkeit* in the object.

For Kant there seems to be a pure form of quantity as such,[2] yet "with regard to quantity (*quantitas*) there are no axioms in the proper sense of the word."[3] That is, there can be no synthetic general propositions with regard to quantity as such, but only with regard to quantities (*quanta*). It is clear, however, that the concept of quantity is being regarded as in its relation to time, where its schema is given as number. As number, quantity relates to the internal sense, or to the form of the consciousness in general, and is quite a different thing from quantity considered in its relation to space. Construction in quantity with reference to space is a symbolical representation in the imagination of geometrical spaces, and as symbolical, may be given "ostensive" representation by its reduction to geometrical notation. It seems possible that construction of *quantitas* may be made symbolically, and through the symbols used, upon their interpretation, transition may be made to construction of *quanta*, where axioms may be formed with complete certainty. This symbolism is algebraic. "In mathematics however, we construct not only quantities (*quanta*) as in geometry, but also mere quantity (*quantitas*) as in algebra, where the quality of the object, which has to be thought according to this quantitative concept, is entirely ignored."[4]

The question is here, however, whether this symbolic construction and ostensive construction are not the same thing. That is, apart from the two notations, and considered as conscious procedure where

[1] A., p. 145; B., p. 184.
[2] A., p. 717; B., p. 745.
[3] A., p. 163; B., p. 204.
[4] A., p. 717; B., p. 745.

objects are involved, are not the geometrical and the algebraic methods the same? It is not easy to see the difference of conscious procedure in these two cases, although in the one case, as dealing with *quanta*, and thus having direct relations to objects in coexistence or succession in time, there is construction of the actual spatial objects of geometry; whereas in the other case, as dealing with *quantitas*, there is no object involved at all, since quantity as such, as having no relation to time, has no connection with those forms which provide the possibility of objects.

Thus it appears that the attempt to establish the notion of *quantitas* is itself sufficient to show that that notion has no significance out of relation to the other concepts; and when thought in relation to the other concepts, that of *quantitas* becomes *quanta*. It thus involves time and space, and, as will appear later, involves also quality with all its "moments." Quantity as a pure concept does not contribute much toward the explanation of the consciousness of objects. At least the "deduction" is not generally given credit for having accomplished its purpose of showing how the pure forms, as subjective conditions of the possibility of experience, can lead to the object in the concrete. And the "object in general" must have a stretched interpretation in which its generality vanishes before it can conform to the "objective"[1] conditions of the object in the concrete.

Kant's shift from *quantitas* to *quanta* is accomplished by the abandonment of the pure concept for its schema, so that when the concept is regarded as having direct reference to the real it appears as number.[2] Here is involved the notion of quantity as the synthesis of the homogeneous manifold, which presupposes, first, the subjective act of synthesis[3] in the successive addition of one to one; and second, the determination of real units as are given in sensation.[4] Within the conception of number there is involved the understanding with its pure thought product as act, and the sense representation as matter to be determined. "Number therefore is nothing but the unity of the synthesis of the manifold (repetition) of a homogeneous intuition in general, I myself producing the time in the apprehension of the intuition."[5]

Number must then be considered in its relations to time and space. In its relation to time as the internal sense, it is the act of comprehending the manifold of intuition under the law of their succession. It is not the image, in this sense, of a collection of objects, but rather represents

[1] A., p. 286; B., p. 342.
[2] A., p. 140; B., p. 179.
[3] A., p. 129.
[4] A., p. 168; B., p. 209.
[5] A., p. 143; B., p. 182.

the act by which a plurality of objects is regarded as a collection. "If, on the contrary, I think of a number in general, whether it be five or a hundred, this thinking is rather the representation of a method of representing in one image a certain quantity (for instance a thousand) according to a certain concept, than the image itself, which, in the case of a thousand, I could hardly take in and compare with the concept."[1] Succession belongs to the phenomena in time, but not to the law according to which these phenomena succeed one another. In the latter sense phenomena are regarded as to their relations in space, in which the order of succession may be reversed, and the phenomena considered as coexistent. But with regard to time itself as the law of the order among phenomena, it is the permanent. "Only through the permanent does *existence* in different parts of a series of time assume a *quantity* which we call *duration*. For in mere succession (succession as the rule and as abstracted from phenomena) existence always comes and goes, and never assumes the slightest quantity."[2] The time form here regarded as the internal sense, and as operative in numbering, is an aspect of the understanding, in that it serves as a faculty of rules to set limits among what may assume quantity. But for this active capacity there would never be a distinction of the homogeneous, since if there could be a consciousness at all it would be one entirely without change, and such a "consciousness" is empirically determined to be unconsciousness. So there can be no homogeneous without a homogeneous *manifold*, and no manifold without the act of synthesis determining limits within the homogeneous.

As an act of synthesis it is difficult to distinguish number from the time form itself. As the "condition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions,"[3] time is regarded as that which is *a priori* in the sensuous experience. And if we identify time as an *a priori* intuition and as a condition of experience, with the understanding as a lawgiver to nature,[4] we have as it seems a condition of the identification of the unities of apprehension and of apperception, and thus the possibility established for the construction of objects in time and space, the objects which constitute the corporeal world. This would also establish all principles in their right as constitutive principles, and decide the epistemological question in favor of construction.

There is, however, little comfort in mere possibilities. The possibility of the construction of nature might exist in the mind as a general

[1] A., p. 140; B., p. 179.
[2] A., p. 183; B., p. 226.
[3] A., p. 183; B., p. 226.
[4] A., p. 125.

rule according to which that construction must proceed if there is to be construction at all; still the question is not answered as to whether there is to be such construction. We may have to heed the realistic assertion that nature is "there" prior to any of our acts of construction, and as a condition through evolution of the existence of that possibility. But evolution as a law of development in time is a "predicable," or a derived concept arising out of the consideration of quantity in its relation to time. Evolution as a principle by no means provides for the reality of our mental constructions, but as a corollary to time it represents a particular direction in which our syntheses in time may move in distinguishing the law of succession from the act which prescribes the law to things in succession. Actual things in nature are not involved, hence evolution as a principle remains a category whose "schema" is yet to be discovered. There is, however, a means of securing reality for the constructions of our internal sense under the category of quantity, and this consists in the relation of quantity, as involving the internal time sense, to the space form.[1] But before leaving time quantity we have to consider it as extensive.

It simplifies matters much if we state at the beginning that by quantity Kant means extensive quantity. His statements about extensive quantity therefore give us our idea of what he means by quantity. His formal definition, however, is hardly characteristic of his general attitude to the matter. "I call an extensive quantity that in which the representation of the whole is rendered possible by the representation of its parts, and therefore necessarily preceded by it."[2] That is, every synthesis of the homogeneous in intuition, considered as represented to the time consciousness, is an extensive quantity; but it is not clear that the character of extensiveness distinguishes that synthesis from any other, if every phenomenon as object is known only in a synthesis. And the possibility of an object is just what makes a synthesis of the homogeneous a quantity. There would be no consciousness at all, since there would be no object, in a homogeneous given as completely undifferentiated or unlimited, because there would be here no evidence of the presence of the activity of the understanding; but if there were not present a distinguishing act, the homogeneous would appear, if at all, as the mere "given" to receptivity, which does not constitute a consciousness. This kind of given would have no quantity; there would be no object and hence no consciousness. Quantity appears here as the condition of the object, and as such condition, is also a con-

[1] A., p. 165; B., p. 206.

[2] A., p. 162; B., p. 203.

dition of consciousness itself.[1] But phenomena as *extensive* quantities, considered as syntheses in the internal time-intuition, can be known only in the bare possibility, that is, only as a limitation of the time synthesis itself. It is nothing more than the successive pulse and pause of counting where the homogeneous unities are quite unqualified or unlimited, so there is no reality for this synthesis. Evolution is valid as a principle here, if we are considering it in its philosophical aspects, but not in its objective or scientific application. When employed in the latter way, evolution as a philosophical principle is forgotten entirely, that is, as a method of pure synthesis in time, it cannot be used as an organizing principle. The application of the principle in science involves the modification of the time synthesis by the application to it of the space-intuition. But of the pure time quantity, since it is itself no object of perception, "I can only think it in the successive progress from one moment to another, thus producing in the end, by all portions of time and their addition, a definite quantity of time."[2] But a definite quantity of time, or simply time under the conception of quantity, is duration; and duration as measured time, since time cannot be perceived, can be known to the consciousness only through appeal to outer space perception.

Definite quantity of itself cannot thus in any of its aspects give axioms, since as defined, its application is restricted to particulars; and while propositions resulting from it are self-evident and synthetical, they are not general as is required of axioms. They can be therefore only numerical formulas. In these "the synthesis can take place in one way only, although afterward the *use* of these numbers becomes general."[3] The synthesis of two numbers, as affected in the one way only, results in the synthetical proposition. But when the characters are used as symbols merely, when their use becomes general, the proposition formed is either analytical or a contentless memory symbol for an established habit. But as a time synthesis the proposition is singular only. The construction in imagination is defined with reference to quantity, but the construction itself determines a particular quantity,

[1] B., p. 203: "Now the consciousness of the manifold and homogeneous in intuition, so far as by it the representation of an object is first rendered possible, is the concept of quantity (*quantum*). Therefore even the perception as a phenomenon is possible only through the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the given sensuous intuition, by which the unity of the composition of the manifold and homogeneous is conceived in the concept of *quantity;* that is, phenomena are always quantities, and *extensive quantities;* because as intuitions in space and time, they must be represented through the time synthesis through which space and time in general are determined."

[2] A., p. 163; B., p. 203.

[3] A., p. 164; B., p. 205.

hence the statement of that construction cannot be an axiom. If it could be generalized in construction also, and not merely in use, the proposition would be an axiom with universal application, whereas as particular, it is only a numerical formula. As generalized in construction a quantity represents the "mere function of productive imagination,"[1] and its statement defines the conditions[2] under which an object is possible in more than one way in that it involves space as well as time.

Generalizing quantitative statements involves more than the time-quantity consciousness. The mere function of productive imagination, if it is a valid consciousness at all, must square with the empirical consciousness in other matters than time, if it becomes possible to make pure mathematics in their full precision applicable to objects of experience. The successive progress from moment to moment has a condition, which, as already remarked, is to be found in the relation of quantity to space. It is true that if the object can be defined as a rule of synthesis of the understanding, and that synthesis could be identified with the time-quantity consciousness, then mathematical propositions, even numerical formulas, would be in their full precision applicable to objects of experience, and any statement of quantity would be an *a priori* synthetic judgment. But it must be remembered that the object is decidedly too complex a representation to allow of such procedure. The object involves not only time-quantity, but also space-quantity; and it is the latter which renders the former possible to representation. That is, space is the schema of time, just as time succession as number is the schema of quantity.

By referring to space and time as schemata I mean to insist on their conceptual character. It has been shown that the concept of quantity taken in the abstract acquires significance only when regarded, as Kant insists, as a synthesis of the homogeneous. But the very idea of a synthesis, as also that of homogeneous unities, implies number as the form in which the synthesis occurs. And number, again, involves time as the form under which a plurality of unities is synthesized in the inner sense. But a synthesis in time in itself gives no guarantee of the reality of the process, since it affords no generality for judgments expressing that synthesis, which are merely numerical formulas. It thus permits the conceptual representation of phenomena in their succession only. But since the sensuous representation of phenomena provides for their synthesis in coexistence, and as parts external to each other, the category of quantity must be further schematized through the representation

[1] A., p. 164; B., p. 205. [2] A., p. 142; B., p. 182.

of space. And this is what was meant when it was said that space is the schema of the time-schematized category of quantity. Thus, after all Kant's insistence that the schema is not the image, it seems that the image of objects in space is necessary to the application of the category of quantity.

That a spatial representation is necessary to the pure time determination is evidenced in many of Kant's statements. "And exactly because this internal intuition supplies no shape, we try to make good this deficiency by means of analogies, and represent to ourselves the succession of time by a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series of one dimension only; and we conclude from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with one exception, i.e., the parts of the former are simultaneous, those of the latter successive."[1] But since succession is the *essential* property of time, such a representation in a synthesis whose parts are simultaneous does not make an analogy likely to be helpful. The analogy still leaves the distinctive character of space and time incommensurable, unless these characters can find a common ground in a deeper unity. This deeper unity is found in the permanent; for, "without something permanent therefore no relation of time is possible."[2] This assures to existence a quantity because of which it does not "come and go." But existence which does not come and go and which therefore has a quantity, has a character which makes it determinable (in thought at least) independent of time, and which forms the ground of time itself (as succession). This character is the synthesis of the object in space. "Though both are phenomena, yet the phenomena of the external sense have something permanent, which suggests a substratum of varying determinations, and consequently a synthetical concept, namely, space; while time, the only form of our internal intuition, has nothing permanent, and makes us to know the change of determinations only, but not for the determinable object."[3] Thus in so far as time quantity is concerned our constructions are of our own internal consciousness, and might very well go on independent of any reference beyond that consciousness. Such a construction, however, would be entirely without basis, since a remembered point in the process could not occur as an element in a new construction, because such a reference backward would give the memory product a *place*. That is, elements would be conceived as coexistent *and* simultaneous, and simultaneity is meaningless except as objects are conceived

[1] A., p. 33; B., p. 50.

[2] A., p. 183; B., p. 226.

[3] A., p. 381.

as external to each other. That is, two pulses of time which are felt as two, though conceived as simultaneous, are equivalent to two objects occupying different places; and when the pulsation is labelled two, that is, when there is a distinction, there is the appearance of "transcendental reflection" which assigns a "place" in time.

The sum of all these considerations is that when mere enumeration is further distinguished, the consciousness involved is more than that of time-quantity; or, when there is a limitation imposed on the time process, this limitation becomes a rule of synthesis and implies an object in space. Hence the conception of the permanent in time implies space; and even though this permanent may be defined in subjective terms as the rule of the synthesis of the homogeneous, it is as such even the limitation to the time flow, and what limits the time flow cannot be itself unless it is to be identified with the whole of consciousness as will. What limits time must be what is itself not mere time, but the result of a characterization within consciousness other than mere succession. "For the purpose of presenting to the conception of substance something permanent in intuition corresponding thereto, and thus of demonstrating the objective reality of this conception, we require an intuition (of matter) in space, because space alone is permanent, and determines things as such, while time, and with it all that is in the internal sense, is in a state of continual flow."[1]

That a spatial determination is necessary to the representation of time quantity is shown in the many instances in which Kant constructs the line in imagination. "We cannot represent time, which is not an object of external intuition, in any other way than under the image of a line, which we draw in thought, a mode of representation without which we could not cognize the unity of its dimension, and also we are necessitated to take our determinations of periods of time, or of points of time, for all our internal perceptions from the changes which we perceive in outward things. It follows that we must arrange the determinations of the internal sense, as phenomena in time, exactly in the same manner as we arrange those of the external senses in space."[2] And that this mode of representation is necessary, in Kant's view, for the idea of quantity in all of its aspects is seen from this statement: "It can easily be shown that the possibility of things as quantities, and, therefore, the objective reality of the category of quantity, can be represented only in the external intuition, and only through its medium be applied to the inner sense also."[3]

[1] B., p. 391. [2] B., p. 156. [3] B., p. 293.

CHAPTER IV

INTENSIVE QUANTITY AS A CONSTITUTIVE PRINCIPLE

In so far as quantity is regarded as the abstract synthesis of the homogeneous manifold, it may be said that there is a consciousness which can be regarded as quantity as such. In this case it is the idea of a unity within an undifferentiated mass of representations which may be either of the internal or of the external sense. No character of the representations is involved in the unity except the formal one of their fitness to be conceived as elements of the same consciousness. But this formal character is a "pure" construction, since it represents only the mode of activity in which the representations are received together. There can be no question that there is construction here, since nothing else is intended by the act which receives representations; but the question which must arise is, Just where does the object get determination? If the object is defined as the rule of the synthesis, there is no difficulty in understanding its construction by the mind; and, further the object has universal validity for the human mind, since the object is nothing else than that constitution which makes a mind a mind.

So long as quantity is the object of our constructions the question of the relations of the forms of sense to the forms of the understanding stands open, and our epistemology is representational. The object cannot be formed out of material defined by limitation from the object. Nor can any synthesis of abstractions represent the object of experience, much less construct it. Quantity must itself have a quantity or be a *quantum;* that is, it must be definitely limited, and this limitation, for experience, gives it a quality. Quantities are, for the understanding, homogeneous, and the character of the knowledge involved is not affected by the difference of the *quanta* considered; that is, the knowledge value of *quanta* by its incorporation in the body of knowledge extends that body in one direction only. But this body of knowledge thus extended is not more inclusive of the real in experience than before its extension.

So far we have considered quantity as extensive merely, and this is the meaning employed by Kant when he defines quantity as the synthesis of the homogeneous. It is a formal principle, and pertains only to such determinations of the object of experience as may be considered

external. As such it fulfils the requirements of a constitutive principle when constitution is subject to the limits imposed by the idea of possible experience. But the formulation of *a priori* possibilities, while it may construct the object of experience in one more or less unimportant aspect, still leaves that object unrecognizable as a concrete event in the experience of ordinary life. The concept which represents the law of the construction of objects of experience must include more than the mechanical aggregation of the characters most remote from what is concrete in experience; and to do so, must consider not only the abstractly homogeneous manifold as extensive quantity, but must ask what it is in the manifold that makes a manifold of the homogeneous, or that transforms the homogeneous from a congealed and dead substratum into a living manifold of interacting individuals. If quantity is to be made the principle whereby objects of experience are to be constructed, it must become limited quantity, or quantity having some definite connection with the real in experience. This connection is made, for Kant, through the only character of the real that is known *a priori*,[1] viz., intensive quantity or degree. We here are dealing with a conception much more promising than that of extensive quantity, since in speaking of degree Kant has reference to the significance of the real in experience, and not merely to the subjective mode of the mind as receptive. And while this second of the mathematical principles is defined abstractly, as if to confine it to the subjective realm where only possibilities are to be considered, yet the principle gets a concrete significance in the application that is made of it.

Extensive quantity is called a constitutive principle because through it the mind marks out *a priori* certain characters of the real, if, in the particular direction in which the mind is working at a given time, there is to be any real. It thus sets the limits under which an experience of the real is possible. But these limits may be determined, and corresponding characters of the real may be suggested, without there ever being an instance of reality present.[2]

In the same way intensive quantity, or the degree of the real in experience, has an *a priori* formulation in terms of the possibility of experience, and this formulation may be conceived as a law in advance of the experience of the reality to which the law applies, and in which it as a law is discovered. That is, degree may occupy consciousness as a law even while there is no reality present which has a degree. As such, it is the "principle which anticipates all perceptions as such."[3] It is

[1] A., p. 176; B., p. 218. [2] A., p. 199; B., p. 244. [3] A., p. 166.

here to be asked in what sense the real as the matter of sensation can be represented in the mind independent of and in advance of its particular occurrences. The question is not asked from the point of view of genetic psychology. Nor is it, for Kant, asking whether a sensation can be felt when there is no sensation; but it is rather, in his mind, a consideration of whether sensation has any characters, conceptual or other, which may have a knowledge significance in the absence of the feeling through which the sensation is known. If there be such characters, then it can be said that if there is to be sensation, or whenever there is sensation, it will conform to certain conditions as laws. If there are these laws and they can be discovered, then sensation as a consciousness can be regarded, in so far at least, as of the same nature as the conceptual elements of mind. Kant insists that there is to be found an *a priori* character of sensation.[1] This character which is known *a priori* in sensation is expressed in the mathematical principle that the real in sensation has a degree.

It is no part of the present purpose to show the various relations which the concept of quality has to the other categories in the system of Kant. That all the categories are bound together through their common schema time, has already been shown (chap. iii). Nor is it the purpose to show that the three conceptions, reality, negation, limitation, are necessary to the understanding of the reality which is present in sensation. In fact, the consideration of these forms is likely to lead to a conceptualization of sensation, and to neglect of the concrete real events in which sensation is experienced. Apart from this abstract scheme we may attempt to find from Kant's statements what he means by the intensive quality of reality, or its degree as experienced in sensation. Such a statement is found in the *Anticipations of Perception* (1st ed.). In this statement sensation involves "a continuous connection between reality in phenomena and negation"; and "fills no more than one moment"; and in a later statement,[2] "phenomena as objects of perception, contain the real of sensation, as a representation merely subjective, which gives us merely the consciousness that the subject is affected. . . . ." In this description of quality as schematized by degree there are three points to which I shall give attention. First, there is the notion of degree as a conceptual mean in the series limited by zero and infinity. Second, there is the notion of the consciousness of a degree of reality as represented in a single moment. And third, the notion of degree as represented in sensation

[1] A., p. 167; B., p. 209. [2] B., p. 207.

considered as a subjective fact. I take up these points in the order named.

Degree has reference to the consciousness of reality as occupying a mean position between zero and the absolute reality as the other limit to the series. If we put it in spatial terms the zero position is empty space and the opposite limit is the absolutely filled space. But the former can never be known, since the absence of reality in an intuition is the absence of the means by which that intuition becomes a consciousness. And since to become known there must be a degree greater than zero, it follows "that no perception, and therefore no experience, is possible, that could prove, directly or indirectly, by any roundabout syllogisms, a complete absence of all reality in a phenomenon."[1] It is clear also that there is no consciousness of the absolute reality, except as an ideal of feeling, or as a pure construction of the intellect which can never become objectified as knowledge. Since knowledge disappears at either limit of the series, and since in this case nothing but abstractions remain, we are as far as possible from the real of actual felt sensation where intensive quantity is supposed to apply. As a relation between terms of a series of possible sensations, degree, as representing the rule of synthesis of the homogeneous, has a significance which can be estimated. Degree in this sense represents a unity.[2]

If degree must be regarded as a rule of synthesis there is difficulty in understanding how we can claim objective validity for our judgments of the intensity of phenomena. Defining the object as a rule of synthesis gives us no doubt the object as phenomenon, or as the result of our construction upon the basis of perception, but this does not show how the object may be given us in perception, which it is the business of intensive quantity to do. The rule of synthesis is not found in the phenomena but in the result of our conceptual activity upon sense data. And it is just the purpose in the appeal to degree to show that our *a priori* rule is identical with a character of phenomena as they stand in series. It is here that the subjective consciousness is represented as standing to the phenomena "in nature" as cause to effect, when we must look at the intensities of phenomena as present in space and time as being the result of a "synthesis of the production of the quantity of a sensation from its commencement—that is, from the pure intuition = 0 onwards, up to a certain quantity of sensation."[3] It is the rule of synthesis as active which gives our acquaintance with phenomena, and as

[1] A., p. 172; B., p. 214.

[2] A., p. 168; B., p. 210.

[3] B., p. 208.

we can look upon that rule as quantitative (intensively and without regard to the aggregate in space and time), our experience of phenomena may through their difference in degree be subjected to the mathematical statement.[1] In fact it is the conception of an intensity of a phenomenon which renders a phenomenon possible to consciousness as a synthesis in coalition; while it is a break in the synthesis, or a "repetition of a synthesis (beginning and) ending at every moment" which gives us the consciousness of an aggregate of many phenomena.[2] Thus intensive quantity gives us a "much," while extensive quantity gives a "many."

Intensive quantity as a rule of synthesis within phenomena regarded as arranged serially, involves causation, which, as we shall see in the following chapter, is not a mathematical, and therefore not a constitutive principle. In neither case is the immediate real of sensation represented in consciousness directly, but only through a conceptualized symbolism, which is clearly representational.

As a "moment," sensation is not a synthesis of parts and is without extensive quantity. It is not quite clear in what sense the "moment" is to be taken, since, if it is to be used in the sense of a temporal limit, then the consciousness of degree cannot be a synthesis; and if taken not in a temporal sense but as a synthesis, then degree becomes extensive quantity. I pass for the present the rigid either–or which represents intensive quantity and extensive quantity as entirely unrelated. I consider here the moment of sensation in its relation to both.

The moment of sensation would seem to be the consciousness of a term of a series out of relation to other terms, a cross-section, as it were, of a series at a given point. Besides the objection that such a view is impossible because terms vanish when taken apart from their relations, there is the further one that no synthesis (and for Kant therefore no consciousness) is possible, since the point of cross-section is a limit, which can never be compounded into time.[3] The moment could not therefore be a continuous quantity, since it could have no relation to time.

The moment as extensive quantity would represent a synthesis in space and time, and as such is open to all the objections which have been raised to extensive quantity, the most conclusive of which is that quantity as extensive, although it determines the object as external, does so with such a vengeance that the object is not directly related to consciousness, and that relation can only be representational. It is therefore clear that

[1] A., p. 178; B., p. 221.

[2] A., p. 170; B., p. 211.

[3] A., p. 170; B., p. 211.

in sensation intensive quantity cannot be separated from extensive quantity, without losing, in the one case, all matter of sensation and with it all reality; and in the other, without losing the formal or space-and-time character of sense, and with it the conscious determination of the object. If the matter of sense is neglected, and the synthesis directed to the forms of space and time, we have the object as mere extensive quantity. If the synthesis is directed to the matter of sense to the neglect of the form, then the object is the immediate of intensive quantity. In this case the question of the relation of consciousness to its object could not arise. But the fact that it does arise is sufficient evidence that intensive quantity and extensive quantity cannot be separated.

It is hardly worth while here to discuss sensation as a subjective fact, since a merely subjective fact offers little help in the search for an object which is not a purely formal one. Still, the purely subjective elements lead, for Kant, to the determination of the object in that they point to its synthesis by conforming to a rule. But given a number of intensities in which a rule is at work and there is a synthesis in time *and* space. This would not, therefore, correspond to the moment of sensation, but would be an extensive quantity.

Thus the notion of intensive quantity as subjective fact is found to be meaningless except as it involves the synthesis in time and space and therefore extensive quantity. Intensive quantity and extensive quantity, or quality and quantity, cannot be separated in the investigation which is to result in the description of that consciousness which accomplishes the determination of the object. Quality, as schematized by degree and represented as the law operative between infinite limits, implies causation. Quality with no limits imposed upon it cannot thus be a constitutive principle; in this case the principle constitutes too much. As the moment of sensation, quality constructs a non-quantitative world, or a world of unlimited manifoldness. It is the world of the many, where there is no hint of law or rule. It thus shows the necessity of the conception of a community of the real and of the interrelatedness of all experience. As subjective, quality neglects that aspect of experience which suggests to us the necessity of the quantitative or mathematical formulation of experience which constitutes our world of science as such.

CHAPTER V

THE REGULATIVE PRINCIPLES

It has appeared that the concept of quantity as a synthesis of the homogeneous manifold has no objective significance except as it involves substance as the permanent real. And this substance has been shown to require an interpretation in terms of the real in perceptual space. As such it is the ground of causality, and carries us at once out of the sphere of constitutive principles, if constitutive principles must be mathematical, into the sphere where principles are "merely" regulative. In the same way, intensive quantity, or quality, in that it gives us only the conception of a multitude among which different grades or degrees of the real may be distinguished, suggests the question of the principle upon which the object may be constructed within the qualitatively differentiated manifold. This principle, when found, must show its applicability through its capacity to combine these different degrees, if degree is to become intelligible. For, degree implies difference; there could be no meaning for the notion of degree as applied to a homogeneous. Hence, before there can be degrees there must be a relation established among the homogeneous, which recognizes or establishes differences. A degree is quantity *of difference*. Now this principle, if we are to appeal always to the possibility of experience, is that upon which we depend when we assert that a particular experience is possible, namely, causation. When we take the concept of the possibility of experience in its ordinary experiential sense, that is, as applying merely to the matter in hand, as, e.g., a particular problem in science, we say that a given experience is possible because observed relations demand that that experience be realized when the given conditions are fulfilled. It is possibility which is predictable upon analogical construction and is a possibility only in the sense that the given conditions are not yet fulfilled. When the conditions are fulfilled, the possibility has passed, and its place is taken by "fact."

But the possibility of experience may be expressed in terms of the sum of the conditions without reference to the result which is to follow upon their fulfilment. In this case the conditions represent factual events of the present, and we say that we see the principle involved in the present situation. Or the conditions may be conceived merely, so

that we can say that *whenever* such and such conditions are present, then such or such an event will follow. We are here thinking of results in terms of causation, and are uniting a cause with its effect. But we may regard a set of conceived conditions in the point of the relations which determine their capacity to issue in a given event. Here we have universalized a situation and we express its causal capacity in a statement which we call a principle.

A serious mistake is easily made here, however, and it can be shown, I think, that Kant falls into error on this point. When we have the conceived complex of conditions expressed in the form of a principle, we say that our principle brings about or produces a given result. It is as if we said that first here is our principle as an active agent ready to spring forth at our call and present us with a brand new event, so that after the event has taken place we can count two existences, whereas before there was but one. But, instead, what we really have is a set of conditions which, upon our change of purpose or point of view, is an event which we consider a result. What is produced is our new purpose, and there has been no addition to "nature," no new "event" has occurred. Nature has no results; an event in nature follows another event, and if it does so uniformly with respect to our interests or purposes, we designate it a result, but then only in relation to the preceding event. The only change in the situation is that what we formerly knew as a complex of conditions, we have synthesized into a unified principle expressing our purpose, and now know the same as an event we call a result.

A sequence implies an extended time or a lapse of time; so that events described under that notion are conceived as disparate, as having individual "places" in time. Under the notion of sequence we are thinking of the progress of the lapse or the passing of a given duration, and its extensity is its only character for us. But when I speak of uniformity of sequence, I have turned from the consideration of a quality of time itself to that of the nature which objects must have in order to become terms in a sequence, that is, to the qualities of objects which make them sequents. So the uniformity of sequence is independent of time, is rather a character of objects, and is singular or unitary and not numerically quantitative. There is no "production," since there is no objective justification for duality of cause and effect or activity and result. There is only a situation conceived as a whole, a "concept," which, as generalized, is a principle.

Kant's mistake here is in abandoning the "causality of the cause" as uniformity of sequence for the ancient superstition of the efficient

cause. But what we are concerned in here is to point out that uniformity of sequence when properly understood is the unitary ground which, for Kant, connects causality through substance with quantity, or that gives a causal significance to the synthesis of the homogeneous when considered in extensity. Thus substance is a conceived ground for causality, and its idea would never arise if the necessity of causality were never questioned. It means nothing more than the unity or uniformity of the causal relation.

Causality is, then, the basic principle in the doctrine of quantity. While quantity as such, or extensive quantity, is under consideration, the consciousness involved is that of the synthesis in time. The operation of the synthesis is therefore serial and linear, or of only one dimension. It is in this case that a purely temporal or arithmetical mathematics applies with its synthetic numerical formulas. But in this synthesis we are only computing or calculating experience. Our progress is rapid and satisfactory so long as we are dealing with constants in direction, so long as our serial advance does not turn upon itself or is not opposed by series of different directions. But experience is a field and not a line.[1] To carry out the figure, let two quantitative experiential series intersect. At their point of intersection there is an event which has a place in both series, and its numerically computed place is or may be different in each. At the same time this event has two determinations, or two events occupy the same time or, one event occupies two simultaneous "times." Now we have seen that simultaneity or coexistence in time is equivalent to coexistence in space; or that the complete consciousness of two objects in one time involves the spatial determination of those objects. When the object or the real is determined in the time series, the quantitative direction of the synthesis is no longer significant, since it must share its determining capacity with a complex of directions. Quantity is only one of the determinants of objects. In other words, an event determined as other than a point of time becomes a nucleus of a myriad of relations. And since direction, or the temporal flow, does not comprise the whole significance, the purport of an event may be considered as extending

[1] Kant's *Dissertation*, sec. 14, note: "Though time is of one dimension, yet the *ubiquity* of time (if I may use an expression of Newton's), by which all things sensible are *somewhere*, adds to the quantity of real things another dimension, in so far as they, as it were, hang upon one moment of time. For if you picture time as a line in infinitum, and coexistents by lines applied at right angles in any point of time, the superficies which is thus generated will represent *the Mundus Phaenomenon* both in its substance and its accidents" (Caird's trans.).

to this *or that* other term. That is, the "productive" influence of events in experience is mutual, they mutually produce and support each other, their relations are reciprocal.

It is evident, then, that the second of the constitutive principles, which has been discussed as intensive quantity, appeals to causality and its ground in the permanent substance[1] through the category of community. We have therefore to leave the idea of the construction of objects in experience, in so far as that construction is of possibilities only, and turn from the constitutive principles to the regulative principles of causality and reciprocity, which are shown to be involved in the idea of construction. After Kant's notions of causality and of reciprocity have been examined, it can be shown, I think, that the distinction between constitutive and regulative principles is merely formal, and that any principle that is really operative in experience proceeds in both a constitutive and a regulative way.

In taking up the examination of causality, I do not undertake to show its formal relation, through its "deduction," to the other concepts. That it has a relation to the temporal "inner" experience as schematized by Kant as quantity, and to "objectified" or outer experience as represented by quality (which, however, has more knowledge significance than is expressed in intensive quantity), has already been shown. It will be sufficient for our purposes to take up the idea of causality as the rule of synthesis.

It is evident that the succession of our subjective representations does not necessarily correspond to the succession of the manifold of an object. If they did so correspond, consciousness would pronounce immediately upon the object, or the object would be merely the consciousness of the subjective succession. But "the phenomenon, in contradistinction to the representations of our apprehension, can only be represented as the object different from them, if it is subject to a rule distinguishing it from every other apprehension, and necessitating a certain kind of conjunction of the manifold. That which in the phenomenon contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is *the object.*"[2] Thus the succession of representations is under some sort of necessity, otherwise the play of fancy would operate upon nature as a free cause. But it is just as our fancy is free that we determine some

[1] A., p. 187; B., p. 230: "Hence a place has been assigned to this category (substance) under the title of relation, not so much because it contains itself a relation, as because it contains their condition."

[2] A., p. 191; B., p. 236.

subjective successions as having no objective reference. It is the case where there is no constraint upon the internal succession which sets the problem of objectivity. For, "our thought of the reference of knowledge to its object carries with it something of necessity; for the object is regarded as that which hinders the elements of our knowledge of it from coming upon us pell mell and at haphazard, and causes them to be determined *a priori* in certain ways. For, just in so far as our ideas are to refer to an object, they must necessarily agree with each other in reference to it, i.e., they must have that unity which constitutes the conception of an object."[1] Agreement among our ideas however, does not account for constraint upon the way in which they agree, or does not show the object as different in any way from the complex of ideas, unless we are to be satisfied in saying that the object is nothing more than the abstract representation of the relations among ideas. But such a realistic demand would call for a determination of the object as external to experience, in which case the fundamental question of the reference of thought to objects could not arise. In some sense the relations among ideas must give us the object. While we do distinguish the subjective succession from something which we call the object, yet this distinction must be accounted for through a rule which identifies the elements distinguished. Thus, "we take that which lies in our successive apprehension to be mere ideas, while we regard the phenomenon which is given to us through them as the object of these ideas, with which the conception we draw from the ideas of apprehension is required to agree: though in truth the object in question is nothing but those very ideas as a complex unity."[2]

That we have objects in our experience is due to the fact that we apprehend a succession of representations as a unity. But this succession involves breadth, as we shall see later. Our consciousness of any term in the succession is not complete in itself; rather, the consciousness of a single element is impossible if we are to have experience. Thus a given term would not be a sequent except as it is conceived as following upon another, since its place in time could not be established except in relation to another of its kind. A term cannot be "placed" with reference to time itself, since the latter cannot be perceived. Nor can the term be related to empty time, for this would involve its creation, and the creative cause is not allowed under the idea of causation as uniformity of sequence in time.[3] The unity of a complex of ideas means, then,

[1] A., p. 104.

[2] A., p. 291; B., p. 236.

[3] A., p. 206; B., p. 251.

simply that ideas are ideas only in complexes, for otherwise there is no possibility of experience. Now, for Kant, there can be no sequence of unrelated terms. This would be a consciousness of pure quantity under the sole condition of time, and as schematized as number, would be merely the computation of empty times as in counting. But times have to be filled before their enumeration has any consequence for knowledge, as was shown by the fact that Kant had to appeal to the real in space in order to make the quantity consciousness constitutive. The counting of empty times is mere fancy, a figment of the brain; an attempt to grind with the conscious mill when there is nothing in the hopper. Some sort of connection is needed.

But does the necessity of *a* relation make the relation, when found, one of necessity? If we have to answer this question affirmatively, the conception of causation as uniformity of sequence in time will have to be modified. The necessity of a relation between the *b* of the present moment and the *a* of the immediately previous, cannot be understood in terms of the *times* in which they occur, nor in terms of the inner consciousness whose form is time, but can be understood only when the objective character is added to the consciousness in terms of coexistence. The *a* and the *b*, when there is question of the reality concerned, are simultaneous, that is, they are capable of a relation which does not involve any quantity of time at all. So far as the objective aspect of the situation is concerned, the whole situation occupies a point of time, which cannot be compounded into time. The *ab* situation stands in a line at right angles to the direction of the time flow, and the time flow is significant only in that it leads to the "place" of that situation. It is, then, their simultaneity in time *and* their coexistence in space which provides the objective character for terms of a sequence. And this is what was meant when it was said above that quantity appeals through substance to causation, when there is question of the constitution of the object of knowledge. Thus, "it is impossible for anyone by mere thinking, without an example, to comprehend how, out of a given state of a thing, an opposite state of the same thing should follow; nay, he cannot attach any meaning to such an idea without a perception. And the perception required is that of the motion of a point in space, the existence of which in different places (as a consequence of opposite determinations) alone makes it possible for us to realize change to ourselves. For, in order subsequently to make even inner change intelligible to ourselves, we need to figure time, as the form of inner sense, by a line, and the inner change by the drawing of this line (motion): thus using exter-

nal perception as a means to the understanding of our own successive existence in different states. And the reason of this is, that all change presupposes in the perception of it something permanent ere it can be perceived as change, but that in inner sense no permanent perception can be found."[1]

This reference of the objective to space is not to be taken in a realistic sense. For change in space (motion), as a knowledge element, is determined, for Kant, in exactly the same way as the inner or temporal succession within the object. The significance of the spatial reference here is that, for the determination of the concrete object in experience, the whole sum of the conditions under which an experience is possible is required to be employed. That sum of conditions as involved thus far includes space, time, and causation, with the ground of the latter in the permanent. These we have examined, but it yet remains to be shown how causation must be further modified in order that it may operate as a condition of experience when the latter is regarded in its full import.

What has been established thus far, for Kant, is that if there are to be objects in experience, there must be relations of necessity[2] among those objects, and that these by their nature exercise a constraint upon the way in which representations are united in consciousness. This way of representation is a rule of synthesis, and our consciousness of this rule is our guarantee that our thought embodies the real and that we are not dreaming.

While causality is regarded in its temporal relations only, it must lead to such a view as regards experience in a linear way, or as if it were of only one dimension.[3] This empties time of any objective character and leaves our conscious constructions "subjective" in the sense that there is no "place" where those constructions should issue, and thus renders the process inconsequential. It represents just such a conception as the continuity of time, when time is regarded as "an infinite given whole." It is the homogeneous which is not yet a manifold; that is, there are no "places" with individuality sufficient to give rise to the concept of a relation, and so long as there are no differences where relations may obtain, the idea of a cause cannot arise. Here it might

[1] B., p. 292.

[2] Whether this necessity is one of fact or one of act does not matter here. Hume is answered in any case.

[3] This point is made by O'Sullivan, *Old Criticism and New Pragmatism*, p. 232, where Kant's view is called a "streak" view of causality. I point out, however, that the deficiency of causality is made good by regarding reciprocity as merely a part of that conception.

be said that time is ideal in the sense that it is a ground of conceived differences, and it would have significance in that by it the homogeneity is broken up into perceptual atoms, thus providing a reason for the question of the structure of experience. But such abstractions must be left behind if we are to give to causality any experiential signification. More than time, whether ideal or real, must be involved before there is approach to the concrete object, and we may attempt to point out some relations which are non-temporal but which are yet instrumental through causality in determining the object. These relations may be found as characters involved in causality itself. And as causality is regarded as a regulative principle, that is, as operative *within* experience rather than *upon* experience, it will be necessary to find the characters of causality as attributes of experience itself.

If we follow Kant in "drawing a line" to represent our conscious values, we may carry further our figure of the "field" or the "sphere" of experience. It may be true that the ultimate limit to which we can carry analysis is the pure time sequence which we conceive of as of only one dimension. But our limit is in this case ultra-experiential and therefore an abstraction. It may be an element of the instrumental devices of our thinking, but the very question of the nature of knowledge shows that it is not necessarily on that account an element of experience before the latter is emasculated by abstraction. The one-dimensional element is of significance only in establishing a locus, but even to do this there is required either previously established loci or a pluralizing of the line. If there are loci already established, our element is no longer elemental, since its character is determined by those of the elements with reference to which it was determined, and if the line is pluralized, there are relations involved which are not merely linear or temporal. The case where *b* follows *a* is not so simple as it seems, and so far as our concern is with the consciousness of the object, we can say that our consciousness is of either *a* or *b* alone. This, of course, assumes that *a* and *b* are not the simple elements that our symbolism takes them to be. As centers in experience, they have individually all the quantitative and qualitative characters that belong to the events between which causation is supposed to apply. That is, within each of them, as a whole in experience, causation is already operative; and this is true even in Kant's sense, as is shown when each of them is supposed to represent an event in possible experience. They are possible experiences, otherwise we should not be concerned with them; and, as such, causation is already assumed. The question of how or why *b* follows *a* is then to be answered through

an appreciation of the characters which belong to each. And in their examination *a* and *b* turn out to be complex events, and the "necessity" of the fact that they cannot be separated cannot be established as merely the accident that *b* follows *a* temporally.[1] That *b* does follow *a* in time may be due to the "necessity" that as knowledge-values the one is incomplete without the other. Besides, there are relations which all agree are causal and in which the temporal relation applies only figuratively, or in a sense that denies the essential character of time, namely, its succession, or rather the succession in time. Such a relation is that of water to its containing vessel, or that of the ball which rests on a soft cushion. And this relation, as causal, is not explained by saying that cause and effect are contemporaneous, or that the cause continues after the effect has begun, if cause is a matter of temporal sequence. Sequence in such a case ceases to be temporal or progressive, and takes its significance (if it have any) from the conceived material or substantial ground involved in a physical law. And here we have left the temporal sequence aside, and are appealing to the conditions of its "ostensive" representation in a relation of space. The causal notion as time sequence has in this case quite slipped our mind, and we find ourselves attempting merely to furnish for that sequence an expression in spatial coexistence. The "necessity" of the causal relation is in this case merely the fact that substance or matter as the coexistent in space is necessary to give an objective character to our inner representation of time. Thus in appealing to the temporal sequence we show that our interest is not merely to describe relations of causation as experience shows them to us but that we are looking for a ground or a reason for causation which might be found by pulling experience apart. Ultimately, we are justified in seeking a ground of causation; but this ground, when found, shows only the necessity of causality as a relation, or that causation as a law is necessary to consecutive thinking; it shows that a law of necessity is necessary to thought; but it does not show *in what* the necessity of the relation as an internal character consists, that is, does not express in experiential or objective terms the connections which are due to causation. The elements which constitute the necessity of causation are the familiar characters of objects in experience conceived as "compossible," or as the unity of a complex whole.

The law of causation is a law of thought. It means that if there is

[1] The causal relation as time sequence is, perhaps, properly taken care of by the psychological law of Association, if psychology "has only to do with the natural history of subjective processes as they occur in time."—Stout, *Manual of Psychology*, p. 6.

to be experience at all there must be a consecutiveness in the occurrence in thought of those elements which are to make that thinking possible of objectification in experience. This consecutiveness is neither temporal nor quantitative, if our criticism of the time-consciousness has not failed. As temporal or quantitative, it fails of objectification; for, as such, nature is neither sequential nor consequential. Nature is; experience has a definite constitution; what it may be in itself or for itself does not concern us. But the object of that thought in which causation holds as a tie necessary under the conception of the possibility of experience is of concern to us, and we may by simple description find the characters of that object which constitutes the necessity of causation. Thus, even though causation must be regarded as a conceptual necessity, the elements which constitute that necessity are the familiar characters of objects in experience. And although the necessity is conceptual, its objectification is "factual."

While *b* follows *a* only in a temporal sense, and as independent of other terms than those of the series to which *a* and *b* belong, nothing further can be said. And the fact that no connection can be made between this series and other serial complexes is sufficient evidence that the temporal series is not what we ordinarily mean by causation. There can be no necessity in what is not possible of connection, even if the connection be only ideal, with other experiences of its kind. And for knowledge purposes, connections of causation are all of the same kind. Indeed, necessity could mean nothing, if there were cases where it were not necessary. This leads us to the conception of the object, if it is the object of knowledge we are seeking, as the center of an infinite number of relations. The infinite is not used here in the absolutist sense, but in the sense of an attribute of the possibility of experience. The object is that which will connect harmoniously with the complex of my interests and purposes from *any* point I may wish to approach it. And the number of ways of approach to the object is limited by the possibility of experience only. If I approach the object from the direction of the purpose of my thought, where I mean it as that which will satisfy my instinct to know, the object is an object of my thought. If I approach it as that which will convert my intention into action, it is an object of my will. But in any case it is a center of all the various relations involved in the process of my defining my purpose to myself, and thus represents that which holds my experience together when an advance is attempted on a basis of that experience. If my experience is to remain intact, at this point there must be an object. Hence, *b* and

b only, follows *a* here, because, if it did not, *a* with the whole complex of temporal series which intersect in this point to make it *a*, and which we call an experience, would fall asunder and become unreal. But the unreality of *a* would involve the denial of our thought purpose as the summation of our whole experience; hence *b* must follow *a* not only because our purpose demands an object, but also because our experience vanishes if this sequence is not realized. In a sense it is the possibility of experience which gives the law to the experience that is actual. So the necessity of causality is the expression of our instinct toward the self-preservation of our thinking.

The necessity of causality seems thus to demand a general statement as a law of the constitution of experience, and we are inevitably led to that general law from the realization of the full import of any particular case of sequence. It must be borne in mind, however, that the "deduction" of necessity must proceed from the inquiry into the nature of the object which is possible in experience, and not from the analysis of the abstract concept of that possibility. The full appreciation of the concrete object-content involves the notion of the possibility of experience as well as that of necessary cause. This object, as we have seen, is the center of an indefinite number of relations; *a* is not merely *a*, but *a*, *a'*, *a''*, ... *b*. But each of the terms is a center of an indefinite number of such series, thus giving breadth to the objective situation. An instance of causality is not a case in which a particular event follows another particular event; there are no particular events; except we say that the particular is representative of the whole complex of experience, and then we incur all the dangers involved in symbolism. An instance of causality must be conceived as nature = *b* following nature = *a*. The abstract *a* must be replaced in the concrete nucleus of relations from which abstraction withdrew it. And the particulars of time sequence are merely the symbols in which we represent the whole of nature as it appears to us in our unreflective moments. The sequence of cause and effect cannot, as we have seen, be represented satisfactorily in the serial expression of time lapse, and what has been said about the time consciousness involving the space consciousness was said with the purpose to show the pure time lapse an abstraction, and therefore not a valid conception under the possibility of experience. The same considerations which compelled the attempt at the synthesis of the time form with the space form in order that we might have a concept for objectivity, now compel us to add to the space-time category the idea of causality. But the space-time-causality category, when employed in the operation

of the synthesis of experience, requires also the notion of substance as an objective ground, and when considered with respect to the possibility of experience, this ground is generalized in the notion of reciprocity.

In taking up the notion of reciprocity little more need be said than was said in showing how the notion is involved in that of causality. It can be "deduced from the idea" of causality when the latter concept is shown from the examination of the concrete object to be necessary to the concept of an object at all. The principle of community is better stated in the second edition of the *Kritik*. In the first there seems to be an attempt to state the principle in such a way as not to involve causality. As such, it might be a "fact" about a realistic world which stands statically in space alone. But it is probable that the period between the appearance of the first and of the second editions was represented in Kant's mind by an attempt to connect more closely some of the things he had put asunder.[1] At any rate, the statement of the second edition shows the influence of the progressiveness of the time idea together with that of the coexistential character of the space idea.

Starting, as Kant always does, with the inner experience, there is the fact of the time sequence. What purport to be objects are passing in endless line and in the same direction. This is, however, a subjective dream, and he is aroused from it by the possibility of the reversal of the direction of the progress, since, as temporal, that progress gives us only one thing in one time to doomsday. As temporal only, our consciousness would be as a mirror before which the spokes of a revolving wheel would appear one after the other eternally. But the rude fact that things do appear in other than the one-at-a-time way is evidence that things are determined in other ways than that of the time sense form. "Hence," as Kant puts it in the *Proof of the Third Analogy* (2d ed.), "we require a concept of understanding of the reciprocal sequence of determinations of things existing at the same time, but outside each other, in order to be able to say, that the reciprocal sequence of the perceptions is founded in the object, and thus to represent their coexistence as objective. The relation of substances, however, of which the first has determinations the ground of which is contained in the other, is the relation of influence, and if, conversely also, the first contains the ground of determinations in the latter, the relation is that of community or reciprocity. Hence the coexistence of substances in space cannot

[1] Kant's reference of the time consciousness to the space consciousness for exemplification is dated by Caird within the period between the appearance of the two editions of the *Kritik*. See *Critical Philosophy of Kant*, Vol. I, p. 500.

be known in experience otherwise than under the supposition of reciprocal action: and this is therefore the condition also of the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience"[1]

Under the idea of reciprocal action, we have to think of experience as the limit within which all our purposes tend, and in which these various purposes are mutually determined in their common purpose to construct the object. The object is then the "whole of experience" in the sense that it is the sole product of experience, and that it represents the dynamical tie which holds experience together in such a way that we are able to proceed upon it as a basis for the production of new objects. Objects are thus wholes of dynamical relations, and their wholeness is their reference to possible experience. Thus there is no need for the "infinite given whole" of sense; in fact, possible experience does not permit such a concept. Wholes are wholes with reference to the possibility of experience only. Experience is itself, as the final assumption, the only "infinite given whole."

But an object is such for me and a significant fact for my experience, and is determined so by my experience, because it as such stands or acts as related to what are for me other objects. Now the criterion for its objectivity is to be found in the fact that it is related to other objects, that is, in the fact that in my purposes to determine other objects it appears as a guide to those objects. It is not that I think this object, but the fact that by it I think other objects; it is a means whereby my present communicates with what is to be my present, to put it in temporal terms. My present thus takes its place in the "society" of objects. If the present occupies me to the full extent or reach of the relations which make up possible experience for me, then I say that I know the object as an end, since my purpose to know is fully satisfied. But this is probably emotional realization, where the distinction of objects no longer obtains, and where our theory of knowledge has no business to intrude.

But the moments of my private thinking comprise only a very small portion of experience. The moments are rare when we "sit down to reflect," as Berkeley says. Consequently the greater portion of the objective world is not determined for us in the "metaphysical" society. The point is here, however, that the possibility of my thinking not in a merely temporal or sequential way, but in a way that involves objects and is therefore consequential, depends upon the fact that the fabric of experience is continuous through the characters that are common to

[1] B., p. 257.

objects. In other words the possibility of experience is a social concept.[1] But the fact that characters are common to objects does not imply that objects or relations are necessarily all of a kind; characters as binding relations are not necessarily similarities. Difference is a tie that binds; and let the difference be as great as may be, the fact that I assert it as existing or subsisting between objects makes these objects of a piece with the rest of experience. The question is here not of the kind or degree of relationship, but rather of the necessity or the fact of relationship. And, as we have seen, the necessity of a relationship makes a relationship of necessity. And the possibility of experience provides the necessity for a relationship throughout the extent of experience. Necessity is then an object, since it is matter of fact.

The object of thought as such has been developed, and although the discussion of it seems abstract and general enough, that development was undertaken merely to show that our reflective thinking is objective, or constitutes objects after the pattern of possible experience. The situations developed are theoretical and the objects concerned are of a definite kind. But the same development may be followed from the opposite direction and the objects involved shown to be of the same kind. That is, the objects reached through a consideration of our theoretical purposes are the same as those reached through the consideration of our practical purposes, and the way is perhaps the more direct in the latter case.

Appealing once more to the possibility of experience, it must, it seems, be said that the theoretical construction of objects in experience is dependent genetically upon the practical construction or assumption of objects. Unreflective activity, such as we saw in the case of the time quantity consciousness, proceeds without defining objects explicitly, and the possibility of their being theoretically defined lines in the suggestions which reflection gathers from that procedure. These suggestions consist of the organized methods of action and characteristic modes of reaction which are imbedded in the individual and the social life. As such they are "material" conditions of the possibility of experience. What the present means to me when I have not sat down to reflect is what is contained in my previous life (either as an individual or as a representative of humanity at large) in the shape of what such moments have meant. That is, its meaning is the form I can give it when I interpret it in terms of remembered similar moments together with the moments which have succeeded the latter as their issue. What will be

[1] That is, a concept of reciprocity; "social" in a metaphysical sense.

possible for me in this moment is defined in axiomatic fashion in terms of what has been actual for me in other moments, and this actuality points the way for me in so far as the present moment is not unique or strange.

Reflection as the conscious determination of objects is called for when the relations between what appears and what is known is merely suggested or pointed to by what has become axiomatic in experience. We thus are able often to "see" a relation before we are able to state it, or to communicate it as a new addition to our present stock. The principles of our familiar possessions are regulative here, and we are able to state that at this point there must be an object, although it as yet exists only in the form of its general conditions. Its place in time has merely been determined. But established methods of procedure so converge upon this point that all that is required to "fill" the point is carefully to follow the directions indicated by our principles. Thus we discover the necessity of a relation which turns out to be a relation of necessity; and defining the point as the intersection of our principles is defining it an object of knowledge, and filling it with reality. The necessity of the object is causation when we have connected it with its kind "in nature," and when we have forgotten the ideal elements of purpose which discovered it.

It is, however, true that not all points indicated by our established methods of procedure are realized or established in their necessity. The object is not always forthcoming. And for this there are various reasons. It may be merely that we do not follow out sufficiently far the suggestions given. In this case there remains an open problem; yet we can assert with some confidence that the real is to be discovered when the problem becomes insistent enough to absorb our efforts to the fullest. The object is a problematical one, yet it may be used if we will remember that it hangs under the shadow of doubt. Or, its doubtfulness may be turned to account in the search for its necessity, in which the doubt vanishes at the successful issue of the search.

Again, the object may not be located because of doubt which hangs over some of the principles which indicate its place. Not all that is organized within our experience is understood so well that we may depend upon it absolutely. It may be that nothing is so well "known." Such objects are the hypothetical ones which we say we have some reason to believe are related by necessity to our experience, but which have not been established in that necessity. Necessity here is an idealized contingency, the "as if" of morality and religion. Such are also the ideals

of the reason. They are doubly questionable, in that their place as assigned by reflection is assigned only in general terms; and also in that the principles upon which the assignment is made are themselves of problematical character.

Such hypothetical objects are merely based upon experience, and the basic reference is so remote that the principles used in their case as well as the objects themselves are only conjectural. They require to be mentioned only by way of illustrating the method by which and the extent to which the regulative use of the principles may be carried in a speculative way. They show the tendency to abstraction which results when it is attempted to express the fulness of the concrete. They go beyond experience in the search of the necessity which is to provide an organic character for it, and the result is the hypostastis of a factual necessity into one of hypothetically absolute character. This external necessity is clearly self-contradictory. The necessity in experience is nothing more nor less than the conceived body of relations which are to be found organizing experience at any moment.

Thus are the regulative principles constructive of objects in experience, and their construction extends further than to possible objects. Kant's separation of the two kinds of principles was perhaps due to his failure to grasp the full significance of his own concept of the possibility of experience. Neither constitutive nor regulative principles are constructive of *experience*, but both are constructive of *the object* in experience. Experience is the "infinite given whole," and construction has reference not to its extent nor its content, but to the intent of that of which we are at a given moment conscious.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

I shall attempt briefly to bring together the various lines of the argument developed by Kant upon the question of the consciousness of objects, in so far as that consciousness is determined by the constitutive and the regulative principles, and shall then follow this résumé with a statement of what I think are the natural and necessary implications of his argument.

The first result of reflection is the fact that knowledge is of objects. Are the objects, in any case and in any sense, the results of reflection, or do they merely appear in reflection? And if they result as constructions from thought either as reflective or as unreflective, in what sense is reflection to be taken? Taking up the matter of construction, Kant seems to find that objects are constructed finally and without doubt or question, but that these objects represent only a comparatively small part of what we ordinarily regard as objects. Objects which are constructed are mathematical, or are objects of quantity. But when constructed, it is evident that these objects are not such as occur or appear in experience when our purpose is not definitely to construct them as objects. And objects which are not directly our purpose do appear. It is evident, then, that the possibility of the definition of the object depends in some way upon the structure of experience and the conditions of connection and permanence in it. Whatever the object is, it is of the same sort as the setting within which the notion of the object arises. Under this new conception of it, the question of the relation of thought to its object appears to Kant and is stated by him as that of the possibility of experience.

The object, however, cannot be constructed in time alone as is undertaken in the discussion of quantity, but the empty and inert time elements have to be filled with the experientially substantial, and this element comes from the spatial character of experience. Space and time thus united give the dependableness of objects in experience, or as we usually call it, the necessity of causation. When this unitary view of space-time-causation is reached, the question of construction disappears, since its meaninglessness has been demonstrated. Out of

this causal conception, when we are thinking of the volume of experience, there grows a conception of the manifoldness of experience which is not hopelessly dissipating, but which serves on the contrary to justify our unifold conception. The realization of the object as a point from which issue directions of purpose whose number is limited only by possible experience, gives us the notion of the object as the core of an individuality, and through this, the conception of experience as an organism whose law is social. Here the logic of practice meets its end in the full definition of the particularly real as of a piece with the whole of our ideals.

And herein lies the significance of Kant's guiding idea of possible experience. When taken as the sum of all the directions which my purpose may pursue in its progress from my present as a hypothetical object, it supplies me with a "rule according to which I may look in experience for a fourth term, or a characteristic mark by which I may find it."[1] The object is not given as a construction in the form of abstract conditions. It appears as a proof or justification of connections which have been found necessary to be made in order that a purpose may be worked out. No addition is made to experience by introducing an externally new element, hence construction is not *of* experience, but *within* it. Nor can the act of construction be regarded as a new fact of "reality" since it is presupposed already in the concept of possible experience. There can be no experience at all if there are not activities resulting in the amplification of objects, so this activity is included in the fundamental assumption. It is therefore through the "characteristic marks" of objects already determined in experience that our principles find a condition of their use. Hence their use is regulative with respect to the object to be determined, since they operate according to rules contained in the characteristics of objects already known, and constitutive with reference to the objects from whose characters the rules are obtained, since these objects are re-formed upon the basis of their reciprocal relations. The distinction of constitutive and regulative principles therefore breaks down, since the two kinds of principle represent only different directions of the same process. They are the same process with respect to the objects involved, for so far as the principles are concerned, objects are all of a kind. They are permanent points or loci established in order to determine the direction of a purpose; and their objectivity consists in their significance for knowledge. And it makes no difference whether knowledge is regarded as the goal of thought

[1] A., p. 180; B., p. 222.

in a speculative sense, or as the basis of rules of action; the objects are the same in any case.

It has been shown that the distinction between the constitutive and the regulative principles is one of a series of sunderings which extends throughout Kant's system. The distinction of sense from understanding gives two worlds, the distinction within sense between time and space cuts off the subjective processes from the substantially permanent, thus leaving the subjective at loose ends with the universe; the distinction of constitutive and regulative principles introduces the void within the society of objects, defining the one part as abstractions, and the other as atomistic particulars. If on the contrary we begin with the principles, recognizing that there is no difference of their objects, we have the conditions of the conception of an unbroken world; and with this conception we have the thought process incorporated within the whole, since there is no distinction of "inner" and "outer."

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THE UNKNOWABLE OF HERBERT SPENCER.

IT would seem that Spencer's philosophical doctrines have been shown contradictory often and thoroughly enough; but they have still an influence which, while it cannot be denied, should be restricted to its proper sphere. Science still likes to appeal to Spencer,[1] and to other writers of the same type, for the justification of its special views, ignoring the fact that these special views either have no relation to, or contradict, the fundamental principles upon which they are supposed to depend. Either, then, the special views are without justification, or the fundamental principles are false, or the relation between the fundamental principles and the particular views is not one of dependence. It is the purpose of this paper to examine one of the fundamental conceptions of Spencer to find, first, whether it has necessary relations to certain particular doctrines, and second, whether it is logically worthy of acceptance.

The conception supposed by Spencer to lie at the bottom of his system is that of the Unknowable. What he means by the Unknowable can be fairly clearly seen from the following citations, after making allowance for certain indefiniteness of expression. The conclusion reached in Part I of the *First Principles* is stated in the proposition, All Knowledge is relative; and this statement is followed by the assertion that that which religion and science usually regard as the ultimate truth concerning the nature of things is in reality unknowable. The ultimate nature of things "remains forever inscrutable." As to the special characters of the concept of the Unknowable, it is, first, not a purely negative concept.[2] It does not represent a state of consciousness which is devoid of all content, nor does it suggest the absence of all consciousness; for either of these conditions precludes the possibility of there being a concept at all. It is not the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible. For to

[1] See the article by H. S. Shelton, PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, Vol. XIX, p. 3.
[2] *First Principles*, §26.

regard the Unknowable as a pure negation would involve the affirmation that we cannot arrive at the concept by reason, and it is just by this means that the existence of the Unknowable is established. That is to say, Spencer thinks himself driven to the postulation of the Unknowable by an analysis of thought.[1] This analysis begins with the proposition, All knowledge is relative.[2] The same reasoning that establishes the proof of this proposition also furnishes the proof of the existence of the Non-relative. The condition of knowledge is the existence of relations among the states of consciousness.[3] No single state could become an element of knowledge, for "that a thing be positively thought of, it must be thought of as such or such—as of this or that kind."[4] From the conclusion that "relation is the universal form of thought,"[5] we may show the positive nature of the concept of the Unknowable. In the very assertion that all knowledge is relative, there is involved the assumption that there is a non-relative, for neither could be thought of except in relation to the other. This would follow from the definition of thought as the establishment of cohesions among manifestations.[6] And if the relative has any reality, the non-relative must have the same reality, for no relation could be conceived between terms one of which is nothing. Further, unless there be conceived an Absolute as over against which the relative is conceived, the relative itself would become an Absolute, and that would involve us in contradiction. Thus the necessity of thinking in relations compels us to believe in the existence of the Absolute. "And in contemplating the process of thought, we have equally seen how impossible it is to rid ourselves of the consciousness of an actuality lying behind appearance; and how, from this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that actuality."[7]

After this attempt to describe the Unknowable, Spencer concludes that, while we are compelled to believe in its existence, we can give to the concept of it no quantitative or qualitative expression whatever. Some attributes must express its relations

[1] *First Principles*, §24.
[2] *Ibid.*, §26.
[3] *Principles of Psychology*, §471.
[4] *First Principles*, §67.
[5] *Ibid.*, §47.
[6] *Ibid.*, §50. *Principles of Psychology*, §471.
[7] *First Principles*, §26.

to the other elements of consciousness; yet these attributes can tell us nothing of its real nature, but simply assure to us its existence as over against that to which we can apply positive attributes. The fact that we cannot tell what it is does not remove the necessity of believing in its existence. Our ignorance of its nature does not make it non-existent, does not make it "the less certain that it remains with us as a positive and indestructible element of thought."[1] Even when we say we cannot know the Absolute, we tacitly affirm that there is an Absolute. For unless it exists we could not even express our ignorance of it. Merely to make the assumption proves that the Absolute has been present to our minds, not as a nothing, but as a something.[2] Our consciousness of it is "positive though indefinite,"[3] yet it "persists in consciousness."[4] For the problem as to the form of our consciousness of the Absolute, Spencer appeals to our conception of the relative. "We are conscious of the relative under conditions and limits. It is impossible that these conditions and limits can be thought of apart from something to which they give the form. The abstraction of these conditions and limits is, by the hypothesis, the abstraction of them *only*; consequently there must be a residuary consciousness of something which filled up their outlines, and this indefinite something constitutes our consciousness of the Non-relative, or Absolute."[5]

Spencer's argument, in brief, seems something like this: Ultimate reality is unknown and unknowable to us. But since no knowledge is possible except upon its assumption,[6] it must be said that there exists an unconditioned something, and that this unconditioned something is in some way manifested to us.[7] Our concept of the Unknowable is not purely negative. It could not be a nothing, for in that case it could have no relation to our experience; and that which "remains forever inscrutable" makes experience possible by underlying it.[8] Our knowledge of a thing comes to us through the relations which obtain among its parts. But the Unknowable, as a vague and indefinite something, though

[1] *Ibid.*, §26. [2] *Ibid.*, §47. [3] *Ibid.*, §26.
[4] *Ibid.*, §26. *Principles of Psychology*, §56.
[5] *First Principles*, §26. [6] *Ibid.*, §191. [7] *Ibid.*, §194.
[8] *Ibid.*, §62.

it is assured to us as positively "there," is not in any known way related to our experience. Yet we must think of it as the condition of experience. Since its relations to our knowledge are not such as can be known to us, we cannot think of it as "such or such—as of this or that kind."[1] It is therefore unclassifiable; and, for Spencer, what cannot be grouped or aggregated cannot be known, since knowing implies grouping.[2] The Unknowable persists in consciousness, and is the ultimate in the sense of that which persists absolutely.

There are, as it seems to me, two aspects of Spencer's argument, although he does not clearly distinguish them. And it is just this failure to distinguish the various lines of his interest which accounts for the confusion often mentioned in connection with Spencer's writings. There is, first, the psychological phase of the argument, in which the Unknowable as an ontological reality is assured existence by what is found in consciousness. Second, there is the logical phase, in which an attempt is made to establish the Unknowable as a condition of knowledge, through an analysis of the structure of knowledge. Both these lines of argument are, as it seems to me, defective, and I shall attempt to show in what respects they are insufficient. I shall show that the first does not apply at all to the problem, and that the second defeats itself when carried far enough to satisfy logical demands.

The psychological argument may be stated thus: When the conditions and limits of anything which is known are abstracted from, there is left a residuary consciousness,—a blank, sheer awareness, which is the manifestation of an unknown something underlying experience. It is there and cannot be got rid of; hence it is an Unknowable and an Absolute as if by pure obstinacy. This is not the place to object to the residuary consciousness as a result of abstraction, nor to the notion of abstraction as a process which results in a residuary consciousness and then vanishes. Attention is here directed to the residuary consciousness with a view to finding what sort of reality it may be. According to Spencer's list of qualities (so long as he remains

[1] *Ibid.*, §67. [2] *Ibid.*, §42.

true to the psychical origin of his Unknowable), the Unknowable is described as positive, though indefinite, and persistent. So far as the question concerns what is psychologically there, it is difficult to understand what difference it would make whether the Unknowable were positive or otherwise. So long as the fact of its presence constitutes its essential nature, nothing can be said further toward its description, since it has no qualities to enumerate nor any relations to be pointed out or explained. All the scientist could do would be to bow down in wonder before its everlasting presence, and chant a lonely "It is." And its persistence may be treated in a similar way. Let it persist to doomsday, and it will still have to be regarded as a negligible quantity, if nothing further can be found within the rest of the system of reality as a reason why it persists. If its character as persistent or its act of persistence has no other business than to reinforce its presence to the degree that it cannot be got rid of, the Unknowable must be regarded as an intruder in the domain of human knowledge, and if there were no possibility of neglecting it, we would have to devise some scheme whereby we could acknowledge it, and still disregard it,—all of which means that so long as anything is 'there' at all, it cannot be properly and satisfactorily accounted for by the use of such indefinite adjectives as positive, persistent, and indefinite. It is clear from what has just been said about the ultimate as positive and persistent that the character of indefiniteness fares just as ill. In fact, it appears that the expression indefinite ultimate is a contradiction in terms. If what is ultimate were indefinite in the sense of vague and confused, it is not easy to see how there could be a basis of any kind for the structure of human knowledge. Or if we speak of knowledge as a process, we would have to regard the process as blind in the degree to which its ultimate were indefinite. The fact is, that an Unknowable or an Absolute cannot be built out of such empty terms. What is ultimate for human knowledge and experience must have more definite characters, characters which connect with all possible human interests and endeavors, instead of withdrawing from all contact with human purposes. And it is clear that Spencer recognizes this

fact when he passes from his psychical Absolute to one which he can describe as a Power, a Cause, and an external Reality. This latter Absolute is, however, a logical matter, and does not require consideration here.

The Unknowable as residuary in consciousness has a slightly more serious aspect as the 'given.' According to this conception a content is present to consciousness directly and immediately, its presence there necessitating no previous knowledge or mental act as its antecedent condition. It is ultimate in that with it all knowledge begins, and further, in that it is the point of reference to which all other forms of knowledge are referred to establish their validity. It is, therefore, genetically previous to, and logically prior to, all other forms of knowledge. The present content, used thus as ultimate datum, is one of which most use is made by sensationalists, the content being sense impression. It is clear that Spencer, in one phase of his doctrine at least, thinks of the ultimate reality as given directly in sense impression.[1]

It is true that of late the ultimate datum has not been insisted upon with so much vigor as formerly, since the criticisms of the adherents of the relational view of thought tend to modify the bold sensationalistic statements. The datum is still defended as a sacred relic, but it is acknowledged that the pure sensuous consciousness is never the whole of any given experience. The datum is found by the analysis of a given complex experience situation, and it is not, as such, a separate or separable mental activity.[2] Not even is it generally argued, when a particular state of consciousness is being described, that there is a temporal antecedence of the relational forms by the sense experience, nor that there is a logical dependence of the one upon the other. The whole compound is psychologically there, and the situation is described as one of great complexity. All that is required to find the pure datum is the analytic purpose of science, which isolates it from the complex experience.

It is strange that those who insist on the ultimateness of the sense datum never question the methods by which the datum is

[1] *First Principles*, §47.

[2] Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 36.

found; they do not hesitate to ascribe necessity to their results, forgetting that the fate of results hangs on the fallibility or infallibility of the methods by which results are obtained. As it seems to me, the ultimateness of the datum involves two assumptions: first, it is assumed that the ultimate must be simple, even while the matter to which it refers is regarded as very complex; and second, it is assumed that, in this case at least, the method of analysis cannot fail, and that the purpose of analysis is accomplished when the elements of the matter under consideration are set apart from one another and are shown in their disparateness.

That Spencer is looking for an ultimate in the sense of absolute simplicity is clear from what he says positively about it,—namely, that it is positive, though indefinite, and persistent,—as well as from what he denies of it, namely, that we can give to the concept of it no quantitative or qualitative expression whatever. What there could be of reality in a thing described in such vacuous terms is not easily made out, nor are we helped in understanding it when he speaks later of it as an Inscrutable Power and an Unknown Cause. The simple facts in the case are that the result of the search for an ultimately simple datum is a bloodless abstraction. We can put it in Spencer's own words when we say with him that the "consciousness of the unconditioned" becomes "the unconditioned consciousness, or raw material of thought to which in thinking we give definite forms." And this amounts to a mere insistence that there is an unqualified datum, with no explanation as to how the raw material ever loses its rawness. At the same time, the adherents of the datum-doctrine continue to harp upon the complexity of experience. Thus, upon their own statement, if the datum is to be found, it is not an experience, but can result only from the dismemberment of experience by analysis. The living process of experience must suffer on the wheel in order that the sacred law of analysis be not perverted. If experience is complex as it occurs in its 'natural state,' why not leave it so, and proceed to exhaust our powers of description to do it justice when at its best, instead of attempting to improve scientifically upon it by tearing it asunder? The predatory

instinct is not lost from the race of psychological logicians. That they have started right, there is no question; consciousness is complex. But the departure from this point is just where the trouble begins. It seems to be forgotten that experience (the point where all philosophical description begins), *when* complex, is quite another and a different thing from the aggregate of its dismembered parts. Or, if not, it remains to be shown what the process of aggregation adds to the parts as such, which restores to the initial experience its original character as living. What I insist is, that a datum can no more be an experience than a leaf can be a tree. And if not an experience, the datum has no place in philosophical discussions. A leaf is not a leaf even, when detached from the tree. And when attached, no amount of description *of the leaf* can do justice to the living organism. The datum does not exist outside of the analyst's purpose.[1] Apart from the whole experience, the datum is nothing, and the complete experience is as 'ultimate' and 'simple' as there can be any reasonable demand for.

It can be agreed that analysis is final, but it is worth while to reflect what analysis means. Those who depend most upon this means of investigation confuse the act of analysis with the results of the act. Besides, there are results which the analyst does not usually recognize; those which he finds are those which he takes from the whole complex of results, and it is this whole which it is the business of logic to examine. The results chosen for description are thus selected out of the whole complex according to the purpose which the scientist has in performing the analysis. That within the whole there are others which the present interest does not consider, is evidenced by the fact that the object of analysis shows different characters when the purpose of the scientist changes. The stone is a different object for the physicist from what it is for the chemist, and neither has the right to maintain that the stone is such only as his particular interest determines it to be. The physical description may modify the chemical, and *vice versa*. Just so, the psychologist has a perfect right to describe a fact of experience, and his description, in so

[1] Cf. Bosanquet, *Essentials of Logic*, p. 28.

far as it is not contradictory to the accounts of the fact given by other interests, must be respected by all others who examine the same fact; but this does not argue that others with special and non-psychological interests may not give attention to characters which do not excite the interest of the psychologist. Analysis, then, has no right to determine *a priori* what characters it will find in a given object, nor to decide upon the primacy of one set of characters over another. It remains the prerogative of the selective purpose to determine upon the characters which shall be in consilience with that purpose, but that prerogative does not extend to the determination of the characters which shall satisfy all purposes. Purpose, with respect to objects, is individual; and, as such, must recognize individuality. It is thus the act that decides to analyze, and not the instrument of analysis, which has to do with results; the same instrument is made use of in connection with all results; but the character and significance of results depends upon the active purpose.[1] It is neglect of the active purpose in connection with analysis that accounts for the brick-yard appearance of experience after it has passed through the hands of the 'datum' logician.

Whatever may be the character of psychological analysis, or of its results, it does not determine or 'find' objects. The object as such has no dependence upon analysis, whatever may be its relation to the purpose to analyse. So far as analysis is concerned, the object is 'there,' 'given.' The purpose and the object meet face to face, and significance accrues to analysis as the instrument by which the purpose works itself out in its relations to the object. As an instrument, it has nothing to do with what is to be found in consciousness except at the beck and call of attention. So the subjective Unknowable,[2] for which Spencer manifests so much psychological concern, has nothing to justify it from this quarter. Whether the Unknowable is justified as a logical matter, and what part analysis plays with it as such, will receive consideration in connection with the examination of Spencer's doctrine of relativity.

[1] Cf. Professor Adamson, *Kant*, p. 7.

[2] Cf. Sidgwick, *Philosophy of Kant and Other Lectures*, pp. 285 ff.

Two other difficulties ought to be mentioned in connection with the subjective or internal Unknowable. As justified by what is found in consciousness, the Unknowable would seem to have no more command over our theoretical respect than the fixed idea of the insane, or the emotional vacuity that occupies the mind of the devotee of art, or the monstrosity which possesses the mind of the mystic. In either case something is 'there' with such a vengeance as to vitiate any attempts that may be made toward rational description. And the Unknowable is just such a psychological zero as, when recognized at all, negates the whole system of human knowledge, and hands the world over to chaos. We cease thinking when we contemplate it. Again, if it have any logical force at all, Spencer's argument for the Unknowable is an imperfect form of the Cartesian 'ontological proof,' consideration of which has certainly been made forever unnecessary by the criticism of Kant.

There seems little reason or justification for the ultimate which just doggedly persists in consciousness, and there is also no conceivable function which such a cumberground could perform in experience. The internal ultimate of Spencer is neither an Unknowable nor an Absolute—not an Unknowable, because the result of the process by which it is supposed to be found could only be a fact of the same order as any of the facts with which the psychological analysis begins, and therefore known as well as any of those facts; and not an Absolute, because, first, as a particular fact in experience it has no more universal value than any other fact of experience, and hence does not constitute but only suggests universal connection; and second, as a mere psychic fact it has no points of connection with the objective system of things, and consequently does not transcend the private consciousness of the individual. The psychological argument does not apply at all to the question of the Absolute. The Absolute which Spencer describes as a Power and a Cause and which therefore has attributed to it characters that negate his internal or psychic Unknowable, and by means of which he attempts to find lodgment for the Unknowable within the system of things, is decidedly another matter.[1] As such, the Unknowable-

[1] See Fullerton, *System of Metaphysics*, pp. 422–428.

Absolute has been criticized thoroughly enough; reference here to the objective or logical aspect of the question will be made only so far as is necessary to carry out the intention to examine the method by which the Absolute is supposed to be reached. This method involves Spencer's doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, which we proceed to examine.

The relativity of knowledge comes down to Spencer from Kant by the precarious way of Hamilton and Mansel, and in Spencer's hands it ends in confusion. There are two meanings (at least) of the doctrine interfused in Spencer's presentation, neither of which is worked out in any conclusive fashion. Corresponding to these two meanings there are what I may designate as the negative and the positive, or constructive, method, the latter containing some promise when pursued to a logical issue. The negative may be stated thus: When abstraction from the conditions and limits of thought is carried as far as human capacity can reach, there yet remains a condition of thought and things which stoutly refuses to budge and is testified to by a residuary consciousness. Consideration to this testator as the psychic symbol of the ultimate has been given above, and it was found that practically all that can be said of it is that it is residuary. This ultimate condition is left after abstraction is complete, or is found through the instrumentality of abstraction to underlie all thought. The negative aspect of the doctrine of relativity presupposes the independent existence of the Absolute, and argues for the complete absence of any relation between the Absolute and the relative. To be sure, the relative would not exist but for the Absolute, and the Absolute would disappear if the relative were taken away. The relative is known, the Absolute unknown; yet the Absolute exists in order that the relative may be known. In order that that which is known may be known, an unknown is postulated; thus a contradiction is introduced into the doctrine of knowledge in order to save the principle that correlatives imply one another. One wonders what becomes of this principle when the doctrine of knowledge itself makes knowledge impossible. And upon following the method by which Spencer seeks to establish his Absolute, it will plainly

appear that the nearer he approaches the Absolute, the farther away from the relative his argument leads; and in leading away from the relative, it loses, upon his own principle, the conclusiveness which he is seeking for it. For knowledge of the Absolute, even, is not knowledge except it is relative; so if it were established that the Absolute exists, the knowledge which establishes it with sufficient firmness that we may say it exists, is also relative knowledge, and the Absolute is swamped in relativity. Thus the independent Absolute becomes relative and dependent in the very process of establishing its independence; and this ought to be a hint that the conditions of knowledge cannot lie outside knowledge—at least cannot lie outside the knowable—if those conditions are in any way to help in understanding the process or the product of knowledge. The Unknowable—how nonsensical the whole matter is when the term is substituted for the Absolute, as Spencer would permit us to do—cannot be sifted out from the knowable by any process of separation. Spencer can harbor the Unknowable in his own mind only by deliberately neglecting every possible positive aspect of experience, and it is just our purpose to show that this method of neglect of the ordinary facts of experience leads and can lead to no positive results. Spencer's method is the method of abstract analysis, and his abstraction is literally a process of drawing away from everything that is concrete and real in experience.

In opposition to this negative method I should propose that abstract analysis does not *find things* as the ground rock of reality, but that it does *disclose an act* which is of the distinctive character of the reality which underlies thinking and the world, but does the latter only when it allies itself with synthesis or becomes constructive of the concrete. Abstraction seems to be for Spencer a principle which runs the gauntlet of all possible correlative terms, putting them to oblivion on either side, and finally meets its peer in an ultimate which defies its disintegrating stroke. What becomes of the correlatives after they are set aside, or what new relations they may have assumed in being set aside, or whether any terms heretofore non-existent may have appeared on the scene as due to the act of setting aside, do not

seem to be questions worthy of the slightest consideration. The whole universe is neglected in the interest of finding a final term which is to have no relation whatever, either actual or possible, to any of the host of terms which gave their lives toward its discovery. So smothered is the ultimate reality under the rubbish of the relative, that the whole of 'relative reality' must be annihilated in order that we may have a glimpse of its eternal thereness; and when we get the vision we are the wiser only in that we know we have burned the bridges behind us, and return to the work-a-day relative world is cut off. The Unknowable, as a presupposed necessary condition of thought, when regarded as independent of the concrete activities of thought, and discovered by the method of abstract analysis, is shown impossible by the very process which attempts to justify its assumption. From abstraction only abstractions can come. If we can abstract from the conditions of knowledge, we can say that no knowledge remains, but we certainly cannot say that an unknowable something remains. If anything remains we cannot call it an Unknowable. Mere want of knowledge does not constitute the Unknowable. For if the thing has no relations to knowledge, if it lies outside the conditions of knowledge, it cannot be defined in terms of knowledge, not even negatively; the term, or any term which has even a hint of connection with a knowing subject, represents something which is *in so far* known.

That the Unknowable described by Spencer is from the start a presupposition is proved by the fact that he employs analysis to establish it. For, if the Unknowable were self-evident in thought, his laborious argument for it would be unnecessary. If it is not self-evident, but yet justifiable by characters to be found in valid thinking, the argument would take the form of a development through concepts generally recognized as valid. That is, the argument would be constructive *upon* certain commonly recognized conceptions, and not destructive and neglectful *of* characters found as concrete in experience. The Unknowable is not found in or by means of the concrete in experience, but is proved to be behind, or to underlie, experience as an unknown cause. What is found beneath or behind experience cannot be

justified by what is in or of experience, that is, what is external to experience is a baseless presupposition, made use of in this case to force the concrete facts into forms which are the creatures of a narrow purpose. Reality could not be successive and disparate impressions of force if the Absolute were a principle active in experience; physics could not be the basis of all knowledge if the Absolute were an intelligible principle within the world instead of a mechanical principle beneath and outside the world; consciousness could not be an aggregate of sensations if there were evidences of constructive purpose; *ergo*, the Absolute is an Unknown Cause and an Inscrutable Power. As was suggested above, analysis pure and simple can apply only to a concept held as a presupposition; the analytic purpose cannot be employed in the development of a valid concept. Analysis may prepare the way for the construction of a principle by the enumeration of concrete characters, but it cannot choose among them, cannot decide that such and such characters by nature belong together. It cannot compare. It is the principle or instrument of the sciences because its application is mathematical. Analysis enumerates the particular contents of a concept; it finds the many and sets them apart so that their fitness together may be examined, but it does not perform the examination. It attends to the terms, but not to their interrelations, hence can provide for no more significant combination than the quantitative. Until thought goes beyond the enumerative interest it has no right to claim validity for its concepts, but must take their significance and application for granted, since to determine the limits of the application of concepts is critically to judge of their development and construction. And the latter is not an analytic process, but constructive, since its concern is with relations, and to be concerned with relations is to create relations whose activity is systematizing with respect to the relations attended to. To analyze a concept is to brand that concept a presupposition; to justify a concept is a formative act, going from the given content and by means of it to a connection which transcends that content and provides for the validity of the concept by establishing its fitness within the system of experience.

The positive aspect of Spencer's doctrine of relativity is significant and fruitful, but it is strange that his own attempt at development of it is its perversion. And it is just as strange that some of his critics[1] have not seen that in this form the doctrine contains suggestions of great logical importance. Spencer's attempt fails because he is unwilling to follow or incapable of following to their logical issue the suggestions contained in the generalizations which he hands down as conclusions from the analysis of thought. The difficulty is probably due to lack of thoroughness in the analysis (which, if thorough, surpasses itself), and this prevented the analyst from seeing that the whole performance is based on a presupposition. This assumption, as mentioned above, is that of the independent cause and the possibility of explaining experience by the discovery of that cause, without showing how the cause is operative. Spencer seems to forget that certain of his doctrines commit him to a view fundamentally identical with that which defines cause as invariability of succession, which, if established, would unconditionally negate the possibility of a cause independent of the phenomena among which the succession occurs. There may be, on this view, absolute causation, which would be defined as universality of connection among phenomena, but the first necessary corollary of such a law would be the denial of a cause underlying or behind experience. In any case the relativity of knowledge, taken in the sense in which Spencer employs it even, that is, in the sense of the incompleteness of knowledge with the further assertion that knowledge can never be complete, does not prove the existence of anything beyond the limits of knowledge. To assert the independent cause here is equivalent to drawing a positive conclusion from negative premises. We can assert nothing as the real on the strength of premises which express only our ignorance. Reference is here made to the independent cause only for the purpose of showing that the relativity of knowledge has nothing to do with that cause. It is,

[1] For instance, Professor Fullerton, who is singularly fortunate in his destruction of the internal Unknowable, might have been delivered from his sensationalism if he had taken the suggestion contained in the doctrine of relativity.

then, necessary to find significance for that doctrine in another direction.

Taking Spencer's conclusions and agreeing perfectly that such conclusions follow from examination of the facts of experience, it can be shown that their significance points in precisely the opposite direction to that in which they lead Spencer; that they point to an Absolute, which, however, is by no means unknowable nor independent of human experience. This positive absolute makes no claim to objective reality, if objective means external to knowledge, but has its reality as the distinctive character of human experience as such. The general conclusion, All knowledge is relative, is based on the further propositions, Relation is the universal form of thought and Thinking is relationing.[1] So far as these propositions are valid, they assume relativity to mean no more and no less than interrelatedness of all forms of conscious experience. And this provides for the significance of the principle that correlatives imply one another, and destroys the psychological doctrine that there can be a consciousness which is 'residuary' and known only by the fact that it is 'there.' The analysis of thought (when complete, that is, when it passes over into construction) shows that there is no determination of thought which is not dependent upon some other determination, in the sense that each form has a reference to some other form, which reference between terms is nothing less than the act of knowing. That the references or relations are the characteristic acts of knowing is well stated by Spencer in the assertion that thinking is 'relationing,' and this conception of thought as a synthetic activity ought to have shown Spencer that the adequate description is a constructive performance, and not one which picks and pries its object into assumed elements. But this notion of relatedness destroys itself when conceived as a series to which there must be a definable final term. Such a demand abandons the relational conception altogether, since it tries to think a term which is independent of the relations that determined it as a term of the series. After declaring the terms to be nothing apart from their relations, it is attempted to construct a term

[1] Spencer's *Essays*, Vol. III, p. 293.

which explains the series without reference to the relations which determine the terms and at the same time give continuity to the series. Such building of toy houses only to knock them down again is characteristic of Spencer's whole discussion; instead of a conception which would provide for permanence and solidity, he sets up an Unknowable which makes the whole structure fall apart. There is no more potency in a final term as a criterion of explanation for such a connected series than there is in any other term of the series. Any term by itself has already been declared impossible for thought. The key to the explicableness of the world does not lie in the vacuum left after that which constitutes knowledge is stripped away, but is found in the principle of the construction of knowledge, which was well stated in the proposition that thinking is relationing.

It is strange that the investigation which leads to the conception of the knowledge process as one of the formation of relations does not realize that it is connectedness which is characteristic of that process and that the facts of knowledge are intelligible only as they are conceived as hanging together. It is generally admitted that facts of experience are found in complexes representing various degrees of interdependence, but the question is at this point whether these facts are to be accounted for or described. Those who attempt to account for the facts begin by separating them into their component elements, and seek by this method to discover through their relations other facts antecedent to them, which may be looked upon as causes. Their curiosity is satisfied when an experience is referred to a previous experience, as if the whole were completely formed and static, and there were nothing to do in any case but thus to trace references backward to a world assumed as complete. Such an attitude is certainly indicative of a dualism of thought and things which is contradicted by the principle of relation proposed as the guiding notion, and avowedly held by Spencer as the key to the intelligibility of experience. It is difficult to see how Spencer would make philosophy the capstone of the sciences, since the method followed by him is certainly not recognized nor followed by scientists. The latter do not feel themselves

obliged to explain the facts with which they deal by referring them to an ultimate outside the order to which those facts belong. In fact, the scientist is not looking for ultimates at all, even though he may leave evidence that a universal is readily found. Physics is not seeking the ultimate nature of body, force, etc., but is striving to give the most comprehensive description possible of the significance of those conceptions for experience, and is certainly not attempting to brand them as utterly unintelligible by thrusting them out of the world. On the contrary, it is the method of science to describe what it finds and as it finds it, and to correlate its results with results already obtained. There is no attempt to mutilate the facts in the hope of finding an undetermined substratum which produces them; for such a 'cause' when found only enshrouds the situation in darkness. And the philosophy which progresses profits by the example of science; it takes its material as it occurs 'in nature,' and attempts to give the description which is most satisfying, and at the same time offers most promise as an instrument for dealing with material which is as yet only possible. This subject-matter is experience in its concrete aspects, and the purpose of philosophy is to find the laws within it which render its constitution intelligible.

Spencer's conception of knowing as relating denies to analysis the right to recognition as a means of investigation, since such a conception can be reached by no other than a constructive process. Abstraction, it may be argued, is never used with such rigor as is here described, and this may be admitted; but when the results reached are in point of abstractness so far removed from the concrete as the Unknowable of Spencer, it is necessary to show that the method is no legitimate one. This has already been shown by the criticism of his results. Analysis pure and simple is impossible as an act of thought, if knowing is relating. And the conclusion which follows is that whenever analysis is at work there goes hand in hand with it a process of synthesis which not only guarantees the results but at the same time justifies the method by the results. It is often forgotten that, whenever in thought things are set apart, there are at the same time and by

the same act relations established between the things put asunder. Everything abstracted from gets by the act of abstraction a determination applied to it, so that differentiation even is a tie that binds. The fact that different aspects of an experience are distinguishable, is an evidence that they by nature belong together, and it is the fact of their occurrence together which provides the possibility of their being distinguished; further, there could be no purpose in making the distinction if there were not a conceived positive relation present as the reason which suggests the distinction. When I deny one relation, I assert another; in fact, my denial is a positive relation seen to exist within the present experience situation. It is, then, evident that the act of thinking is not so much one of making distinctions as of going forward in a constructive fashion upon the basis of the suggestion afforded by observed differences. It is, thus, a synthetic activity, and one which provides for unity and intelligibility in the whole of experience, in so far, at least, as our concern with experience is theoretical.

ELIJAH JORDAN.

DR. JORDAN AND SPENCER'S UNKNOWABLE.

Dr. Jordan's article in a previous number of this Review[1] has been brought to my notice. I regret that I have not seen it sooner because, in that I appear to be the only living philosophical writer who maintains the essential soundness of Spencer's work,[2] and as, moreover, Dr. Jordan specifically refers to me as an example of those who refer to him "ignoring the fact that these (Spencer's) special views either have no relation to, or contradict the fundamental principles upon which they are supposed to depend," his remarks certainly call for a brief reply.

But if Mr. Jordan is good enough to refer to me, he might do me the honor to notice what I said. I do not ignore anything, that is anything relevant. If he will read my article through once more, he will find that I have given reasons for my opinion that the *Formula of Evolution*, and, inferentially, the whole of the philosophy, is absolutely independent of what Mr. Jordan is pleased to call the fundamental principles, *i. e.*, the doctrine of the Unknowable.

Dr. Jordan, on the other hand, appears to consider the Unknowable, the essential foundation of Spencer's system. The question, then, arises which of us has interpreted Spencer correctly. On this question the one individual who ought to know what Spencer meant is Spencer himself. And Spencer has taken special care to correct the misinterpretation which Dr. Jordan repeats. In the final edition of *First Principles*, there is a postscript, from which it will be sufficient to quote the following:—

"But now let it be understood that the reader is not called upon to judge respecting any of the arguments or conclusions contained in the foregoing five chapters, and in the above paragraph. The subjects on which we are about to enter are independent of the subjects thus far discussed, and he may reject any or all of that which has gone before while leaving himself free to accept any or all of that which is now to come. . . . Unfortunately I did not see that part 1 would be regarded as a basis for part 2 . . . very many have, in consequence, been prevented from reading beyond this point" (and so on).[3]

[1] Vol. 20, p. 29 seq.

[2] Cf. This Journal, XIX, p. 3; *International Journal of Ethics*, July, 1910, April, 1911; *Mind*, Jan., 1910.

[3] *First Principles*, final (English) edition, pp. 109–110.

It would thus be possible for me to agree with the greater part of Mr. Jordan's criticisms, and yet to inform him that his whole discussion is irrelevant. In his first sentence he says:— "Spencer's philosophical doctrines have been shown contradictory often and thoroughly enough." Then why do it again? Philosophical apparently means the doctrine of *the Unknowable*. Mr. Jordan, I suppose, would not regard the coordination of positive knowledge as philosophy. If that is his standpoint, I would certainly advise him to leave Spencer alone. He does, as a matter of fact, refer very largely to the *Psychology*, but it is, perhaps, allowable to suggest that, if he reads that work with the bias that there is essential connection, where Spencer has informed him there is none, he may, possibly, not obtain from it the meaning it was intented to convey. That, however, is by the way. Dr. Jordan might, perhaps, have taken the line that, although Spencer was of opinion that the rest of his philosophy was independent of *the Unknowable*, he was mistaken, and that the remainder will not stand without such collateral support. But then he does not say so. He gives no reasons for thinking so. He is merely pleased to assert that the philosophy is based on the Unknowable. As a matter of fact, a philosopher of much greater note than Mr. Jordan, Professor James Ward, has taken that line. My own essay was, in large measure, an attempt to prove that the blunders rested with Professor Ward, with what degree of success it is not for me to say.

This, I think, is sufficient answer to Mr. Jordan. But it is as well to add that I do not thereby admit the truth of his criticisms, even on *the Unknowable*. But, here at least we reach a sphere where a number of interpretations are possible, and I can hardly maintain my own interpretation against possible difference of opinion, until I have had an opportunity of stating it. It is not possible to attempt any exposition of Spencer's Unknowable in a brief note. But I should not like readers of this journal to consider me as an example of those who ignore fundamental connections. It is, therefore, necessary to say that an article interpreting that section of Spencer's work, in the light of the other sections that have already appeared, was offered to this Review, but was not published on the ground that, unless seen in the setting of the book of which it was a part, it was liable to misinterpretation, a criticism which will show that I can hardly be cited as an example of the fallacy Mr. Jordan appears to have found in some writers.

I would suggest, therefore, that those who undertake to criticize and to interpret Spencer's philosophy, would do well to pay more attention to the ten bulky volumes which constitute his coördination

of natural knowledge, rather than to the minute fraction of one volume, insignificant in bulk and unessential in content, designated "The Unknowable."

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REPLY.

IN my article on "Spencer's Unknowable" I was not concerned so much with the *value* or usefulness of the fundamental principles for the special sciences, as with the logical consistency of the principles themselves and with the logical method employed in establishing them. In that article I maintained that the Unknowable is an illegitimate conception; that it is not negligible because of the fact that it vitiates other results reached by the method which Spencer employs to establish it; that that method is faulty in both its psychological and logical aspects. I attempted to show that, by following Spencer's method in its psychological aspect, any psychic fact may be elevated to the dignity of a 'principle'; and by following the method in its logical application—in Spencer's argument for the relativity of knowledge—it is found to require supplementation. Under this completed form of the method, 'relativity,' instead of establishing an ultimate unknowable *relatum*, turns out to be the principle of interrelatedness or systematic connectedness of all reality; and with this as a completed principle, the Unknowable would have to be regarded as the negative factor which postulates a universal scepticism. Mr. Shelton's criticism, therefore, as inspired by the belief in the negligibility of the Unknowable and the value of the Spencerian principles for the special sciences, is entirely irrelevant to my argument, and therefore calls for no reply.

I have to confess that I did not see the final English edition of the *First Principles*, but assumed on the strength of the statements of the reviews that it contained no essential changes. The statement which Mr. Shelton quotes is certainly not important. Even though the content of the five chapters mentioned may be, as a *result*, "independent" of what follows, yet this independence constitutes a logical fission which Spencer himself was not able to bridge over. That is, as a *ground* for the operation of his method, as clearing away the *debris* for the expedition of the process of coordination of positive knowledge, these five chapters have to be considered. But it is agreed that their importance, though not negligible, is *negative*, since it vitiates his method; hence it has for this reason to be refuted.

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THE MEANING OF CHARITY

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Whatever may have been the philological or linguistic reasons for the change of the familiar text which uses the term "love" for the older term "charity," the differences of a moral and social character in the meanings of the two terms are sufficient to justify the change. The term "charity" has evidently outlived its usefulness, and as a vestigial structure is at present really dangerous to the moral tissue in which it has become imbedded. There are therefore good and valid reasons for the discontinuance of the use of the term in the fact that it has lost all moral or religious significance in becoming corrupted to the purposes of narrowly practical interests. And the corrupted concept has vitiated much thought otherwise significant for social discussion, even though the illegitimate use of the term were unintentional or unconscious. It would not be necessary to postulate a preponderance of vicious purpose in order to argue an almost universal misuse of a supposedly moral term. But the change of terms has not touched the root of the matter. The question is not one which has any necessary relation to the use or misuse of language. It is rather a question of the moral and social bases of the concepts involved, or strictly, a question of the nature of the moral and social relations represented, whatever be the terms employed to represent those relations. The proper way to get at the difficulty is, then, by rigid psychological analysis, in order to discover the fundamental types of consciousness represented, and their moral and social value as determined from their relations within the moral consciousness.

When regarded from this point of view, the type of consciousness behind these concepts represents a human institution—one that has to do with the attainment of an ideal human good, and for this reason properly called either moral or political, as the instinctive accompaniments of the one or the other satisfies better

the requirements of the individual using them. What is this institution? What is its sanction in human affairs? What is its relation to the terms we have here under question? To answer these questions briefly will put the matter squarely before us. With regard to the first question, the institution connected with the charity type of consciousness is that of control. The term "control" is meant to be used in the sense it has assumed in contemporary social discussion; but for the purposes of this paper and to avoid a long process of elimination and to state briefly and positively the meaning of the term, let us say, in general terms, that the idea of control refers to the disposition of human affairs by humanity. If we state the matter thus, it will be easier to avoid the presuppositions and technicalities of the sciences of politics, religion, and sociology, and to restrict the discussion to the grounds of analytic psychology. To put it still more concisely, what we are driving at here is an understanding of the mechanism of human self-control, when that concept is used most broadly as meaning the autonomous act of humanity in directing the processes of its destiny. Nor will it be necessary to regard control as a strictly conscious process, although the determination of its nature will be facilitated by a knowledge of the nature of particular conscious processes in the individual life. As to the meaning of control in human affairs, the problem is a logical one and leads to metaphysical grounds; and the proper statement of the matter would involve the construction of a theory of evolution. If human destiny is a process, then its unaccomplished stages have a meaning for the interpretation of its accomplished stages. The distant future good of man must be at least a proximate and partial good now; that is, the idea of the unaccomplished has a regulative use in the direction of the process of its own accomplishment. This directive force of ideas is, then, the sanction of control in human affairs, and will be regarded as rational and logical in nature or blind and impulsive according as we give predominance in life to knowledge and intelligence or to will and instinct. But this force of ideas is in no sense deliberatively legislative or legal, and there is here no purpose to attempt to establish the "natural" right of civil control. It is perhaps not necessary to assume an absolute

distinction between instinct and reason; in fact, it might be maintained that the severance of the two is just what renders the problem of control so difficult. The consciousness of an event or relation is at one time clear and luminous, at another vague and indistinct, or perhaps almost "unconscious." But we are unfortunately often not clearly conscious of the distinction between those things which we know adequately and those which we know confusedly. And we mistake the one for the other. That is, we accept an unrationalized instinct as the apple of the eye of the reason, and go wrong; not necessarily in practical cases, of course, but inevitably in the case of considerations of the grounds of practice in thought. This circumstance will suggest the answer to the third question proposed above, namely, that the relation of control to charity at least involves the assertion that charity is an instrument in the hands of the larger process of social evolution, and not necessarily therefore a matter of the effects and relations of which we are fully conscious. Our discussion is intended to show that, since charity is an element in a larger partly instinctive process, we are quite generally deceived as to its moral significance.

It seems to make, then, practically no difference whether our concept of charity be interpreted in terms of almsgiving or of love; i.e., whether its basis be material and economic, or subjective and purely spiritual, whether it represent the active and volitional side of our nature, or the passive and contemplative. The result in human affairs is the same in any case. Charity refers to the ideal of a better status for humanity, at least in the minds of persons competent to envisage the concept in the sense indicated above. It refers to humanity as organized and banded together in the interest of a higher destiny, and its common reference to the "lowly" and unfortunate is nothing but the recognition of the unsatisfactory relations that obtain among humanity as at present organized. And the mingled sense of pity with which we perceive the victims of the failure of our best motives to provide a competence for humanity is at bottom a regret that one of our purposes has failed—the purpose to contribute to the commonwealth of human good. The sense of charity is then one of the deepest instincts in human nature, and, being a deep-seated instinct, it is

essential to all social relations, as well as perhaps to all strictly personal purposes—"the greatest of these is charity." It is one of the most important of the instruments through which men hope to attain to the highest of their possibilities, and may therefore be called a means of control.

As a proper means of control in the higher personal life of morality and religion, what is the function of charity? The history of religious literature and of moral theory as well would seem to indicate that man has pretty generally regarded his final purpose as lying in the "beyond," that his utmost good inevitably is to be found outside the present, that his real home is afar off in a sphere where limitations are not what they are in this shut-in vale of tears. All of which means that the immediate awareness of the present status of the self is rarely satisfying. And in those cases where the consciousness of the moment is satisfactory, a very little analysis is sufficient to show that that consciousness is not the consciousness of the larger self—rather the consciousness that is self-satisfactory cannot be the self-consciousness at all; it is a consciousness whose object connotes the satisfactoriness of some remote and accidental organic feeling. We do not find ourselves in feelings of satisfaction, nor in any other immediate fact. Rather we are led indirectly to the discovery of ourselves only through a logical process set in motion by some distractive state the unsatisfactoriness of which is intense enough to goad us into a recognition of the problem involved in an experience being satisfactory or otherwise. Present fact perforce turns our faces toward the beyond. But shall we find the beyond constituted by the same kind of elements as that which drives us to it? It is the allurement of the "other" that prevails upon us to look to the future. But the "other" is not foreign. The present has two characters: its factual, ideally geographical, as it were; and its worthful, its meaning in immediate feeling. The ideal toward which we look lacks the former, except in the higher forms of constructive art; and that is its only difference from the present. There is no "real" difference between the ideal and the real. There is nothing wrong with the fact of life. It is the meaning of this fact with reference to our whole life and the feeling consequent on this relation which renders

it focally conscious, that may be real and right or unreal and wrong. The ideal and the real are in this sense both factual, and their existential characters are not subject to valuation; it is the relation between the two that may take a moral estimate. That the life of the intellect in science should eventually realize the meaning of that relation through the equation of the "mere" fact with the ideal of what the perfect state should be in terms of value, is what we mean by moral evolution; and the limit of the process—that is, a final balance of the moments of the process—is our concept of welfare.

There is, then, nothing wrong with my factual self. What I need is a set of conditions different in some important details from any I have known. This is a set of conditions, as I see it, under which a rational being would experience fact equated with value. It is the familiar life-conditions with the unsatisfactory elements removed. My idea of the good for me is that of myself as relieved from the limitations imposed by my present feeling states—not relieved of the feeling states, but of their lack of qualitative harmony with myself as fact. My enlarged, personal self is the goal of my purposes. It is a sum of cognitions unannexed by feeling, while the incomplete personality of the present is a nexus of feeling.

Charity is the relation, then, between the lowly state of my present more or less impersonal self and that kingdom where my lowly and despised state is lost in the exercise of the princely function of self-legislation unhampered by the limitations of the flesh, which, as feeling states, is, morally, to be regarded as impersonal. The object of charity is then the enlarged self, the I. I envisage myself as I might be and will that I might attain my potentialities. The incommensurability of myself as I am with myself as I can conceive myself to be is the logical ground of the charity relation; and the capacity for conception of this relation is the moral personality. Our analysis has shown that all moral relations are personal; they are all functions of the I. Then charity *must* "begin at home." I am myself the object of any and all charity I can understand; with any other object charity becomes an abstract and quantitative relation. As a moral relation it must remain a

character of the inner self-consciousness. Consequently my interest in the other fellow is secondary and derived. I see that he does not come up to the possibilities that are in him and that he cannot take advantage of the opportunities that lie about him. It is, however, in my attempt to apply my inner disinterested feelings to the other fellow's case that the purity of the charity idea is lost, and my charity becomes as sounding brass and a clanging cymbal. Then charity leads me to the false conclusion that I am my brother's keeper; then the light that is in me has failed. Here again it makes no difference whether charity means loving or giving, feeling or doing—whether it is the will with its consequent deed, or the affection with its quiescent state. A personal relation become objectified is rendered impersonal and therefore non-moral. And in rendering charity to Caesar we are attempting to objectify a personal relation. Nor does it make any difference what is the origin of the state in question, whether a biological instinct or an ideal of worth. When the whole relation is objectified, when we consider the unsatisfactory condition of another as compared with his ideal, we are unable henceforth to keep our thinking free from admixtures of our own purposes. The other fellow's affairs become entangled with mine, and it is my ideal welfare that becomes the object of my thought rather than that of my neighbor whom I began by attempting to help. It is a conscious relation which cannot be completely objectified without losing its real nature.

The disparity between my neighbor's state and what both he and I would regard as his ideal state constitutes for me his need. Now we have seen that when we objectify this relation we reduce it to the cold externality of fact; i.e., we depersonalize it. It is for us no longer the personal relation between self and object, but a relation between objects. But the standard of reference for all things considered as values is the self, and the self involved is the one which I can know, i.e., myself. I am not judging his personality, but that of which I judge is his morality, that is, his relation to his good, and the standard is I. There is no sense in my attempts at description of another's ego, except through the doubtful method of analogy. My neighbor's need is then the index to his moral status, and when I refer it to the personal standard, the need

indicates a state of his which we call lowliness. But from the high ground of the standard the situation means the discovery of superiority for the standard, it assumes uniqueness for the idiosyncratic function of the personality, and all personality that I can know is mine. Contemplation of my neighbor's moral status is highly complimentary to me. It discloses a trait in me in which I excel. His lack is my gain. It is highly comforting to reflect on the misery and lowliness and want of humanity at large, for it gives the sweet assurance that we are not as others; and this fact is probably what makes charity so attractive a "virtue" in modern life. The deep feeling for others' pain is a highly agreeable experience for most of us. And the religious devotee will not for all the world give up the bliss of the agony of tears which he can cause to flow on any and all occasions with no more provocation than the mere presence of the idea of the distressed in body or mind. And the stoniest and stupidest of hearts will with tears most uncharitably read the scriptural strictures on charity with a pleasure that passeth understanding. The poor in spirit are as objects of charity of lesser dignity than the charitable soul that judges them. Their need is a suggestion of the fact that in spirit they do not measure up to the standard of the personality by which they are judged. And what deceives us in charity is the fact that the personality that serves as a standard is the very same personality which does the judging when the need is discovered. The consciousness of another's need is thus a consciousness of a superior dignity as belonging to the self-consciousness. It establishes a unique position for the judger. The object of charity is then pitied, we feel sorry for the one whose want is great. And out of the generosity of our hearts we give him our sympathy, and while our giving is intended to equalize his opportunity with ours, it at least gives us the comfortable assurance of a loftier and worthier status for ourselves. Now the very fact that we argue that in giving sympathy we "bear one another's burdens" and "make each other's burdens lighter" is a proof that the effect wanted is to increase the general status of good or decrease the general weight of burdens. Sharing with the other fellow will tend to distract my attention from my own shortcomings, and thus increase the

warmth of the self-congratulatory feelings; and to get the fullest value, I will have charity for all mankind, will distract myself from my own condition by arguing that all humanity is probably in worse straits. There is comfort in reflecting that it might have been worse. It will at any time serve to center our consciousness, not necessarily upon a worse state, but away from the moment of present unpleasantness. There are abundant psychological reasons why out of the most bigoted and self-centered race-mind the world has known there should spring the religion of universal love and good-will to men.

But it is less than a step from pity to contempt. In fact, the basis of contempt is already contained in pity, and both are indigenous to sympathy. And sympathy is the essence of charity. A very short residence in this vale of tears suffices to carry us beyond the stage of reflective idealizing. In the development of the religion of charity the doctrine of non-resistance and caring not for the things of this world had very soon to be "interpreted." And interpretation flourished until we reach the conception of the church militant and the church triumphant, and the things of this world so fused in the interpretation that in time the church became the richest institution on earth—richest even in the point where moth and rust do corrupt. The early need of the spirit becomes the want of the economic man. And man's want is of the means of life. Nor is the life more abundantly his concern at this point. The earth has been so far "subdued" that he will be happy if he can guarantee for himself even the less abundant necessities of existence. Here we return to the concept of need, and the need is the necessity of existence, not the lack of spirituality. Inevitably then in this world need becomes an economic phenomenon. Our concern is, however, with the psychology of the matter. We have seen that charity leads to a distinction between persons, and it can now be shown that the distinction to which it leads is practically one which has invariably a material ground—economic in the crude sense. We have seen that a disinterested consciousness is always objectless, and that a consciousness with an object clearly defined is impersonal, or, to state it baldly, material. Consciousness of charity for another is then the consciousness of a

depersonalized object, and all impersonal objects are instruments in the hands of the consciousness that knows them. Hence personalized need can only be of and for the self-consciousness, the spiritual life cannot go outside itself for its object; and whatever we know as objects other than our own spiritual inner purposes are objects as instruments, which means that they are material. The other fellow's need is therefore for me a tool, and the object of his need is of the earth earthy.

Difference in dignity between my neighbor and myself thus becomes a question of worth, and worth tends to take always an economic signification. The object of charity we first pity, then despise. Lowliness and unworthiness now mean want of the goods of life, and the goods in this case are the external conditions of life. I am what I have; and because my neighbor has nothing, he has no being except as the mere material out of which through charity I can work out my salvation. The beggar must lie by the wayside—a part of the beneficent constitution of things—in order that I may have the material to prove my spiritual respectability. The poor we have always with us! That the beggar should himself *be* a value or possess worth could not occur to us. He is the imperfection of the flesh, and through his lowliness only can he come into relation to my worthiness; he is the negative condition of my attaining my due. All worth, with reference to charity, is in having.

It is of course neither possible nor necessary to argue that there is no good except economic good. What I wish to insist upon is that in all goods there is this economic aspect, that in everything we call good there is an external and objective reference. That a purely ideal good does not free itself from the immediacy of feeling, and hence cannot take on a generalized signification, seems to follow at once from the universality of the fact that our disinterested concepts tend always toward degeneration when considered with reference to their practical use. It seems that there can be no question of this fact when it is looked at historically or when the data are psychologically analyzed. A concept either becomes "abstract" or assumes the concreteness of immediate feeling. An idea in use becomes either a vague and meaningless

symbol, a "mere form," or it represents a concrete particular. Our doctrines all turn out to be either mystical, dark sayings, or they get a crudely concrete or material significance. It is thus clear that the practical use of ideas seems to involve epistemological degeneracy when their concreteness is assured, or moral unregeneration when their universal value is emphasized. But the point is that all our value ideas show the downward tendency toward economic materiality so long as prominence is given to their external or objective meaning.

The index to the spiritual superiority of the charitable mind is thus his worthiness, which naturally shows the tendency to become vulgarized into mere materialized worth estimated in terms of possessions. We do not here wish of course to go to the length of attempting to show that the necessary connection between spiritual worthiness and material worth is necessarily or even generally recognized by the worthy. But it could easily be shown that it is often thus recognized by reference to many cases in which charity is made use of as a business asset. In fact, the charity which "vaunteth itself" would prove the point. And the unfortunate thing is that we are all often deceived by such charity. We are here concerned to show that the "goodness" of charity, as it actually operates, is to confer upon the giver the consciousness of spiritual respectability and to distinguish him from the subject of his gift by "natural" and impassable limits. Its final meaning is, then, socially, to accomplish the undemocracy of caste—to establish between persons an ineradicable distinction into classes which are in "nature" mutually exclusive. And here it could be shown that the argument of "equality" is made use of to hide the conscious fact that men are divided into classes of different worth. The practical misuse of two moral categories will illustrate this point. I have reference here to the categories of "obligation" and "natural right."

When the Lord made a covenant with Israel the ground was smoothed for a perfect moral relationship. Not that it is desired to give a supernatural sanction for either morality or for contracts—there is no more a supernatural sanction for a contract, even a moral one, than for anything else, economic individualism to the

contrary notwithstanding—nor is a contract as usually understood necessarily representative of a moral relation. In fact, the contract often covers a multitude of moral evils, and is perhaps most often either immoral or merely negatively or restrictively moral. But the covenant with Israel represents the mutuality of obligation. The question is not whether the "party of the other part" has performed his function so as to guarantee my right; the only question that can arise is whether each party has met the obligation which his nature imposes upon him, and the question can occur only to the person who feels the obligation. Israel could not know a breach of obligation on the part of the Lord, and the Lord would not be concerned with a breach of obligation in Israel, whatever he might be able abstractly to "know" about it. That is, the obligation of another cannot be the object of moral concern for me. Israel's sin is not a sin against God but a sin against the ideally perfect Israel. All I can know with reference to my contracts is a faithful performance or failure in proper performance on the part of the other person. And the performance of function is only indicatively or symbolically moral. But the real knowledge of obligation can only be of *my* obligation, which is disinterested and objectless, therefore personal. And all obligation is personal—as known it cannot be the expression of the other person's personality, which is self-cognitive only and requires no object. I cannot thus know another's obligation, and morality dictates that I cultivate my own vineyard. The other's obligation is known only to himself, as mine is known only to me; it is the idiosyncrasy of the personality. The only relation between two personalities from the point of view of knowledge is one based upon logical analogy. It is an epistemological relation and is *only* known, that is, has no other being than that defined in and by cognition. God himself cannot then immediately and objectively know my obligation.

Now the corollary to the proposition that obligation is personal is that all personalities must be assumed equal; not in the quantitative sense that they are interchangeable, but in the sense that they are equal "before the law" in that each embodies or is the law. If they are not objectively known, they cannot be distin-

guished. The characteristic of the personality is not a distinction, even though personalities might differ in their unique functions of obligation. This is the ground of democracy with reference to social and political relations, and of "brotherhood" in the sphere of religion. But it follows further that in a brotherhood of moral personalities there is no place whatever for any distinction of "lowly" and "worthy," and hence no place for charity or any other concept which rests on inequality of individuals. Inevitably, then, charity vaunteth itself and is puffed up, for its only excuse for being is to mark a distinction that rests on no real difference, to give to the one who exercises it a place distinguished from the common herd. Far from being a "natural" character of man, it is the most clearly and materially artificial. It represents the first step toward man's fallen state. It is man's first self-deception, his first difference from God. Would we dispense with "love" and charity as fundamental religious virtues? The divine love is merely a recognition and an appreciation of the equipotentiality of all personalities and is a moral phenomenon with no peculiarly religious connotation. There being no "depraved by nature," there is no need or excuse for terms representing differences of dignity that do not exist. We are of course talking about the abstract love as represented in charity. Biological or natural instinct has no point in common with what passes as religious love, in spite of the fact that it is often confused with it. The concept of eternal righteousness, as the Jew would have it, or, as the Greek would say, universal justice, is the highest concept attained in moral experience, and what is not contained in that idea is subject to the moral degeneration which all practical concepts sooner or later show.

What is the moral experience which must take the place of what is designated charity? The fact that charity represents a universal human trait furnishes all the justification that any idea needs or can have. But its universality does not preclude that it is and must be universally misunderstood. The fact that charity is universal assures it a meaning, and the question is naturally, What is that meaning? There may be two aspects distinguished

in all meanings. First, there is the meaning for the inner personality of the consciousness for which a value exists. This we can define as the consciousness of identity with the personality of some object of cognition. It may be called obligation when obligation is understood as the unique meaning of the self-consciousness. It is peculiarly personal, the only "free" act of the personality, the act of cognition which gives self-knowledge. In the second place, there is the outer, objectified aspect of the self-consciousness, the consciousness set up as the standard of values. The proper designation of this objectified obligation is justice; but it must be hastily added that justice does not refer to any particular relation among individuals, but is the standard of judgment for those relations. Being the measure of such relations, it is not identifiable with any of them. It is the law of personal relationships as obligation is the ideal of the synthesis of those relationships. Each is an aspect of the autonomy of the personality, and between the two they exhaust the theory of morality and dictate what morality shall be practically. No moral person can therefore desire charity; in the state whose citizenry is composed of persons even God's mercy can find no place. Whoever asks clemency admits his guilt, he asks the coward's terms. The recognition of charity in its usual meaning precludes the possibility of any morality.

The charity attitude then negates morality in the recognition of distinctions of worth. Its final effect (and its unconscious purpose) is to perpetuate those distinctions in the interest of the "worthy." This it does through appealing to the instrumentality of the idea of natural right. It must be conceded at the outstart that some positive theory of natural right is indispensable. But it need not be perverted. As a moral personality I am free; but freedom gets interpreted as freedom from the necessity of recognizing obligation as being the law of my nature. And this comes to mean practically that, as a person of superior worth, even when worth is crudely interpreted in material terms, I have no obligation. Those who do not possess worth are bound, limited; and if I choose to loose their bonds, the act merely replaces the bond of natural conditions with a bond of gratitude to me. I have taken

the place of natural conditions, and my influence over the needy assumes the naturalness that inhered in his previous condition. Gratitude on his part is thus my right, and the right is natural—guaranteed in the constitution of things. Obligation becomes objectified, transferred from my personality to a quality which I recognize as of value (to me) in others, and is made proportional to the extent in which the needy person is dependent upon me materially. All obligation is thus on the side of the other fellow, and since I have the means to his freedom the obligation is due to me. He becomes my slave and the slavery is right and necessary in the constitution of things. Responsibility rests only upon him; I am free and my will is his law.

Thus we see that charity in its practical application tends to lead to the abandonment of all morality. In the social order it becomes a justification of slavery through economic means. In religion it leads to a bigoted paternal self-righteousness and to the finality of external authority. It would seem to have no function in any system of morality that can justify itself to thought. It leads to a distinction of persons in which any difference which carries any kind of power over others is justified in "nature," and finally adopts the point of view of heteronomy of will in the case of the person in need. And the acknowledgment of the externality of law is fatal to all morality. Hence if I adopt the charity point of view, any power I may have becomes a right, and good can then be accomplished only through my will. My neighbor's need establishes my right over him. My wealth makes him my servant; my intelligence makes him the instrument of my purposes; my spirituality makes him my protégé; my vice makes him my victim. In short, I am my brother's keeper; and under the influence of this fallacy the ideal of human brotherhood is indefinitely postponed.

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IDEA AND ACTION

E. Jordan

Since the discovery some years ago of the importance for psychology of the reflex-arc concept there has, it would seem, been instituted a general propaganda in the interest of applying the notion to the methods of all the sciences which touch in any way the human element. Not only has a very large part of the output of the psychological laboratory been committed quite exclusively to the mechanism involved in the concept, but recent attempts to go beyond the presuppositions of experiment merely, in the direction of a developed psychological theory, also seem to assume that all thought on matters psychological can consist only in descriptions of the way consciousness 'behaves.' And behavior as thus conceived is simply the sum of things done by consciousness through the instrumentality of the organism, in the interest of results achieved in the immediate material environment. Even the most refined value-aspects of ideas and feelings are but fluttering attempts to 'do things,' which somehow get smothered in the depths of the organism. Consciousness gets up in the morning, stretches its behavioristic legs, and its half-waking awareness of things is nothing more than the reverberation through the 'organism' of leg-stretching movements or tendencies to movement. It puts on its behavioristic clothes by hitching itself up to previous reflexes somehow left vibrating in the hypothetical organism; it recognizes itself as the same 'motor-complex' that went to bed the night before by tendencies to carry through the same motor reactions involved in locking up the house, which reactions still synaptically persist; its decision to meet the day's work is duly 'prefigured' in muscular effigiations, and it goes forth to conquer, reflexly rejoicing as a strong man.

Under the influence of the further assumption that all things can be explained psychologically, the same attitude has dominated other interests than those of scientific psychology. In economics the individual is now an economic force,—is, in fact, merely an element hopelessly involved in a system of 'economic forces.' With reference to production he is a 'cost' or a 'resource' or a labor 'supply'; his existence is measured in 'wants' which are estimated in terms of 'prices' in distribution; he suffers dissolution through 'consumption' and his bones are gathered to his fathers in the potter's field of economic waste. Sociology makes of him a tissue in the social organism (or 'organization,' as they seem to prefer to say now), girds up his loins with social forces, fulfills his destiny in social instincts, turns him over to the social reformers, who mark him off a lot in the New Jerusalem of socialized conditions.

To put the case briefly, from the point of view of the human sciences of the present, the human individual dissolves into a calculable sum of physical, biological, and psychological 'conditions.' It will be contended in this paper that this point of view originates in a psychology which has wrongfully appropriated the name of empirical or experimental and in a psychologized philosophy which has adopted a naive, realistic materialism falsely supposed to rest on the principles of scientific method, and that its basis is to be found in the dogma that the essence of the idea is action.

The principle that every mental process or state of mind or idea (it makes no difference for our purposes what name is given it) tends to express itself either mediately or immediately through movement in the organism is, perhaps, well founded. But that this tendency to expression explains anything more than certain elementary structural characters of the idea may very well be questioned. The case is quite clear with the ordinary ideas or mental contents which accompany the simple necessities of action involved in daily life. As I go through the daily round of duties, my conduct is adequately described as a complex series of sense images together with series of muscular movements more or less

appropriate thereto. Here we are on the simple plane of reflex or sensori-motor reaction, and the quality of the sensation constitutes perhaps all the 'consciousness' I have, certainly all I need in this action-context. The same mechanism disposes of the entire life of habit, so long, at least, as habit flows on undisturbed. Similarly, the sensory reports from deep-lying, organic functions touch the key for the discharge of movements in instinct, so that the entire life as organic may be described as nervous and muscular automatism. And in so far as we are content to assume that the entire content of 'mind' is disposed of on the principle of organic automatism, the basis of our psychology, and of the philosophy that depends upon it, is simple and very attractive. But may it not be too simple? It seems that our employment of this assumption would necessarily commit us to the further assumption that the age-long metaphysical problem of the relation of mind and body has been solved, and that an empirical demonstration of the solution can be given. But it is just in this assumption that the difficulty lies. That is, the validity of the assumption rests upon the reality of the problem, which ought to be avoided if the principles of the philosophy of action are to be consistently followed. A problem set for us in immediate, empirical fact is dodged by uncritically accepting the identity of its two terms. In the face of the facts and of their concreteness and disparateness, we assume that mind is essentially nothing but functionings in the organism.

The question takes on sharp outlines when we employ actionist presuppositions in the description of certain types of mental facts. It can, of course, be objected that description does not require any presuppositions, and the objection is valid, if and after we have accepted the attitude that presuppositions (that is, ideas which are not immediately identifiable with organic response) are not involved in the mental life at all, but that that life is merely organic. But even a superficial examination of the images involved in perception and memory will set out in clear contrast to each other two characters, both of which seem to be root-elements

of the image. If Bergson has meant anything in the discussion of current psychological problems, it certainly is that mental facts are not as simple as they have seemed. On this point Bergson has been led to adopt a position that might be characterized as radically empirical, in spite of the fact that the rationalism inherent in his modes of thought spoils much of his discussion by trying to join together what God hath put asunder. Note for a moment his handling of the facts of perception. In the experience of immediate fact the unique factor is that an object offers a clue to the organism upon which the latter is to react in some way advantageous to itself. Presented fact is either useful or not, and the gist of perception is disclosed in the choice which the body makes among prefigured modes of reaction; the reaction not chosen degenerates in the situation in a way which renders it merely 'virtual.' This virtual action is the pure perception and is distinguished from actual perception by the fact that the latter passes off reflexly through the organism. Because the latter is immediately accounted for in terms of organic response, no consciousness in the strict sense is involved, and we have merely the case of automatic adaptation between one 'real image' and another, the unique element being simply the fact that one of the images is privileged. But in case the adaptation does not take place in this immediate and automatic fashion, when there is a hitch between stimulus and response, the action originally meant by the stimulus, that is, the real content of the object presented as this meaning, is seen from the point of view of the real situation to become precipitated or 'prefigured' as virtual action. It is then, it would seem, act as viewed from the side of its representative or cognitive function, the idea of the logicians. Thus the attempt to force the duplicity of fact into the simple form of an outward act, regarded as homogeneous throughout, defeats its own end by showing clearly the contrary fact, that the image invariably presents two faces, the one being the motor tendency to reproduce its object, the other the representative function of intending or meaning its object. And Bergson's laborious analysis makes it fairly

evident that the image can never be so simple as not to consist of both. Further, his method of reaching simplicity here is significant, and possibly illustrates all methods having similar purposes, that is, one of the aspects of the image is found to be merely 'theoretical.' But this looks like neglecting a fact because it does not behave as theory requires.

Clearly, then, although the assumption is that action is the only element involved in any real situation, that same element seems to split itself into two very different parts, the one being the action as a fluent and living relation between real things,—an act which occurs and in occurring actually creates,—the other fulfilling its function by merely 'meaning' an action which is deferred. But being deferred means that it does not occur, and failing to occur means that it does not express itself through the organism. Thus the crux of the matter for a psychologized logic is just the fact that the break between the neural or physical conditions on the one side, and the act which is to modify that set of conditions on the other, is the slip betwixt the cup and the lip. And while most idealistic schemes have thinly covered the breach with assumptions, and have beclouded it with fine-spun logical trivialities, the best that modern actionists seem able to do is to bridge the gap with a hypothetical contact mystified under the name of synapse, thus trading one mystery for another. For the synapse is now a physical or neural connection, now a poetic or energic 'as if.' It is *as if* two liquids were separated by a membrane of rather high degree of impermeability. And the result is that continuity of action between the organism and its environment, which was established in the first place by assumption, now requires a second supposition,—and one of rather doubtful probability,—to render its position secure. But when we have to bolster up one presupposition by another, by what compulsion are we obliged to stop with two? It would be far simpler to take the common sense view that an act is an indivisible unity, which, as unity, *can* have whatever functions or characters it has in fact, and that it requires none

of the ingenuity of psychological atomism to 'establish' its simplicity. Bergson's purpose seems to be to show that the depths of ontology, which are included, of course, within the profundities of epistemology, are fathomed when knowledge of the act leads us to the vision of duration and futurity. But it is just this vision that many of us do not survive. And yet "how goodly had the vision been." For, when action is thus caught on the wing, it vouches for its existence in another form, viz., that in which it does not act, but simply represents. While the latter as pure perception exists only theoretically, its import becomes significant as a troublesome negative limitation to the out-reaching ambition of the form which exists practically. That is, its theoretic persistence posits the whole field of reality as cognitive and interpretative, and as not requiring in any sense the urgencies of mechanistic energies as a final guarantee of its right to reality. And this means that a static world of representation is, after all, behind Bergson's attempt to create a world of pure functional reals. The same dualism of psychological reals persists throughout Bergson's work, and the problems it presents give him occasion for most of the significant insights which that work offers for modern thought. We have seen that perception is, on the one side, pure act as prevenience, and, on the other, act as carried through to response. Memory shows the two forms as pure memory and habit-memory. And although the pure forms are 'only theoretical,' yet it is apparent that his thought would not hold together for a moment, if they were not given equal status with the practical forms of experience. It seems clear that not every aspect of experience is necessarily included in the notion of action.

If we should consider the most potent factors in the thought of the present, it would become more and more evident that the emphasis is in every field upon the dynamic and living, rather than upon the eternal verities of an older type of thought. And by dynamic and living we do not mean the spiritual impulsions of a life assumed to be made up essentially of comfortable accomplishments and close-

fitting realizations, but rather the ruder and cruder life which embodies insatiable urgencies arising from the necessities imposed upon the organism by a world of like structure. The home of the spirit is to be found and founded in the flesh, and the life of the spirit is to be saved to the flesh. Philosophy glories in the fact that it is of the earth earthy. It may be worth while to note some of the many directions in which this motive is finding expression. And first, remembering that the spirit of the modern age is scientific and positivist, one would naturally expect that science would show the first and fundamental postulate of the modern mind in the principle that matter is to be defined in terms of energy. The old atom of homogeneous stuff is displaced by the new center of forces, and the latter receives definition in terms of mathematical relations, which, in their turn, seem to be exchanging their old-fashioned stability and 'universality' for functional relations to their 'conditions,' which conditions are, once more, functional intersections of other dynamic lines of force. Logic follows suit by regarding the hypothetical judgment, once conceived, perhaps, as foundation and superstructure, as representative of a course of evolutional progress, and the fact that little seems to have been accomplished in the way of developing the conception may merely argue the truth of the generally accepted dogma that logic must await the realization of definiteness in scientific method. And just now the scientific method seems fairly to wallow in insurgent fluidity with its consequent indefiniteness. Action, movement, change,—these are the categories that are fundamental everywhere.

But the interest in change is temporal and practical and human. It is, then, in the fields of the practical interests that we may expect to find the most interesting attempts to apply the principles of actionist philosophy; at least, it is for those interests that most of our philosophers show special concern. It might seem a rather precarious procedure to undertake to incorporate the uncertainties of changing fact into the instrument whose function it is to find definiteness (however low a degree) in the very inwardness of the facts

themselves. And yet that seems to be what is attempted, and results so far do not look reassuring. That is, a logic of change has perhaps not yet been worked out,—the 'logic of evolution' to the contrary notwithstanding,—and it may be that the very notion of ordered knowledge within an experience of fluent fact is what Hobbes called a 'metaphorical speech.' If one accepts a philosophy or logic of change, one is committed to the acceptance also of a world which consists of other things than facts, a world in which anything becoming another thing is a serious problem. For under this condition the idea as act becomes a cause which may upset the world of fact at any point or at any moment. The act becomes free, its effects unpredictable, thus contravening the very scientific method which called it into being. And this difficulty is only avoided by reflecting that, while an act of creative power, the idea is also a represented value.

The philosophy whose theoretical form we are here attempting to state may be summarized thus. The idea is an act and nothing else; and further, the act which is the idea is the action or movement involved in the functioning of the organism. Then every situation which has hitherto been erroneously supposed one in which we should think ourselves straight and then 'give the thought his act' is really a situation in which an act of ours is included as an element in a larger functional whole, this inclusion being the essence of consciousness and the process of thought. Yet thought may, after the act is completed, dwell on the question whether the act was successful with reference to other possible acts, possible acts having reference to alternatives of action distinguishable in the situation as a whole. That is, consciousness is reflexive rather than reflective. Thought is then co-terminous with the physical and physiological processes of movement, these processes being charged with the further capacity for *post mortem* examination of the relations between the situation which they constitute and other situations of the same sort. Life is action; thought or consciousness is useful, that is, real, in so far as it renders action successful; that is, it *is* successful action. Successful

action is that which issues in proper conditions of further action. But action may embody and fulfill the finer needs (avoiding the term purposes) of the æsthetic and religious experience, as well as the coarser and commoner needs of the organism.

There is much that is satisfying and attractive about such a scheme, and most persons will find little difficulty in accepting it,—so far as it goes and with the proper restrictions and limitations. And if belief in idealism (for which the above is supposed to be an antidote) ever involved the conception of the life-process as a complacent contemplation of consummate truth, then idealists should ask pardon for their sins. There are, however, two parts to this creed, and these will not permit of being confused without serious consequences. Nor will they permit of over-emphasis on either part without destroying the balance of forces which represents the truth of the creed. The two clauses are that life is action, either as (1) the act of critical estimation or evaluation, as for example in æsthetic or logical experience, or as (2) the act of the organism in accomplishing results which condition its further action, that is, results in what are ordinarily called material things.

An emphasis upon either of these two tenets which carries with it neglect of the other is fatal to any well-ordered social or individual life, and as a social order of individual lives is the highest of conceivable human ends, undue emphasis in either direction entails a misunderstanding of human motives and a confusion of the meaning of the term practical. As a case of overworking the first of the principles might be named any of the ancient or modern logical idealisms which stand out so attractively in the history of philosophy. As poetic schemes of pure values known in placid contemplation, they issue in the ideal of a timeless, universal Garden of Eden, such as appears again and again from Plato's *Republic* to Wells's *New Worlds for Old*. These have been real in so far as they have stimulated men's minds to try to work them out in the flesh. But their notorious falsity 'on the whole' is well exemplified in the actual history of the New Jeru-

salem, the supposed 'reality' of which has drugged with overdoses of 'hope and trust' the spirit that should have accomplished a good human state, expecting thus to conquer by waiting and through inaction deferring to the timeless a human ideal which should have been operative here and now. There has been further confusion by compounding this idealistic view with scientific atomism, in the hope of saving the individual from the *mêlée* occasioned by the attempt to get things together *überhaupt*. An idealism saved over from the period of mediæval universalism runs hopelessly together with modern scientific atomism, and the result is the absurd confusion of economic individualism in practical affairs and the hopeless effort to identify the individual with the universal by sheer force of logic. And when the outcome of the attempt is accepted as a principle of philosophy, any and all morality seems to be rendered impracticable thereby.

But if, on a basis of the philosophy of the pure thought-act, we come to grief in mere contemplative appreciation, the issues of the opposite point of view are worse. Action being accepted as the basis of the reality of life, emphasis comes to be laid on the mere gaining of results, without taking the trouble to inquire whether our results are of any consequence. Indeed, the only criterion imposed by our actionist principle upon any result is that it serve as a condition for further results, which in turn are judged by the same standard. Hence the apotheosis of 'process' and 'tendency' in theoretical affairs, and the Mammonism of 'getting things done' in practice. The weaknesses of the philosophy of evolution and the indefiniteness of its categories probably find their roots here. A full discussion of these weaknesses would sooner or later implicate the principles and practices of scientific method itself, but that lies outside our present purpose. On the other hand, a scheme which looks for justification to practical consequences should welcome an analysis of some of the interests within which practical consequences are the desideratum. Let us therefore look at some of the current motives involved in our more important practical disciplines, with a view to seeing

their relations to the prevailing direction of present-day thought, thus briefly suggesting what the application of actionist philosophy to the interests of education, politics, and ethics brings forth as its more weighty practical consequences. Even at the risk of overstepping the bounds of philosophy, we may attempt to disclose the 'business' motives which actionist principles seem to make dominant everywhere. One begins to suspect that the degree to which 'practical' interests dominate the present social and political situation constitutes the *reductio ad absurdum* of the philosophy of action.

A superficial glance at current educational tendencies is perhaps conducive to hopefulness. Many movements seem to be indicative of an approaching democracy hitherto not conceivable. We hear proclaimed in nearly every educational address the principles of democratic or universal education laid down in the governmental schemes established by our fathers. Educational journals are filled with the same sentiment. The interest in education is declared to be wide and popular. There was never a time when well-trained persons were in such demand. Even business is supposed to require persons of largeness of mind and roundness of character. The 'people' are clamorous for education. And if our notions of education were determined by current discussion, we would be obliged to conclude that the American people have risen as one man and declared that education is the panacea for all the ills of life. No doubt there is a fundamental faith in education, even a belief that it constitutes for us an only hope; but there is no corresponding degree of intelligence in our attempts to understand what the process means. And in our zeal for education we are ready to 'do' anything except to try to think clearly. Many things are done already, so many, it may be, that a generation of clear-headedness will have to pass before we shall see that many of the same things will require to be undone. Briefly, the notion of what is involved in education as a process and as an accomplishment has recently changed; but it seems never to have occurred to our experts that the

change may be for the worse. Since the initiation of the elective system there has steadily been growing up the conviction that anything which may happen to interest the individual provides satisfactory matter for the educational process. But a little critical analysis of this principle would have shown that it rests upon a questionable sensationalistic or rather impressionistic psychology, and further, that it implies that the standard for education rests upon the caprice of the person to be educated, rather than upon the judgment of the person who is educated. It is he that is sick that is to be the physician. In practice, therefore, since the child is fundamentally active rather than thoughtful, his interest demands that the process be adapted to things he can do. Consequently the curriculum must be made over, first, in the interest of laboratory science at the expense of languages and the so-called cultural subjects, and secondly, in the interests of the 'practical' at the expense of the knowledge-aspects of the sciences. First Latin, Greek, etc., had to give way to physics, chemistry, etc.; and as for the rest, the sciences themselves soon were superseded by vocational subjects; now we have 'shop-work.' A list of the 'practical' subjects now occupying a place in the curriculum is enough to fill with dismay and despair the mind of any one not committed entirely to commercialized materialism. It can be confidently asserted that a large majority of those engaged in the actual work of teaching are skeptical of the results obtainable in these subjects. And while it is sincerely hoped that sooner or later serious permanent results may be obtained from these interests, the intelligence required to direct them to that end does not now exist in the minds either of the experts or of the business men who (actionists all) are jointly responsible for their incorporation in the school system. But things are done nevertheless; also pell-mell. From the point of view of the philosophy of action the situation begins to look like this: Practical men, discerning that the older education based on ideas and committed to the belief that significant results must involve ideas, see that results in this form are not immediately

practical, not convertible into cash. They cannot be converted into things of value,—value meaning what can be represented by economic activity. For them, to learn is to do; to do is to make; to make is to produce the conditions of further action; in short, the educative process is the commercial process. To prove the point our experts commit the fallacy of converting, "The commercial process is educative," into "The educative process is commercial."

A similar arraignment must be made of practical politics. It would perhaps be contrary to every American tradition to ask that a legislator be prepared with ideas, or that he should defend his action by appealing to ideas. The only requirement is that he get results, these being usually in the form of 'pork' or of a shave in the tax-rate. The latter result may be obtained (however unjustly) by shifting the burden from the constituency to the shoulders of a section or class unable to defend itself by reason of numerical or commercial weakness or of ignorance. No questions of the right constitution of the social order seem to be worthy of consideration, but each problem that arises must be settled with reference only to immediate material results. Aside from the possibility of dollars and cents to be made either for the legislator or for the constituency, the next and perhaps most important consideration is the influence of a vote on the likelihood of re-election. Again, the ideal is to do things, or to get or have things done. That considerations of a purely speculative or, so far as immediate consequences go, impractical character might contribute after all to the accomplishment of results more satisfactory, even from the material point of view, than mere dependence upon methods and processes, is a principle whose statement will evoke only merriment from our practical men of affairs. Once more the emphasis is placed upon action to the utter neglect of ideas or principles. Thought is necessary; yes, but only to distinguish methods, never ends. Thinking is doing, or perhaps better, getting things done.

It is, however, in the interest of morality that this criticism of actionist principles is undertaken. Under these principles

the conscious life is identified with, or involved in, the complex of physical or physiological conditions which constitute a situation of fact. Ethics is then a purely descriptive science, hypothesis itself being a descriptive process; all questions are questions of fact. Morality is that life which knows, or rather senses, or perhaps better still, tends to reproduce, its relations to its evolutional conditions, its *mores*. The *mores* are a set of conditions which determine both the processes and the results of present action. Causation is the moral law. Whatever is, is right; morality is custom, and "It is being done" is the last word. Yet this scheme of activity is offered as a substitute for older idealistic schemes on the ground that the latter furnish no room for spontaneity; that the life of humanity is tied up hard and fast in a system perfected from the beginning. The older views can offer, it is asserted, nothing as possible in new and significant and creative activity which was not contained already in a world bound tight by systems of immutable law. There can happen nothing which was not implied in reality from everlasting to everlasting. When something occurs, it is but a rendering explicit what already incorrigibly and completely was implicit and given. And much fine sport has accrued from the sorry predicament of something which 'is' but still is not 'given.' But an act described as implied in the complex of ideas which make up the character of a conscious individual is no more predetermined than the same act described as a tendency in hypothetical nervous connections in the organism, or as tendencies in the social group. That the idealistic language refers to fact immediately open to common sense is evident by the moral response (we are appealing to the actionist's principle of significant action) which it elicits from a very wide diversity of persons to whom the mere scientific argument will mean nothing. In other words, that a given course of action is the normal outcome of the presence of a given set of ideas probably means more (in terms of behavior even) than to say that the course of action had its conditions in *mores* or causes apostrophically described as tendencies to act. But the actionist or be-

haviorist will probably insist that he has never meant what is here attributed to him. Then what has he meant?

After all, from the moral point of view, what is the difference whether you conceive your world as fixed and transfixed by relations which hold together systems of ideas, or as bound up and determined by natural laws which knit together complexes of facts and tendencies to movement? As a criticism of the idealism which gets lost in a maze of contactless relations, the call for a return to facts is *à propos;* but when facts have no meaning except what they can surreptitiously obtain from fictions, one begins strongly to suspect that the criticism is merely negative and skeptical. Likewise it may not be altogether out of place to suggest that the skeptical critic is either consciously or unconsciously replacing his own ideas with hypothetical entities, such as, for example, the potential energy of the physicist. In any case, a 'fact' is as easily represented by the idea of relation as by a tendency to movement; it is as simple to explain potential energy, considered as the fact that certain consequences will result when certain conditions are fulfilled, by referring the situation to the purpose which may reach the consequence through fulfilling the conditions, as by describing the consequences and conditions after the event has occurred. And apart from considerations of simplicity, the demand that the ideas be made functions in real situations is met already when we assume purposes as elementary to the situations, whereas the 'epistemological' difficulties so much flouted of late have to be met only when we begin with the 'facts,' which we tend to regard as independent ultimates. There seems to be, then, logically, no advantage which either of these points of view can claim over the other; one justifies itself by reference to certain typical characters of experience, the other by reference to other characters; and each type seems as 'real' as the other.

To cover this logical *impasse* the philosophers of action take refuge in the practical, in much the same way and perhaps for the same reason that some, possibly all, types of idealism resort to the contemplative. The practical means,

so far as any statement yet produced is concerned, the attainment of results through action of the type which is to be found in "the concrete, living experience of every-day life." Thought-action involved in scientific research is of this type; in fact, all processes of thought or experience are fundamentally identical in this form, in so far at least as they can attain to this form. The only theoretical considerations which seem to be necessary are involved in seeing merely that a given process is true to type, that it conforms to the condition-activity-result standard. Conformity of a given process or fact with this standard is truth. Failure to conform is falsity, but is yet fact, so error is real. Thought is practical, or better, is practice, action. Its interest is not in results as ends, for results are of consequence only as conditions of further action. Reality is the complex within which the common factor is the movement of thought (and this is organic with physiological movement) or what may become thought,—the apotheosis of process.

It will be readily admitted, I think, that such a scheme corresponds closely to the facts of actual life. The 'thought' process here described is a fairly faithful account of what actually takes place in the world, of what actually is done. It has probably represented the dominant human attitude of the past century, perhaps also of the preceding century. It is certainly the attitude of scientific interests throughout the entire modern period, and the tremendous advances in natural science are due to it. The accomplishments of man in political history are results of a method of thought or an attitude which could be properly described in the same way. The English political method being taken as typical (and we must remember that it is perhaps to the English that the greatest advances in scientific thought are due), that method has consisted in the reference of present action to past results in the interest of new results of the same kind,—precedent. The development of America materially and politically has followed the same course, in spite of some idealism which, in an unguarded moment of enthusiasm, crept into the original governmental scheme. There is no end of the illustrative

proofs which might be adduced to show that the method of human success is trial and error.

But what has been the *total* result? Have we after all, granting that philosophy is interested in life, attained to a life that we can unreservedly call worthy or significant? Have we not, if we look at the matter from the point of view of actual practice, failed to reach a 'life,' in the sense in which every person demands life, but have succeeded merely in expressing a blind will to succeed? It may be very strongly suspected that in the enthusiasm for getting things done we have substituted for the truth-values and appreciation-values that make up the content of life a system of abstract method-values and thing-values which furnish merely the conditions of living, not well, but anyhow. And our suggestion made above that a wrong emphasis here is fatal, now seems to convict us of having committed ourselves to a life of material or economic determinism, in which the thought-life is a mere instrument for the accomplishment of external results. It would be hardly to the point to argue that such a consequence is not meant by explaining thought in terms of action, or to insist that thought-action is restricted to solving real problems on the higher planes of vital activity, while insisting continually that philosophy must keep in touch with actual life. In this case actual life must be the test of our thought-system, and the life that we find actual is one which, practically, is determined by principles unworthy of any serious effort of thought. Nor is this a merely temporal or personal pessimistic judgment. The present industrial system with its methods is generally recognized to represent the life-scheme of practically every individual, whether the individual is aware of the fact or condemns the system or not. And this system, although it fulfills the requirements of a life modelled after the principles laid down by a philosophy of action, stands condemned as unworthy of a human life by every person who can think at all. It would be simple to explain the great war in terms of conditions and results in the complex of life-action, but can the life that is wasted be explained in terms of war-

action? At a certain point explanation must become justification; and it is hard to get justification out of a mere complex of impersonal situations. It is admitted, then, that our philosophy must be based upon life. But a reference of philosophic thought to actual life, without any consideration of its unrealized possibilities, only condemns the mode of life and the philosophy that is found to agree with it. And a continual emphasis on the practical will never supply the checks necessary to keep the life-movement on the upward trend. What has perhaps actually happened is that we have been so drugged by continued material success through mere doing that we have at last attempted to accept the ethics of modern industry as a principle for a universal philosophy; we have accepted the philosophy of *a* life for a philosophy of life. And just now, in the welter of world murder and in the living death imposed by the industrial system, life is paying the forfeit.

No doubt a new philosophy is at present required. But it cannot be one which expresses no more than life as it is, but must show that what is, contains suggestions of new directions of worth. And things of worth (except economically) are not discovered or produced through action alone, but rather through emphasis on critical reflection after action has laid down the bases of life. It is only upon correction of action that *life* can begin. At least, corrective reflection is a fair substitute for that bumptious strenuosity which follows the placing of emphasis upon action. Maybe we shall all be willing to accept the philosophy of doing, when men are thereby shown how to act *as men* and not simply as instruments in that specific unhuman or inhuman situation which happens to exist and to catch men's fancy, or which may artificially and in the interest of gross material results be constructed with the purpose to take advantage of human weakness. We may then come to the point of asserting the truth of the principle that thought is action. But there are acts *and* acts. And the qualitative differences between acts make all the *real* differences in the world, although they may be only differences in degree. That thought is action

does not entitle us to say without qualification that action is thought, as undoubtedly is the tendency in discussions of the practical. The production of material results through organic response, or the resolution of unsatisfactory inner situations, however real such situations may be, are not the only types of action that are significant in life. Much of the thought-action which furnishes the content of an intelligent life has no immediate reference to overt action, and possibly in most cases *when* the act is being performed, there is no immediate or remote intention of producing results outside of the present consciousness. And much of the thought that has been responsible for past human achievement has been obliged to lie dormant as value until future situations arose in which it might become practical. This means that thought may and does determine the situations in which it is to be useful, and while it may have grown out of previous situations, its contact neither with those situations nor with the situations in which it is to be useful is known to it when the thought-act is accomplished. Thought is then often an end in itself, so far as its own act is concerned, and this is true in spite of the fact that it may turn out to be useful. That it may turn out to be useful is evidence of further thought. Granting that all thought is sooner or later useful and has connection with practical situations, it still may be argued that those situations are not consciously involved in the thought process while it is going on. But this is one of the cases where appeal to the unconscious will settle all difficulties. And the settlement on these terms looks very much like a refusal to recognize any problem. The tendency to refuse to recognize problems is often shown by those who argue most strenuously for the problematical character of all thought.

This argument, it must be confessed, begins to savor too much of old-fashioned 'reason.' What we are after, it is insisted, is to force reason to make room for other forms of experience like feeling and will. As directed against a conception of reason which makes it act like an efficient cause to produce results ideally out of nothing; as against a reason

that permeates the whole of what is, reducing what is to eternal rationality; as against reason which is regarded as anything else than the life-process in the individual human being, the criticism is accepted as valid. But to many persons it has not occurred to make of reason anything other than reflection held as dominant in the life-process of the individual. It is not necessary to think of it as separated from the life-process and somehow eternally hostile to it. It may be said frankly that there is no 'reason' any more than there is a principle of synderesis. Still it may be allowable to use the term to designate what is most characteristic in the life-process, even if that function should turn out to be on occasion 'irrational,' as it doubtless often does. In any case we have no right to impose on that function the obligation to guarantee results, even at the expense of subverting the world, as we do when we insist that since reason ordinarily functions in an orderly way, it must therefore guarantee a world rationalized throughout as a product of original design.

But if we remember that by reason we mean simply the fact that memory and imagination *function together* in the life-process of the individual, the difficulties mentioned above will be met by anticipation. By memory and imagination we mean no mythical entities or powers or faculties, but simply the fact that the past is envisaged and the future is constructed. Recalling further the factors that furnish the content for both processes, it will be clear that there is no single aspect of life that is not represented in 'reason' as we now understand it. Memory is largely the feeling that accompanies and characterizes the recognition of 'action' implied in spatial and temporal relations experienced previously, and in connection with imagination these feelings function as plans in further action designed to accomplish a satisfaction or fulfill a purpose. Thus memory cannot be described without involving the imagination, and the description of imagination involves memory. And the two processes taken together constitute the one invariable element within the life-process. This common element has

been inadequately described, and, under the name of 'cognition,' has been represented as a free cause, but that does not argue away the fact that what is better called recognition is a factor common to all experience that is significant or that may become significant.

It thus seems that 'intellectualism' in some sense or in some degree is unavoidable, and the problem is to find the sense in which, and the degree to which, the principle of reason will stand emphasis. That it has been over-emphasized in the past is shown by the criticisms for which empiricism has forced recognition. A more or less satisfactory balance has, however, been reached between the intellectualists and the empiricists, and the problem now seems to be whether further concessions must be made on the part of reason in the interest of action. The point of view of this essay is that already the impulse to do in practical affairs has been overworked as an epistemological motive, and what is necessary now is that the attempt should be made to think out a proper balance and harmony in the present chaos of life-processes. A philosophy of action, particularly in the degenerate form of efficiency philosophy now employed to displace ethics as the science of practice, may work satisfactorily as a principle in business where men are things or parts of machines; but in education and politics and ethics where men are, or hope to be, men, something is yet to be learned from the doctrine of 'pure ideas.'

THE DEFINITION OF INDIVIDUALITY.

THAT the concept of individuality is the central issue involved in any question of modern culture, from whatever point of view approached, would seem to be beyond dispute. It has been one of the strongest influences in human life since the time when man attained the first degree of self-consciousness, and some form of the notion seems to be an element in the idea of organic being as such. To trace the history of the conception as it has affected thought and life to the point where it has attained its central position, would be a significant achievement, if it were possible. It would show, I think, along with its constitutive relation to most things that are felicitic, also a tendency to abnormal overgrowth which is responsible for many things that are destructive or preventive of human welfare. One clear result of modern philosophic thought is that the notion of individuality lies at the bottom of all practical interests. One variation of the notion has laid the foundation not only for the vast achievement of natural science, but has also indicated the material basis upon which the external aspects at least of political, social, and industrial structures have been erected. And there are hints that upon the conception of individuality, when modified and built out in directions which do not clearly appear as yet, when once it becomes fully and deliberately clear in its meaning, there will be formulated the plan of the system of values which is to give a fuller and finer order within the chaos of political and moral relations. One of its forms is the perhaps still prevailing 'individualism' of the last two centuries, which seems fairly well to have fulfilled its purposes and to stand now in the way of ideas better fitted to present conditions. It was scientific and practical in its nature and purpose, naïve, innocent, and enthusiastic in its outlook, and seems never to have succeeded in making fully explicit the logic upon which it rested. The latter obligation was assumed by the recent 'idealistic' movement in

philosophy which had its origin in the systems of Kant and Hegel. The results obtained appear to indicate some rather fundamental changes to be effected in the logical and practical structures which have been erected upon the basis of the old individualism. At any rate this later philosophic movement has taken seriously the logic of individuality, and questions the outcome of the older forms of the doctrine.

The question that appears to be most pertinent in this movement is, What, in its elementary logical characters, is meant by the individual, or abstractly, by individuality? That is, it is a question of definition, not specifically of terms merely, but one of delineating with such clearness as is possible the essential properties of the individual considered as the type of the real. This has been done quite fully by the advocates of one type of individuality, but in the main the meaning of the term seems to have been assumed as self-evident or so simple as not to call for efforts at definition. Some of the meanings are to be got at therefore only by a study of the implications of language, a method which is not peculiarly conducive to clearness or to agreement. But it has seemed to me that, since the 'facts' are and remain the same for all types of theory, the better mode of approach is to inquire as to the various points of view from which individuality has been discussed. These seem to be three, although the phenomena are so complex that it is difficult to prevent them from running into each other in all sorts of ways. There is definition of the individual first, in terms of distinctness, or what it *is not*, or rather, what is *not it*; second, in terms of its content, or what *is* involved in it; and third, in terms of intent, or what *may be* in it, or what is *meant* by it. I propose to examine these definitions not so much with reference to the formal logical necessities of implication contained in them as with reference to the concepts of the institutions of practical life whose forms and functions depend upon the notion of individuality, whatever the type of definition that is given to it.

1. The first of these types of definition probably represents the indefinite and nebulous notion implied in practical interests, and, in so far as it has any degree of formulation, rests upon the

sense outlines of perceived objects as the latter appear in action rather than to thought. This is the meaning indicated by the etymology of the word, that which is indivisible, or which presents itself to sense as undivided or with a solid or unbroken front. Undividedness, expressed in generalized terms as indivisibility, is a later and somewhat refined theoretic entity, one which, as apprehended with a positive reference, perhaps comes to be given logical value in the idea of unity. Thus both the positive and negative aspects of the word appear in its lowest or what seems to be its most original meaning. This is the mere designative use of the word, and will be found to be an element in all definitions. But with the original perceptive fact at the basis of the experience, the term seems to concentrate its meaning upon the visible outlines of physical objects, or upon those sensuous experiences which have as object the spaces and qualities that intervene between physical objects as perceived. In this way a given blur of feeling would be made to stand as an object over against another complex of similar sort, and the part of the experience which becomes most important might easily be the indefinite emptiness which serves as a line of demarcation between them. The significant aspect or phase would be, first, the outlines or limits of an object, and next the environs or contours apprehended as feelings held vaguely and undefined, or, as what is not the object in mind.[1] It is conceivable that the idea of negatives, or even that of the contradictory, may have grown out of some such simple experience. But in any case the idea of individuality as distinct or exclusive is not necessarily committed to negatives, although the emphasis upon distinctness has led in most discussions to a negative characterization, but may imply quite as well its positive aspects. And the use in this connection of 'distinct' as negative in intention seems to be grounded in an assumption like that of Hume's, that the distinguishable as distinct in perception is separable in the sense of separate and 'different from' the object. It is a failure to distinguish 'different within' from 'different from,' a fallacy which the idealistic doctrine of the 'other' does not always escape.

1 Cf. Bradley's doctrine of the 'background,' *Appearance and Reality*, 2d ed., p. 92.

A fallacy similar to this seems to inhere in the 'positivist' method of natural science in its reliance on the method of difference and the negative instance. Analysis of phenomena turns out to consist in the breaking up of the given into the greatest number of simple parts, the end being to get each part different, quantitatively, at least, from every other part, and isolated from all other parts, the assumption being that a given fact is intelligible only when seen as an analytic or segregated many, and that intelligibility depends upon its object being as small and as empty, *i.e.*, as void of quality, as possible. Thus the method of difference continues the process of separation to the point where elements can be distinguished only by being given different numbers, or by being given separate places in the numerical series. They are then recognized as being not different at all, that is, they are interchangeable, one counts for as much as the other, which means that it is not the elements that differ but only their designations, the abstract symbols by which elements are represented. The elements as real have disappeared, and the matters of real fact to explain which was the problem with which the process began, have been left entirely out of the account. Thus the attempt to find individuality by reduction of fact to simplicity ends in abstraction, the attempt to give positive character to the idea of nothing.

Empirical philosophy undertakes on the same method to lay down the logical structure of theory upon which practical interests may rest. It starts out with the idea that human beings and their interests, with the possible exception of the directions in which the latter tend to be expressed, are all alike, indistinguishable, except as to their numerical aspects, which, as we have seen, leaves what is real in the facts behind. It is a rather severe vengeance, setting out with the idea of individuals as distinct and numerable, that it should end with the result that they are indistinguishable—"each to count for one, nobody for more than one." But it shows beyond question that the individual, as used in the language of dogmatic individualism, and as depending upon scientific method, is a meaningless abstraction; and that the method of difference, when interpreted as a stripping off of posi-

tive qualities, destroys not only the qualitative nature of the real, but negates all relations among reals upon which qualities depend, thus destroying the real as a positive conception and leaving only a bleak negation—the not-this, not-this . . . which is a case of negative premises or of the fatuous infinite judgment. Two illustrations from widely different periods may take the place of further discussion. When early Christianity, under the necessity of defending itself against Hellenistic metaphysics, adopted as its function the saving of souls instead of that of establishing the kingdom of God, the resulting conception of the individual was one whose essential character was that of distinctness, and the question of 'personal identity' later became serious. On the one hand was the human individual, lost, strayed from the fold, fallen away from God, meek, lowly, as nothing in the sight of the Lord, a mere abstract nothing requiring the grace and the infinite power of God to give him a real status. On the other hand was the corresponding abstraction, big, blank, far separated from human contact, unapproachable, unspeakable, the abstract absolute nothing of 'negative theology.' As a consequence of this sort of individualism the main problems of life were misapprehended, and instead of a serious doctrine of human relations, there grew up the fanciful vain imaginings of mediaeval theology. Distinctness of individuals led to individualities conceived of as so far apart that a hierarchy of mystical beings was necessary to mediate between them; the blanks between individuals were filled with *other* individuals, the infinite process; the result being the development of the vast mediatory machinery of the church and the dogma that salvation is possible only through the offices of the church. It had therefore the characteristic result that, starting from subjective individualism or particularism, it ended with abstract universalism. Another instance of a similar process of abstraction is the individualistic philosophy of Spencer. The individual considered as distinct becomes a mere center of forces, its relations to other centers being centrifugal and negative and exclusive, the very type of pure mechanical force. So the real individual can in the end be only what is left, a 'residue'; one may say that it is the real which the Spencerian method never suc-

ceeded in making contact with. Its relations are therefore negative and dispersive, one term being 'against' others. The state, as with other corporate reals, denied the characters of individuality, becomes the representative of superior force on the occasion of a deadlock of individual forces, showing its highest form and function when there is least of it, and when it does nothing. And the result is the pathetic notion that the individual attains his highest end and contributes most to the social 'order' when he pursues his own ends regardless of the interests and purposes of others.

Thus this naive and practical conception of individuality described above is rarely to be found with any adequate definition. Some attempts at definition are discoverable in the history of law and politics, and in the discussions of personal identity in theology. It is the more or less half-conscious principle that governed the development of modern democratic states and of modern social and industrial organization. It represents the same motive as that which becomes more or less explicit in the method of science, and as a political and social and industrial shibboleth took some degree of form in the party cries of 'freedom,' 'equality,' 'democracy,' etc. It began to be recognized as a problem in the discussion of these practical relations and resulted, in its political aspects, in a modified form of the very old doctrine of natural rights. It found sympathetic recognition in the tendency toward democracy in religion which had been more or less unconsciously operative since Bruno, a reaffirmation of what was perhaps more clearly articulate in the formulation of Christian doctrine during the early centuries, but which had been overshadowed during the middle ages by the *étatisme* of the Church. Through the discussion which attempted to lay down a philosophy for the political and social motives dominant in the eighteenth century, the prevailing interest in man led to the analyses of human nature contained in the psychological treatises of the period. These were the work of the 'psychologists' in political theory, the authors of the 'natural theology' with their genius for 'facts', and the 'empirical' moralists. The question then became one of the *content* of individuality.

2. Thus Locke, Hume, Paley, Adam Smith, and their successors in British and French thought, undertook to lay bare the whole furniture and equipment of the human individuality, raising deliberately the question of the nature of the structure of the 'self,' those with religious and moral interests entering somewhat irreverently into the very depths of the 'soul.' Their object was to spread out to the view of the scientific intelligence *all* the details of the content that could be found and isolated and described, to state the whole case as one of 'matters of fact.' The result was the famous catalogues and classifications of the machinery of the inner life, the idea being that a complete account would be given if and when every detail of experience was set off from and over against every other, with the aggregate taken as a whole. So Hume, when looking into his own self, could find only particular states following each other serially and longitudinally or disposed spatially, and, disregarding the 'habits,' 'dispositions,' and 'tendencies to expect', found no self other than the states taken singly or in aggregate. Some issues of the matter-of-fact procedure were 'atheism' in religion, or a rather positive and blatant disbelief in the type of individuality held by the conventional church attitude of the time; the abandonment of faith in metaphysics; and, in the moral and political and legal theory of Bentham, J. S. Mill and Austin, a relapse into the common-sense attitude for which the individual is the plain man of affairs, the physical and psychological man. Once more, and consistently with the underlying scientific attitude, the individual is simply a 'matter of fact,' the fact in this case being simply the common-sense living and striving human being.

The individual is thus defined from the point of view of what he *is*, of what of fact there is in him that can be set apart and disposed to critical review. Individuality is thus taken for granted; a presupposition more or less unconsciously taken over from the uncritical practical attitude. The purpose to define the individual from the point of view of content becomes, when examined as to its logical implications, largely a matter of exhausting the *extent* of the conception. That is, the definition is extensional, its reference is to the number and diversity of facts to which the term

applies. It thus applies only to the external qualities of the individual, in spite of the psychological terms in which the descriptions are expressed. The mental facts recounted imply no more of unity in the individual life than did the outward facts of property and the machinery of government which were the concern of legal and political theory. The whole mass of the theory of human nature was then external and quantitative, which is to say negative, and this is true in spite of the tiresome analyses of the feelings and 'propensities' which make up the body of the ethical literature of the time.

This doctrine is therefore open to the logical criticism that quantitative conceptions in general have to face. The scientific optimism involved in an empirical or matter-of-fact philosophy imposes a too vigorous confidence in the method of agreement. In the search for fact and in the building up of the edifice of knowledge by continuous accretions of new elements, 'and' becomes a fundamental category. It thus ignores altogether all question of significant ends, and for this reason fails ever to reach real universality; such ends as are involved are limits, and limits are to be approached only through quantities, *i.e.*, negatively. Facts then are all alike, are homogeneous throughout, are classified with reference to the absence of difference, which, by the way, is also itself a difference; and the result is once more the abstract qualityless homogeneity which can only be conceived as spread out in space with its various loci numbered—they could not be named—because they represent no real objects. For the ethics representing this type of philosophy the individual is primarily the aggregate of states of feeling, the addition of the aggregates gives the grand total of a sum of happiness as end. From the political theory it is learned that the individual attains his end by increase, and by making the most of his isolated self he contributes most to the good of the whole. And the famous theory of population is concerned with the increase or diminution of the number of individuals. From the point of view of the prevailing legal theory all are 'equal' before the law.

There is no purpose here to deny the tremendous practical consequences for the development of the instruments to human wel-

fare which came from this individualistic movement. These conceptions have possibly done more immediately, at least, toward making life interesting and significant than whole ages of philosophy that rests upon unimpeachable principles. What is denied is that they rested upon principles that were in any sense clearly or adequately defined. And what does not rest upon adequate principles is finally wrong. The argument is intended to show that the underlying ideas of the period were altogether confused, that the period, while confessedly resting its destiny on the reality of the individual, had no clear or worthy conception as to what individuality implies. The individualism developed in this period, and still appealed to as the justification for the types of legal and political theory and institutions presupposed in contemporary politics, has no ground in the facts and is logically inconsistent at many points. Persistence of this misapprehension of the nature of individuality is responsible for the political and industrial confusion now so much lamented and so little understood, and I suggest that deliverance from the confusion will come, if at all, through a conception of individuality more in accordance with the facts of life and more consistent with the formal demands of thought. An outline of the new individualism is already to hand in contemporary theories of logic.

3. Individuality is also defined from the point of view of its meaning, and meaning is not essentially a matter of content. We have seen that 'individualism' defines individuality by 'differentia' or extensionally or dispersively, and thus confuses it with the particular. It is therefore a quantitative conception and its correlative categories are matter and force. The individual is, finally, the organism, and the 'social organism' is a mechanical arrangement of parts whose contact with each other is by impact and whose 'interests' are material. Their relations in political life are governed by 'checks and balances' and in moral life by the sense of obligation conceived negatively in terms of restraints and 'sanctions.' Its "ideal system of Law ought to aim at Freedom, or perfect mutual non-interference of all the members of the community, as an absolute end."[1] What mutual non-inter-

[1] Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, 7th ed., p. 444

ference can mean in a system governed by mechanical law I find extremely difficult to conceive, and I feel obliged to decline to believe that such an idea ever did or can control the purposes of human life. The definition by intension is an attempt to give form and substance to the element of universality in the individual and so to render its particularity or factual aspects real. Plato accomplished this result, in his educational rather than in his political theory, and his work has not been altogether lost. Plato's thought has influenced us through the popular idealism of religion, unconscious and inarticulate as his influence has been, and has had more real formative power than the bombastic individualism we have avowed, and it is perhaps responsible for such degrees of 'order' as have been achieved. But the real meaning of individuality has come to clearest expression in what has taken the name of modern logic. It seems to me, however, that the negative and separatist tendency inherent in 'individualism' is not as yet completely overcome. We have seen that the attempt at extensional definition failed because of its artificial reduction of its problem to terms of quantity and space and discontinuity. It will appear that definition by intension will have its troubles with time and continuity and identity, and these difficulties are pretty much of the same sort as those involved in extension. It has remained for Bradley and Bosanquet to indicate the method by which these difficulties may be overcome, and they have attained this end, it seems to me, by going behind the conceptions of space and time and externality to a type of category more intimate with the life of experience.

Space and time are of course not unreal. For scientific purposes, whether practical or formal, they are necessary. That is, when the object of purpose is the existent, they are indispensable and, in their way, real. And they *are* existents on much the same grade as other objects of scientific interest. They are substances in that they stand under the structure of ideas when the latter are constitutive of 'fact', and are themselves as such and in so far of the same tissue with the given. And they are individual, undivided, indiscerptible, as are objects in any other form or in any other case. But they are also particular in that they cannot

lead beyond themselves in any other way than by repetition of themselves, thus giving 'the infinite in time and space' as the ultimate of the analytic motive. They therefore negate each other, set themselves over against each other, become the manifold which, so long as thought takes them as its presupposition, cannot reach the universal and can never therefore define the real. The ultimate real, that is, the real as constituted by its principle, cannot be expressed in terms of time or space, or of both at once. Questions of ultimate origin in time are then unintelligible, for the reason that time alone and of itself is never the whole reason for a thing: for the same reason the locus in space of an object is not determinable because space alone is not the whole of the conditions of an object's reality. And partial determination is what is meant by abstraction; which ought to clear up some of the difficulties of 'relativity.' As to objects being 'given' in space and time, it seems necessary to say that there are other dimensions of reality which must be considered before we reach the universality that makes an object real. Of course objects are thus given, but not as real, only as abstractions in thought which serve as the basis of practical motives. Individuality, then, is the veritable beneath the spatial and temporal characters of things, and the attempt at its definition in those terms states only its formal characters, which, in the absence of what it means, are abstractions. The weakness of experimental logic and the logic of action is just the false assumption that time, process, 'tendency,' are matters of intension, that they carry meanings, while they represent merely the instruments of approach to meanings.

But there is a difficulty here also for the theory of transcendence, which, it is to be feared, is to some extent a veiled statement by way of interpretation of what is really quantitative difference: the this becoming its other involves all the fallacies of time and process. The 'other' is what is not this, or is beyond this, or outside this, or what the this becomes; such language at least leaves the doctrine open to misinterpretation. It seems to stand on the analogy of undertaking to build up through spatial and temporal relations a whole out of parts or atoms, or elements or what not, so long as parts are regarded as other than each

other. It is an attempt to think real objects on the analogy of their manufacture in the arts, an attempt which, with the correlative effort to construct objects out of growth processes or temporal relations, was responsible for many of the logical troubles of Aristotle.

It is the avoidance of this constructionist or productivist fallacy which gives such great significance to the work of Bradley and Bosanquet. The positive method employed is what might best be called that of aesthetic creation, an idea which has nothing in common with making or with action in the exploited sense in which the latter term is now so widely used. As a method it recognizes the fact that when intension or meaning is taken as a collocation or fusion or interpenetration of qualities we are still on the ground of extension, and will have difficulties with time and process, space and *quantum*. Even mechanism deals with qualities, quality is the essential medium through which the relations of materials, as uses and functions, are either made intelligible or are taken advantage of practically. And it makes little difference how far qualities are rarified by abstraction so long as they maintain their consort with the spatial and temporal or perceptual aspects of things. Things are not universalized, *i.e.*, realized, through their actual or virtual qualities alone; it is not a question of the qualities *of* things but of the principle *in* things. Intension is not therefore specifically a matter of qualities, but of intention or principle. With the question as to whether principle may be known independently of the experience of the qualities of objects, I am not here concerned; the question is one of the criterion of the real, not of its genesis; a question of fact, not one of how the facts came to be.

What, then, is the principle of Individuality? The criticism given above indicates that we cannot lapse into the negative attitude for which the principle of individuality is "just that condition of being for itself and on its own account."[1] Rather "Individuality is what its world, in the sense of its own world, is."[2] I should like to begin with what to my mind is least satisfactory

[1] Hegel. *Phenomenology of Mind*. Eng. trans., London, 1910, Vol. I, p. 289.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 295

in the doctrines of Bradley and Bosanquet. Taking their characteristic and oft-repeated terms we find individuality defined as 'self-subsistent,' 'all-inclusive,' 'self-dependent,' 'immediate,' 'perfection,' 'completeness,' 'unity,' 'harmony,' 'wholeness' and by a great number of other terms both descriptive and appreciative. It is true that no doctrine can be fairly criticized by reference to isolated terms, and it is recognized that in both authors perhaps all of these terms are qualified in various ways. I think, however, that without extended quotation it is possible to discover two widely different attitudes represented in the list of terms. These two attitudes are more or less discordant and indicate a worse and a better side in the general doctrine. In the one case, a number of expressions place the essence of individuality in the exclusive or discriminatory characters of things. "Its inmost being is, and must be, infected by the external."[1] And again, "That which is individual or absolute claims to be self-sufficing; that is to say, to be an Identity which determines and is determined by its own differences, but is not dependent on anything outside itself."[2] Similar statements can be found throughout the writings of both authors. It seems that the characters that determine individuality from this point of view are such as exclude something, or set it off from or distinguish it from something, which in the practical relations of human beings, becomes the assumption that men are necessarily opposed to each other, that their interests are necessarily exclusive and competitive. This form of argument seems to me to be based on the analogy of the space relation in one of its aspects, and in the other, when it places emphasis on consciousness and experience, to imply the solipsistic uniqueness of mysticism. Thus completeness, perfection, self-dependence, all-inclusiveness, self-subsistence, however internal or subjective may be their content as consciousness or experience, still that content seems to be a matter of extent, of denotation, and they all find their ultimate in some form of abstraction, with the exception, noted above, with reference to harmony in its aesthetic sense. The whole vast structure of Ab-

[1] Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, 2d ed. p. 246.

[2] Bosanquet, *Logic*, 2d ed., Vol. I, pp. 135–136.

solutism then seems to be, so far, exclusive and negative in character, to fall apart by its own dividedness, and to take the form of one vast 'infinite' judgment, the infinite not-this, not-this, . . . Nothing—the Absolute as the hypostasis of the principle of negation. Distinctness is not, I should urge, the differentia of individuality as the real; it is rather the practical formula by which *individualities* are organized into functional wholes, which are also individual, and implies that individuality has already been defined positively. It is not negation that is real, but the *negative*, the *instance*; and though the instance may be negative, its negativity is a matter of the principle of its apprehension and not of the law of its constitution; its negativity is *one* element in its existence, but it is not its individuality. Then just as 'objects' are not determined in space and time, as being inadequate to their whole nature, so they are not determined by their distinctness, which seems to be the meaning of inclusiveness, completeness, etc. And, though the suggestion is hazardous, it seems that Professor Bosanquet's doctrine, when stripped of the machinery of a negational logic, which, it is agreed, is essential to the formal basis of individuality, as carried over and applied to the intensional aspects of the real, may have merely taken for granted the current 'individualism' with all its strength and weakness.

But a very different account must be given of Professor Bosanquet's doctrine of the individual as an aesthetic whole, of the real in terms of harmony or proportion or logical stability. The real as principle is not the complete, not the finished as done and cut off, however dynamic we may try to conceive it, but the harmonious as satisfying, as not raising any questions as to what *it* is or is not, nor any question as to what anything else is or is not. And it is this once assumed—one could wish it were more adequately and less formally stated—together with the concrete instances drawn from the field of art and the aesthetic experience generally, that makes the contact with Plato and gives the doctrine its final value, a value which is in part obscured by his formal logic. His *logic* of individuality approaches too near the individualism that has made mockery of the prevailing political

and social and legal theory. But his religious and aesthetic principles point to a new day in the practical relations of men.

In the first place an aesthetic whole is not complete in the sense that it is finished, or determined internally or externally by metes and bounds as distinctness and inclusiveness imply. It is not necessarily dynamic or 'growing' in the sense of a balance of contending motives. It is essential to its nature that contention is not there, no balanced tension of centrifugal and centripetal forces such as characterized the hard logic of the Stoics. It is possible that it cannot be said in positive content terms what is there; perhaps it can only be designated. "*Our* individuals, so far as imperfect, do depend on designation for the recognition of their uniqueness. And this is a conclusive proof that they are not and cannot be genuine individuals."[1] In any case the difficulty of avoiding the existential implications of content seems to give a sort of Hobson's choice between a negative definition with its infinite form and the more or less mystical attitude implied in the assumption that it can only be designated, with its corollary that meaning cannot be expressed. In this case logic will have to come to terms with rhetoric, a consequence that is preferable to a logic formalized by negation. These difficulties seem to me to result from the analytic assumption that in dealing with the real we must break it up into subjects and predicates, terms and relations, ultimately into atomistic 'not-thisses.' Then 'unity' is of course the only recourse, either with its inevitable wooden process of fitting things together in extensional or negative forms or in saying them together with rhetoric. But the doctrine of aesthetic unity, which is outside the necessities of formal logic, does not involve any such mechanical process of building up, and avoids the constructionist fallacy. Between the terms-relations muddle and the mystery of the 'non-relational'[2] or 'super-relational' there is a third possibility. The distinction between the internal and the external is another case of the extensional or content fallacy.

As analysis of terms and relations the account given in *Ap-*

[1] Bosanquet, *Logic*, 2d ed., Vol. II, p. 261.

[2] Bradley, *Truth and Reality*, p. 176.

pearance and Reality may be taken as final, at least until new meanings are involved. They are not distinguishable even on the ground of a distinctionist or analytic logic. When relations are external they are terms; when they are internal they fuse with qualities, and since qualities are regarded as private appurtenances of terms, the whole situation becomes one of content. This brawl of atoms the aesthetic experience avoids. The contents of individualities are mutual and are therefore intents. That is, contents cannot, when considered as carrying meaning, be regarded as exclusive and repellent, or distinguished from each other by any line that can be drawn between them. The very attempt to distinguish them involves other contents as meanings intervening among them and leads to the contradiction that meanings are disposed linearly in the form of process which, by its nature, becomes infinite. There is no contradiction then in saying that the same meaning may be essential to what in their external aspects are to be regarded as distinct individuals, and it would be correct to speak of this situation as a fusion, or interpenetration, or overlapping, if it were possible to divest these terms of their connotation of uniqueness and extensional otherness. But this is a weakness of language and does not bind the intellect to space, as Bergson thinks. And it is experienced fact that identical elements of content are common to different individuals. As such they become intents, universals, and as without any specific point of incidence, which merely means that they are not particulars, they are public to all forms of individuality to which their quality adapts them. The individual as exclusive and private is the atom; it has existence *only* it is a methodological device which comes not of its own virtue but as a dead Hander to the throne of the real. Individuals are not then distinct, it is a common life that we live; the real is the common. This is the Plato that is struggling under the weight of form in the doctrine of Professor Bosanquet. This he recognizes, but grudgingly, it seems, for he appears to restrict mutuality to the higher spiritual functions, or to "things that are not diminished by being shared—such as kindness, beauty, truth."[1] But Plato

[1] *Social and International Ideals*, London 1917, p. 12. But see also *Prin-*

seems to have asked, What is it that is diminished by being shared? Having adopted the principle of individuality which consistency compels, he consents to go all the way, and violates the principle only in the unfortunate mistake of subordinating individuals to individuals in the case of slavery. Here again it is concrete fact which is more convincing than any argument except that which constitutes or finds principle for the fact. Just how am I distinguished from another person? By my organism? But that is hardly I; it is the 'clothes-philosophy' of individualism. By my interests or purposes? But which of these do I not share with any one who happens to care? And these are certainly not diminished by being shared. By my property as the instrument to my purposes? But what *real* end is accomplished by 'private' property, or how can property *in use* be private? There is no use that does not become 'public' by confluence with the uses of other persons. These are the matters that make up the content of the practical sciences, and I suggest that their most urgent need is for the principle upon which individuals are determined, in other words, the principle of individuation. I *am*, when 'principled,' just the synthetic mutuality or publicity of objective purposes which I recognize in my friends. When they and their interests are destroyed my life becomes mere extensional existence. This self-identification is the type of the aesthetic, the religious, and the moral experience. I identify myself, when I am principled, with some publicity as a cause. I may exist without intent, I may even act and know and still remain unrealized by any principle, but I am not then a 'man.' That is, without mutuality of interest I am 'unprincipled'—the principle of individuality is mutuality or publicity. And it is tragic that this fact is at present being most fully recognized outside the 'learned sciences of human relations.'

What then is the status of distinctness and privacy with reference to the individual? The doctrine of individuality is committed to the conception of degrees within the real, to the propo-

ciple of Individuality and Value, p. 58, where types of individuality include a great business organization, the economic life of a great city, and the moral life of a society, when viewed from the point of view of an active participant.

sition that individuality is the real in a variety of related stages and forms. These stages and forms are all identified by the principle of mutuality which gives to each stage or form its significance or intent. This principle might be called the concrete universal if universality can be relieved of its extensional and negative implications. Individuality is principled by mutuality. This, I take it, is what is meant by the insistence on unity, which gets so often and so grossly mistaken for harmony. There may be unity of extent or content which in the abstract is the formal condition of order as an identity of differences, but which has little in common with a harmony or mutuality of intent which is the principle of the real. Unity is likely to be abstract and external and superimposed, as compared with even the lowest forms of voluntary mutuality of consent which gives form to practical organizations of persons, such as a club or even a gang. The problem is to avoid absolute identity or abstract universality, and the means of avoiding it is, in connection with individuality, the device of distinction or privacy. Distinction, whether it is called difference, negation, privacy, or whatever, is an abstraction like extension. As being completely uncolored by meaning it qualifies only space and time. In any other connection it is a pragmatic entity, its being lies in its utility, and as a convention it is unprincipled by the real. It is useful for practical purposes. It has no power to constitute the real as has mutuality, but it has proportioning or distributive reference to the real. It can tell us where, within the tissue of the real as mutual or interpersonal, conventional marks of division may be drawn off to facilitate the placing or the giving of relative values to the various degrees of intent. That is, the problem of distinctness is a practical problem, one that does not directly involve 'nature.' It is one of drawing artificial boundaries within the actual, to put it negatively. Or it is one of displaying the positive lines of interrelation, the *liaison* which slurs together the many and various types of individuals within the individual. If there are degrees of reality, and if the real is individual, then 'distinct individuals' is a contradiction in terms. These types, the physical, the organic, the personal, the corporate in its many forms such as the social, religious, political,

national, are not realized through difference or distinction; distinction is the practical device which will enable us to grasp the principle of mutuality of intent upon which some degree of order may be effected in the affairs of men "with regard to the Ideas." Distinctness is not the logical differentia of individuality, but the practical formula by which individuals find their station and function within the complex of inter-individual relations which constitutes an individuality of higher degree. Its function is, once individuality has been positively realized through its principle of mutuality, to differentiate practically among the many forms which individuality may assume. It distinguishes individuals as to their degree-forms within individuality, but it does not set off individuality from what it is not. Individuality has no 'other.'

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POSSESSION AND INDIVIDUALITY.

AS the total sum of objective means to human ends, property is the material basis of civilization. It is therefore a first principle for all sciences which have to do directly with human relations, and has a special and peculiar importance for politics, ethics, and law. The ideas of property, and its correlative possession, will therefore take their form and significance from the elementary philosophical attitudes which dominate these sciences. And the attitude most characteristic of modern thought is that which is represented in the various forms of what is called vaguely individualism. Those sciences which, like sociology and economics, and perhaps also politics, assume a descriptive or definitory purpose with respect to their subject-matter, find their goal in an isolated and unique human being, the biological and psychological individual. Ethics and law, which adopt a directive purpose with respect to the same subject-matter, reach their end in a separate and unique entity which is variously designated as personality, soul, or legal person. But in any case the real, it seems, is particular, unique, and self-sufficing. And yet the method employed by these sciences, in so far as it has to do with defining the individual, assumes the equal reality of relations, thus negating their principles and throwing them into contradiction. Discussions of possession in ethical and legal literature show this contradiction in a peculiarly subtle form, which it is interesting to try to understand.

Representative legal treatises emphasize the difficulty and perplexity of the subject of possession. There seems to be some doubt as to whether phenomena in this field can be reduced to principle, and there is a tendency to shift the final attempt at determination to the region of evidence, "that general refuge of things otherwise unclassified."[1] This difficulty is due perhaps to the great variety of meanings of the terms used. There is posses-

[1] Pollock and Wright, *Possession in the Common Law.* Oxford, 1888, p. 6.

sion in fact, possession in law, possession of right, all of these it seems in various degrees and at various removes. One may have the right to possess without possessing, and, with respect to another person, a better right. The right may be denied, affirmed, obstructed, guaranteed by the law, taken over into the custody of the law, created by the law, destroyed by the law, perhaps defended against the law; and may be taken, held, and transferred in a variety of ways. And all these events may happen while we assume that the right is 'natural' and inherent in the individual. Moreover, the phenomenon of possession involves a wide range of more remote facts which are necessary to a proper understanding. Thus Holland[1] analyzes the phenomenon of right in general into (1) the person entitled, (2) the object, (3) the act or forbearance, and (4) the person obliged. This arrangement it would seem possible to simplify into persons, things, and their relations; and, if we follow the legal terminology, possession will turn out to represent the functional relations expressed in use and enjoyment, and control and disposal as involved in the various methods of transfer. There are almost as many difficulties raised as solved by such an arrangement. For example, it requires a good deal of pains to distinguish in every case between the person entitled and the person obliged, especially in such cases as the destruction of one's own property or the still more difficult case of suicide. Again, a forbearance is an act, and the fact that it is negative in form does not alter the essentially positive character of persons and things with respect to which the act takes place. And again, the object, or thing, as it stands isolated in such schemes, is as near a pure abstraction as possible. It is therefore necessary to come to a little closer examination of terms.

With respect to the right of possession the elements of an ordinary transaction that stand out immediately are, as we have seen, persons, things, and the relations subsisting between persons and things. These relations, though differing in quality and importance, are together the content of the idea of possession. Possession therefore extends in two directions, in the one case embodying itself in a nexus of qualities and possibilities of function which

[1] *Elements of Jurisprudence.* New York and London. 9th ed., p. 86.

might be said to represent intrinsic value, that is, the qualities which seem to common sense to inhere in the nature of objects and which serve as points of application for action; and in the other thinning away into the so-called subjective qualities like impulse, desire, etc. But the two ends of the line approach each other in the completed practical experience, which implicates person with person, person with thing, and thing with thing, the synthesis as a whole giving us the idea of a moral or social order.

We begin with the idea of person. We should like to say that by person we mean just what common sense seems to indicate the term to mean, or to take our cue from the common law, assuming that the law is the crystallization of the good sense of the common man. But the ordinary definition taken from law will help only in so far as intentions are regarded as intelligent and good; that is, the legal definition goes far beyond the simple isolated person of common sense. This seems to mean that the law assumes morality, or to indicate that the point of view of the law was built up under the assumption that the knowledge of simple moral matters is an innate datum. In a simple statement like Pollock's, "Persons are the subjects of rights and duties: and, as the subject of a right, a person is the object of the correlative duty, and conversely,"[1] all the points of our present inquiry are taken for granted, and the statement is perhaps further vitiated by certain historic obsessions about the origin of rights that still dominate the law. And yet the statement implies that the crucial point in law is the idea of person as a sum of relations the most important of which are together designated possession or some other term indicating a complex of legal relations. Moreover, these relations are external and dispersive and mechanical; a right is a right *against* somebody, or against all the world. Possession then means merely that a person possesses a thing when he is able to prevent anybody else from getting it, that is, is exclusive.[2] The person is conceived as a negative and restrictive force; and this seems to negate not only the idea of obligation as expressed in positive performance, but renders the person an abstract dispersive force which makes non-

[1] *A First Book of Jurisprudence.* London, 1896, p. 107.

[2] Pollock and Wright, *Possession in the Common Law,* p. 20. But compare Holland, *Jurisprudence,* pp. 190–191.

sense of any idea of ordered relations of persons, and so of those institutions of association like the family, state, etc., which the law is supposed to sustain.

Possession may be regarded as biologically grounded in the person through the fact that it guarantees him life and success in leaving offspring.[1] But this would justify individual or 'private' possession only in a very limited degree, by no means to the extent that property should free offspring from the responsibility of effort, that is, it cannot be justified if the end is to be regarded as the continuity of social institutions. Possession is sometimes conceived as holding the metaphysical person together in the sense that it synthesizes it and gives it unity of purpose and stimulates effort and leads to accomplishment. But metaphysically it is hardly possible to assume any such isolated entity as the person of the law, or to draw rigid distinctions between persons in such a way as to set them over against each other.

Little insight into the meaning of possession seems obtainable from an analysis of the isolated person, if possession is to have any meaning as a principle of human organization, and, while the analysis is imperfect, it may indicate that there is no 'innate' or 'natural' right to possess, and perhaps also that the right to possess cannot be based on any simple fact whether of law or tradition or nature or God, or any simple psychological process of feeling or intelligence. The basis of the right to possess is something larger still—something objective in a way that will justify and explain the claims of law or tradition or nature, something subjective in a way that will give quality to the right to possess in terms of feeling and intelligence. The result is that the right to possess cannot be deduced from the nature of the person, rather the person must or does in part at least get its status and character from the right to possess. We shall see that the 'natural' person is an abstraction; and that from any point of view involving human relationships the person is in every case a 'juristic' person.

With respect to a thing we remain on the ground of the reflective good sense of the common man as that is once more implied in

1 *Cf.* R. Petrucci, *Les Origines Naturelles de la Propriété.* Bruxelles et Leipzig, 1905.

legal language. It will not then be necessary to decide whether a thing is an ultimate object of cognition or an ultimate point of issue of an impulse. A thing, let us say, is what can be used and enjoyed, or controlled and disposed of. I may use a thing with the expectation of enjoying its qualities or results (which are still qualities) when taken in conjunction with the qualities of other things; things cannot, as instruments to our purposes, be isolated, perhaps even in thought. In this case my purpose would be interpreted in terms of muscular reactions coupled with the expectancy of their issue in feeling. The muscular reactions would be qualitatively indifferent in themselves, and their appeal to me would come from their being more or less clearly regarded as means to an issue which I would interpret, if I did it at all, in terms of enjoyed feeling. In either case the issue, whether reaction or feeling, is an object capable of valuation in that it is a part of an intended whole. So that any use of any thing implies that it is a part of a larger ordered whole or system. And out of connection with this no thing means anything. And ultimately the connection will involve persons if our point of view with reference to the situation is ethical or legal. Use then gets its meaning from things ordered in functional systems.

Similarly with reference to things as enjoyments. I may enjoy the use, that is, the using, of a thing, or I may enjoy it with a view to its future use. I enjoy the reading of a book, or I enjoy the book in the expectation of reading it. But in both cases the book as thing means use and enjoyment, and use and enjoyment mean certain relations which it sustains with me through the complication of its qualities with the qualities of other things, the situation becoming an ethical matter when the complication of qualities involves other persons, or when it involves myself imagined as occupying another stage of my own development, a relation of myself to myself at another time. The question as to how I may have got the book, etc., is a further complication of relations of a similar sort. That is, the economic relation is a case of the ethical. What appears clear here is that the meaning of use and enjoyment of things as the terms are employed in common language cannot be deduced from the abstract nature of things used nor of the

persons who use them, whether we state meaning in terms of intelligence or feeling. Rather this meaning is properly derived from the relations of persons to things, or as we shall put it later, from the relations of persons to persons as these are mediated through things in the synthesis of persons *and* things that constitutes the human order. We arrive at the same results when we consider things as controlled and disposed of. It is at this point that legal theory seems most inadequate; it seems to assume that a thing's reality consists in its being held by a person who is totally unrelated with the rest of the universe. It is perhaps this assumption that makes the question of 'contract' so very difficult and involved in legal discussions. It is abstractly conceivable that a person may get some use and enjoyment out of a thing in the absolute vacuum to which the individualist in ethics and the jurist condemns him, whether that vacuum is conceived as lying in the hypothetical ether of intelligence or of feeling. But the case of control and disposal is not nearly so simple. Control implies that I have the power (the right would imply the legal or conventional re-enforcement or limitation of the power) to modify or effect changes in the relations of a thing to other things or persons. The status of other things or persons may be for me either conscious or unconscious, still I must take account of them in some way, otherwise I could not modify their relations. Positively I am determining the order and reference of things to each other (and in this case I perhaps look upon persons as also things) and am considering the whole as the working out of my attitude or purpose. That is, control is the expression of my purpose in terms of the order in which my impulses and intentions are to be expressed. However, this is the description of an abstract psychological or physical process so long as no elements in the situation are regarded as on the same plane as my own purpose. It will become ethical or legal strictly only when I realize that some elements within the situation may compel me to defend myself as against, or ask my help in conjunction with, their attempts to reconstitute from their specific point of view the same situation of which I am a part. Control of a thing involves therefore either isolated manipulation in vacuo, which is meaningless, or the mu-

tuality of the power of control as shared, whether the wills or wishes of the persons concerned consent to it or not. And the ethical quality of the situation or lack of it depends on whether or not there is also mutuality of consent to control. There appears to be no thing which I may control without involving the same power or right in other persons. And I am moral in so far as I consent to intend an end mutually with others, and in so far as my action is adverse I am either immoral or a moral reformer. But action in moral reform is merely a special case of mutual consent, in that the consent of the whole is assumed to be obtained in advance of a full understanding on the part of its intelligence. This point I suppose the individualists state negatively when they say that I may control my own property as I will in so far as I do not interfere with the same right in others. But this proposition begs the whole question; the question is, what, after all, *is* my own? The restriction placed on my action by the theory when it says I may do what I will with my own except in so far as I do not interfere with the same right in others is equivalent to a negation of the right as a peculiar appurtenance of the person, if it is true that possession of things sooner or later involves in every case my relations with other persons. The conception of persons and thing as separate, isolated, and external to each other makes any idea of ordered relation in human affairs impossible. The right to control of things then inheres in the order of persons who consent mutually, or is 'natural' to that order.

The right of disposal as the right to maintain or relinquish possession is a case of the right to control. Whether I may convey and warrant to John Doe 'his heirs and assigns forever' anything of human or personal use depends on the consent of the order of persons, which cannot in the nature of the case relinquish its interest absolutely, for that order is the source and origin of the right to possess, in that its existence depends on the exercise of the right, and its essence defines the nature of the person by prescribing his end. Consent to individual possession of the absolute sort on the part of the social order is self-contradictory in the sense that it is the negation of the structure of the human order which alone can consent finally or possess. The right of the indi-

vidual to possess in terms of use and enjoyment or control and disposal is then delegated or permitted; and the important question is as to the nature and extent of the limitations. Legal theory recognizes the power of limitation by the 'state' as absolute: in the case of possession by the *dominium eminens;* in the case of perhaps all other rights by the 'police' power. But it is not quite clear as to just what principle is invoked by the order of persons operating as the 'state' in these cases. I suggest that the absoluteness of the right of the order of persons to restrict the right of the individual to possess is warranted by the fact that a degree of order exists; by the fact that the growth of the order implies an ever wider and more complex interrelation of persons and of persons with things; and by the fact that the 'good' of the person necessitates the 'best' and fullest in the order of persons.

With regard to the first point, any degree of social order that gets itself generally recognized implies in so far that the purposes of the individual have been brought into some degree of synthesis with the purposes of other individuals. And this means that the relinquishment of special and exclusive interest on the part of the individual is a recognition and acceptance of the larger order as his higher good in proportion as his intelligence is developed symmetrically with his interests. Or, if the larger order is recognized only as a solution of a conflict of interests, that is, negatively, as implied in the law, the order is accepted as the arbiter of interests, and in so far as the order is accepted as possessing authority, is looked upon as the ground of interests. The existence of a given degree and quality of human order, then, guarantees to it the unlimited right to possess, and the power to delegate it to the individual, and the significance of possession, whether held by the order or by the individual, will depend on the degree and quality of organization. Not because of any original 'nature' (except in case the order of persons is regarded as nature) which may be conceived as temporally or logically prior to the rights of individuals, but simply because of the fact that the order has a necessary derivation from the exercise of rights by individuals as these rights are expressed and defined through the common use of things. In the second place, the right to control the individual's right to

possess is seen to inhere in the order of persons in the fact that the order through growth increases the complexity and improves the quality of its constituent relations. And the absoluteness of the right is assured just because we can place no limitations upon the possibilities open to realization of personal and interpersonal relations through growth. The individualist looks upon the human order as the expression of the quantitative characters of men, and from this viewpoint the order can be increased only by multiplication of persons and by increase in the quantity of things, or by mere extension of external relations among persons and things.

But the principle of the constitution of the social order and of its growth is qualitative in nature. The association of individuals develops in them interests and purposes which they do not have when withheld from association, for the simple reason that no *individual* purposes or interests have their end in the individual who holds them. It is true of course that these qualities rest upon quantitative counterparts, and that the latter can be separately described with some degree of success. The psychology of crowds affords examples of the quantitative aspects of social relations as expressed in the mere intensification of certain characteristic feelings. But these facts do not exhaust the possibilities of meaningful modification of character that arise from intelligent association. The significance of association then lies in the qualities of relations formed, and these qualities cannot be disposed by the negative and restrictive agencies of law as these agencies at present exist. Such qualities are positive and expansive and look outward and forward; they are the moral qualities properly so-called. When the shoemaker sells me a pair of shoes the relations of persons and things involved are fairly simple. He is interested in getting as much for his work and as great a profit on the materials used as he can, and is limited only by my ability or my willingness to pay if I am the only customer. I want as much wear and comfort as I can get and at as little cost as possible. But no exchange would ever take place on those grounds alone. It is at this point that industrial relations become difficult because of the depersonalization of human relations through the excessive multiplication of machine 'conveniences.' Unless the sale is effected through some sort of

fusion of personal interests the relations involved are negative and dispersive or 'competitive.' But if a fusion of interests can be reached in which both parties are relatively satisfied, the relation established is one that is positive and constructive in the sense that it is or may be the ground upon which further and wider syntheses of interests may be effected. In any case the basis of the right to possess is discoverable neither in the shoemaker nor myself as isolated individuals, but in the synthesis of persons as that is set up through the thing involved—the shoes. The shoemaker never owned the shoes, for somebody sold him the leather and his interest extended over and fused with that of the man who wore the shoes and expected good wear from them. The 'good' shoemaker is therefore, in Plato's sense, the personal instrument through which a fusion of interpersonal relations is established. Moreover, a so-called third or disinterested party must get his interest satisfied on the ground that shoe sales in general must be so conducted that all will be protected against the hyperdevelopment of particular interests. And it is this third party as the order of persons whose interests get expressed in the typical ethical judgments. Such judgments find their objectivity in their reference to the synthetic order of persons as that is mediated through the qualities of things. A moral judgment is, as a judgment of a court on the law ought to be, a 'corporate' judgment. A moral judgment is, as a legal judgment ought to be, an interpretative allusion to a social order, either actual or ideal; to the actual in the more simply descriptive references to accepted standards, to the ideal when the reference is critically constitutive of new standards. The right to possess is then native to the system of purposes which represents a synthesis of interpersonal interests. This system is logically prior to the individual and is the origin of the authority of the moral law, as well as that of the civil law, over the individual. And it is the significance of the consciousness of this higher unity that determines the moral and civil quality of the individual, and the degree to which his action approaches consilience with this unity measures the morality and the 'patriotism' of his action.

The social order which has final authority is that which answers to our as yet unrealized purposes, and not that represented in the

history of custom, even if it be true that organization gets effected through directions established by custom. Custom sets the problem, points to failures or successes in the past, and suggests directions along which intelligence, superceding habit, may strike out new lines for the future. Intelligence is not directly concerned with the detail of specific acts. The latter may in the nature of things remain indefinitely under the motivation of habit. Their moral significance lies in the fact that they are or may be elements in the process through which intelligence draws the plan of an order of acts. And this whole is not a complex of factual elements reproduced from memory merely, but it is also an imaginative construction which draws its materials largely from an æsthetic reinterpretation of past conditions. And in so far as the social order depends on possession it will require that the law which determines and limits the right to possess be formulated with respect not to antiquated ideas and institutions as in the case of the law of property as it now stands, but with respect to the ideas and institutions which present needs dictate shall be constructed in the future. The hazy history of the past as it operates in precedent imposes upon us the sorry necessity of decomposing the complex problems of life into elements simple enough to be readily disposed according to principles applicable if at all only in a remote age, and the decomposition leaves the problems mangled beyond recognition even by the lawyers—hence legal fictions. And these fictions, by the way, are more real than the supposed entities at the basis of the law. A difficulty between a corporation and its operatives on the one hand and the 'public' on the other is reduced to simple terms of John Doe and Richard Roe, while the John Doe-Richard Roe situation has long ago ceased to be, if it ever was, representative of any real personal relation. Its terms are not identifiable with any events in the present order; and this backward reference to a primitive state of simplicity perpetuates antiquated methods of interpretation of social and personal relations. The actual facts of social relation are hidden behind the opacity of a form which is usable because it obstructs the light; it may mean anything and therefore means nothing. By this method of solution a personal relation involving justice is made a simple relation of indi-

vidual to individual, the standard applying to which can be only an empty form. The relation is then regarded as measurable, the individual is a quantitative unit, and the social order a mechanism.

But while the *content* of a relation between persons is a matter of the individuals involved and of their peculiar qualities, the *intent* of the relation points outward to something larger. As content it involves a simple situation which is composable by a matching of specific points, as when in the case of litigants it is found that one owes the other a sum of money. So far, a complete solution is reached provided all the facts in the case are duly weighed. It is a case of the law and the evidence, and the application of 'principles' does not call for intelligence, since it is a mere matter of perceiving the applicability of a rule. But the intent of the relation (by which the precedent was supposed to have been established) carries beyond the specific elements of fact, and requires the consideration of circumstances within which the facts themselves are determined. The larger social complex within which a particular act occurs is in a sense a producer of the act, in that it might have made it otherwise than it is. The specific act is then referable for its meaning to its locus in an order of acts, the act is capable of being understood as the expression of the uniqueness of the individual only when referred for its moral quality to the social whole in which it finds its being. As the expression of the 'individual' it is capable of complete description and its history may be told by reference to some previous psychological state. It can be estimated quantitatively by a standard fixed in previous time; it can be 'adjudicated' but it cannot be valued. The question of its worth or worthlessness is one of its place in a synthesis of other acts and other persons as these are mediated through things and as the whole is conceived as a harmonious dynamic order. It is within this order that possession gets its meaning; possession is a function of the whole. Possession as use and enjoyment particularizes things with reference to persons, when the matter is looked at from the viewpoint of individualistic psychology, and it is this viewpoint that gives individualistic ethical systems. Referred to a stretched metaphysics of the individual, it results in the natural right and the superlative

dignity of the person as emphasized in rigoristic or rationalistic systems. But possession from the point of view of control and disposal under the complicated conditions of the present, which have grown up long after the typical ethical and legal points of view have been worked out, presents problems which, it is to be feared, are soluble by no ethical or legal standards or methods that now exist.

The situation suggests two possible courses. It may be possible for human life to exist without standards; and if standards must imply fixity, the attempt would be an attractive adventure. Perhaps something like this is attempted in equity procedure. And it seems characteristic of the rough-and-ready way in which we pronounce simple judgments in private life. A case is settled on its 'merits,' or disposed of by reference alone to the 'facts,' and without any reference (conscious, at least) either to rules or future exigencies or possible neglected interests. As a case in equity it is settled by the judge's notion of moral 'common sense' which is perhaps only his own dominant prejudice. Here an act is regarded as not connected either with the life history of the agent or the wider group of acts of other persons, or with definitely anything but a supposed quality in the act itself. This is illustrated by the procedure of the hedonist who would judge the act with respect to some feeling which is a part of the psychological mechanism of the act itself. In any case the act is standardized with reference to itself, which is to say that no standard at all is used. This point I suppose is meant by the usual criticism of such procedure as subjective, since it carries with it no point of community upon which there may be agreement or disagreement. The question is therefore not arguable, and where we have no ground for concerted action or thought, there rules are out of the question and atomism is the word with which to describe human affairs. But actions are properly judged with regard to the possibilities of agreement in terms of further action or thought which they provide; and by agreement I mean not abstract logical consistency alone, which I do mean, but also the mutuality of consent to act through coöperative effort for the accomplishment of a common or reciprocal good. The 'objectivity' of moral judg-

ments, then, indicates the necessity of standards, and the question is as to their nature.

The tendency of the mind to drift or lapse toward the most attractive or simplest idea has led to the adoption in law and politics of precedent as a working standard. The same force tends to fix precedent as 'natural' and necessary. Hence we eulogize the 'eternal principles of justice,' etc., and forget that justice *is* merely the right ordering of given concrete relations which manifest a constant tendency to change. Whether the change is to be orderly will depend on the nature of the standards by which direction is given to it. Most of the disorder so much lamented in things human is due to the rigidity of laws which, because they will not bend, must break. There is as a consequence lawless action and lack of accomplishment due to uncoördinated effort. If there is to be order, to say nothing of 'progress,' standards must be flexible. Control by this sort of 'Lesbian rule' is then not a rigid logical predetermination of direction, but a critical and coöperative composition of various directions that represent different elements of motivation in the order which is being established. This standard might be indicated as the principle of cooperative effort of thought and action which directs human endeavor toward the mutuality of human good. While its function is to direct and order the moving whole, in other words to objectify its purposes, the degree and quality of order attained at any moment will react on the principle and revalue it continuously by requiring progressive adaptation to an end which, in the nature of the case, is only partially understood or defined. The quality of the present human order presents as a problem an end which is only partially appreciated, but which is yet judged better than the present. Or, put the other way around, it pronounces adverse judgment on the order that is, and calls for detailed effort of thought and action toward its reconstitution. There will be progressive give and take between the end as community good and the principle which is its instrument. The end is, let us say, a shared good in the form of a balanced and equitable but dynamic social order; the principle, a shared obligation to effort as expressed in mutuality of interest and coöperation in action.

When we look at possession and property as a social function, as I think we must learn to do, it will appear that what is called control misses the point at which the endeavor of men aims. It seems to have the negative sense which makes legal restriction meaningless in that it externalizes all the agencies through which motives get worked out. It assumes that possession is an appurtenance of the individual and that individual interests are different from and hostile to each other and to those of the whole, and that any order is an unstable balance of opposing forces. On this assumption the best government is the one that governs least, and the only function of government is to stand apart and umpire the game and to interfere only when methods become too raw. But it is difficult to see why government should not enter the game in a positive way, if it is to be the agency of control; it must do so if we are to take seriously the principle that government represents the will of its people. We do not will a negation in other connections. So the two so-called principles of government contradict each other. If possession is to stand for positive furtherance of social ends, it would seem that laws governing its use and control should look rather to the degree to which it represents community of purpose, than to the degree to which it stands for individually determined ends. It is time to rethink the old superstition that the general good is served best by the 'free hand.' So long as we look upon the human order as composed of 'individuals' taken as determined by separate and particular interests, the agencies of control, by which I mean those instruments through which the public or common will gets expressed or public purposes get formulated, can only be dispersive and separatist in their effects. And if we are to assume that these agencies and interests are represented by government, then government must be defined in terms of sovereignty, dignity, majesty, etc., all of which it is to be feared mean simply force. The principle upon which government acts will be negative and disruptive, and as expressed in the law will externalize and harden into rigid mechanical forces all the agencies through which social purpose seeks to make itself effective. Individuality conceived as determined by the psychological and biological aspects of the human being—the 'natural person' of the

law—can issue only in a mechanism and materialism with an exaggerated greed for physical property. And the attempt to conceive the individual as a unity of any other kind, in so far as the emphasis is placed upon his distinctness as is done in the legal and political doctrines of rights, will come to nothing else than a coarse materialism in which relations can have only such significance as is derivable from the notion of conflicting forces, and Hobbes' war of all against all will be the last word of political theory. Emphatic assertion that individuality is a spiritual entity or a qualitative whole or system comes to nothing the moment the attempt is made to distinguish 'private' rights of individuals 'against' each other, or against anything for that matter. And the attempt to make rights 'inhere' in the individual as ordinarily described is after all a denial of any real meaning in the term. A private right is, therefore, in connection with the individual in the old sense of the term, a contradiction in terms.

This is not intended as an attack on the reality of the individual, nor on rights, nor private rights, nor even on the right to private property in material things. But a profound respect for all these notions leads to the question whether there is any clear significance that can be defined or defended for these terms as they are assumed in the practical relations of law and politics as these get expression in legislation and judicial procedure. There is no such thing as the 'individual' of the law and politics; consequently from that point of view no consistent account of rights or of human relations can be given. The question of real importance is, then, one of giving as clear and definite a statement of the meaning of individuality as is possible, one that will be consistent with the facts of human relations as the latter appear in their whole meaning. Then a question of law will not be referable to an act of legislation (as it perhaps rarely is in the process of judicial interpretation) but to a metaphysics of individuality (as in practice it generally has been, though to a mistaken metaphysics) which can justify itself to thought. That is, the question is not one of determining specific rights, although specific rights are, once we have a hold on a right principle, determinable; but one of the nature of individuality. And this is a question of

metaphysics. From this point we might begin with the proposition that the individual is real. This means, I suppose, that some sort of theory of individualism is final; that there is no possibility of going back of the notion of individuality. But this means that the real is individual. Then variety of real content suggests the idea of degree, and with this idea applied to individuality we have a way out of the contradictions of 'individualism.' There are then individualities of varying degrees and the important practical question, particularly for legal theory, is one of defining, with such conciseness as is possible, the various stages and types of individuality as they apear in the relations of human affairs. This process will of course imply a first agreement upon a principle, a *fundamentum divisionis;* and this again will raise the old question of the 'principle of individuation,' a reinterpretation of which is, I submit, the one necessity of legal, ethical, and political thought at the present time. I should not undertake to say what would turn out to be the final principle upon which the various types of individuality should properly be distinguished. It might be necessary that the principle take different forms for theoretical and for practical purposes; or for the different sciences that deal with human relations directly. I merely suggest that property considered as the material ground of life functions and as the instrument of social purpose might serve some of the practical purposes of law and politics and possibly of ethics for the distinguishing of the various forms of individuality. It is clear that the property idea has been one of the larger elements in the history of the development of the idea of justice. And it is probably at the bottom of the distinction in law between the 'natural' and the 'artificial' person.

Proceeding from such an idea as this the question of possession would become one largely of determining the types of 'person' involved in a given case. The 'natural' person would then be the point of incidence of property considered as private, and the limitations of the extent of this form of property could be relatively easily proportioned to the value of the social functions performed by the individual. And the 'trust' idea suggests that it would be possible to distinguish between possessory social functions as con-

trolled in use for an abstract purpose, and the same functions in their point of incidence as represented in ownership. That is, it is possible for the instrument of a social function to be used and controlled in the interest of a social purpose without being *owned* at all; which suggests that the idea of ownership may have with us a tremendously exaggerated importance. The various types of corporate personality or 'artificial person' could be differentiated along the lines of the various uses of public property; and the question of 'who owns' the properties used and controlled in the interest of corporate entities would be of little or no consequence. There would thus be individualities represented by the family, the church unit, the various social and political units, all these characterized by the diversity of relation of 'natural' persons entering into the whole; and individualities represented by corporations, estates, masses of property, even more or less abstract groups of 'rights,' these characterized by various removes from incidence in natural persons. The point is that all these entities are individualities; the 'juristic person' is no less an individual, and no more a fiction, than the 'natural person.' They can all possess and assume other legal relations; and the extent to which some of them can enter into questionable political relations is well known. And the distinctions among them might very well—I suggest it as a mere practical maxim—follow the different classes of property. If it be objected that the determination of individuality by property is materialism and an 'economic' theory, the reply is that property as the objective criterion of individuality is itself determined as a social or interpersonal function, and avoids the materialism involved in making the criterion of right and property the natural person, which can itself be determined strictly only by its psychological or biological characters. The natural person is a low type of individual; it is the particular aspect of what is universal in the higher individuality of an interpersonal function such as the family.

On such a conception the old rigid distinction between private property and public property is avoided. Private property is sacred and inviolable, to be sure; but that does not justify the individualist principle that one should get what one *can,* nor does

it justify the vast masses of property which are now withheld from productive use to satisfy the mere whim of the individual. Public property is also necessary; the state is possessor of all kinds of things independently of the control which it exercises over all the property of its subjects.[1] But between the two is a long series of individualities representing in their use and enjoyment and control of property the complexity of interpersonal functions which binds the mass of individuals into an organic whole. And it is these mediate individualities that are real, at least *as* real as any. If there are any fictitious persons they are the extremes of the series: the natural person and the state when regarded as ultimates. Full individual freedom in possession has demonstrated its own contradictoriness; and the idea of state ownership and control is offensive to all types of mind. And the alternative is corporate ownership, or dropping the idea of ownership altogether, use and control by corporate individualities representing in their organization the major functions of human intercommunication.

In this way can be avoided also the objectionable legal notion that possession is exclusive, as well also that of the negative and restrictive character of law. If our rights and our law must 'control' and 'restrict' or be 'against' something, let them be against 'all the world' as the conditions of life in the interest of human welfare. There can be avoided also both the hyperdevelopment of the individual and of the state, and we shall be rid of the irrational notion that the state is external to and against the individual—'the man *versus* the state' idea. The question with reference to most of our legal and political notions is, what forms and degrees of individuality do they respectively represent?

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1 Holland, *Jurisprudence*, p. 366.

AN APPROACH TO IDEALISM.

TOO much emphasis perhaps is laid, in recent expositions, on the logical, the more strictly metaphysical and technical aspects of Bernard Bosanquet's philosophy, such as its view of the Absolute or of the logic of the concrete universal; and too little has been done by commentators in the way of bringing out the broader, the more immediately human and richer aspect of that philosophy. For it is to my mind the direct human side of Bosanquet, our best living exponent of idealism, that needs emphasizing to-day, not primarily because this side is 'human' or 'idealistic,' but because possibly through this approach a great philosophy can be a little more widely and genuinely understood, and can, therefore, a little better "help to recall and concentrate the modern mind out of its distraction." And at a time when psychiatrists are nervously bemoaning a world hysteria, even slight aid is to be valued. Ultimately what ails the world is its philosophy, its ideas; and through philosophy its ultimate cure must come. Nor is it possible to say that bad philosophy died when Germany was defeated. If Germany's war psychosis was due basically to a faulty naturalistic metaphysic, applying the doctrine of natural selection to the lives of men and groups of men, then various other nations are not so far removed from Germany's point of view as they think, save in relentlessness of logic and rigor of application. Of extant metaphysics, idealism is very nearly the only one which actually has kept itself free from the fatal error of accepting a scientific naturalism as a 'pou sto,' which thenceforth becomes philosophy's point of departure, not to be gainsaid save at the risk of being unscientific. To-day philosophical analyses which begin and deal directly with human life and experience as it concretely is, and not as it is interpreted as being when viewed through the abstract conceptual glass of a naturalistic biology and psychology, are at a premium.

Any approach, therefore, to a way of thought which, far from being abstract and supra-human, stands almost alone in beginning

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THE FALSE PRINCIPLE OF LIBERALISM[1]

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IT IS encouraging when the philosophers begin, in apparent qualms of distrust, to overhaul their fondest prejudices; and it is cause for an unusual degree of satisfaction when they find among them one which they have hitherto overlooked, perhaps because of the very warmness of intimacy in which it has been held. Recent discussions[2] of liberalism have thus apparently furnished a surprised enlightenment to their writers, at least, if one may judge from the seriousness and perturbations of spirit with which they begin to look upon this ancient hoary prejudice, or from the extraordinary methods by which they propose to make amends for their former neglect.

Professor Dewey recommends (p. 228) continuance of "experimental procedure," the method by which science obtains its eternally fragmentary and tentative conclusions. Professor Hocking appeals to the inner profundities of spirit, the spirit of an inconsequential idealism—"There can be *no new polity without a new emotion*" (p. 239). Professor Montague, re-baptizing liberalism democracy, divides the remains into equal portions and gives them sepulture in the splendid but gloomy tombs of capitalism and communism. And Professor Randall, with appropriate funerary histrionics, elevates the spirit of liberalism to the empyrean realm of faith in intelligence.

In spite of the keen insight and broad wisdom displayed in these discussions, it seems to me still possible to doubt, or at

[1] This essay, in a slightly different form, was read at the meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association held at St. Louis, May, 1935.

[2] John Dewey, "The Future of Liberalism," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXII, No. 9, 225–30; William Ernest Hocking, "The Future of Liberalism," *ibid.*, pp. 230–47; John Herman Randall, "Liberalism as Faith in Intelligence," *ibid.*, XXXII, No. 10, 253–64; Wm. Pepperell Montague, "Democracy at the Crossroads," *International Journal of Ethics*, XLV, No. 2, 138–69.

least humbly to inquire, whether all the critical thinking has really been done in connection with the subject of liberalism, or whether all the important aspects of the question have even been touched upon. I do not wish to undertake to do the possible residue of thinking, nor to hunt out the phases of the question that have been missed, if there are such. And I do not desire to argue the matter with anybody, certainly not with the eminent gentlemen who have so fully shown that they know vastly more than I could ever learn about the subject. What follows, therefore, will, I hope, be regarded merely as my reaction to, or from, the discussions of liberalism indicated above. Perhaps I ought to add, in self-defense, that I have tried as best I could to avoid even the appearance of constructive statement.

I suppose the original meaning of liberal is what befits a free man. But as the conditions of any freedom that has cultural value have always been wealth and power, the term "liberal" comes to apply to the attitudes of open-mindedness and open-handedness and generosity in which the free man bestows his wealth and exercises his power. From this I suppose the term gets its political application, in which the free man looks upon the problems and conditions of human life from a broad and generous and disinterested point of view. In any case, liberalism appears to be an individual attitude of generosity toward the conditions and stations of other people. And it appears to imply disinterestedness with respect to the disposal and distribution of those things which human beings generally regard as the peculiar conditions of well-being. As such, the liberal attitude is rather negative in its implication toward objective fact, and the liberal man gets the reputation of not being concerned about the small occurrences of ordinary daily life. On this account the liberal is not aggressive in the pursuit of the objects of his convictions, and is likely to remain benevolently and loftily inactive in the presence of crises.

But the liberal attitude also may, with a twist, become positive and aggressive, even to the point of militancy. As a nega-

tive individual *point of view* it is characteristically intellectual. But suffused with emotion, it becomes that vague mixture of cognitive and affective elements called purpose, and as such becomes an active principle of fellowship among individuals. This mongrel is often a lovable and pious beast, and frequently knocks its brother's head off in the interest of brotherhood. Under its high-floating banners beguilingly inscribed "our brother's good" we march to the economic and military conquest of our neighbors in the interest of elevating their culture and of establishing profitable relations within the affairs of men generally. Incidentally, our liberalism thrives on the wealth and power that comes from the conquest. It may heal and bless with the one hand and murder and ravish with the other, and there is no way of knowing in advance which it shall be. Liberalism as a social and political and ethical attitude is a psychological monstrosity, and what is veridical in it is self-contradictory.

In the political sense there is also a negative and a positive meaning. Negatively, the liberal spirit leads to freedom and "our liberties." But it is freedom from something, and it is liberty against the aggressor. These characters are easily recognized in the history of the Western peoples during the past two centuries. The impulse to freedom and liberty has been credited with much of our cultural development during that period, but our cultural accomplishments are results of freedom and liberty in the same way that bowlders lying on the hillside are results of the glacial stream. The scratches on the surface come from the mere movement, but the movement follows directions that are determined by the contour of the land; and that a given bowlder with a given form will be deposited at a given point is determined by agencies that have little or nothing to do with the movement, so that what happens is, in relation to the movement, a matter of mere accident. Liberty and freedom are negative, and what is negative is not a cause.

But there is a positive political liberalism. It came into existence perhaps from the application of the instinct of fair play to

political relations, and developed under the name of "tolerance." Tolerance grew out of attempts to control the political aspirations and resulting conflicts of religions, and developed on the principle that you can be generous with respect to what does not make any difference anyhow. One could not get excited about the choice between two theological abstractions, and it is interesting to note that tolerance developed out of the same conditions which in other directions led to skepticism on the one side and to deism on the other. Everybody should be free to think and express his own opinion, since one is as good as another; none of them makes any important difference, and to be happy is the final goal; thought and opinion are relations of ideas in any case, and depend upon experiences which may be different another minute.

In ethics, also, liberalism, under similar influences to those enumerated above, became benevolence and generosity and the sloppy interest in "others." Negatively, its influence is seen in the reflection that, since individuality must, in ethics, be represented as universal, there can be no differences among individuals. This is the basis of the egalitarian and democratic theory that all men are, at the last resort, of the same status or are "created equal." So one is as good as another. This attitude came to be, in industrialist hedonism, the assumption that one individual more or less doesn't matter, the brass-check attitude, so individuals in any number may be discarded when no longer industrially useful; we can afford to be liberal on this point, and we rejoice in the number of people whom we maintain at a minimum existence.

But there is a positive liberalism in ethics. Since the individual must be universal, then any individual is of infinite worth, as in the rationalist systems from Stoicism to Kant. The liberal principle of indifference as to individuals now means that the individual doesn't matter because all that matters is relative to the individual. Then our effulgent liberality is indeed cosmic in its scope, and the attitude becomes identical with the reality

itself. This means, of course, that reality is identical with the attitude, with the state of mind by which it is contemplated, and nothing in the universe is now good but the good will or the noble intention. Liberality to all means liberality to the whole, and is identical with it. And liberalism becomes the ontological thinness of the thin air its elementary subjectivism implies.

In law liberalism has expressed itself in the same two ways. There has been a revolt against formalism and the letter of the law as an expression of the negative element in the liberal attitude. The demand for a freer interpretation of the law has been noble in its intention, but futile in its effects, for it has depended solely upon the subjective attitude of the person who by grace of politics or business happens to be judge; and there remains, even in those cases where the chance of judge is fortunate, the same deadening machinery through which the attitude is to be given effect. Men do not gather figs of thistles, and they do not get justice from the occasional and accidental free attitude of the judge. Indeed, one of the most serious counts in the charge against the law is the caprice of the individual judge which prevents the development of sound principle in precedent. The uniform peace of death is endangered by the pranks of caprice, and the eternal law trembles in every joint.

But the efforts of the law—rather, of the few legalists who understand the problem—toward a positive embodiment of the principle of free interpretation within a competent instrument have been pathetic in the extreme. They all go back to the same old platitude—the subjective fiat delivered thunderously from Sinaitic imbecility. Even the great Holmes has left us on this head little but dissenting opinions, beautifully liberal, to be sure, and powerful in their rhetoric, but with no more force than the breath in which they were cast, as against the stodgy solid fixity of the techniques of promulgation. The conception was noble and immaculate, imaged in stately forms and colored in splendor; but the parturition was bungled by the clumsy midwife who was employed apparently because she was making the

most noise at the time. And one of the most promising cultural possibilities of our time failed because it flirted with what has perhaps been one of the worst cultural developments of all time. I mean that legal theory attempted to give itself expression in terms of sociology with the result—well, sociological jurisprudence. It is fortunate that the social psychologists avoided a worse consummation only by their ignorance of the existence of the problem. True, we shall continue to get liberal judicial decisions in increasing number and proportion; but the juridical structure will remain a disgrace to the idea of a rational civilization until a constitutional principle is devised for that structure. And the principle will not be a formulated state of mind, but will describe an institution.

The present status of liberalism is therefore critical.

And the crisis is of the nature of tragedy—the flaw that is inherent in the substance of the thing consists in the fact that the substance is not there.

The pseudo-essence of liberalism is its subjectivity. That is, the principle by which it attempts to constitute itself is contradictory; there is no object for which the liberal conception is the adequate ideal structure. Because of the nature of the phenomenon there is no objectification possible, no object in which it can become real. Its principle of subjectivity is a *contradictio in objecto;* because its essence is adjectival and insubstantial, there is no ground upon which it may objectify. Let us see that, and how this is the case. And to do so we may pass in review the more important attempts that the liberal principle has made to come to full objective realization.

Protestantism came into existence perhaps before the liberal principle was formulated, but it was nevertheless one of the important stages in the process of the formulation. It had its negative and repellent aspect in which it revolted against the old order; and it had its positive aspect in which it expressed the aggressive freedom of our European ancestors. But neither the instinct to revolt nor the urge to freedom has anywhere ever

successfully implemented itself in enduring structures, and Protestantism is one of the best examples of that failure. The reason is not far to seek.

Protestantism is religious liberalism. It has all the fundamental characteristics of liberalism. If we are right in saying the principle of liberalism is subjectivity, then these Protestant characteristics will be psychological in the sense that they imply a ground in those aspects of the experiential situation which we define in terms of their difference from objects and in terms of the absence of the structural relations upon which both the existence and the concept of objects rest. Protestantism is, then, a state of mind, and is incapable of being anything else. Its principle is stated in the proposition that salvation is accomplished by maintaining a state of mind, or by indefinitely prolonging a process of mind. Salvation—I assume that salvation is the religious equivalent of reality—is then a state of mind, and reality is attained by a mere change of mind. This is exemplified in its psychological mysticism, the assumption that in immediate experience the soul is in direct contact with God. And since such a state of mind, however exaltedly cognitive we may think it, is still affective and emotional, contact with the real is identity with the real, and thought is forever lost in the un-Hegelian Absolute of sheer subjectivity.

But life is not like that, and the Protestant cannot maintain the nothingness which his feeling would dictate as its essence. Life has its liturgy, its ritual, it *is* the ceremony in which it gives itself form—that is to say substance. And as the life of Protestant liberalism is contradicted in its subjective principle, that life will express itself in monstrosity. So we have schism as its law, and denominations galore to the last extremity of individualism. Every man his own god.

The fundamental weakness of Protestantism is, then, the weakness of all purely subjective motives—the inability to provide itself with an effective embodiment with which to implement its own acts. There are no competent structures through

which its ideas may will themselves into reality. It can never institute itself, never set itself up as a completed reality. Its method of "love" is futile—we cannot love each other into the Kingdom. Its method is the method of self-deception, the method of unconscious but pious fraud.

Democracy is political subjectivism, the assumption that the realities of social and public life can be attained through and in states of mind. Liberty, equality, fraternity, these subjective attitudes are sufficient; it does not matter that no adequate instrumentation of them in terms of human ends and objects is possible. We feel the urge to liberty, and go to the polls and vote. We will that something be done by government, and we send a man. But neither the ballot nor representation has any effective contact with appropriate instruments; they fail, as subjective motives, to find any competent implement. The ballot is the assumption that a symbol is real in the absence of continuity with the thing symbolized, and real in the same sense as the thing symbolized—a fallacy worthy of logistics. Representation presupposes the possibility of the substitution of wills—a radical misconception of the nature of will derived from the atomic individualism which democracy postulates. Freedom, etc., objectify in government, which is abstract process.

Democracy means liberty and the rejection of authority. Its ideal of self-authority means authority exercised by something beyond the individual even if what is beyond is chosen by the individual from among the capacities of his own nature. And the democrat knows this and renounces it. But he tricks himself with "self-government," for self-government means no government, and the democrat is a nihilist at heart. Or, since government implies the control of relations among persons, self-government means the absolutism of one great individual, as is realized in industrial democracy. And where there is no authority there is no discipline, and where there is no discipline there is no order, and where there is no order there is disorder—chaos. Where there is nothing but discipline there is orderly stagna-

tion. And democracy becomes an expression of the contradiction that is inherent between order and freedom. In either case there is no such thing as regular or orderly procedure, so there is no progress, so no continuous stability of achievement. On the principle of self-government there is either dictatorship or communism. And the instrument of government will be force in any case, either objective or military force, or subjective or psychological force—propaganda, fraud. The alternative it presents us now is ballyhoo or business. And ballyhoo is ballyhoo, and business is business.

Democracy involves toleration, hence the abandonment of criticism. When I "consider" my opponent's viewpoint politically I am willing that it be tried, in spite of the fact that it is false and unworkable. I should oppose the trial of it to the end, and the scheme, if adjudged worthy, should be tried in spite of my opposition. But I have saved my integrity as long as I could, and will agree only when the scheme works objective results in culture, and demonstrates that it works. This stubbornness is the proper attitude of intelligence, and it must not give way to compromise or good-fellowship.

But toleration involves the denial of any elementary distinction of degrees of value. It is therefore skepticism, and its result is nihilism. But its alternative is not intolerance, which is frequently mistaken for depth of conviction. In its skepticism it goes to the depths—of depravity—that government is best which governs least, less government in business and more business in government—these blasphemies go to the last extremity in the denial of value in life; there is in them the will to confusion. The practical maxim of democracy is, then, "Anything will do." Democracy involves toleration, and toleration is a compromise attitude. It has compromised its soul.

The tragedy of democracy is, then, its assumption that public reality is a state of mind. Its "public welfare" is a psychological phenomenon, a hypothetical and categorial state of mind. There can then be for it no competent instruments or means

through which such states of mind can be realized, since they are already Platonic reals. No genuine act is then possible, for an act that does not achieve or attain or become an object is a contradiction, and there is no achievement where there is not something that is not yet real. While, therefore, our states of mind are regarded as real, our "acts" of government will be the mystic exercise of the fiat; acts will be fulfilled in passing laws, and the dignity and authority and beneficence of the act are all independent of whether it is or can be obeyed. Obedience is not a duty, we merely "acknowledge" the law and its power, and then go about our business. And often our business consists in evading the law at the same time that we recognize and acknowledge it; thus self-government becomes self-deception, and its principle is fraud. Fraud in this case, as subjective, is psychological force, propaganda; and political experience is the process of convincing yourself of the truth of what you know to be false.

But in ethics we have the worst case of subjectivism—if anything is worst where everything is altogether bad—and the less said the better. We can then at least be brief. If we are empiricists and utilitarians, moral reality will be utility or welfare or happiness—in any case a state of mind—and while we will interpret moral experience in terms of brute economic, or brutal aesthetic, facts, we will nevertheless go on to reinterpret our facts, however brutal or brutish, back into the thin plasma of consciousness, and smudge the thing over with primal feeling. *The* good? An all-day-sucker for a penny. There is no *thing* that is good until it as thing is dissolved in the penitential tremor of emotion and reduced to the slush of affects. The good dies aborning, it can take on no body, hence has no place in the scheme of real things. Or, if we cite the *fact* that utilitarianism has been a great reforming force and has achieved real results in objects—oh, well, look at the objects: industrialism and business, and the standard of high living and plain thinking. Or,

look at its aesthetic objects—huge gobs and vast piles of industrially excreted concrete.

So, also, if we appeal to ethical common sense the good is sympathy, well-wishing, benevolence—a state of wistful vacuity and empty yearning. Hence we image the nothingness with the colors of its like, and the good becomes a nebulous "other," which differs from the original only in Einsteinian characters. But it is neither in character nor relation actionable, and our moral relations to it can only be attitudinal and prepotential. The good is what it ought to be at infinity, while neither of the terms to the relation are known. And they are not known because there aren't any, and because the conditions of knowledge are never present. Moral reality is always unreality because it is an "other" and is never attained. The false principle of liberal ethics is that obligation is owed to a person or persons. This is true only of the corporate or objective person, but this liberalism is ignorant of. It knows only the subjective person, the person of states of mind. But obligation is never due or owed to such a person, nor has it any meaning statable in merely subjective or experiential terms.

So also with Kant and the rationalist. The good is the good-will. But the moment the good-will makes contact with any reality it is transformed into desire, and its moral potentiality is gone. It must therefore make no such contacts; goodness must remain abstracted from all objective connections, must consummate or objectify within its own internality. And when Kant comes to aesthetics, that is, to the metaphysics of ethics, he is frank in saying that the objectification is merely psychological, and the ultimate good (beauty) remains ideal and beyond the reach of mortal man. It remains forever suspended in design (where Kant is obviously right), a purpose without purposiveness (to correct Kant's major slip), but he ruins the exalted conception with a relapse to naturalism, where design as existing in nature is confused with nature existing in design. Incidentally, some others, failing to remain hard-headedly

Whiteheadian, make this slip, and become pantheists. Reality need not be conscious, nor need purpose know. The End may be Nirvana.

The fallacy which runs through all modern ethics, as through all liberal "thought," so far as I can see, lies in this fatal assumption that reality must be a state of mind. All modern moral systems rest on the assumption that reality is a function of the distinction of one individual from another, the distinction made in terms of the psychological "goodness" of the individuals. They have thus a psychological criterion, which, being a contradiction in terms, means that they have no standard at all. They attempt to create a standard by universalizing a state of mind. And this cannot be done. Their worst possible form is realistic ethics, where the realist suffers from his apostasy from idealism. Realism has confused the fundamental truth with which it sets out in common sense. It attempts to categorialize its object, as it should, and it seeks objectivity through the universal, as it should. And the method is speculative abstraction, as it should be. But the abstraction is an abstraction *of* the *subject*, in which there is no real content, so the object is not categorialized. Real universalization is abstraction of the object through a system of determining categories, and the subject, even the self, is discovered in the process. Abstraction thus becomes speculative determination. The realist misses this, and Berkeley moves from demigod to god. The fallacy is universal; even in philosophy we foolishly seek the truth in a state of mind and by psychological and epistemological methods, and, at our worst, we find in logic that reality is experience. We philosophize about philosophy, and reality goes its own way. What we probably mean is that experience is reality. But in any case, reality, for ethics, is a "value," an indefinite and indefinable state of mind, which we undertake to classify in scientific schema, or celebrate in rhetorical ecstatics. But we never understand its meaning, and we shall not understand its meaning, for states of mind by themselves and merely in terms of their

content and in terms of their relations to each other, are unintelligible. What is the reality involved in value we have not even asked. Everybody tells us how it feels; nobody tells us what it is.

In aesthetics, which, as I insist, is the metaphysic of ethics, and when written will come near metaphysics in general, our subjectivist folly, our genial liberalism, becomes really and literally a work of art. But it is a grotesque. Nothing could be more beautifully inane and charmingly vacuous than most of what is written about beauty. The sublime is grotesque in its risibility, and the tragic comic *sub quadam specie aeternitatis*. Beauty, we say, is a state of mind; and aesthetic theory an attempt to determine which state of mind it is among the infinity of states of mind. Nearly all of the states of mind have been guessed by somebody, which explains the bounteous harvest of theories. Aesthetic method is "valuation," and our preferred formulation of it is a gracefully raving rhetoric, by the use of which we hope to control or direct the gush and splurge of our states of mind and to spill them evenly and rhythmically all over the aesthetic landscape. Beauty is anything and everything so long as it's a state of mind; any object of any interest, any interest in any object, distance, *Einfühlung*, expression—in the latter beauty is so ineffably inner that the apprehension of it ends in rhapsodic inexpressibility. Santayana sums it all up gorgeously in finding that Beauty is a psychological trick that our states of mind play on us—they pretend to be what they are not, and that is beauty. Here the method of fraud attains to cosmic self-consciousness, self-expression, in the beatific act of self-deception. Beauty is not real, it's merely a state of your mind, and aesthetic experience consists in jollying yourself into believing that it is real. And aesthetic theory is the plastic surgery by which the fraud is perpetrated on the face and form of Beauty.

In law, liberalism becomes the subjective principle of free interpretation—the essence of the law becomes its intent—the state of mind in terms of which *you* interpret it. Whatever

tangles of interests—they may be gruesomely unlawful and immoral—but the clot of interests that happens to make up the mind of an ignorant judge at any instant, that is the law. In our supreme court the law is one thing for four judges and another thing for five, and what it is to be finally depends upon the direction in which prejudice happens to blow or economic "necessity" directs our sordid interests and fears. We are in revolt against the letter of the law, not calm enough to see that there is no law where the letter fails to weld it to the structure of our being. Where there is no embodied form, where the act of man is not solidified into the enduring texture of his life and incorporate there, it is idle to speak of law, and blasphemy to speak in the name of the law. If the law is not the framework which holds together the loose-jointed structure of life, I mean if it is not there in its own actuality continuous with the being of things, there is no law. We are still worshiping the superstition that the law is the command of the state, the state of mind of a mythical person whose forms of expression are force and fear and cajoling fraud. But the law is nobody's state of mind, and it is not a mystical effluvium of the state. It is neither a state of mind nor the mind of the state, if I may be cute. The law is the precipitated, incorporate, realized objectified act of man, and it creates the state by imposing its form of order, or ordered form, upon the crude practical reality of life as that reality stands plastic clay in the economic, industrial, religious, social, and aesthetic affairs of men. The state is, then, culture incorporate in law.

Then what has the law to do with states of mind? It is the system of the acts of man, realized or objectified in principle; it is not his congealed states of mind. When we melt its substance down into states of mind, its fluidity renders it incorrigible, and negativity becomes its element. Its virtue is to deny its object, any object. It forbids everything. Hence it can have no end, nor can there be any competent instrument for its expression. Its judgments, which are objective and realized in affairs when

true, are decisions or opinions, which are subjective and false. There is and there can be no system of them, and the effort to give them system becomes tragic in the confusion of precedent. The only thing solid and certain about the law is its uncertainty. This the contradiction and fraud in a law that boasts of its positivism.

Through its affinity with a subjective ethics and politics, the law, in spite of its boasted positivism, abandons the consistent legal thinking by which it should develop an intelligible legal philosophy, and embraces the harlot—legal positivism and the reference to "social" "experience." This mistress is unprincipled, has no character, no integrity. The law not only has no principle but is incapable of one, for its substance is a tissue of subjectivities, a framework of psychic processes which can have no substance, and floats disconsolate in an abyss of "interpretation." The law's negativity and contradictoriness are expressed in physical force; the power to compel is conceived to be its essence, and psychological force, propaganda, fraud, particularly in international relations, become bluff and buffoonery. Literally, "the law is a ass."

In economic and industrial life the consequences of our subjective methods of liberalism are beyond tragedy, and beyond description, and are rapidly becoming beyond the possibility of human endurance. That men could ever have believed that reality consists in desires, wants, interests, satisfactions, or could have made the fatal blunder of believing that real acts can be planned with respect to desires and wants and interests and satisfactions, and, last and lowest, could have been simple enough to try to act on the assumption that desires and wants and interests can be objectified, will be, if we survive the impending chaos, utterly and wholly and hopelessly beyond reason to comprehend.

Liberalism is thus subjectivism adopted as the method of culture. Its "principle" is that reality is a state of mind, an "experience." There are many great positive side-consequences of

its operation in the field of confusing nightmares which we call values. It has given culture a variety, at least a multitudinousness, which it has never had before. The possibilities of objects of use, the possibilities of interesting states of mind, have increased infinitely within recent decades. But these possibilities have not been realized, and they cannot, on liberal "principles," ever be realized. Our vaunted material and social "achievements" are emphatically not realizations of cultural purposes. As objects and ends they rest on sand, and as states of mind they are gall and wormwood. For the basis of the objects is sham, and of the states of mind, fraud. Liberalism means that for generations we have amused ourselves with our states of mind, and we have done nothing else, in spite of our boasted interest in things. Like heedless children we have toyed with our own images, ungraven eidola, unconscious of the flow of things about us, while the structure of things by its own autonomy has predetermined the destinies of men. We have believed the lie and are damned.

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THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN SOCIAL CRISIS

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THE role of philosophy in time of crisis is the same as its role at any other time. A crisis only emphasizes the practical aspect of philosophy. Its normal function is to keep humanity's corporate head on straight. To perform this function it operates to maintain systems of critically clarified basic ideas. An idea is a symbolic representation of an aspect of objective structure where objective structure means systems of objects in relations of mutuality—mutuality of causal and logical dependence, mutuality of value implications, mutuality of nisus toward ends through active functioning. Systems of objects structured through their own inherent spontaneity constitute nature. Systems of objects structured by the operation of a spontaneity under the guidance of intelligence constitute culture. An object so structured is individual, and corporate, is what it is as it occupies a status in both systems at once. In this case we call the object a "public object"; and the realm of occupancy in both the status of nature and the status of culture is designated "the public." This public is the substantial reality implied in all uses of the term "practical" and is the object matter of politics. Problems relative to the nature of the constitution of the public are problems of political theory. Problems relative to the growth and maintenance of the constitution of the public are problems of practical politics. The public in

empirical terms is the "state" or the "status" of public structure under empirical conditions. The systems of effective means to the growth and maintenance of the constitution of the state, where institutionalized, are called "government." The process of applying principles derived from political theorizing to the control of growth and maintenance functions in the state is "legislation."

An element of public structure organized by its own law to perform a specific function within the state is called an "institution." For example, a nucleus of the elements of the work activity, corporately structured by its own law within a system of natural and cultural objects, is called an "industry," an object of peculiar importance in practical politics; and the function and process of work institutionalized by law within this corporate structure with respect to the whole public is Industry as a universal; an idea which becomes an essential concept in theoretical politics. It is to be observed that politics has no subject matter of its own; politics is the theory, that is, the thought action, the legislation, that supplies the system of principles for maintaining order among institutions.

Within these institutions one factor of great importance is the individual human being; but, as far as politics are concerned, all aspects of his importance accrue to him by virtue of his place and function as one element among many in the institutional structure. I do not believe that the question as to what is this place and function of the individual in the institutional structure is at all well understood in the political theory of modern times; I do believe that for the elements of the solution of the problem we shall have to go back to the classical politics of the Greeks and Romans. I say for the elements of principle we must go back to the classical systems; but for the specific elements of content we shall have to dig our solutions out of the virgin soil of existing political fact. And I believe that modern political theory has been all along—certainly is now—entirely mistaken as to what it is that constitutes the elementary politi-

cal fact. The assumption that the elementary fact of politics is the inner will of the individual human being, or that it is that will pluralized and compounded in a mystical general will, is the major premise of modern political theory. It is false; and its falseness has worked corruption into the vitals of every modern state and is now bringing them all to a common dissolution.

This is the illusion around which the modern democratic state has vegetated; and it is the submerged rock upon which the democratic constitution is now threatened with breakup. Or rather, what it is showing is that the so-called democratic state has not now and possibly has never had an appropriate constitution. It is not the Fascist, not the Nazi, not the Communist, who is destroying democracy; if democracy is threatened with disintegration, it is so by its own disease—the false maxim that is built into its constitution. Of course, all these statements are premised on the proposition that we are all lovers of democracy. And they imply that we will try to understand it.

Stated in philosophical language, this maxim—the political primacy of the individual will—is the hypothesis that reality is a state of mind. This idea is not peculiar to politics—politics has no subject matter of its own—but was formulated out of historical antecedents within the currents of modern religious, industrial, social, and economic activity, and the thought which this activity occasioned. The maxim degenerated out of what has been the foundation principle of all genuine philosophy from Anaxagoras on—reality is ideal. This the empiricist corrupted into reality is an idea; and this the subjectivist motive of our modern culture in politics, ethics, and religion has further distorted into reality is a state of mind. The tragedy of all philosophy of the modern period is its assumption that its proper method is psychology, and that is still true, still more tragically true, now that the psychology so used is called "logic." As far as the public order is concerned, this method has nothing whatever to say. And sociology is saying it for our legal and political thought.

But we have said that the role of philosophy in any time is to keep ideas straight. All ideas of practice are political ideas. They all refer to the metaphysics of ethics, where all ideas are practical and have their ground in institutional structure. It is then this structure that is the ultimate object for politics.

Politics, then, is constitution building; and constitutions are built by a proper fitting-together under law of the institutions that make up the structure of public life. Constitutions are neither built nor maintained by the mystic fiat of any mind or of any combination of minds. If we are to hold to the use of the idea of will as explanatory concept in politics, it will have to be redefined in terms of the ordered and integrated momentums of institutions working together in the public body—the corporate or objective will. The political will of a state is this corporate will expressed in the creative urge toward public ends and is constituted of the various corporate urgencies of its constituent institutions. The church, the school, industry, the family, all these, when harmonized in their corporate intent, that is, when their interrelations define the design of a structure, constitute the state. And this corporate intent is the will of the state. The will of the state is not the mystic sum of the mystic pulses of energy of human beings. At the point where a definition of will is required we are at the bottom of ethics, and the problem is one of metaphysics.

The problems of politics are therefore philosophical problems, and the method of politics is the method of philosophy—logic. Politics is not a social science; in the sense of the terms normally accepted it is neither "social" nor "science." It is thus not accessible to scientific method, so that there is no such thing as political science. The problems of politics are not problems of fact, or of any generalizations on facts derived by empirical methods. They are problems of law, and law is intelligible only through the functioning of the legislating intelligence. The tragic illustration of the distinction made here lies in the history of modern democracy. Once more, we all love democracy. It

discloses that democracy has regarded its function to be one of determining empirically an ultimate method; the assumption that the whole meaning of politics lies in determining the *modus operandi* of the "common will," so that democracy is merely and solely a means for giving expression *ad hoc* to the political process, for finding specific instruments through which the "common" will could express itself in particular cases. So it has become common to describe democracy as the "method of the good life," and to recommend it as such. And to this characterization of democracy there can be no objection at all.

But if this is a proper characterization of democracy, then democracy is not a politics. It does not contemplate a polity; it designs no constitution. It offers no suggestions as to the nature or the structure of the state, no hints as to how the functioning institutions of life are to be organized into a corporately integrated whole, no picture at all of that order which is the ground of all meanings in political or public life. Hence, a constitution has to be made for it artificially and fitted on to it externally. And it neither has offered nor can offer any suggestions on these vital questions; it neither has offered nor can offer a hint as to the nature of the order upon which depends its own successful operation as a method; it can furnish itself with no solid foundation upon which its own functioning could secure its own continuity. Democracy carries in itself, therefore, the seeds of dissolution, and this weakness becomes tragic in political practice as the persisting tendency to corruption—a tendency which modern business has learned so well to take advantage of—and explains why democracy has become so sacred a symbol to the businessman, and why oligarchy has constituted the modern state in the name of democracy.

Democracy then gives us and can give us no plan for the order of the public life. It constitutes no state. It is not, therefore, a political theory, it implicates no political system; it has no plan of a state; it tells us only how to work the state after the state is once ordered and established. But there is no hint in the theory

of democracy as to how the state is to be ordered or established. And it cannot effectively maintain itself clean and whole even as a method; for, being ignorant of its moral ground, it confuses itself with utility, and utility is infinite process. Democracy is not a theory of the state, and what is not consistently complete in theory cannot work in practice.

Politics is then the conceptual design of the structure of the state. It is a building plan and not a loose-jointed set of instructions for the operations of the state. Politics as theory of state structure is not a question of processes or of any kind of procedure. It can accept democracy as a method, or it could elect any of the other types of method known to political theory. Its object is the "design" of the state in all the senses of that troublesome word. And the design of the state is the skeletal framework set up by the mutuality relations among the elements of which the state is composed. These elements are the institutions within which the life-function embodies itself—becomes corporate. This design of the state, in its functioning as active intent, is simply the active constitution, the substantive law, through which the state is maintained. The state is composed of the system of mutuality relations of causal and logical necessity which bind the elementary institutions into a corporate whole. Thus the problem of the constitution of the state is a problem of the structure and relations of corporate bodies. It is not a matter of the relations of men to one another except as those relations are instrumented within the corporate structure of institutions. The question of the relations of men to one another as men is the "social question," which is the playground for sociologists and political scientists and is relatively unimportant for politics.

But this is to say that politics is a question of the fact, that is, of law. It is not a question of "the facts" or of preferences among "ideas." It is not, therefore, a matter of ideologies. To describe the political world today as a conflict of ideologies is silly. It is also not a matter of "nationalities" or of national,

racial, or religious prejudices. Men have learned to take one another's mythologies as poetic expressions of the historic accident that determines each community to have its own subjective symbolisms, and nobody treats them with the sublime seriousness necessary to the theorist. Until blinded and demoralized by propaganda, the men of today would not fight for their convictions, and I do not believe that they would be sensible if they did. But they will fight for their institutions, right or wrong. We have certainly learned that what we believe cannot be proved or disproved by fighting about it. But what is obvious as a cause of political disintegration is that within recent years the institutions of public life have developed a form and structure that have forced upon them a redistribution of their mutual relations, and, as these relations in their system are the constitution of the state, the state has changed its essential nature. And we have both in our theorizing and in our legislation ignored this; our thought has not reformulated the new law necessary to regulate life within and adapt it to the new structure, with the consequence that the new structure moves blindly after its own momentum. And these changes and developments within the basic constitution of the state have not been effected or largely affected by our states of mind. At best our states of mind follow after the fact by at least a couple of generations. It is true that our feelings, convictions, prejudices, mythologies—racial, national, religious—would have entered into the discussion upon which a new lawgiving would have had to depend, but they enter there as hindrances; and even if they had determined the law, that would have been merely to determine the law as unconstitutional, as contrary, that is, to the factual structure of the state. For the law does not make the state or its constitution; the state, i.e., the constitution, makes the law, that is, the statutory law, when the law is right or just. For the law that is just is declaratory of the state's constitution, which latter is there *in rerum natura* as the product of cultural and natural evolution without benefit of our ideological convictions.

As an example of what is meant here: the ideologies of the peoples of Europe today are not essentially different from what they have been for many generations. But while they have remained the same, the life-activities of the peoples have been forced into a newly developed institutional structure, especially in their economic and industrial phases. This new structure has forced upon them a new mode of active life, and with it, of course, a "revaluation, in this case a devaluation, of values." But it is the new objective mode of life that is causing the conflict. And, since the mode of life has changed more rapidly under war conditions, one can now see new evaluations, possibly new ideologies, right or wrong, coming as results of the changes in the modes of life. Chamberlain was forced by circumstances of objective fact to see that "civilization as we know it" was gone; and it would never have occurred to Churchill that a "redistribution" would be necessary after the war if he had not been forced to it by the logic of events. It is this logic of events that is the determiner of political destiny, and ideologies are never deep enough to float its weight.

Since, then, democracy is a political method only, the theory of democracy is not political theory. Political theory—politics—is the system of principles of law by which the various phases of political structure, i.e., institutions, are integrated in a corporate whole. These principles are the norms that underlie positive law and are grounded in the metaphysic of ethics; they are objectified in the structure of public life; hence all law is public constitutional law in so far as it has authority. A state is a type of family, a church, a school, an industry, etc., maintained within a corporate structure by principles of law which constitute them a corporate whole. It is not constituted by relations of men or by relations of their ideas. The institution through which the law creates and maintains the harmony and unity of the fundamental institutions within the state, the agency that keeps the peace, is government; the man's first obligation, po-

litically, is to recognize that he can act politically only through the government that maintains the state.

But the individual's action by and for and through his government is practical politics. Practically, then, the political problem for the individual citizen is that of maintaining the legal status of the family, the church, the school, and industry as the characteristically political institutions, within the corporate body of the state. By the vote and through other governmental machinery he expresses his will as a political agent, and the matter or content of his will is always some aspect of the structure or the interrelations of these political institutions; he asserts his will about the organization of the school or church or industry or government, or about the relations among them. His son cannot go to college; there is something wrong with the organization of the college or of the industry upon which the means thereto depend, or something amiss within their relations to each other. The problem is not a reference to his personal weakness or his son's weakness; the trouble is in the college or the shop, or there is some frictional maladjustment between them. Most of what we call civic evils are not due to the psychological or moral characters of individuals but to frictions that develop among institutions. And it is the task of the citizen through government to rectify these frictional difficulties.

But these are questions of extraordinary difficulty, and the fumbling and confusion of practical politics are the result. This is probably necessary, since the method of practical politics is experiment. But if the citizen is face to face with a problem that is too difficult for him, it is not his fault. The fault lies in the statesman as political theorist. The statesman should know the political problem so well in principle as to be able to supply to the citizen a code of maxims of political action adequate at least to the experimental purpose of guidance in normal circumstances. And familiarizing the citizenry with adequate maxims of political action should be a purpose of public

political activity, and is one of the proper functions of government.

Then what is it that the statesman should know in principle as a basis for what he should hand on to the citizen as practical maxims? This knowledge begins and ends in the critical analysis of the conceptual structure of the fundamental political institutions—the family, the church, the school, industry, government—and of the systems of relations, actual and possible, that can and do hold among them. Politics has no peculiar content, no content of its own; its content is the nature and interrelations of the basic institutions. The analysis begins with the system of the ethical-legal concepts upon which the public structure rests, and we remind ourselves that by a concept or idea we mean a symbolic replica of aspects of structure—in this case the structure of the family, the church, the school, industry, and government. I say these all rest upon certain ultimate ideas of metaphysics and are, therefore, the roots of law. What the statesman should know, therefore, is what is intrinsically legal about the system of ultimate political ideas.

These ideas are that of the person, and the corollary system of objective implicates of person made necessary by the postulate of public order. These are the system of the concepts of the law—right, property, obligation, etc.—and are all of them logical and practical implicates of the concept of person. A few brief comments on these, for the most part critical, is all that can be offered here. But a thoroughgoing analysis of these ultimate political ideas would show that the practical "sciences" of ethics, economics, politics, and law are masses of contradictory nonsense.

It is obvious that from any point of view the concept of person is central. From the point of view of our "social" "sciences," and particularly for ethics, the person is a unique agent alone in his universe with his means and ends. His means have no meaning or status in the universe except in relation to him; we try to set up a theory of this monstrosity in the notion of interest. His

ends have no meaning except as some aspect of his own nature, pleasure, happiness, "self," considered as realized in terms of the completion of their existing characters. True, after we have given our account of the individual and his world in terms of himself, we observe that he is withal a member of a family and has other institutional connections. But we still regard these connections as "social," as accidental addenda, whereas they are the most important elements that enter into the presuppositional ground upon which the concept of person is founded. They are not relations, in the ordinary sense, but stand to the person as functions to structure, or attributes to substance. They are analogies, and they constitute, with the person, a unique identity. This identity is not available to scientific description. The person is meaningless apart from them; they constitute the core of meaning which the concept expresses. As a consequence we shall have to redefine the person in terms of a corporate structure of interinstitutional relations if our ethical theory is to have that conformity to fact that is necessary to give it validity and ground its formulas as law.

In economic connections we try to picture the person as a center of energy, and this energy is restricted for the most part to expression in production. Objects produced and called "goods" we try to think in a system which has no relation to ethical principle, and the ambiguity of the term "good" in such a use throws the system of objects into a fraudulent confusion and the theory of the nature of "goods" into pathetic and contradictory futility. The institution we try to build around such pseudo-concepts is the tragic instance of human failure.

In our legal procedures, as well as in the theory of law, such as we have, the person is equally narrowed in conception. Here for the most part the person is merely a center of reference for interests. But this only means that the law has abdicated to the law merchant. Besides being, as a theory of interests, a totally inadequate representation of the nature of the person, our law overlooks the more tragically important fact that interests can-

not be made matter of law without denying and frustrating the very possibility of law in any sense except the mere expression of a command as a power to compel. And this is law giving way to force. If you don't like Germany, look to the bases of your law.

And, finally, in politics the person of prevailing democratic theory and practice is a voter expressing his mystic freedom or a taxpayer submitting to a superior force. So completely is he severed from all institutional connections that he is "agin" all of them, even to the extent of defining "that government is best that governs least" and conceiving the state as organized on the principles of checks and balances so as to guarantee its futility.

I propose to wreak a critical damnation on all of these "social" "sciences." In respect of this idea of person, they are all of them false in their attempts at principle, and all of them futile in their practical implications. A world in hellish chaos is all the fact I care to adduce. And my only suggestion is that if we are to be serious about our destiny, we might consent to look to the possibilities for both theory and practice of the notion of the corporate person.

Our theory of the person, therefore, has no relevance to the actual practical person of contemporary life. The same is true of all the major practical concepts, since they all derive from the concept of person. We have a political theory of property and a law of property that have no statable relation to the existing institution of property; a law of contract that has no meaning in terms of the contractual relation upon which the modern state rests; a law of rights and obligations that has little correspondence with the actual institutions of rights and obligations; a criminal law that is obsolete and unintelligible in relation to the facts, etc., for the entire scheme of practical principles. Our ethical theory is subjective nonsense and our economic theory materialistic rubbish.

When crisis is upon us it is too late. There is nothing that philosophy can do. The philosopher's sin lies in the fact that

for the last three hundred years he has done nothing in the way of redefining the systems of practical principles or of adapting them to the changed conditions of life. And this during a period when the conditions of human existence perhaps shifted more than in any other equal period in its history. By way of atonement for his negligence he might now try to anticipate an end of the present crisis, by attempting to construct valid principles on the ground of existing facts for a possible future—if there is to be any future after the carnage is over.

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THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

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IN THE general concern over the problem of origin and validity as found in the sociology of knowledge, a far more basic problem has suffered relative neglect. This problem may be formulated as follows: Is the sociology of knowledge, from a theoretical standpoint, even possible? If possible, then in what sense is it possible? And how, especially, can that possibility obtain a theoretical ground? These questions have received various and highly divergent answers. But, unless one can establish the legitimacy of the sociology of knowledge, there would appear to be little reason in discussing the problems that can arise only on the presupposition of its legitimacy.

As a matter of fact, the problem at hand is far wider than the mere sociology of knowledge: it concerns the legitimacy of all forms of the approach to thought in terms of a social matrix. However, the controversy over the theoretical possibility of this approach has proceeded almost entirely in reference to the sociology of knowledge. For its disowned and disowning parent, historical materialism, either has not cared or has not ventured to develop the problems involved in the assumption of the social determination of thought, and other variants on the social approach have similarly neglected the theoretical problems of the approach. Hence, in order to investigate the problem of the possibility of a social interpretation of thought, we cannot avoid considering the controversy as it has occurred in the peculiar context of the sociology of knowledge. As one might expect, points of relevance only to the sociology of knowledge mingle with points of wider relevance. For the most part, however, the debate concerns central issues, and the central issues belong not

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CONCERNING PHILOSOPHY[1]

THERE are various ways of characterizing modern philosophy, and of stating the difference between modern philosophy and medieval or ancient. Ancient philosophy sets out from an aesthetic viewpoint which finally invents the logical form as its instrument, desires to see the world as a whole, and intends to appreciate the world for what it is. And since the ancient viewpoint was worked out generally within groups engaged in discussion, it followed a corporative method and sought an end not bounded by the limitations of the individual observer. Its object was a corporate aesthetic whole, whose status and situs were determined only by other objects of identical nature. It had no relation or quality in any way derived from, or referent to, experience.

The medieval viewpoint was religious, in the peculiar oriental sense that it constructed its world out of the objective necessities of its life, out of those objects of life which were necessary to supplement the inadequacies of the world of experience. It was contemplative in its attitude to its world; it had no purpose to do anything about the inadequacies; even the full realization of what it regarded as its object, the transformation of its object into an objective, was to be realized in another world by the instrumentality of divine grace. And divine grace was itself an instrument, objective and not under their control, its efficacy outside experience, by means of which human limitations were to be gratuitously evened out. Also, the medieval view was a view of the whole from the whole, that is, it contemplated an end in which the particular

[1] The presidential address to the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association, April 1942. Undelivered owing to the author's unavoidable absence from the meeting.

would be assumed and subsumed, and the significance of the end lay in the fact that it embodied in an institutional structure the human purpose represented in the whole.

Thus the philosophic quest of the Greeks sought its object through a corporative method and, presupposing an institutional structure, had for its end an ideal whole; the medieval quest followed an institutional method, and had its end in a corporate structure. Is there anything suggested here that effectively characterizes the modern viewpoint?

It is the accepted commonplace to say that modern philosophy is scientific, analytic, humanistic, naturalistic, antischolastic, "anthropocentric"; "internalized", says Windelband; "illumination", says Falckenberg—"Philosophy as illumination, as a factor in general culture, is an exclusively modern phenomenon." The two characters perhaps most frequently named, both intended to indicate a superiority in modern philosophy, are its uniform reference, in some unique way, to the "inner" man, and its finding its object in nature; it has its source and ground, its medium and its method, in subjective inwardness, yet it is purely and disinterestedly and objectively scientific, with the world as its goal. It is thus no accident that its major problem is epistemology. That these two motives are incorrigibly contradictory does not in the least disturb the blatant egotism with which we congratulate ourselves upon possessing the final view. We know that our modern viewpoint is scientific, that it seeks the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth; that it has its source, its original impulse, its goal and consummation, in the mysterious depths of the inner man and the eternal inwardness of nature. And putting together the two claims and giving the monstrosity its appropriate name, it is atomic mysticism.

I say we approve with enthusiasm the modern viewpoint, and emphasize various particulars in which it is superior to the ancient and medieval. We tend to look upon the earlier views as if they were at best mere premises, with a suspected negative implication, from which we draw the modern conclusion, and to regard the only thing sound about the premises that they render the conclusion final. I should like to suggest that the only sound element in the conclusion is that it summarizes the weaknesses of both premises,

and thereby reduces itself to futility. But let us look for a moment at the assumed weaknesses of the ancient view and the medieval view.

Greek philosophy started out with a correct formulation of the philosophic problem. Thales asked plainly and in prose what the poets had already asked in figurate beauty many times before: What is it all about? With the problem stated, the Greek went on with characteristic human indecision to make all the mistakes he could, and, the mistakes formulated, to find all the corrections there are. There was naturally among the Greeks, as with us, the tribe of meticulists, those who could see the reality only when writ small and broken into its ultimate parts, who find the end of the intellect only in the process of building structures of abstractions to stand only tentatively while plans are being made to knock them down again. This was, with them as with us, the pursuit of truth. And there were among the Greeks, as among us, those who could see the reality only as realities ensconced within the seeing, where they required only to be re-presented in the symbols by which they were writ.

But there was also Plato, the artist-philosopher, the spirit, the form, of the Greek race. And with him and his kind the shortcomings of Greek philosophy were all corrected in Greek art. What is could not be realized directly; it could only be represented, and what was represented was redesigned and transfigured and embodied in the instrument of design—in the drama, in sculpture, in architecture, and in a special and synoptic way in the art of politics. And here the first and greatest of truths the Greeks knew, and which we have not yet found out, that "justice", as ultimate synoptic principle in thought and the law within reality, is the harmony of the state when the state is the status of nature and as that status is determined by the principle of the Good, and where the principle of the Good is just the nisus to the whole, and the whole is representable not quantitatively as totality but qualitatively as integrity. In this state the particular, through the philosophic law, attains the universal, or the universal is realized through the law in the particular, so that the principle of the state is the perfection of the work of art, and the work of art is perfect as the real in the state. The principle of perfection, once more, is that which

states the corporate identity of the particular as existent or substant with the universal as subsistant or circumstant in the individual.

As individual, and hence concrete, the perfect was defined in terms of nature as that which can live in spite of limitations, and in terms of thought as that which endures or abides without reference to limitation. As a function in nature it maintains the continuity of individuals in the universal, thus laying the basis of the species or type, which, as idea, is the primary condition of all thought. Perfection, then, is the principle of that which can live or be and be intelligible, and the fullness with which intelligible being is present at any point is the key to its status in reality. The real is therefore the perfect which incorporates the actual, so that to find reality in the instance we must go beyond the scheme of nature to the nature which is completed in art. And, if any definition of life or being is demanded here, it can be given as that active medium within which the continuity of nature is transformed into the continuum of the species or idea; and as the transformation effects their identity, the identity becomes both the locus of the act of judgment and the medium-stuff out of which the real content of every true judgment is formed. This medium appears in experience as feeling, where it is the subject-matter of aesthetics. So that the problem of aesthetics is to demonstrate the objectivity of feeling, to show that feeling can only be as substance.

That is to say, the limitations that inhered in Greek philosophy were replica-statements of flaws that are discernible in the nature of things in so far as the nature of things is regarded as an object of thought. The flaws then are as real as the nature that is to be known; they constitute the qualifying characters of nature through which the knowing process is to have access to nature. The flaw then is the basis of the primary element of method by which the reality of things is to be represented. In logic it is called the principle of difference, and in inductive procedures it is the ground upon which all proof is supposed to lie. In the art-philosophy which came to be the full realization of Greek life and thought this principle was the principle of Tragedy; and it was fundamental for all forms of Greek thought in the law that lay at the basis of ethics and politics. It is the eternal breach between the actual and the ideal-real that determines the necessity for action; it also consti-

tutes the ideal plan or design of the end that gives action its meaning. And it is the permanence of the breach in the nature of things that makes action the continuing instrument by which life is to realize itself; the breach is also the endless emptiness of desire which as substantial feeling constitutes the eternal occasion for action and the stuff out of which life is to be realized. Hence desire has no inwardness, but is hard substance like any other matter, and psychology knows nothing of it.

In politics also, as the Philosopher-Artist of Greece also saw, this primordial flaw is the continuing ground of the life of the State, and thus the subject-matter of politics. It becomes a political entity by virtue of the fact that it is the universal of the condition that makes action necessary for the individual, and, as such universal, it is the ground condition of order as the basis upon which the state can and must rest. The fact that the flaw in the conditions of nature is incorrigible is what gives to the state its perpetuity. And this fact also determines that all theory of the state must be formulated in eschatological terms, that the only thought-structure that can always be true of the state is the Utopianism of a theory of ends. It is this tragic fact, this fact of enduring tragedy, that gives to the real the substantial character of the universal by which the real is to be equated by identity with the intelligible; only the identity is not the identity of mathematics and logic but the analogical identity of aesthetic structure.

When therefore we define the perfect in terms of ability to be or endure (viability, for the scientist), and connect viability as characterizing quality with the substance by which things are real, and recognize enduring being as the principle of continuity in nature, and then observe that nature in the factual aspect is the perfect instance of discontinuity (the condition that renders the scientific concept of cause a logical surd), we have the facts on a basis of which the law of Tragedy is to be formulated. It is simply stated as Nature negating the function of perfection in enduring life, nature negating itself in God and withdrawing from contact with the actual while yet refusing itself access to the ideal-real, where it represents itself as Tragic Will in a form higher than that of the actual of life. This is the object transfigured in the objective of the tragic design.

The State then as tragic object is the fullest reality and the perfect work of art. It can live, and it is the thing that gives life to what can live beyond nature and the mere lifespan of the individual. The state is thus the ground in being of the universal. But in the actual state there are embodied elements fatal to the maintenance of its integrity. These are the empirical factors, instanced in the always practical thought of the scientist, who must see unity in terms of its elements where there are no elements; and in the spastic thought of the mystic who demands that reality be given exclusively and exhaustively in the part, where there are not parts. Hence the scientific attitude is subjective and becomes contradictory in its demand that reality remain partial and dependent for its character upon the procedures of science. But the mystic, who lies hidden in the shadow of the scientist, is of another color, and we shall have to watch him closely.

So Greek philosophy is objective in that it postulates a corporate structure for reality, and finds this structure instanced in the fact of corporately ordered life. It is objective in that it is a direct representation or expression of reality without involving the subjective element—that is, without its thought becoming conscious of the fact that it was itself an integral part of the reality expressed—so that the diremption of subject-object is never made because the possibility of such a distinction as that between mind and object, design and its end, has never come to consciousness. It is this becoming aware of possible distinction, by thought, of its own process from the object in which it expresses itself, from the being which it thinks, and then confusing its process with the object, that marks the subjective the distinguishing characteristic of modern philosophy. The absence of the distinction of thought from the being which it thinks is the distinguishing feature of ancient philosophy.

A philosophy thus corporately structured in ethical and political ideas could not survive the collapse of the state in which those ideas had their substance. And the period of several centuries after the breakdown of the Classical state has a place in history only in the story of the attempts of those ideas to find a solid landing place somewhere within the sphere of life, which they assumed could be substantiated on other ground than nature. This haven could not be anywhere within the scheme of nature, for it was the in-

herent weakness of the natural scheme that was responsible for the collapse of the moral-political system. It could also not be within the system of the ideas as detached from nature, because as thus detached the ideas lacked the element of concreteness that supplied them with substance. There was left then only the realm of the fanciful—not the fanciful as definitely structured in the objects of imagination, for that is the sphere of art and rests upon nature—but the fanciful pictured in terms of the felt need for an object that was nowhere to be found, and hence could only be symbolized by the inner and emotional phases of experience itself. They attempted vainly to substantiate feeling in the mere fact of its being felt. Thus the very nature of the objects pictured was negative, they are represented in terms of their absence as inwardly felt, so as objects of experience they could only be referred to a world which was characterized by qualities the opposite of those that were given in knowledge. Thus we see that where philosophy and art were united in the life of the state there could be nothing of a substantial nature left after the state had broken down, so that this very nothingness became the basis of whatever construction was possible. That is, all construction must be in and of experience alone, which presents itself as a substantial nothing. It is thus that the period is subjective and religious rather than philosophical, and that it has its roots, so far as there are any, in negation.

But the negation here postulated was not the mere methodological negation of scepticism. This can be turned to constructive use. The negation of the religious period was postulated upon a substantial ground, and that which was significant by its absence had a positive character which gave it a constructive power in reverse. And as the ideas of the period got their content from a reference to inner emotional states, the negative principle assumed the positive function of denial, and was identified in experience with misery, suffering. But since the potency of the principle of misery is positive, it is an aggressive and emphatic negation, and would have to be given a ground in any case; so it was identified with the fact of distortion in nature which the Greeks had recognized, and nature became the symbol and reality of all that was unreal. This unreal reality, this positive negation, was imaginatively personified as evil, and the primary purpose and function of life and

conduct were the evasion and avoidance of evil; that is to say, life had a negative purpose. These evasions and avoidances were also objectified, as negations, in the principles and practices of magic, and magic developed into a system of ritual. The system of all these ideas centered about negation became the foundation of the institutionalism of the succeeding medieval period, and magic became religious science.

Another phase of this system of negation with its technique of magic laid down the cornerstone of the foundation of thought in the modern period. Connecting the aggressive negative principle with the stuff of emotional experience led to the attribution of causal efficacy to the emotional center, so that the reality implied in the negation was identified with the subjective factors in the individual. The individual thus became responsible for evil; but he was also, as the primary condition of the universal, the causal power by which evil was to be met, and, as spiritual conqueror, he became the symbol of all that was ideal, and was worshipped as the hero-saint. This deification of the individual persisted to become the major premise of all thought for the modern period, and we notice it later. But what we must not fail to note here is that, with the collapse of the state and the consequent necessary emphasis upon negation, with the contradictions which negation made manifest in experience, the endowing with fictitious substance the absence of objects as represented in desire, and the general practice of hypostasis of abstraction, with the overemphasis upon the subjective, and the dependence upon specialized technical processes as in magic and ritual, with the attributing of causal efficacy to the mere inwardness of ideas and subjective processes, with all these we have the complete system of the assumptions of the empirical philosophy, and suggestions as to its connections with primitive magic and the mysticism inherent in an overemphasis upon empirical content.

But all these assumptions are mere empirical distortions of profound truths. The first and most important of these truths is that nature is an aborted effort to realize life in the actual. The shallowness of the empirical philosophy has always been a consequence of failure to see what is to be seen in nature, the plain implication of a reality which the religious instinct apprehends, to be sure, but

nevertheless tends to distort in the directions of its peculiar interest. This is the contradiction that exists between the metaphysical intent of nature and its purpose to express life. If we may put the problem in terms of the tradition we can call the metaphysical intent of nature God; then the life-principle in nature will be at direct variance with God's intent, and the struggle between the two is on. This could be better stated perhaps as the eternal effort on the part of God to reproduce himself, where the divine seminal *Urschleim* became the nebula of nature with its infinite capacity for indecision. The effort at selfreproduction succeeded a little less badly in the creation of man, since in man it attained the image, at least, but it was the weakness of the eternal will that came to be the basis of human nature. However it may be stated, this elementary contradiction in the substance of things was conceived to lie at the basis of life, so that when life comes up for formulation in the medieval scheme, and when the quality of immortality, which it had for faith, is seen to require objective verification, the method required that the verification should be in terms of experience, and the only conclusion possible was the selfcontradictory proposition that life had its principle of objectification in the eternal experience of misery, that life has its object in its subjective intent.

The two terms of the persistent contradiction are thus the existence-principle that makes nature real and the sentience-principle that becomes the basis of all judgments of any sort about nature when nature is regarded as the locus of the functions of life.

Life then is objectified through the principle of misery, where misery is taken as the product of the friction between existence on the one side and sentience on the other. The imposition, by the creative or reproductive force, of existence upon sentiency, or the immolation of sentiency upon the hard altar of existence, thus becomes the ultimate fact; and, regarded as experience, becomes the starting-point for modern philosophy in all its forms, and remains to this day the common fallacy of all philosophies. In the attempt to find the objective in the element of existence and to write it down in terms of universals of experience, ignoring the fact that there are no universals *in* or *for* experience, the modern mind created science; but, as there is no universality for experience, the attempt was made to force universality upon existence by taking its mere

abstract extensive continuity and applying infinity to it. So the formula was forced upon it as number and quantity, and the apotheosis of the abstraction laid the blessing upon mathematics as scientific method. Science was therefore mathematical physics, an abstract existentialism, and so it remains to this day, the presupposition of a metaphysics that finds its soul in magic.

In a similar way and by the same techniques it was attempted to find objectivity for sentiency in its imposed relation to existence. As objectivity in the science of existence turns out to be abstract exteriority symbolically characterized by mathematics and manipulated as magic, so the science of sentiency, "social science", finds its ground of objectivity in abstract inwardness, interiority imaged in the reversed recession of time, withinness reduced to abstract negation, and determined by its qualitative emptiness to assume the form of the mathematics of lapse. This is mysticism. Its method is infinity in reverse, zero over zero, and is at present exemplified in the "sciences" of psychology and sociology. There was once a philosophy that was called social psychology.

Thus the philosophy that grew out of the contradictions that religion had discovered at the base of things, invented a pseudo-content as a ground against which to formulate the contradictions. This pseudo content is experience, sentiency forcibly wedded to abstract existence. Its method for dealing with this empty content is, appropriately, magic, a symbolism which *is* the reality it symbolizes, and which it also took over from the religious method of incantation. Its temple is the Laboratory, dedicated to the Great Unknown, the God Omnescience. Modern philosophy therefore is the philosophy of experience; its attitude or point of view, its "perspective", is mysticism; and its method is a newer and better and blacker magic.

Modern philosophy thus undertakes to interpret a subjective reality by and in terms of a subjective principle. Its subject-matter, its method, its point of view, all are subjective; and the final commentary and estimate is subjectivism, in the nugatory and derogatory sense, the sense that finds its failure catastrophic.

Philosophy derives from, and lives and functions within, a cultural medium, from which it gets not only its attitudinal direction, but also its peculiar substance. So ancient philosophy got its essen-

tial characters from a medium of a political state whose substance was ethical and aesthetic; medieval philosophy came into being within a medium of negative religious institutionalism dominated by feeling, and it took its characters from that feeling; modern philosophy formed within a cultural substance whose essence was the inwardness and immediacy of a feeling that demanded a positive reference to nature, where nature itself was imaged as the inward essence of the feeling conceived as active will. Reality was thus determined by the postulate of that will, which acts in pure spontaneity, pure liberty, requiring no reference but to itself. It is essentially irrational, and its baseless postulates become unquestioned and unquestionable grounds merely and solely as a consequence of their assertion; its act is simple, unconditioned; and the object of its act, which is also a product and a project of its act, is unconditioned, being characterized by simplicity; so its reality has an individuality that is undivided, atomic, and can only be exemplified, never defined. Thus the physical and metaphysical atom, the mathematical point, the windowless monad, the "individual", the infinitesimal. All these ideas are functions of pure magic, symbols deified, and they operate within a medium of a mysticism which differs from religious mysticism only in being abstract, vacuous and dried out. They all sum up in the attitude of subjectivism, by which we express the weakness, inadequacy and negation of all the forms of modern philosophy.

The Renaissance, as the earliest modern cultural formulation, can be described as nature turned inward and directed upon itself, appearing phenomenally to itself as consciousness, whose substance is measured in terms of its own felt intensity to differentiate it from the symbolic extensity of the earlier abstraction. Referring the philosophy of the Renaissance to this consciousness as its cultural medium, we can give a brief characterization of its various phases in ethics, politics, law, and art. Ethically, the Renaissance is negation, that strange positive, emphatic, aggressive negation of the negations of the middle ages, which becomes, in practice, irresponsible assertion, the outburst of the atomic and autonomous undivided will of the individual which acts without reference to anything. This negation, become aggressive, lays the foundation for our modern ideas of freedom and the peculiar type of unprin-

cipled order which we hope to make the foundation of our political life. Politics in the Renaissance thus implies the realization of the universal within the peculiar individual described above, where the universal and objective element in the individual will demands the organization of the state as the instrument of the individual will itself. This is, of course, a flat contradiction; but it becomes the basis of the politics of democracy: the superstition that the state exists to fulfill and realize the will of the individual. The final implicate of this assumption is, of course, the apotheosis of pure abstract and irresponsible force, as will particularized must be mere force, as we see happens to the democracies after they have come to envisage purposes in the negative economic terms of needs and wants. Machiavelli's Prince and Hobbes' Monarch are absolute, but they can only realize their unlimited power and exercise irresponsible force after they have achieved a democratic incarnation in the modern businessman and are thus de-moralized.

Law had been the objective type of the universal and had been considered as final principle in the universalism of the Church. In the Renaissance law is conceived as the expression of the inner power of the irresponsible individual; so will becomes the "law" of unlimited force, the universal force or energy of materialistic metaphysics, for which universality means quantitative infinity. Whereas for the church of the middle ages the law had been an expression of the ubiquity of God, a principle operating over the individual and giving him objective moral guidance, the law for the new day, identified as it is with the will of the individual, is justified by the supposition that the will has the quantitative universality of the abstract reason. This new principle of law comes to being in the ambition of the princes of the European communities, now trying to organize themselves as states which shall, in mundane affairs, at least, be independent of the Church. In abandoning the Church as the ground of the universality and thus of the authority of the law, the law came to be broken into as many fragments as there were contending princes, and that fragment tended to acquire authority which had the power to prevail over the others. Thus we have our notion of "the law backed by force", which is nothing but a simple identification of law with force, and this means that force supersedes the law, as the princes found when

they began to assert authority over powerful private organizations of interest. Thus again the peculiar affinity of the subjective for the purely mechanical is evident.

With respect to Renaissance art a similar statement holds. Art becomes the instrument of expression of pure subjectivity: emotion in its raw psychological inwardness with all the particularizing characters of the individual. And here also the same reversal takes place: emotion completely individualized within the subject as his inner state becomes the substance of an art to which the formal aspects must conform. And while a very high type of form proved to be possible for this content so long as it identified itself with the religious emotion of love, the subjective motive transformed and individualized this emotion as the sex impulse, which is recalcitrant to any form, and this materialized motive became the basis of the formlessness of "romantic" literature, and is now showing itself to be the Nemesis of all genuine art. The subjective and individualistic character of the art of the period shows itself in poetry, where the sonnet and the canzone were characteristic forms. The sonnet tended to be the form of a single spastic pulse of feeling, individualized and expressing intensity rather than quality, emotion at its heroic greatest intensity, for which the stiff constricting form of the sonnet was inevitable.

In all these phases of the culture of the period there is the same dominance of the subjective. All are concerned with nature, but it is nature in reverse, *naturans,* nature as immediately and inwardly felt and regarded on that account as ultimate.

As we approach the modern period proper, it is not surprising, in view of the motives we have found dominating the middle ages, to find the period opening with an outburst of science and religion, magic and mysticism. As this field is familiar, I can be brief, although I do not believe that we have yet seen the real significance of the two movements. Galileo, a scientist, undertakes to give us a philosophy of existence, and there is perhaps no doubt that he intended to give an interpretation of existence strictly in terms of itself, without the confusions that necessarily come from viewing it in relation to its opposite principle of sentience. But the reference of facts to themselves is still subjectivism; so existence is explained as subjectively spontaneous and dominated by its own internal

force; and this reference to the fact, especially when the force is particularized in the concrete specific fact, is magic, and calling it force is only giving it a family name to take the place of such individual names as gnome or salamander. And this subjectivism is not overcome when we abstract from the concreteness of the facts to their external relations, and hope by quantifying the relations to attain the objective; the relations as thus thought become pure constructs of the process of thought, and there is little to be gained by exchanging the abstract process of thought for its mystic content as found in the immediacy of feeling. It might even be possible to show that the feeling must be presupposed before the process is intelligible in any terms; but in any case it is not possible to avoid subjectivism by any of the tricks of science. I forbear to mention the stratospheric ventures of contemporary mathematical logic.

Galileo's magical attempt to bootstrap himself out of the subjectivism of the time was matched or bettered at every point by Luther and the religionists. Galileo, at the last resort, could *find* nature only in the mathematically ordered successive impulses of his own inner reason. Luther, whose quest was also for nature, but whose magic demanded vicarious approach through God, could only find it within the depths of inner feeling where it as such was inaccessible to the reason, because in those depths it identified itself with God, and was not to be approached except on the knees of faith. It could therefore not be stated in its essence by the reason, but could only be argued about by the reason. This is pure mysticism, of course, and it is a mysticism formally identical with that of Galileo (even their magics have been recently identified—God is a mathematician); so there is no ground of preference for the one over the other. And it is to be noticed that Luther's mysticism comes to practical contradiction just as did Galileo's, only in a different content. Galileo came out with material energy and the abstract mathematical "law" and a universe of particulars; Luther, after throwing his inkstand at the objective in nature, came out with the abstract divine right of the individual (king) and, materially, with a numerous family.

So whether we look to the scientific or to the religious phases of

the modern period we find the subjectivist point of view completely dominant.

The philosophers tell the same story. As soon as the philosophic phase of the modern movement was under way in Locke and Descartes it was evident that the prevailing tendency was to be emphasis upon inner experience as the reality for the philosopher. Locke's system was based upon psychological analysis, and it was he who gave impetus to sceptical doubts whether there was or could be anything real at all besides the mental states, a type of scepticism that reached the selfcontradictory stage in Hume and Kant. And I suppose the tendency of the modern movement to regard Hume and Kant as its greatest achievements comes from the fact that the one of them carries the empirical point of view of the scientific tradition to its and philosophy's last extremity; while the other did the same for the empirical attitude as it was formulated in its mathematical aspects by Newton and in its religious phases by the pietistic movement. That is to say that the whole of reality was rounded up by Hume and Kant within the corral of the inner experience; there was nothing but nothing left outside by Hume, and for Kant the only thing left outside experience was the vacancy left by the inclusion within experience of that which was its own efficient cause, the contradiction of the thing-in-itself and the autonomous will. For both, all reality is either experience or that which represents experience in its potential state. And this potential experience, the "possibility of experience", becomes objective irrationality—nonsense—in Freud.

Even Spinoza and Hegel, who perhaps come nearer to philosophy than anybody else in the modern period, and who in their metaphysical systems come as near a genuine objectivity as modern thought ever does, both seem to resort to psychology in their practical philosophy, and especially in their reflections on politics. It is hardly the objective mind of Plato and the Stoics that one sees in Spinoza's God or the Hegelian Reason, and one suspects elements of the subjectivist egoism of the modern in both.

I hesitate to attempt comment on the contemporary scene, for I have had no interest in the classifications of the philosophic systems, and slightly less interest in the systems themselves. But it is

hard to see in, *e.g.*, the idealism of the present any way out of the pit of subjectivism, rather a deepening and broadening of the way in. It is encouraging indeed to follow Bradley in denying the philosophic claims of the concepts of science and in showing the logical contradictions involved in attempting to elevate those concepts to the status of philosophic ideas; in the scepticism and criticism necessary to put science in its place and thus open the way to philosophy, Bradley has done great work. And in laying bare the weaknesses of the empirical philosophy which issues from science, particularly in ethics, his success seems secure. But he has still not freed himself from mathematical abstractionism, as his doctrine of the Absolute shows clearly; in fact it shows what in some other directions is completely proved, that he was not as safe from certain religious presuppositions as he had supposed. He falls, that is, for an empiricism of the very worst type when he comes to put his finger upon reality so as to identify it. Reality, he says, is experience as given in feeling; thus he identifies himself with a mysticism of the most primitive sort, which, if it has any logical status whatever, undoes all the work his scepticism had built up. The same mysticism of the crude religious sort is obvious in Green and Royce and Whitehead, so that since Hegel idealism has had very little to say for itself; it has done well in denying a scientific basis for philosophy, but it has not avoided mathematical abstractionism nor religious mysticism.

Nor has realism fared better. Where the realistic attitude expresses itself in a doctrine of nature, its acceptance of science usually forces it to an abstract atomism, or if it has the mystic tendency it ends in a pantheism or panpsychism of some sort. It may take the way of mathematical physics to a pure abstractionism which, where tinged with the mystic coloring, becomes subjective idealism. And in any case the commitment to empiricism forces upon the realists the methodological *how*, and their answer to this is the analysis of perception. Thus the reality the realist so courageously and so justly accepts and posits as the basis for any philosophy tends to disappear hopelessly within the bare process of sense-perception, the process by which his empiricism demands he find it in fact; his philosophic postulate becomes the psychological prejudice that reality is discoverable in empirical fact, and the

methods by which it is to be made known are psychological. It is the philosophic tragedy; no man who reaches philosophic maturity will accept a metaphysics which has not its bases laid in realistic presuppositions; it is tragic to see these bases rot out in scientism or develop the fantastic overgrowths of mysticism. The canker of the age has infected philosophy at its base in realism; the empiricism which bloats itself in science where it can, and prostrates itself in mysticism where it must, has blighted philosophy at its root. The story of this tragic event is the history of modern philosophy.

There are but two possibilities in philosophy, idealism and realism. And any approach to finality will unite the two as complementary phases in a whole where their differences will provide a status for all the negatives that critical scepticism may require, and where their agreements will lay the basis for every positive judgment that knowledge can demand. All these negatives and affirmations will rest upon a ground that is not experience, but will accept and embrace all that experience can show to be consistent with that ground. Reality is not experience, nor is philosophy about experience. It is not even about language as the instrument of expression for experience. Nor is it about ideas, nor active impulses, nor about the shadows of the shadows. So it is not positivism, nor pragmatism, nor phenomenalism. It is not even an instrument of prestige to impress its votary's dignity upon the public mind; nor is it a commercial commodity seeking new markets. It is barely possible, and this may be conceding overmuch, that pragmatism had its original impulse in a realization of the emptiness of the assumption that reality is experience, and that there was in it a genuine motive to find a solider ground in action; but it flounders between the Scylla of Peirce's scientism and the Charybdis of James' mysticism, and goes under finally in the tool philosophy, leaving a sea of experience placid with a deadly calm and glassy with a brittle emptiness.

It is the function of philosophy to find the objective reality within a world whose existence and basic empirical characteristics are known. *How* the world is *to be* known is not an intelligible question. Questions about the *how* are technical questions, questions of science, and science is not philosophy. There is no *how* of Knowledge, and Knowledge is the concern of philosophy. Science

cannot know, its motive is action. It is the function of philosophy to lay out the primary veins of the world's structure as universals which are to be principle-postulates for the various human spheres of concern. Its purpose, that is, is to lay down basic postulates of action as the foundation of ethics; to formulate postulates of being or existence for science; to work out postulates of order for politics; but a philosophy cannot be made out of any of these sets of postulates. And when it has done that, and has pointed out the directions in which corollaries can be derived for each succeeding age for various practical disciplines, its task is done. And the fact that each generation must do all this for itself does not mean that each should find a new philosophy, but merely that the world of reality that is to be formulated has changed. For change it will whether we philosophize or not, and whatever may be the type of our philosophizing.

These reflections, though melancholy, are not as dark as the fact. The fundamental fact that meets us now is a world in chaos, a cosmic chaos, a *contradictio in substantia* for which there is no description black enough. Falling into the pit of subjectivism has left us without a morality, no vestige of character remains. For a mess of garbage man has sold his soul to the business man, and the world of reality is sold out. So there is no obligation, for there is nothing to be responsible *to*. God died, and the world dissolved, when man found his destiny in himself. And the responsibility for the situation is philosophy's. We have furnished no ethical foundation for the human world; no principles of order for the political world; no laws for the control of our attitude to existence, nor for the control of the practical activities that depend on these laws. Our ethical endeavors have sought the end within experience, ignoring the fact that for experience there is no end. Our political thought has sought the rules in law for the subjective control and guidance of the eternal conflict of man with man which it has accepted as a postulate, being ignorant of the fact that the function of law is the elimination of conflict. Our scientific thought has abandoned the search for the realities of existence, and has sought nothing but technical means and processes by which the realities and the values could be reduced to terms of our interests, forgetting that for interests there is neither substance nor law, neither

reality nor value. And while we have in our egoistic stupidity insisted that the world should come to terms with our subjective purposes, the world has laughed in our face and has gone its own way, which is not the way that human wish or subjective motives would have it, but a way determined by its own inertia, and so leads to no end. And our refusal to see and follow the reality to the end that the reality be made conscious of its destiny has left us without a destiny.

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THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY

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THE famous dictum of Sir Henry Maine relative to the structure of human society is one of the very few propositions of genuine universality that have been formulated on the subject of human relations since Plato and Aristotle. The observation that ancient society was constituted about the principle of status and that modern society had its constitutional principle in contract is a valid and vivid contribution to the theory of society. But it seems to me that it has been understood only in its less important implications. The emphasis has for the most part been placed on the implication that the history of society is to be looked at as a transition *from* status *to* contract and that somehow progress, regarded as a growth in a positive direction, is a necessary consequence of that transition. Also it seems to be implied that the modern constitution based on contract is superior to the ancient constitution based on status. It does not seem to me that this is a necessary or even a determinable conclusion. I do not wish either to affirm or to deny these interpretations of the dictum, but I think it may very well be a radical misunderstanding of the relation between the ancient structure and the modern in its more important aspects of meaning. I know also of no way effectively to prove or to validate such a conclusion. It seems to me that a more important question arises as to the meaning that is to be given to the relation between status and contract as well as to the meaning of the terms themselves. This will raise also the question as to whether the relation is useful in the interpretation of society as it exists at present, and whether the interpretation so based will be a usable speculative standard for the estimation of future society and a principle hypothesis from which maxims may be deduced for the planning of the course of practical politics.

The first in importance of the meanings of this famous dictum is, as it seems to me, that human society *has a structure*, that the structure is objective fact, and that it can therefore be formulated in terms of objective and universal law. This fact of structure we moderns, under the dominance of democratic and contractual preconceptions, tend to overlook. For us, society is, basically, a collection of individual persons held together by subjective ties, and the material substratum of society is ignored. But society has a structure independent of subjective relations. Further, this universal law of social structure is the basis and ground of law in its political, civil, and "legal" senses and, therefore, the

premise upon which rests all theory of the state, of law, and of society in all its aspects. This principle of social structure is also the ground of "positive" law in the sense that upon it is based the system of principles from which alone the fact of society can be made intelligible; and the fact that the fact of society can be made intelligible through the concepts of law and structure is perhaps all the meaning that can be given for "rational" law. It is because of these considerations that the relation of status to contract is of fundamental importance to us now while the very foundations of the state, the validity of law, and the possibility of meaning for human society are being questioned—and being questioned not by the puny interests and purposes of men but by the logic of the facts of existence. In another connection I have pointed out that the principles of status and contract, as they function in contemporary society, are identifiable in property interpreted in terms of "privacy" and in contract interpreted in terms of "agreement" or "meeting of wills"; and I have been at considerable pains to show that both concepts as thus interpreted are essentially inadequate to the facts and are responsible for the confusion in which our contemporary life now finds itself.[1]

In approaching the problem of status, we shall try to keep in mind the implications it necessarily carries to the ideas of order and property and the synthesis of the two ideas in institution. There are also secondary implications to authority and control in the notion of status, when we think, as we moderns invariably and mistakenly do, of society from the point of view of the subjective interests of individuals. But these implications, so obvious they hardly call for argument, prove that status as a fact or a condition is inherent in the very nature of human relations. Society cannot be thought of as human except as we image it as persons occupying positions relatively to each other and as thus somehow determining the complex of relations that gives to society its texture. But it is possible and also profitable to abstract the system of relations away from the persons, and this we do when we generalize the idea of person by denying to it concrete individuality, as we do in the legal concept of person, where the lawyer is trying to get away from the particularity of the person and to see the person in terms of law. The person is therefore reduced, as a creature of the law and as "citizen," to the filler of a place; and we think of this place as determined in a number of ways, each of which ways representing a fundamental insight into some aspect of the structure of society. This place may be thought of as fixed or designated by the idea of the whole in which it is a distinguishable position, thus giving the notion of society in its totality and unity. Or the place or position may be regarded as determined by the genius and peculiar capacity of the person who occupies it; so Plato, thinking of this unique capacity as virtue, discovered the basic moral nature of society and the state. This centering of the structure of society within some capacity of the person is also the root idea of democracy; only, in the case of modern democracy, the capacity specified as central, viz., the will, has turned out to be a myth.

Plato also goes on, in interpreting the status of the individual in moral terms, since morality is concerned only with action, to discover that the relation of status is a function in the organic sense and that it gets its significance from

[1] See my *Forms of Individuality* (Bloomington, Ind., 1937).

the fact that its concrete content is always an action. The type of action here indicated is supposed to express or represent or be the essence of the person, and here we have the moral character of the person stated in terms of, or rather consisting of, the action that is characteristic of him. But Plato's insight here that the social or public status of the person is identifiable with the being of the person, as that being expresses itself dynamically in action, is the first hint we have of *will* in the individual; and the further development of this hint of will as being involved in human relations is perhaps the root of the idea of contract. So in this sense, at least, the idea of contract is derivable from status and is so by the mere fact that position or status can be, and perhaps must be, interpreted as dynamic and autonomous and thus capable of expression in terms of will. But it is interesting to note that status and contract imply each other; their basic relation is then logical, and it hardly makes sense to derive either from the other or to speak of their relation in historical terms. The fact of their logical relation suggests also their possible synthesis, which we are going to try to picture in the concept of corporation. The major difficulties of modern social theories relative to these matters come from our tendency to derive status from contract, or to establish status on a basis of contract, the latter interpreted as "meeting of wills," with the consequent emphasis upon subjective considerations, and this tends to overlook the fact of structure altogether. As a consequence, so far as the fact of structure in society is recognized, with the importance this throws upon constitution, we tend to try to embody the notion in our constitutions in the subjective forms of "rights," "duties," "liberties," and to ignore the fact that the concrete substance of social structure, and thus the stuff of constitution, is always institution. But institution, as we shall show, is, essentially, ordered or legalized property; and its legal ground is status rather than contract. But the fact that we uniformly interpret institutions in terms of rights, duties, interests, etc., shows that our social theory, as resting upon contract, is subjective, and thus ignores or fails to see the hard facts on which alone an adequate social thoery can be based.

One conclusion emerges here which I think should be plain to all. It is that the fact of status is basic to the very idea of human society and therefore must be recognized as a factor present in society at all times and in every instance. But what is universal in fact is, as formulated in judgment, a principle; so we have in the concept of status one of the foundation principles in accordance with which society is constituted. It is therefore a constitutional principle for all political states and takes substance in the actual state in the legally ordered property which is the stuff of institutions. It is necessary to assert this here with emphasis because of the tendency of modern thought to conceive institutions in the subjective and personal characters of individual rights, interests, etc., thus making the sole basis of interpretation of society to rest in contract. But contract, as we hope to see, is merely status looked at in its dynamic aspect; the two notions of status and contract are not therefore contradictories or correlative opposites, but imply each other in such fashion that neither is meaningful out of relation to the other, and both have meaning that is positive only through the reference to the synthesis of the two which is their identity. This synthesis we have already noted in the concept of structure.

So that status is not to be regarded as the distinguishing characteristic of a historical period to be superseded by a superior principle of contract in a later age but as one of the uniform constituent factors of human society everywhere and at all times.

Just as we think of society in terms of its substance and as permanent and fixed, and as thus the ground of order and stability and of dependableness in general, when we interpret it in terms of status; so we think of society in terms of contract when we wish to find the principles underlying its active and growth phases. When we think of society as achieving, or as striving toward, ends so as to express purposes, we naturally give expression to these facts in terms of will, where the will is thought of as the ground of determination of the relations which are to hold among its constituent elements. Or, more naturalistically, if we tend to look upon society as dominated by blind "law" and process in the scientific sense, we are led back necessarily to causes or forces which have their meaning in that they are supposed to determine the relations among its constituent facts. And if we go still further inward and in the direction of the individual and undertake a psychological explanation of the basis of society, as has become the dominant practice in modern times, we shall interpret the active aspects of society in terms of "will" as it appears to scientific analysis in the form of specific phenomena of mind. In any and all of these cases we shall have society given to us in the form of its least, last, and remotest elements as a multiplicity of detail, and our problem will naturally be one of showing how the elements are brought to the unity which we recognize in the concept of society. Hence, contract, as the meeting of these elemental "wills," will become the device by which we hope to find the rationale of society. We must keep in mind that the ultimate purpose all along is to understand the *structure* of society, which we vaguely conceive as the basis of its intelligibility. And, as this structure becomes, for politics, the idea of the constitution of the state, the question is finally one as to the nature of the constitution of the state. Since in this view we approach the question of the constitution as one of how the state comes to be constituted or how the constitution comes into being out of the elements which compose it, our notion of contract becomes a constitutional principle in that it supposedly shows us how the elements go together in the formation of the state. And here we have the famous "contract theory of the state," where the notion of contract is one of active principle determining the relations that hold among the elements and thus integrates them into a composite whole. In so far as the root idea of contract is the meeting of wills, the concept of the constitution to which it leads is that of a unity of the people through the conformity of their wills, and thus involves agreement and the idea of a general will. But this again overlooks the essential part which institutions play in determining the structure and constitution of the state and thus tends to ignore the important constitutional function of property. It is just this neglected element of property which is now playing havoc with the democratic and contractual constitution. Perhaps Russia today means that property has discovered its constitutional function.

The criticism of the contract theory of the state has become a part of the tradition of reflective thought and now seems to be centered in this neglected element of property. And the meaning that

contract is to have in relation to the facts of modern life has become the subject of a good deal of study. We cannot go into this here,[2] but it can be said, I think, that the theory in its older form has been much weakened or has been forced to accept very far-reaching modifications. And it is easy to indicate where it fails. Any adequate theory of the state is, after all, a plot of its constitution, and the theory of contract cannot present us with any rounded picture of the structure which forms the substance of the constitution. The contract theory therefore never did and never can provide for the constitution of the state and therefore fails to present the state with the character of permanence which is the very essence of its meaning. This can be illustrated, I think, in the constitutions of the democracies. They give us no completed picture of the state but concern themselves with the arrangement of the particular elements; for example, they exhaust themselves in the discussion of rights, liberties, duties, and interests of the individual persons whose collectivity is supposed to make up the stuff of the state. That is, democratic constitutions, which all depend upon consent as a form of contract, are obsessed with the importance of the minute and simplest and most immediate relations of social structure and thus fail to achieve any plan of the whole structure. Or, if the effort is made to vision the whole, it is dominated by the idea of the *working* whole, as the idea of contract implies the dynamics of society, so that the emphasis here is all placed upon the instruments by which the integration is to be effected. Consequently, the mere organization of government is confused with the constitution of the state, and the constitution exhausts itself in an effort to provide machinery with which to implement the social or rather the governmental process. Thus it can be said that democracy, in its modern form at least, has the basic weakness that it provides no constitution for the state but undertakes only to implement a method of government.

As a consequence of this failure of democracy to provide for the continual creation and maintenance of the constitution, the actual constitution of the state, as embodied in its institutions and the order that comes into being from the functional relations of the institutions to each other, is left to formulate itself out of the blind processes of nature and life without benefit or grace of the law. And we must keep in mind here again that the essence of an institution is the property that gives it substance and continuity and thus the basis of permanence. Accident, therefore, and what the practical man calls "the necessities," since property has power but no vision, determine the state as a "mass of perdition" and confusion, with the legion of evils which are just now coming to be so persistent as to demand a new and thoroughgoing examination into the bases of the state. And I am here suggesting that this new investigation may best proceed from the foundation principle of structure.

But this confusion and the breakdown of democracy illustrate, if they are not the results of, the basic weaknesses within the contract idea. This weakness lies within the subjectivity of the idea, that is, in the fact that the idea attempts to validate itself within a fact content that is partial and thus not fully representative of any reality. The active phases of reality cannot adequately be conceptualized without indicating at all points

[2] *Ibid.*, chapter on "Contract."

their dependence upon the passive and stable phases. This means that contract, since it undertakes to do just that, is partial and inadequate as principle and will have to be complemented by a basic relation to status with its reference to substance and property before it can serve as a constitutional principle.

When we observe that both status and contract show fundamental weaknesses when analyzed and that each seems to involve by necessity a reference to the other in order to make its meaning complete, it is suggested that they are, after all, both "derivative" and not in themselves real but only aspects of a deeper lying reality; and this raises the question as to what this reality is. If neither status nor contract can be made intelligible by itself, but if they imply each other, the inference is that they get their meaning from some third thing, and the question is then what is this third thing. To assume something different in nature from both as their mutual referent has the unfortunate consequence that the thing assumed will have no qualitative identity with either; but if so it cannot explain either. The only alternative to this is to assume that the third thing is the identity of the two themselves, and this necessitates showing how status and contract can be identified as each having its meaning in the other and, through this mutuality of meaning, constituting the entity which we require. If we can discover the object in which both status and contract can be seen to express their full meaning, then the constitution of this object will indicate the principle of their identity and suggest that this principle is that upon which the nature and structure of society depend.

This object that identifies status with contract has been known for a very long time; and the elements of its structure have been, inadequately, perhaps, long recognized as the basis of the law of its nature. It has also, again inadequately, been recognized that the law of the constitution of this object lies close to the principle upon which human society has achieved such order and organization as has been possible to it. The object referred to here is the corporation. The constitution of the corporation is the objectification of the principle which we found to represent the synthesis and identity of status with contract. The corporation and its principle, and their central importance, have long been recognized; but it is unfortunate that, for the most part, the knowledge of them has been limited to law and theology, and the tendency in both these disciplines to relapse into vague abstraction has prevented the type of general interest that would have been necessary to show their full significance for social and political theory. Also, the tendency of both the law and theology toward a superficial practicality has tended to conceal and confuse the deep intellectual problems that are involved in a general theory of corporation. A thorough investigation of the corporation in its general characters, one not restricted to the legal and religious interests, will show that it is a fact of universal scope, and nothing short of the universal can furnish validity for the principles of social order in their political and moral implications. And it was the fact that the legal and the theological accounts of the corporation ignored its universal moral nature, and emphasized its superficial and practical character, that was responsible for the fact that the corporation has become of late the symbol of large-scale evil.

The principle of corporeity is thus the synthesis of the principle of status with the principle of contract. And I submit

that it is upon this principle, and upon it alone, that the investigation of the present structure of human society can offer hope of significant results. And I should insist further that any speculation upon, or planning with reference to, the future of human order will have to set out fron the principle of corporeity. And the reason behind this necessity is that *now human society has a corporate structure.* Human society, of course, always had a corporate structure, and our interpretations in terms of status and contract have been partial and inadequate. And, with respect to the term "corporeity," I should justify it as most appropriate because of its heavy emphasis upon the physical; and this seems to me justified because of the central importance which impersonal property has come to have in modern society.

I would admit that there is a sense in which it is true and important to emphasize the historical and developmental aspects of the relation of status to contract; so that the dictum *from* status *to* contract puts their relation with great force. It also satisfies our prejudice for evolutionary explanation. If, however, we wish to retain that statement of the relation, we shall have to amplify it and go on to say: *from* status *to* contract *and on to* corporeity. But the historical statement seems to me important only as emphasizing the fact that *now* human society has a structure not completely characterizable in terms of either status or contract or both but is fully described only upon a basis of corporeity as a stage beyond them and representing their synthesis with the new qualitative characters which a corporate entity always displays. But while it is important to recognize that different historical periods are each characterized by its emphasis upon one of the principles, the ancient by status, the modern by contract, and the contemporary by the principle of corporation, or corporeity, yet the historical statement ignores the more important fact that the three principles are, and have always been, present and operative together and simultaneously wherever human relations have shown any tendency to lay the ground for civilization and culture. They are not each operative in a separate historical period or under its own peculiar conditions.

It is the emergence to dominant status of these new corporate phenomena in modern society that has demonstrated the weakness of the principle of contract and the major types of political and social organization that are supposed to rest upon contract. Democracy, through its concepts of freedom, liberty, rights, with their modern counterparts in initiative, enterprise, etc., is generally regarded as the objective form of contractual society and political organization, and it has come to be questioned in very serious ways. It is obvious that it is the weakness of the contractual principle that is responsible for the social frictions that have thrown democracy so seriously into question. And these weaknesses of contract appear now because society has come to have a structure, through its institutional development, to which contract no longer corresponds as principle; and we have the very serious situation where the bodied structure of life and society is moving in one direction while the principle supposed to guide and direct it is moving in another direction. The consequence is the confusion and strife which are now worldwide; and, because it is blind and without rational purpose, it can only appeal to force, from which no rational issue can be expected to follow.

But the revolt against democracy and

the contractual principle does not avoid all difficulties. While it may avoid difficulties that are peculiar to the contractual society, it will meet with difficulties that are peculiar to its own nature. For the revolt is merely reversing the historical formula and moving, or attempting to move, *from* contract *to* status. That is to say, the antidemocratic forms of society (strictly they are mere abstract ideologies, as democracy, with its subjectivist interpretation of contract, has also come to be) are attempting to go back to a regime of status, which, as a principle of order, has, by itself, even less to recommend it than contract. The situation illustrates the fundamental error in the interpretation of the relation between status and contract, which is probably due to the statement of the relation in historical terms. *From* status *to* contract implies a rigid either-or as the basis of their relations, and, as this always turns out negative, their relations are regarded as opposites and contradictory. But, since their relations are not negative and repulsive but positive to the extent of implying fusion, the authoritarian state will not avoid the evils inherent in democracy but, in addition to them, will afflict itself with a batch of evils inherent in its own nature. The obvious conclusion from this dilemma is to be reached through the recognition that contemporary human society has a corporate structure, and in that structure the truth of both contract and status can be given realization because its principle of corporeity is a synthesis and identity of the two principles.

It would be interesting to go on to show that the principle of corporeity is dominant and operative in society now and has been the dominant influence for some considerable time; but, since it is a universal, it cannot be dated. Society is now corporately organized, and it is this fact that explains the obvious futility of most of our recent efforts to deal with the problems that have been continually cropping up. Our attempts to deal with these problems all rest on the old notions either of status or of contract, and we have divided our constructive proposals rather equally between the reactionary, whose ideas are based on an antiquated status, and the radical, whose ideas go back to a contract doctrine as obsolete as its rival. The only hopeful point here is that in the democratic blundering of the past century, or a little less, there have begun to appear some expressions of the principle of corporeity which sooner or later must be, if they are not already beginning to be, consciously recognized for what they are. Thus the tendency in political activity to develop "blocs," tightly organized in the corporate form, whether legally or not, and based on a specific form of property; also, the functional organizations which are also on a specific property basis, viz., the labor union, banker's association, etc., and are also of a tightly corporate structure. There is also the tendency to multiplication of political parties, a fact of great importance in some European countries. All these movements seem to be expressions of the corporate principle's seeking an appropriate property object. But, as in most cases the principle operates without intelligent direction, its results tend to be negligible. But the most significant development within the century is that of administrative law and the multiplication of administrative corporate instruments as legislative agencies to give effect to the great variety of public purposes which have developed out of the rapid complication of society as a consequence of increasing technical develop-

ment. The howl of condemnation of the conservative statist and the approving shriek of the radical contractualist are equally ignorant of the very important developments taking place here and are equally oblivious to the fact that these very developments are making obsolete and antiquated the theories of both. Both would like to go back to some doctrinaire abstraction, and to call their attitudes ideologies is an insult to the dignity of a great word, but it at the same time condemns both for failing to see the facts under their noses. The plan of the future of human society for a millennium lies in the form of simple fact before our eyes—eyes which we have only for narrowly practical purposes, but which, after all, see not. And the only wisdom or vision necessary to take advantage of the plan that exists in fact before our eyes is common sense enough to recognize the fact. Human society has taken on a corporate structure, and there is demanded of political wisdom only that it see and recognize the fact. The idealizing utopian there is still left in us will find the way from there on out.

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM OF RELIGION

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I HAVE the profoundest respect for religion and for people who take it seriously, particularly if they take it seriously enough to permit it to modify their action in the direction of the right and to limit or exclude their claims to an exclusive or unique interest in the world and in themselves. And I can feel a deep reverence for the person who can and does restrain his instincts to the advantage of his more refined feeling, and who can and does deny and negate his interests out of respect for his ends. And I can and do execrate the person who refuses these refusals, and who makes capital for himself out of those of his capacities which might be developed into creative agencies within the realm of culture.

That is to say, I think it is possible to make a significant character for the individual by determining his instincts, feelings, wishes, wants, fears, hopes, into a generalized attitude to the world; and I think it is useful and worth while to dwell contemplatively upon this attitude and to emphasize and deepen it, and I think it may be possible to cultivate this contemplative attitude until it approaches the wonder from which knowledge comes and out of which with grace wisdom may arise. And I think that there are possible modifications of nature that may come from the active impulses that have their conditioning circumstance, if not their origin, in this contemplation; and, further, that there will come into being from the objects that are constituted under the influence of this attitude useful and beautiful structures that become elementary parts and factors in the great scheme of the world in which we live and move and from which we have our being.

And, further, while I am at this confession, I believe it is possible and worth while to try to think about this world which we sometimes exalt with the superior title of values. Indeed, I am convinced that much significant thought upon this topic has already been developed in the course of the development of civilization, and that this thought has proceeded far enough to be appropriately called a relatively faithful picture of the universe from its special point of view. And I believe that this point of view is valid under principles that can be and perhaps have been partially demonstrated.

All this adds up to my conviction that there is such a thing as religion, that it is important and valuable, that some significant thought has been devoted to it, and that more, much more, thought could be given it than is being given it now, and that it is the obligation of those who represent it, while they have taken it beautifully to heart, to take it also carefully to head. And my conviction involves further that in taking it to head they will be obliged to find for it principles of which as yet they have not even dreamed, even though they have ransacked the Freudian dream book through and through.

So—there *is* a theology—possible. There is a theology that is actual, but

it is not philosophy. And to represent it as philosophy indicates a character and a purpose a little less than candid and a near approach to a pious fraud. And here I have got myself in for a definition of both theology and philosophy. And I am going to shirk the obligation.

The presuppositions and postulates that have been made in the interest of religion have been exploited to the last ditch, and their fruitfulness has been exhausted. But the result of the processes of thought by which they were exhausted is one of the most, if not the most, magnificently significant objective achievements of the human mind. And the system of propositions arrived at as the conclusion of that thought development was, and is, as near the whole truth as it will perhaps ever be possible for the human mind to attain, certainly as near as it has so far attained. The significant monument erected by that thought was the system of St. Thomas as modified by Duns Scotus. The purpose of the system was to prove the compossibility and compatibility of values with existence within the world as men know it. That is to say, to prove the existence of God.

It failed. But the failure had positive value in that it justified and justifies a proposition that becomes the major postulate of the metaphysic of ethics and the principle by which the world can be interpreted in terms of all demands that human nature can make of it.

The problem which the theologians were concerned with was the only question of theology that can at the same time be formulated as a genuine problem of philosophy, viz., the problem of the existence of God. This is assuming, of course, that the theologians mean by God the principle and ground of all values; i.e., that God is the universal concept of Goodness, The Good. And to have determined *that* was a profoundly important consequence, for it saved religious thought for a time from floundering in the misty confusions of mysticism and superstition and proved that it is possible to think about religious realities and still maintain the logical respectability of thinking, even when the thinking is itself fallacious. It is unfortunate that before they quit arguing, and after the thinking was all done, they did lapse into the magical trivialities of psychology, with the attempt to distinguish thought from desire or volition in the question of reason versus faith, and thus provided for an indefinite continuance of futility in Protestantism. But the real result was a solid achievement for the human mind. And this achievement consisted in formulating once and for all and in reasonably clear terms the problem upon which old Plato had to resort to artistic techniques in order to save himself from lapsing into mystery—the problem of the compatibility and compossibility of values with existence. And the dogmatic statement of the principle is that values can have no existence and existence is forever worthless under conditions of life and thought. This principle was formulated in religious terms as that of renunciation of the world.

This result, I said above, was significant for ethics in that the metaphysical breach in the world which it exhibits lays down the ultimate ground for the continuing necessity for action on the part of human beings. An act is the attempt to realize a value within conditions of existence, and it can never be complete. So it can never reach the

point where further action is not necessary—we are caught in the *circulus in mundo,* the squirrel cage where advance is evident only by the flip of a tail. It is true, of course, that action can realize its object fully and finally *in form* in conditions that transcend existence, and at this point it establishes one of the grounds, namely, the ethical, for the significance of religion. Of course I refer to worship as an act which realizes its object in an ideal perfection, a reality that far transcends any objects or objectives of this vain world and manifests a world of which existence can know nothing. But *this* theology repudiates in its avarice for the flesh, in its demand that the real should stand knee deep in the slush of sense with the whippersnapper Aristotle calling to the god of the Earth to give it body! Ah, Plato! How much happier to have had no child to fall into the sin of error.

And the theological conclusion was also important for aesthetics, and thus laid down another ground for religion in the beauty of the act in which religious value is realized. The procession and the pageantry, the chant, the song, the oratory, the pictures, the candles, the odors in the semi-gloom, and then the burning bush. How short and sordid is the life of a religion that eschews the idols and attempts to maintain itself by arguing about truth and disputing about doctrines. How precarious the destiny that hangs upon belief. If I am to be judged by what I believe, my case is hopeless, for I have no idea at all as to what I should believe. Certainly what I know doesn't call for belief, and I don't see how I can be expected to believe what I don't know. Is not Protestantism enough in the way of example of the schism and degeneration inherent in doctrines which pretend to truth about the world and about human destiny, and are not the doctrines themselves enough to discredit any effort to put religion into the stocks of logic? It is true of course that one can be logical in talking *about* religion, but a religious doctrine is not *about* religion but pretends to formulate the *realities* of religion and demands for religion systems and objects which in the nature of things lie outside of its reach. The religion that expires in a social gospel ought to exhort its followers to shake off the world before they with the world go down to perdition. Oh, Jerusalem, Jerusalem—but ye would not.

And the realities are idols, eidola, ideas. They are objects of infinite beauty. Of course, Thomas was speaking and had to speak for the primitive savages who occupied western Europe. It was necessary that he recognize the flesh (matter) if he was to convert Germans and Englishmen, but it was not necessary to make a principle of it, and certainly not the head of the corner of it in the principle of individuation; matter is the matter of the real (sometimes), but it is so only as the idea has tamed it to form, and for the techniques by which this is accomplished there is no recourse but to Plato. It is unfortunate that St. Thomas thought of Plato in terms of St. Augustine, and still more unfortunate that St. Augustine had Plotinus read his Plato for him. But the breach in the heart of the world that was demonstrated by the research into the problem of the existence of God posited the principles by which the world could be formulated in terms of the laws of Beauty—it propounded once and for all the principle of tragedy by which alone the value of existence, or the existence of value, can be made intelligible.

Religion is thus real and has its unique place in the scheme of things. Its reality can thus be demonstrated through its ethical and aesthetic content. It can be recognized through its imaginative emphasis upon the metaphysical implications of ethics and aesthetics, its insistence that goodness and beauty furnish the design and structure of the constitution of things; and the recognition that it is the cosmic import of goodness and beauty that is the basis and ground of their reality and significance at the same time, is precisely what justifies religion in its claim to the truth, in so far as that claim can be justified. Religion has its truth therefore in its insistence against all the world that goodness and beauty sit unified in truth upon the throne of the universe.

But Plato, even Aristotle, knew that goodness and beauty and truth (and this trinity are by analogy one) do not sit on the throne of the universe as God. That is, of course, if God is a personate individual who is related to the universe characteristically as a cause and begetter and as the agent through whose virtue realities begin to be. Or, if we dodge the question of cause with the idea of creator and thus appeal to negation as principle in the concept of a world made out of nothing, we shall have a world and a God who resemble closely that upon which the creative act is expended. The idea of creation, or of cause either, for that matter, is made unintelligible by interpretation into terms of origins, for this interpretation assumes that time is of the essence of the world, and that the essence of time is its lapse, and that the lapse of time is efficacious with respect to concrete entities. It forgets that time by itself explains or grounds nothing. And we can and do confuse the issue to obfuscation by reflecting that time is itself a creature of God. For there is a circle here that is vicious, and I believe it vitiates every statement that St. Thomas makes with respect to the existence of God. For every statement presupposes God—each is a magnificent declaration of his faith and marks the abandonment of reason in the cause of faith. St. Thomas learned the ultimate truth, which he never forgot and which stood as postulate behind every proposition he uttered, when he entered school at the age of five—it was impressed upon him with a vividness that cast the halo of divinity upon every thing he ever afterward saw, and it made him the blessed saint and saved him from philosophy for eternity. ("The Lord spake to him in Horeb out of the midst of fire." Deut. 4:15.) The conclusive proof of the existence of God is, for the individual, the persistent assertion of it while the individual mind is taking form; if his education is neglected until he attains maturity, the discovery of the existence of God will be made only in an emotional situation that says to him that God standeth within the shadow where he should retire and pray. (". . . For he giveth not account of any of his matters." Job 33:13. ". . . The Lord answered [Thomas, as he did] Job out of the whirlwind." Job 38:1.)

Gilson says it rather neatly: "Let us therefore also believe that the apparent incompatibilities between Reason and Faith are reconciled in the infinite wisdom of God" (*The Philosophy of St. Thomas,* p. 44). Which is postponing the issue indefinitely. But a God who is the guarantor of values is not and cannot be a cause, for values are not to be found within the mechanism which cause assumes. And the world that is

assumed in the postulate of a first cause will be the world of abstract necessity, and its principle the unmoved mover; and there is little to be hoped from a *contradictio in adiecto,* where the attribute hides away in mist the substance it is supposed to give status. When we appeal to the notion of an unmoved mover, I think it would profit us to look up once more Aristotle's distinction between motion and action. And I think it would be useful to remember our principle of ambiguity when we speak of an act of thought. Or, if God is infinite cause, he is then the cause of everything indifferently, and the distinction of good and evil at once disappears. And the prevalence and predominance of evil or negative influences in the world will spell extinction of the good. And I do not believe we can save God from these contradictions by loading the thinker with the perverse will and the sinful nature, for human weakness is, if real enough to excuse God, also among the realities of divine creation.

Religion, I believe, implies and involves realities. But these realities cannot be made intelligible by grounding them in an infinite cause, nor can they be given status by an abstract Aristotelian logic or by any logic which undertakes to reconcile values with existence by manipulating abstract symbols. The *flaw* is the ultimate Fact, and creating symbols for it does not explain it away. Our logic, then, and our theology which appeals to philosophy are hopeless, for philosophy proves exactly what we as religionists do not want proved. Let us agree then that our religious theory is not intended to prove or to demonstrate objective realities, not to convince, but to exhort and persuade. And our "argument" is meant as much to persuade the arguer as the argued at. And our theology with its logic and its doctrines is a part of the ritual, and our arguments are moral persuasion directed largely at ourselves to sustain our convictions, and our exhortation is oratory with aesthetic intent. I'd go miles to hear a good sermon where I would not turn the corner to hear the existence of God demonstrated.

So much for religion as philosophy.

We could go further if there were time. But time, while not a cause, is a limiting condition within existential circumstance.

We must therefore consider religion within the conditions where time does function, namely, within experience. Most people who are loudly interested in religion at the present time would argue, I think, that religion requires no proofs or other evidences than can be found within the experience of the individual, and they believe that this experience provides immediate access to the realities. God can be approached directly through the medium of the inner consciousness, so that his existence is apprehended through his presence without the necessity for machinery of mediation. Paul's vision on the road is absolute. I believe that even now there are Christian existentialists. This in spite of the statement in the book that no man hath seen the Father, and this statement, so far as I can recall, is modified only by the case of somebody, I think it was Moses, who got a glimpse of his back parts. Anyway, there are no technical devices, no worship, necessary in making connection with reality, no antechamber where you take off your fleshly shoes or leave your worldly umbrella; and worship, which could be conceived in terms of contemplation, becomes a process of self-hypnotization

by the fiery vividness of a mental state. So subjectivism is absolute, and man becomes his own God. The situation is comparable with that of those who think hard about religious questions, for they approach pretty close to this absurd result when they go with Aristotle to the ultimate thought of thought or with St. Thomas in finding the beginning of knowledge of God in sensation. This mysticism was the bane of the Church until it learned to tie a rope around the belly of the mystics and furnished them a comfortable place to do their contemplating where it would be harmless. And I suppose this is inevitable so long as we incline to lapse from logic into psychology and from metaphysics into epistemology.

With no knowledge at all of the issues involved, I was once upon a time burdened with the chore of teaching a course in the history of religions. So I had to buckle to it, and try to learn a little of something that would get me by the authorities—Brer Rabbit, you know, just had to climb the tree when the fox was after him. What I thought I learned from reading the religious systems—I was not a good teacher, so I didn't depend altogether upon what others said about them—what seemed to me the major premise of all the developed religions was just the proposition that experience is uncertain, deceptive, fraudulent, and undependable where destiny is involved and gives uniformly a quite distorted and false picture of what we somehow know the realities must be. Also, as a student some years ago when psychology began to feel its oats, I had to get a strong minor in it to get by in philosophy, so I went into it whole hog, even to the extent of pathological psychology—I mean there was some at that time that wasn't. And what I learned from psychology was that there is no character of truth or falsity, reality or unreality, goodness or badness, beauty or ugliness, in short, there is no character of mental states that will justify even a generalization, to say nothing of universals. So there is no order possible to them, so also no meaning of any sort.

The mere fact that something occurs in my mind (I won't say it of yours) is perhaps of the least consequence possible. Anything, right, wrong, beautiful, good, ugly, real, unreal, anything can, everything, including nothing, may, occur in my consciousness, and nothing that appears there is of the slightest significance. Unless I find from its implications something objective, something constituent to the world outside which has its being in relations other than to me, the appearance is a phantom. What takes place in my mind is gone when I turn to look at it; and it is well that what happens there should not return again. To maintain a given state, of assurance, for instance, requires constant attention and a care that is better given to more substantial things. That I should find God within the misty depths of my consciousness would be the strongest suggestion of his unreality, and I am happy to know that what I know as real has no place within what is me. My consciousness is not a fit habitation for the worthy beings I have known and know, and I shall rejoice when it no longer hangs as a shadow over the beautiful forms and figures that are the design of the real.

I know, of course, that there are those who reduce everything to experience, who even confuse thought with experience, and then identify it with what is private and exclusive to the individual. And for them thought becomes identical

with the psychological processes, and they say it goes on in their minds. But this in itself is evidence that they have no notion of what thought is, for the first realization of thought is the announcement from outside that some mental processes have strayed, and that if there is to be sense to any mental processes, they must submit to an order imposed upon them which is not inherent in their occurrence. And I know also that there are philosophers who will tell us that reality *is* experience and that some of these have perhaps done the most important thinking that has been done within the past century and a half; which only means that thinking has been, for the period, significant only for what it has got wrong. But reality is not experience; I should say with the religionist, when out of his worshipful habit, that experience is not real, and that it is the obligation of life and thought to realize it in so far as realization is possible within a world that is broken by the tragic flaw. God, with all his power, can make nothing of my experience.

The appeal to philosophy, then, leaves the religion of experience without foundation, for I doubt if anybody who knows anything about philosophy would accept the appeal to experience in the crude form that is made by religion. And I suggest that since the appeal to thought and the appeal to experience both fail it in the end, religion might better come back home to rest upon ethical and aesthetic grounds and leave to philosophy its proper task of finding justification in metaphysics for those grounds. Philosophy began, you know, when men left off telling stories about the gods, and there is no excuse at this point to go back to story telling. And we are not philosophers when we devote our energies to proving that the one story that we prefer is better and sounder and more comforting than all others, even though we mistake its comforting function for the truth. And we are a little less than frank when we tell our stories in the name of philosophy. Of course, we will respect the honesty of those who are in possession of the truth and who use philosophy merely as an instrument to prepare minds for its acceptance or to refute errors which might interfere with its propagation and who consciously recognize that theology is not philosophy and who, therefore, find the basis for their truth in historic or other considerations. One cannot question the integrity of those who refuse to examine their postulates when they tell you that at that point they are not philosophizing. I knew a boy once who was plowing with a recalcitrant mule (perhaps the adjective is redundant). He ran out of hortatory resources and was resorting to profanity when a benevolent old farmer passed and remarked, "Ah, Bub, you won't catch any fish that way." The boy answered, "I ain't fishin'." If we could only recognize things for what they are and accept them as such. We do not have to transform base metals into gold to make them valuable, nor gold into glory to make it useful. A spade is a spade, and a philosophy is a thing to think with and a theology comforts and assures us where everything is uncertain. It even assures us, when the universe falls to pieces, that the flaw is a part of the universal seeming. Where I cannot see to act, a form yet stands eternal and awaits a propitious moment, and what I ought to do remains forever unmoved.

I wonder if anybody ever was curious about *my* experience and about *my* at-

titude to the world? I do not believe that my experience is or could be important to anybody, and I am quite certain that it is not important to me. As a matter of idle curiosity, however, I have set down a few notes.

My philosophy is one thing. My theology, if you want to call it such, is another thing. Its major premise is that there is a moral quality imputable to the act in which existence is imposed upon a sentient being. Or the converse, the act in which a sentient being is burdened with existence is the primordial act, its formulation is the basic postulate of metaphysics, and as a judgment it asserts through the experience of pain the Pain that is the Flaw in the structure of the Universe. The final phase of the act of creation was the judgment, "By the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat bread." "Unto the woman he said: I will greatly multiply thy sorrow." "And unto Adam he said: cursed is the ground for thy sake."

Please don't jump to conclusions. This is not pessimism, for neither pessimism nor optimism has any status in thought, and they are used only to express an epithet of odium and have no place in a judgment. And what I am stating here are judgments about my attitude toward the universe. And first let me clear myself against your objection that I have contradicted myself. I have denied the reality of experience, and here I have posited pain as the ground of metaphysical interpretation. But Pain is not an experience. It is the substance of the world so far as the world is to be considered as an object of value—the Flaw in the universe that lies at the basis of ethics and aesthetics as their primordial Fact.

For pain is nature burled:
And this, the substance of the sentient world,
Is spindle on which beauty's flesh is whorled,
The End in which what is is being furled.

Even so its bonded whole
Is symbol for the beauty-structured soul:
Of dyad-universe it is one pole
Round which eternal substance needs must roll.

So is old Pain a part
Of all that has its being for the heart.
In nature it is nothing; the mere start
For what will Be incorporate in art.

The pain that I experience, my pain, is as unreal as the rest of experience. It is the mere symbol of the suffering of the world. The God-Man accepted *his* agony as unreal, as the mere symbol of the suffering of the world, expiated it, transcended it to demonstrate the reality of the Pain which throbs in the heart of the universe, and thus proclaimed the principle that makes all attitudes true that are true or can be true in the ultimate assertion—Renunciation. So it is my obligation to deny and reject the universe that *is* in my assertion of the world that can be, and my duty lies in the obligation to give objective form to that assertion. But we have crucified him in the name of a worldly joy—have forgotten the agony of spirit in the bliss of the lust of the flesh. I say it is not *my* pain that is real. I will take it as it comes, in fact, I perhaps have never known what an experience is that is not colored by its cosmic quality. And I cannot conceive of an experience that is free from it—the pleasures we claim for our experience are merely the lure to a pain that is its reality. I can take it, for I know that it is unreal. But the Pain I cannot take and must renounce is the suffering of the world. The other fellow's pain, the suffering of the innocent child, the sparrow dying with a broken wing,

Why are we under harsh duress
To pass with bleeding consciousness?

The fact that a vast majority of the people of the world have never known anything but pain and want and anxiety and dread and fear ought to remind us of the concept that is basic to our own religion—that of suffering. And the significance of suffering should remind us that we have accepted, in pretense, at least, the doctrine of suffering as that which sketches for us the explanation and the justification of a life dominated by its pains. But in our theology we forget that this explanation proceeds through the symbols that constitute the structure of art, and that these symbols have their meaning in their content of moral action. It is the Cross that gives Christianity its power and its truth.

And yet we say that life is the end and goal of the religious motive. Naturally we overlook the actualities of life for its ideal possibilities: but we forget that life as existence has none of the ideal possibilities. So that there is no connection between the ideal of life and its actuality, none, at least, that does not violate all the laws of thought and appeal to the irrational in magic. But I forget that I am giving you my attitude toward these matters. Simply stated, and so far as life is concerned, I have no interest in the question at all. I cannot conceive of life within conditions that would make it desirable, and to conceive of it as perpetuated under the only conditions that give the concept meaning is abhorrent. And there is no abundance of it that can appeal to me. I've had enough of it, thank you.

NOTE

1. Professor Elijah Jordan died on May 28, 1953. This paper was read at the meeting of the Indiana Philosophical Association, October 28, 1950, and has been edited for publication by Professor Max H. Fisch of the University of Illinois.