

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

Second Term. Cornell

Prof. Creighton

Feb. 3, 1908.

To go back over Hobbes for discussion. His work is the Leviathan, the name taken from scripture. Job. on the title page is a picture of the monster and a quotation from Job. This great power is the State, which in gov't is absolute. He is opposed to Aristotle in that man is a social animal: saying that the state results from a compact and the desire for peace. For H. then man is by nature unsocial and selfish. H. is consciously opposed to Aristotle. H. is thus opposed to Grotius (Hugo de Groot, 1632) DeJure, et Poce, a work on international law.

The state thus grows out of the human need of protection and peace, his self-interests. Peace is the greatest good and the purpose of government. The great evil in the "state of nature" or of war of all against all. Perhaps this view is that H. lived in a stormy time (b. 1588) and personally had a passion for peace. Thus there is a compact. I give up my right to interfere if you do the same. So justice depends upon compact, and no compact, no justice.

Breaking the law is wrong simply because it leads to trouble - you get in jail. Right or wrong are prudential terms. H. thinks almost entirely of the external relations of indus. and not so much about their internal moral inclination.

Strong centralized power is necessary in order to guarantee the peace which is necessary. The government must therefore have all power and be irresponsible, the gov't has promised nothing, and is not held by contract, justice does not apply to the acts of gov't. If the people can call the King to account there will be constant turmoil and trouble.

But why will the gov't rule justly, where it has no obligations? Because the rules will see that a strong ruler will make a strong people, et vice versa. He makes light of Hampden refusing to pay 20 s. ship money. He does not see the principle in it, but would pay the 20 s. for practical reasons of peace.

H. was the heretic of his time, on account of his materialism and absolutism. H. got the wrath of the orthodox party. His religion is not known.

Yet he is the originator of Eng. ethics. H. has two principles-

1. Moral distinctions are artificial. That is, in the state of nature there is slight distinctions in morality. Morality grows up with and in the state, and does not belong to human nature as such. Cudworth, a contemporary of H. Cumberland, etc., try to show that morality is eternal and immutable and belongs to human nature as such.

2. Human nature is essentially selfish. From this second principle there grew up the efforts of later Englishmen to show that the altruistic sentiment is a kind of farsighted self interest. That is, self-interest is fundamental, but reason will show that it is wise to be altruistic. It is thus rational to be moral, for rationality is prudence.

The best book on Hobbes is Sir Leslie Stephen, in Eng. Men of Letters Series.
Next day. Descartes. 1595-1650.

Life of Descartes - Miss E. L. Holdane.

A Translation of D. by Veitch.

Descartes on the Emotions - Tarrey. (See this for the rel. of body and mind)

Read the Discourse on Method.

Meditations in Veitch.

Descartes - The Discourse on Method.

Part I. considers the state of science of the time in which the author lived. He was dissatisfied with them all tho recognising the good that came from them. Yet he retained a love for math. and was pained that a science with prins. so firm, had so slight a superstructure erected upon it - He delighted in Oratory and Poetry, but considered them as products of natural gift, and to have no necessary relation to the truth.

After leaving the instruction of the school and being dissatisfied with it he resolved to find what truth might be got from his own exp. by the means of his own meditation and reason. Accordingly, to enlarge his exp. he travelled and met various people, at court and in the army. Thus encouraging him to compare his own thought with that of others. After studying "the book of the world" he resolved to make himself of study: and this treatise is the of his Method of procedure in the for truth. deals with the Rules of the Method. structures which are the result of the of a single indiv. are more perfect than those built up by different persons. So less truth in the Sciences as the product than in the "simple inferences which of good sense rising his natural prejudiced judgment draws respecting the matters of his exp." with this conviction he resolved to sweep wholly away the opinions he had up to this time embraced: hoping to find theories more correct or at least to readopt the old ones after scrutiny of them by reason. This reformation was, however, to apply only to his own opinions. This resolve to examine every opinion was due to the discovery that no opinion, however absurd, has been held by some respectable philosopher: and it is this very diversity of opinion which suggests that most of not all are untrue. The diversity suggests also that the ground of our opinions is custom and example rather than certain knowledge: as also that a "majority vote" is no guarantee of truth, especially if the particular truth is in any way difficult.

So Descartes proceeds slowly: not casting away hostilely any opinion without careful scrutiny even if the opinion had manifestly no relation to Reason: considering carefully first what was the nature of the problem to which he set himself, and secondly, by what method he might arrive at Kn.of whatever lay within the compass of his powers. He had been carefully educated in Log. i.e., Alg. and Geom., and no doubt being impressed by the exactness and certitude of these sciences, he naturally invoked the aid of these. But he found that Logic deals more with the communication of the Known rather than with the investigation of the unknown: That Alg. and Geom. were so abstract, so restricted to the consideration of certain figures, so tied to rules and formulas, that their results embarrassed and obscured the mind rather than cultivated it. His belief was that a few rules rigidly followed would most satisfactorily arrive at the truth, so he hit upon these four.

1. Never to accept anything as true that he did not know to be such; that is, to precipitancy and prejudice.
2. To divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible.
3. To pass from the simple to the complex: assigning in thought a certain order even to those objects which in nature do not stand in a relation of antecedence and sequence.
4. To make enumerations so complete, and reviews so general, that I might be assured nothing was omitted.

He would begin then, with the simplest proportions or relations of math., such as subsist between straight lines, than which he could find no objects more simple: and to help to retain them in the memory, to express these relations in certain characters the briefest possible. By this means he hopes to discover truth; and as the truth on any particular point is one, whoever apprehends the truth, knows all that on that point can be known.

Hist of Phil. Feb. 5, '08.

Descartes (1596-1650) Bornat La Haye, Tourraine was educated by the Jesuits became disgusted with the science of his time, decided to study himself and the book of the world. Discourse on Method (1637) Meditations(1641), Principles of Philosophy (1644) Traite des passions de l'ame, his psych. work. Wrote also a book on the "world", but was not published for fear of the Church. During the 16th Century to the 17th there was much liberality to science, but later the Catholics reaction became more intolerant.

His theory of the world was a mechanical and meant that it could evolve from mechanical principles. The world begins with a nebula, thru mechanical prins: may or must become what it is. Kant held the theory in 1755, also by Loplace, who developed it perfectly. Loplace was asked where in his system God comes in, and L. replied, "Sire, I found no need for such an hypothesis."

See Veitch (Open Court Pub. Co.) The Discourse, also the Meditations. This latter is the most systematic statement of his theory.

D. was educated at La Fleche, became recognised as a brilliant student. Later he became convinced of the unreality of the science of the time, that too much depended on tradition, or opinion, and had no right to be called science. So he decided to see the reasonings of men in their actual practical life. He wished to establish the sciences on solidier found action. It is characteristic of this age to be dissatisfied with the old science, and to desire a method by which to proceed in the way of Kn. Thus Hobbes and Bacon hoped for a new method by which the Kn. of man might be systematized. So he went to Holland lived there nearly 20 years, His communication with the world was thru Father Marsienne. His method is "De omnibus dubitandum" i.e., everything must be for the time being, doubted or questioned. His scepticism is not final, but we doubt that we may know. Thus he calls into question every one of his former opinions. The evidence of sense was even brought in doubt before reason, and their many illusions shown. The senses often deceive us. So we must discard all Kn. perceived thro sense. So all Kn. handed down thru tradition must be doubted. This really was where D. began to doubt. There may be much truth in it but tradition does not ground.

Of the truths of reason, those of math. seemed the most self evident, and D. put much dependence on them. It is possible that our minds are so constituted that we may be led astray. God may have made us so that we cannot but fail. But if you say that God would not be God, then we may say that we may be misled by some powerful demon. So it is possible to doubt even the fundamental truths of reason. But so long as you doubt, so long as you are being deceived, it is clear that you think. That is, you are conscious, and conscious of your own existence. Cogito, ergo sum. Even if there is a demon who deceives, he cannot deceive me in that I am conscious. Thus his foundation is the immediate certainty of self-conscious experience. This proposition is not a logical syllogism, but is based on intuition. Its evidence is its clearness and distinctness, its self evidence. This cogito ergo sum is also a test of truth. It is clear and distinct. So when we find a proposition which is clear and distinct, or has force and vivacity, as Hume says, we may know it is truth: it is self evident. They looked upon truth

as having some property which distinguished it from the false. This clearness and distinctness, force and vivacity is such a quasi-external property belonging to the conscious idea which makes it true. Now however, our test of truth is its fitness, togetherness, with the rest of our experience.

Having established the proof of the self D. goes on to prove the existence and perfection of God and from this to the proof and explanation of the objective world.

Proofs of God's existence:

1. Some ideas come to us from without, some from the imagination, some are innate. Of these last is the most important is the conception of God. Where did the idea of God come from? What caused it? No finite thing can give the idea of an infinite being. So the cause must be equal to the effect. So God must exist as the cause of the idea in us.

2. The idea of the infinite is the negative of the idea of the finite. But this will not do for D. The idea of the infinite is the positive idea, the ground for the idea of the finite.

3. He gives also the ontological proof. See Meditations, 3 and 4.

3. The ontological Proof. We have the idea of the infinite being who is the sum of all being. This very concept of ours involves the reality. For if the perfect being does not exist he is no longer perfect, for existence is implied in perfection. With regard to a finite thing, the concept does not involve the existence. But God necessarily exists. His perfection implies it.

Put in this way:

God of Highest Being is/ an existing being, that is, God contains all attributes or all predicates. So the very concept of God includes the concept of existence as one of its elements.

But it may be objected, that the perfection of the idea does not guarantee the existence of the objectively real. If we look at it this way, That if there is thought, there is something, it can be maintained.

4. The causal proof - is the most legitimate. We have ideals which are higher than ourselves. Descartes thought that God put this into our minds in some external way. Yet we can maintain that the presence of ideas in our mind will lead us to some spiritual interpretation of the world. That is, the higher existence is thus the cause of our existence, and a higher conception of ideals will bring about for us a yet higher existence for us.

Hist. of Phil. Feb. 7, 1908.

See Miss M. W. Calkins - The Persistent Problem of Philosophy - A discussion of the various systems, and a very full statement. The fact of our own existence is the fundamental principle of Descartes' system. From this other propositions may be deduced. For him Kn. is a system of truths, one involving others: so beginning with one we are led to another and so on. It is obvious that D. was thinking of math. as the ideal for all science. He thinks if we have one truth and could draw on it, we could show all truth, not only of what is but also what is their necessity. As in Geom. we begin with an axiom we are led to a chain of necessary consequences. If this method could be introduced into all science, we would have as he thought a perfect Kn.

Our first prin. is that of our own existence. From this we go to the existence of God. He has two proofs of God's existence.

1. God exists as the cause of me, my ideas and of what is perfect in me, only the perfect can cause the perfect.
2. The idea of the perfect of infinite is the positive idea: it is the presupposition of finite existence. Finitude comes from the limitation of the perfect. We know ourselves by contrast with the ideal; and knowing our finitude posit God's perfection.

Descartes proofs are easily shown fallacious from our standpoint with our added experience. He assumes the prin. of causality. That is he assumes what he attempts to prove.

D. says God as all-perfect can not be a deceiver. That is, he cannot will to deceive even if he can deceive. This guarantees the veracity of God.

In the same way, the external world must exist because God could not deceive us in its appearance. God is thus the cause of our perceptions thru the external. But the ext. world does not exist as sense perceives it. It exists as extended bodies which have motion. The world is made up of bodies of gematrical kind. The body is a space filling something - it is extension itself. His conception is practically the conception of science today. Sensations belong in us, outside us, there is only extended body. But how about the world of color, sound, etc. He says our only valid ideas are our math. ideas. Those of color, etc. are confused. Only math. qualities are distinct. Does he mean we can't know how color, etc. can be real? That we can't think of these as existing in the thing. The phys. world is given us by D. as a mechanical and math. world of body and motion. All things are caused by impact of one body upon another. Phenomena are the operations of matter and force.

Some of D's conceptions are crude. He says motions is transferred from one body to another. A body remains at rest until moved by another body. He thinks of motion as being given up. He thinks of the amount of motion and rest in the world as constant. A body parts with its motion or rest but this motion or rest is taken up by another body. This is the early form of the conservation of Energy. His physics is much like Hobbes - it is a mechanical system, permanent because of the permanence of God. But Hobbes called the mind a body. D would restrict this mechanism to things and animals. But man tho partly mechanical in his body has yet a mind. So D. is dualistic. The essence of mental substance is its thinking, its essence is in its being conscious. "There is in man united the phys. subs. and the thinking subs, the body and mind." These two are distinct and separate largely. The body as machine goes its own way, and soul goes its own way. But he considers the relation bet. the mind and body.

His trouble is that he still thinks the soul as a quasi physical entity. He asks where is the seat of the soul - and finds it in the pineal gland for this alone is a single element in the brain. Sensation is effected thru the "vital fluid" or the "animal spirits" which permeates the whole body. Sensation sets in vibration the animal spirits and this vibration transfers itself to the soul. Thus arises perception or sensation. So also the soul communicates an agitation to the animal spirits and thus commands the body. So the soul must be a physical entity if it can give motion to a body. While he separates the soul and body he yet thinks of soul in a quasi-physical way.

History of Philosophy, Feb. 12, 1908.

Descartes died in Sweden in 1650 where he had gone in 1649 upon invitation of Princess Christina. She made him lecture at 5 a.m. and he caught cold from exposure.

God is ens realisunus, omnitude realitatis.

His theory of emotions makes a distinction between the various feelings. It is much like the Lange-James theory. That is, some feelings are merely the perception

of physiological changes. With D. certain emotions are primary - 6 of these, wonder, joy, sorrow, love, hate. From these the others are compounded. Spinoza laid stress on the last three.

D.'s theory of emotions is important for psych.

He had influence even in his life before they were published. He had trouble both with the protestant and Catholic Theologians and his works were at last put under the ban.

But his thought had great inf. on the following writers of France - as Finelon, Bossuet, Sabinet, etc. They tried to follow his analytic method. The Jansenists were influenced much - the greatest of these Pascal says sciences goes only so far as math. Treatment is possible, but adds to that the importance of the feelings. He is great as a literary character but added nothing to the Hist of Phil. The heart has its reasons as well as the head. Only in immediate feeling can the world be known. He tried to get here a basis for the authority of the church. He was driving against the Jesuits as a Jansenist. He was an apologist of the church and religion of his time. His "wager" is famous. There is a chance that religion is the safe thing, for if not there is nothing to lose, and otherwise there is everything to gain. Yet Pascal is often better than this. He insists on the value immediate exp. and the principles which can not be demonstrated. He considers the relation of body and mind. If you don't feel pious, go to church, do the stunts and the piety will come. That is, the bodily act may engender the proper subjective condition.

Arriault and Nicole authors of the Port Royal Logic were Jansenists. Gassendi is an upholder and maintainer of atomism and ought to be a materialist. He offers this materialism again. D.'s spiritism.

Genlinx - Malebranche - are both Cartesians - in general, but modify his theory in the relation of body and mind. They are Occasionalists. Descartes says the relation is one of mechanical action and interaction,

These latter say that God is the only cause, the efficient cause of everything. Genlinx says neither does body act on mind nor mind on body. But the change in the body is the occasion of the idea in the mind which is given by God upon the occasion. So, when there is an idea, God causes a change in the external world.

Malebranche says we see all things in God. He thinks of God as having the ideas of all things in his mind eternally. The sensations, ideas, are all conditioned by the body and are not true, they have the capacity for error. Spinoza would call this kind of Kn. imagination. But man has the capacity of knowing things perfectly - we see them as they are in the mind of God. This has a close relation with Plato and Plotinus. The true being of things is found in God.

Genlinx was a Hollander - Wrote on ethics - died 1669 at "Budapest" as an *der pest* (of the pest or plague) is mistranslated by the translator of Hoffding. Berkeley and Malebranche met and should have agreed, but M. could not see how.

Spinoza

The collection of works on Spinoza is perhaps the best this side of the Atlantic collected by Pres. White. See Sir Frederic Pollack. Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy - Perhaps the best.

Caird - Spinoza - in Blackwoods Series.

Wm. Knight - Addresses by Spinozists.

Joachim - The Ethics of Spinoza - Commentary

Spinoza 1632-1677. A Jew taught in the Jewish traditions for the Jewish church. Was dissatisfied with the Jewish theology, was excommunicated, and supported himself by grinding optical glasses. Worked out his system in isolation, but later had relations with the great scientists of his time.

During life he published a kind of compendium of Descartes' principles. He later published his Theological - Political Tractate.

After his death his works were pub. with the title Opera Postuma. It contained his Ethics which he was afraid to pub, an unfinished wk. on the Improvement of the Understanding, another the Tractatus Politicians, and a fragment of a Hebrew Grammar.

In 1852 (?) two MSS were discovered which had the title Tractotus Brevis. de Hovino et Deo et de Felicitate.

Elwes - Bohn Lib. trans. of his Ethics.

White - Another translation

All except the Short treatise were in Latin and this one in Dutch. The Theological and Political Tractate. See Vol. II of the Bohn Ed. for his works.

Feb. 14, 1908.

See "The Improvement of the Understanding" by Spinoza. This is a discussion of method and represents the spirit of the time to get a perfect method in the search for Kn.

The "Theologica-Political Tractate" - This is a modern discussion of the questions of today. It, for instance, distinguishes bet. the theological definition of what one should believe, and the fact that religion is an attitude of mind. He insists on freedom in belief.

He is decidedly modern in his criticism of the Bible. That the Scriptures are entirely local - i.e. belonging to the conditions of environment of the Hebrews. The old testament - the Bks. of Moses, etc. were written in Post-Exilic times. His ideas are reproduced cons. or uncons. in Jowett's essay on the subject.

Spinoza's chief works is his Ethics. "Ethics mora geometrico demonstrata." Its form is that of Euclid's geometry. Begins with definitions, axioms, propositions, etc. It is noticed that this form is an impediment to him, and his clearest thoughts are expressed in the carollaries and notes and remarks.

But his idea is to put ethical truth in the form of laws of geometry. Descartes thought that the extended could be treated geometrically. But for S. body is substance; so is thought, i.e. all reality is substance. There can be only one substance, so everything can be put in the geometrical form. S. is the strict logician of the Descartes idea, so he cannot have two substances, as thought and extension; for if there were these two they would limit each other, and would not therefore be substance, which must be infinite. There is one substance and by reflecting on its nature S. hoped to make a completely adequate deduction of the nature of all things.

The definitions in Bk I. Substance, attribute, mode, etc., are defined, and these are the basis of all further thought. Substance (God) can not be conceived as depending on another. It is the self-caused, the causa sui. In addition to this one substance, we have to think of modes, or finite things, the modifications of the substance. The finite is the limited, i.e. has relations. The modes or particular finite things are real, but only as parts of the whole. They are not independent beings. We may understand these in two way: (1) in the way of proximate cause, i.e. its relations to other finite things; but this leads to the infinite regress. This is the scientific method of explanation. (2) We may see things in their relation to God. This is the highest explanation, i.e. to see how the finite thing follows from the nature of the inf. substance. Everything in nature follows from the nature of God. God is not the external cause of nature, nature does not follow from the will of God, but they follow necessarily from God's nature, i.e. God is the immanent cause of nature. God rather the ground of the world than the efficient cause.

Essences and existences in S. are difficult. He seems to mean this. By existence he means belonging to the order of nature, having spatial and temporal relations, belonging to the causal order. But there is another way of looking at these relations. The essence means the following of one nature from another. As from the essence of

the circle certain things follows: as the radii are equal. We should be able to look at man in this way. In fact all things follow from the nature of God and his essence. What he understood by time is not clear, but it is evident that the temporal relation is not so high a concept as the logical relation. He thinks of things sub specie aeterintatis. Things are related logically, and this is the higher relation. "By eternity I mean existence itself," not infinite time, but an order which is not temporal at all.

In Book I., DeDeo, S. undertakes to prove there is only one substance and that it is God. This is his starting point. There is one fundamental substance, and this cannot be proved, but must be assumed. "So whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived." He distinguishes his own view from the anthropomorphic view, that God has passions and will etc. as a man, acts according to an end, etc., but God's intellect and will, if he has them are different from the human's for the human will must have something objective toward which he strives. But if God wills, there must be something lacking to God, so he is not perfect. S. does not accept the ordinary view of teleology, unless you mean a universal teleology. God does not act freely as man does, for that implies the imperfection of God. The world could not follow from the choice of God, even God could not choose by a fiat to do one thing or another. We even are not conscious of the causes of our actions. If we could we would see them as necessary. There is no contingency. This comes from our ignorance. "If the stone in falling were conscious, it would think that it were free." There is determination even in the finite order. In the appendix he lays Jane on the theory of teleology. Everything is pre-determined in God. Things do not act as men, with an end in view.

HIST. of Phil. Feb. 17, 1905.

In Ethics, Bk. I. from Prop. XVI on including the Appendix. Spinoza is giving his notion of God. In some places he identifies God with nature, and in others he distinguishes between the natura naturaus i.e., activity of nature, or active nature, and natura naturata, or passive nature, in this nature is a result of the necessary perfection of God.

God is often thought of as acting from purpose toward a goal, but this is not the case. God does not act with an end in view, there is no teleology in the active nature.

He does not hold the freedom of indifference, but he is free in accordance with his own nature. He acts in accordance with the perfection of his own nature. Thus God is a causa sui, he acts by his own nature.

In objecting to the freedom of indifference leads him sometimes to seem to deny freedom entirely, but he yet saves the freedom which follows from the nature of a thing. Thus God is free because of his nature, just as the qualities of the circle follow from the definition, freedom is an attribute of God's very nature.

In the appendix, S. is speaking of the supposed consciousness of freedom, and that nature acts as men act, with a purpose. If we can't find the causes in nature, we furnish them from our own nature. From this comes the idea that God is the special God of our nation or our tribe. The appendix is a terrible satire against the anthropomorphic conception of God.

The argument from design is often given as a proof of God's existence. Finding in nature many things useful to us we say that God created them for our convenience. But they find earthquakes, etc. so they say that God brings them about because he is angry. Experience gives infinite proof that the good and evil come to the pious and unpius alike. But math. furnishes us with a kind of proof which will destroy all these superstitions. This famous example of the tile falling from the roof and killing a man. They say that it was God's will. But there are causes in nature which must explain such events. All our predicates of value, as good, bad, well-ordered, ill-ordered, etc. show that we judge of things according to our peculiar constitution.

Part II. Prop. 40, Note 2. Different kinds of Kn. See also previous props. Imagination is distinguished from true Kn. Imagination arises from affections upon the organization, and ideas arising thus are the resultant of the physiol. change. Hence the indiv. differences. It is seeing things through the body and is twisted by it. The human mind has not an adequate Kn. of itself from this source, but a Kn. only confused and fragmentary.

But there is a true Kn. Reason is the source of true Kn. There is ratio such as sci. Kn. from prins. And there is intuitio, by which knowledge comes direct, it is immediate insight into the nature of things. Reason is the source of all truth, while imagination is the source of all error. Reason demands that we see things out of relation to the affections of our bodies. The judgments of value, as good, and beautiful, etc. follow from the way things affect us. But by math. we can know things as they actually are in their true nature. When we see things this way we will pass no more judgments of value. Their perfect existence is all there is to it. They are, and are not necessarily good or bad. When we see them as math. completeness, it is perfectly satisfactory. We cannot go into the question of what the world might have been, but must take the world as it is. But we must begin with the parts and from them construct the whole.

It is characteristic of rationalism that they begin with the whole and deduce the whole scheme from it. God has infinite attributes, but only two of them are known to us. They are thought and extension.

History of Philosophy Feb. 19, 1908.

Spinoza's conception of God and his relation to the world. He seems to look upon God as the logical ground of the world. Everything follows from the conception of God just as the qualities of the circle follow from the conception of the definition. He thus desires teleology in so far as it takes an anthropocentric view of the universe. The whole world does not exist for man's own interest. It is, and follows logically from the concept of the divine substance.

S. denies that God has intelligence or will. But there is left yet in his notion a kind of conscious force. To love an idealistic conception of the world we must think that the world is governed by a rational principle. This is necessary if there are to be such things as values. If we think of it as controlled by force we might look upon it as blind and mechanical. S. is interested in refining and purifying the concept of God. The tendency is to look upon God as one who looks after our private interests. S. wants to make the concept of God universal and not explained as willing particular things to our interests. S. might have admitted that there is a purpose in the world as a whole - that it has some end - there is something being realized. But he does not develop the idea. He takes a merely geometrical view. Hegel says S. calls God the substance but fails to look at him as subject, who rules the world by intelligence. But later in S's work we shall see that there is something better than the definitions which he gives. He cannot get a unity of purpose in the world upon his mere definitions. Yet he says blessedness is harmony of human will with the nature of the universe. S's criticism of the old teleology of theology as given in the appendix at the end of Ethics Bk. I, is perfectly just and convincing. It is not necessary that all our wants should be fulfilled, that we get everything we want. The goodness of the world does not depend upon our whim or caprice or want. All religion must get beyond the anthropocentric notion that the world must satisfy our wants and interests. God is not necessarily there for our sake. "True religion must consist in the finite realizing that he has no rights over against God" - Creighton. It is God's will and not his that is to prevail, nor must God's will accommodate itself to ours. If we can harmonize our will with God's we are good. Yet, there are some of our interested

which God must respect, e.g. He must see things come out in behalf of the good, true, and beautiful and with a conception of these of the same kind as ours at least.

If in God's will there be no distinctions as right and wrong, etc. we could not regard it as a good will. But with the highest kind of Kn. we can love God, when we see that our lives harmonize with the constitution of things we recognize that God regards right and wrong in the same way we do. But perhaps there is not so much teleology in Spinoza. He is right in objecting to the old theology, but he seems to go to the opposite extreme of mechanism. The old theology is irreligious and immoral.

Immortality - as continued indiv. existence - is hard to find in Spinoza, but will be considered later.

As to virtue, perhaps it can be said that all our Kn. our virtue, etc. may follow from the conception of the nature of God. This would make him a quasi-rationalist. But God may know the processes within himself. S. may insist on finding the laws and understanding thus that we may know virtue.

Second Part. The Nature of the Mind and its Connection with the body.

There is also a close correlation of mind and body. The mind is spoke of as the idea of the body.

The more perfect the body the more perfect the mind. As body has plurality of parts so the mind has plurality of ideas. There is a correlation bet. physiological changes and psychases. Yet there is no causal relation between the body and mind. He holds a kind of parallelism but he does not use the word. There is harmony bet. the order of things and the order of ideas. Between the thought attribute and the extension attribute there is a correspondence even these two things are two aspects of the same thing. The idea and the physiological change are two sides of the same fact.

The object of the (idea) mind is the body. In another sense than parallelism (physiological) can the idea and object be interpreted. There is an epistemological correspondence. Our thought corresponds with the things in nature and the order of thoughts correspond with the order in things.

Part III. Origin and Nature of the Emotions. He tries to give a scientific account. He tries to show they obey laws and do not depend upon our will. There are certain conditions under which we are angry, just as qualities follow from definitions. Mind must be treated scientifically.

Spinoza's notion of the emotions. The emotions are parts which belong within the order of nature and are determined by nature's general laws. Many authors treat man as more or less outside and above the laws of nature. So he says we must give up the notion of free will, and try to understand it. The passions arise according to necessary laws and can be treated more geometrico. He is seeking the origin and nature of emotions and regards them as mere facts such as science would treat. The fundamental ones are pleasure, pain, and desire. These arise under certain psychological laws as of the law of association: also, objects which resemble things we love, will arouse in us the passion of love - that is one law under which they arise is resemblance. Love is a feeling of pleasure in connection with the consciousness of an object. Pleasure follows the conservation of the object loved; also the destruction of objects hated. We love those things which we see others love, and hate those which others hate. All these things follow according to laws of nature or psychological laws. The important thing is his insistence on the necessity of these things.

It is necessary that man be at the

Hist of Phil. Feb. 21, 1908.

The important thing in Spinoza is to be found in the notes, propositions, appendices, introductions.

Write on Spinoza. By next Friday.

- I. On the conceptions of Substance, Attribute, Mode.
- II. Gdo - conception of and Relation to world.
- III. Relation of body and mind BK. prop VII ff - Bk III. prop II et corollaries.
- IV. Various kinds of Kn. Particularly Reason et Imagination.
Prop 40 note 2.
Prop 29 corollary.
- V. The nature of the emotions and their laws. How they belong to the laws of nature, are determined.
- VI. Control of emotions.
Bk. IV - prop 19 ff - Appendix to part IV.
Bk. V - Liberty of Man.
- VII. Intuitive Kn. of God and love to him. Part V.
- VIII. The Highest Good as a common good. Relations to fellow man.
first pages in the Improvement of Understanding.
Bk. IV prop. 30 to 37 - Appendix to pt. IV, of nature.

The Control - Part IV.

An emotion can only be controlled by another emotion, and not by any intellectual act. See the property of association. An emotion whose course is present, is stronger than otherwise.

Yet through Knowledge we may attain to some control nature. We can rise above the common order of nature by means of knowledge.

He speaks often like Hobbes. The basis of action is one's own advantage. But that which is our advantage is what will help us to understand. We desire first to preserve our own being. All other action must follow this first purpose.

Reason impels us to try to understand. Knowledge is the highest good for Spinoza. Kn. of God is the highest good and to know God is the highest virtue.

When we know the laws of the emotions we can in a way control them. By two ways. 1. When a passion is known it ceases to be a passion. Its violence is modified. 2. We can associate the emotions in such a way as to hinder those that are hurtful, and foster those which are advantageous. We rule our minds by knowing the laws of our minds. The highest Kn. is intuitive. Imagination is just the ideas as they come into our minds, they were psych. process. This last is subject to the laws of nature, corresponding to the phys. laws of the body. He who knows these psych. laws can guide them toward the attainment of his own purpose.

Reason has two stages. 1. Scientific. (ratio). 2. Intuitive which is direct, immediate, sees all things from the nature of God sees things sub species aeternitatis.

It requires an emotion to control an emotion. Emotions are (1) Passions which seem to seize us (2) Those which are due to the mind's own activity. The highest emotion is attended with the highest form of activity. So to understand God is to love God. This is amor intellectualis Dei. Through this love we attain to some freedom. This intuitive kn. is indeed very rare but it is an ideal and we must strive toward it. By this we see immediately the logical consequence from the logical ground. From this intuition we see that all things follow from God independent of all ideas of time. Seeing things sub species aeternitatis makes our kn. independent of the time relation. This high love toward God has no personal interest - we cannot expect anything from God in

return for our love. At the same time the highest good the clear understanding is a social good - it demands that we consider the interests of our fellows.

This love we have for God proves that the mind is eternal. Since we can be capable of knowing things outside the relation of time, the mind that knows things sub specie etc, must be itself independent of time. But he is not thinking of mere endurance - more of the quality of the mind to apprehend universal and eternal relations of things.

Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. It means control of the passions. The good life is its own reward.

Hist. of Philosophy - Feb. 24, 1908.

Leibniz, his life, born Jun 31, 1646, his father a prof. of phil. Father died early and his ed. was looked after by his mother. He had a fine library left him by his father.

He says of himself that he early felt no sympathy for scholasticism. But he revelled in the ancients Plato and Aristotle, etc. Entered the university early where the instruction did not suit. So he read Descartes privately. At the age of 17 he wrote on the prin. of Individuation, i.e. Do Indv. things exist. He was always interested always in the problem of the Individual. He went to Jena and studied math. under Weigel. Took a L.A. on a legal subj. His early publications were of no account. Took the Doctor of Laws degree and had offers of profferships. Joined the Society of Rosicrucians, a mystic society which dabbled in chemistry alchemy, etc. But here he met a man upon whom his future career depended. Thru him he got into the civil service. He insisted that lectures in the A. should be given in German.

Went to Paris Mch. 1672 to influence Louis to a war in the East. While here he met Huygens and other followers of Descartes. While in Paris he did some good work in Calculus. Was called to Hanover in 1676 in a civil office. His life was largely filled here in the library with routine work, but wanting to devote himself to phil. studies. He was a man of the first genius, but never worked out a system. He had always connection with the nobility.

He had an idea of uniting the Protestant and Catholic Church. Held high offices Imperial Councillor, etc. His works Theodice, 1710. This was not an important work as was theological. New Essays, written 1704, pub. later. This was a reply to Locke and also a statement of his own epistemological theory. Of the shorter essays:

G. H. Duncan - Trittle, Morehouse & Taylor, New Haven, Conn. This is a good trans. and will give you a gen. notion of Leibniz.

Dr. Latta. Carendon Press, 1898, trans. of the New System of Nature, 1695. Explanations of New Sys. 1695-6.

Essay on Ult. Orig. of Things 1697-

New Essays

In 1714. Two essays

The Prins. of Nature and of Grace, and the Monadology - Never pub. until Erdman's ed. 1840. Erdman gave the name.

To the phil. of Leibniz -

Early Mod. Phil. was largely occupied with the nature of substance. This first thing after breaking with authority. Subs. for Locke and Descartes was what can exist by itself. They say that the order and system of things correspond to the order and system of ideas.

This def. of Subs. says too much. For if it could exist by itself it would have been absolute. Thus Descartes defined an abs. but he had two of them and never got the two together. So Spinoza saw there could be only one subs. And

Leibniz says subs. is nature, or exp. (?) or God. But Spinoza could not get his conception of the indiv. in his system, and this was perhaps what gave Leibniz his notion of the indiv. and his insistence upon it. But L. did not altogether escape the notion of subs. The monads have no windows. L's difficulties came from the weakness of the phil. of his time - i.e., talking too much on subs.

What he does is take his stand on and in the process of indiv. exp. This process of my exp. is the substance that I am. So there are an infinite no. of monads and the subs. reality, is in the process of representation or exp.

What does this mean in comparison with the theory of atoms. The difference is great. For if monads can be divided infinitely it cannot be a subs. So the monad cannot be an atom but it is a substance. It is an inner process and that process is the reality. Where is it? in space? No. Our cons. does not exist in space. So a monad doesn't exist in space. Space is a confused form of perception. Even a blade of grass has infinite marks our qualities, so leads to confusion. What I see in space is a confused conception of an inf. no. of centres of exp.

Now how can we get there together each monad is cons. of limitation it has an activity which is active, that is cons., and there is also a passive force. The rel. between these may vary so there are all degrees of activity and passivity. But each monad has a character more or less of its own. These monads exist not in space but in terms of their own experience. So every monad is something on its own account. But the world must be a cosmos. And the monads can't have anything to do with each other. To avoid this difficulty he uses the Pre-established Harmony. These monads are so adjusted that they always gibe. Like the clocks they keep the same time. But the theory means more than this. The monad represents the world from its own point of view. But they all are related internally.

The idea of Compassibility is a great one. God has in his mind an infinite number of possible worlds and he selects the "best possible". But he does what all do. We must take the world as we find it and we don't bother about how the world got made. But from the conception of God the world that he made is the best possible and turns out to be the one in which we live.

Each monad, as it represents the whole world, cannot cease to exist. For while anyone might drop out without bothering the other, yet the loss of one means much to God. His pre-established harmony simply means that the world is found more or less as a unity. The theory is a huge figure of speech. Monads do not affect each other.

Hist. of Philosophy - Feb. 28, 1908

The monad a metaphysical atom, it is a centre of experience. These form a hierarchy. They do not exist in space but the conception of space is due to a "confused perception" or as L. had better have said "confused conception". So space results from the imperfection of the human way of looking at things. The function of the monad is to represent internally the nature of things. The "express" or "represent" the nature of things. The monad is a representing activity. It thus expresses its own nature in representing the nature of things.

There are two ways of looking at the Phil. of L. He speaks of the monads as mirrors placed around the market place each expressing reality in its own way. Again he talks of "compassibility" as respecting the relations between the monads.

L. is better understood in the light of the philosophy which has resulted from him or at least have followed him. He instituted the notion of the inter-connectedness of experience instead of the previous way of considering things separately. The connections among things represent the reality. That is, reality is organic. We do not get reality in bits but we get it as an organic whole. Thus

as we think of the body as made up of parts but the nature of the whole is not complete, nor does the part mean anything apart from its connections with the whole.

Leibniz was interested to show that being is a unity, just as Spinoza; yet he wants to insist on the reality of the individual part. While the monads form a system yet each monad has ultimate value and being in itself. Pre-est. He does not mean that things are externally put together by God, but that they are compossible," that is they go together because of their internal nature. That is, experiences is unified.

Leibniz was a mathematician and discovered the differential calculus. So perhaps from his notion of series, continuity, he gets his notion of the hierarchy of monads. He does not deny the difference of degree among things.

John Locke, 1632-1704. Studied at Oxford at Christ Church. Studied medicine but seems never to have practiced, but was thus led to the empirical method. Here he knew Boyle, the physicist, and Sydenham, the physician.

Locke early got connection with the family of the Earl of Shaftesbury with whom he remained until the end. Shaftesbury was liberal and protestant; therefore opposed James II. Both L. and S. had to take refuge in Holland (1683), but returned to Eng. with the reign of Wm. and Mary. He held some political offices. "The Essay Concerning the Human Understanding" 1690. "The Conduct of the Understanding." "Two Essays on Gov't." "A Tract on Education", "The Reasonableness of Christianity". Locke stands for rationalism when the term means simply reasonableness and the dignity of the conduct of life by reason.

He insists on examination, candor, reasonableness, and these ideas must be carried into religion, ethics, gov't, etc.

Leaving Continental phil., we turn now to English phil. The systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, are rationalistic, that is, they proceed conceptually, start from the internal content of the mind and deduce everything from there. Little attention is given to empirical kn. They hardly recognize the knowledge as science gives it, but must deal with universal and necessary propositions, as in math.

Its fundamental prin. is that of identity or contradiction. That is all should follow from laws that are necessary. Empirical, a posterior kn. is not given importance. Yet Leibniz in his prin. of Suf. Reason, tries to make room for empirical kn., but he did not follow it out. The rationalist insists on reason. Even Locke thinks of math. as the highest kn. and that the body of facts do not contain in themselves their law.

The empiricist begins with "the facts" while the rationalist begins with prins. The empiricist says that kn. is experience, attention is given mainly to particular facts, rationalism holds to prins. Each perhaps exaggerates his point. Locke was one of the leaders of thought. He is the incarnation of reasonableness or rationality, he insists on reason for everything.

The Essay is a criticism. It is the beginning of critical philosophy and has the same spirit as the Critique of Pure Reason.

The Essay arises from the conversations of Locke with his friends. Here he finds he "takes a wrong course, that they ought to investigate the human faculties of knowing. Before talking about religion, ethics, etc., we should know how far our knowledge can go. He means to study the capacity of the human mind.

See Fraser's Locke, Blackwood.
Fox Bourne's Life of Locke.

Hist. of Philosophy Mich 2, 1908.

The essay concerning human understanding published 1690. The two great phil. schools are rationalists and empiricists. The first insist on the deduction from reason, the second upon experience.

For rationalism the fundamental prins. of kn. are through reason, they exist innate in the mind. The empiricist holds there is nothing innate but everything comes thru experience. Sense perception is the basis. The rationalist insists on law, the empiricist on particular fact. The rationalist again takes math. as a typical science and thinks all kn. should conform to the truth of math, in form at least. Hobbes is a rationalist, but he does not believe in innate ideas, and also he insists on the dignity of sense perception, while holding to the form of rationalistic thought.

The Essay raises the epistemological question as the most important for phil. The origin, extent, certainty, validity, the grounds of assent, and opinion, are proposed for investigation. He insists on the plain historical method, i.e., proposes to describe the understanding as he finds it.

Bk. I. Innate Ideas, a refutation of the doctrine.

Bk. II.

Bk. III.

Bk. IV.

Empiricism holds that all kn. comes from experience. He uses the word idea for whatever is the mind's object when it thinks. He was the first to bring the term into general use. The doctrine of innate ideas is a common opinion referring to Descartes and his school. But he can show, he thinks, that we can find the origin for ideas, without appealing to the doctrine of innate ideas.

It is supposed that there are certain ideas both speculative and practical which are universal. But their universality does not prove them innate. He takes up the question of the innateness of the laws of thought as, what is, is, etc. Or the prins. of geom. are universal and necessary and are found innate, the mind comes into existence with these ideas already formed. Certain moral prins. are innate as, good is better than evil.

But to disprove these appeal to exp. Children, idiots, etc. have no knowledge of these innate principles. By the method of inspection he finds no innate ideas. This is also the case in regard to the speculative as well as the practical ideas. Even the idea of God, Locke says, is not universal, but men come to form it through experience. First the attack refutes the innate ideas as actual existences in the child at first. The facts here are sufficient to refute the question. This leaves the question open however whether the mind may have certain forms to which the experience is moulded. The empiricist insists on the tabula rasa. But we may give up the notion of particular innate ideas and yet hold to innate forms. The form is *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu*. This is the thorough going empiricism.

Leibniz in his new Essays, says that the formula is not bad but he would add to it *nisi intellectus ipse*. That is the intellect has an organizing power, it counts in the organization and development of experience. Empiricism thus tends to treat exp. from the external side. We may yet insist on the forms of the intellect.

Second. Why does Locke insist so much on the refutation of innate ideas? He is trying to deal authority a final blow and insist that we must depend on experience. It follows that principles cannot be followed without examination. So long as innate ideas holds, it allies itself with the general attitude of subjection to authority, so that men are no longer free to follow their own experiences. The method of experimentation is thus killed. And every prop. almost has been regarded as innate and sacred.

Locke is the great apostle of rationalism - in the broad sense - he insists upon reason as based on experience as its materials. Innate ideas are a refuge for superstition.

In Bk. II. is an account of how our ideas come into the mind. All kn. comes from experiences. Exp. is of two kinds outer sensation of the external world, and inner, or reflection. Thus he acknowledges the real world. The sensible qualities, as hard, soft, sweet, yellow, etc. and the means by which we get these is sensation. The ideas of thinking, feeling, willing, hurting, etc. come from reflection. We might call this internal sensation. So sensation and reflection are the two sources of kn. From these sources we get the materials of kn. We get the simple sensations from them. But we can combine these simple elements, and thus we get complex ideas. But the original materials, simple sensations, all come from sensation, they are given. Yet we may combine these in any way we choose. Yet it must work always with the simple ideas as materials.

Hist. of Phil. Mch. 11, 1908

Locke - Essay Concerning the Human Understanding.
 "The Reasonableness of Christianity".
 "Thoughts on Education".
 "Commentary on St. Paul".
 "Three Letters on Toleration".
 "Conduct of the Human Understanding".
 "Considerations on the Interest on Money".
 "Two Treatises on Government".

His attitude to theology and religion. He believed in simplifying things. In religion he gives the essentials. These are: The existence of God which can be demonstrated from the conception of causality. It is yet supposed that the existence of God can be proved demonstrably. He approaches Christianity from the rational point of view. But he is not a thoro-going rationalist, however. There are things above reason, things we believe in them by faith. These are yet not contrary to reason. The scriptures must be believed because of their rationality.

L. tries to show that Christianity is essentially reasonable. The Deist says there is nothing in it but what reason will permit.
 Lockes Political Theories, in the Two Treatises on Gov't. In these he gives the theories which were held in Eng. at the time of their publication 1690. The will of the people is supreme. The sovereign is held responsible to the will of the Patriarcha. This tried to justify the divine right of Kings. He founds it upon Scripture. Adam had right from God to govern his descendants. So from this the patriarch becomes the man of authority. Then Kings occupy a position like that of the patriarch. Locke takes up this theory and studies it in detail. He finds no reason to believe that God gave any such right to Adam, and if He did we could not prove the Kings descent from Adam. Also the Father has no right over his children when the children have attained maturity. Also the Father has no more rights than the Mother over the children.

In the second Treatise he comes to his own theory. He finds gov't like Hobbes on the social contract and the "state of nature", H. said there was no law in the state of nature except the law of one's own wish. But Locke finds in the state of nature a law of nature - men found there are rational beings, so they will be guided by in right and wrong by their reason. There would be rights and duties even in the state of nature.

L. differs from H. again. H. said that the contract was made between the other fellow on the condition that the other do likewise. But w. L. the contract is between the citizens as a body and the sovereign. So the sovereign is bound as a party to the contract. He must keep in view the good of the people. There is to be besides the executive, a legislative power. This is composed of representatives elected by the people. The King carries out these laws when made by the reps. of the people. But men have "certain inalienable rights", as, right to live, and possess property. He has a right to the fruits of his labor. He, the citizen, does not surrender these

rights when he goes into the contract. Naturally, man is subject to reason, civilly, man is subject to laws made by the legislative power which has been erected. No one is subject to the arbitrary will of any man. To be free is to live under law in society.

L. emphasizes the necessity of dividing the dept's of gov't. Thus, the executive should have no part in the making of the laws. The executive and legislative sides should be kept separate. The judicial belongs to the executive. There is another function - the federative - which has to do with war and peace, and foreign affairs generally.

The point in Locke's discussion is the insistence on the individual's rights, and the limits placed on the rights of gov't. He does not believe in too much gov't- has rights which he never gives up. Insists on liberty and equality before the law. He differs from Hobbes who dreads conflict about anything else. Locke, however, tries to secure the freedom of the subject. When a revolution is necessary the people must appeal to arms, and drive out the sovereign.

All this is common sense to us, But Locke is great because he anticipated the principles which got universal acceptance. He knocked out the innate ideas, he busted the scolasticism in religion. He insisted on reason in everything. It is Locke's doctrines which worked such changes in France in later years.

See Leslie Stephen. "History of English Thought in the 18th Century".

To pass to Geo. Berkeley, pron. Barkley. Born in Ireland, 1685. In 1700 he went to college for 13 yrs. at Dublin. Before 30 he came to London. Here he got into literary circles thru Swift. Pope speaks of him. He travelled many years on the continent. Came back to London and went into orders. He conceived the idea of coming to America to found a college for the education of the Indians. This college was to be built in the Bermudas.

He landed in Rhode Island and lived near Newport for 3 yrs. He had had gov't. promise of support, also had subscription. These went back on him and he had to go back to Ireland. He became Bishop of Bloque. He died 1763 after living a few months at Oxford.

See Fraser, A. C. "Life of Berkeley", for stories of his life.

In New England the Puritans feared him, but they admired him. He left money for Harvard and Yale Universities, the latter a Fellowship from the sale of his R.I. farm.

His Phil. Works

1709. "Essay toward a New Theory of Vision".

"Prins. Concerning Hum. Knowledge."

"Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous." These are the best prose in Phil. Hylas is matter, and Philonous is the mind lover.

"Alciphron."

"The Divine Visual Language Vindicated and Explained."

His last works is "Siris". This is a lot of phil. reasonings in which he modifies his subjectivism. See the life, and read the first 33 sections for they contain the gist of his phil.

Hist of Phil. Mich. 13, 1908.

Write a paper on Berkeley. The first 33 sections of the principles contain an outline of his philosophy. Write the argument.

See Fraser: Selections from Berkeley.

Berkeley's system is called an idealism. But if it is so, we must call it a subjective idealism. That is the world exists only as it is perceived in the minds of indiv. minds. He denies the independent existence of the external world. His motive is theological. He is disturbed by materialistic explanations of things since Newton's mechanical explanation. He thinks materialism is turning men's minds from

God. Now, what is matter? It has been assumed as external, independent, and existing for itself.

Matter is nothing apart from the mind which perceives it. Apart from the mind things do not exist. Locke came near to the theory but did not accept it. Thus with kn. as agreement, and things as complexes of impressions, he could easily have gone on to the Berkeleyan idealism. Locke even could find no valid proof of the independent existence. What we know of a thing is qualities but these are ideas. So Berkeley carries out L's theories further than L. had done. So he can say there is substratum, which L. did not give up.

What we know comes from sensation, and thence thru ideas, or through memory or imagination. All our kn. is made up of ideas. So a thing is simply a bundle of ideas. I get sensation, certain of these accompany each other, and get called by one name. This ensemble of sensations is, when represented in the mind as ideas, what we mean by a thing. Locke speaks of the same thing, but he holds to the substance in which qualities in here.

Yet for B. there is left the mind. Aside from the ideas there must be something which is not an idea, which has the ideas. How do we get the idea of the self if all our kn. comes from exp. There is a way of knowing different from knowing thru ideas. The self is an active thing. We do not think that anything objective corresponds to our feelings, hopes, fears, so the sensations cannot exist otherwise than in the mind which perceives them.

If I say the table exists, I mean that I perceive it. There is nothing existing which is inert, dead. To be is to be perceived. *Esse est percipi*. The essence of things consists in their being perceived. You cannot attach any meaning to matter as dead, inert. To exist apart from mind is a contradiction in terms. If matter is lifeless, what meaning can you give to the term.

I never know an object except as perceived, except in relation to mind. Concrete exp. always shows things in relation to mind. We can abstractly think of extension without color, but what I know is the relation of things to my mind. The tendency to abstraction is what makes us think that things exist independently.

Again the distinction between the secondary and primary qualities will not hold. You can't separate form from color. Where the secondary qualities are, there must be also the primary qualities.

His common sense argument. Only philosophers would miss anything if matter did not exist. They say we must have a material world behind our ideas. We directly know only our ideas but as a cause for our ideas we posit the external world. This is the theory of representative kn. But grant the existence of matter, and if it is lifeless, how can it cause anything? Even if matter explains sensation, and brain processer, that does not show what is the cause as the existence of ideas.

But there must be a reality to which our ideas correspond. But you don't know whether they do correspond or not. All you can know is your own ideas. If there were external bodies we could never come to know it, and if there were not we would have the same cause for thinking it as we do now.

These are the arguments which B. uses to combat the theory of the independently existing world. He appeals primarily to experience. What we know is our ideas. The material world never gets into our experience. By a thing we mean a group of perceptions. If we think this away we get into abstractions. Existence without life, is parroting words. *Esse est percipi*. Primary and secondary qualities are identical. If there is an external, we can never know it and it is of no use to us. It could form no part of experience. The principles of explanation of exp. must be immanent in exp.

Berkeley says that his theory is that of the plain man. That is, which I see and hear and touch. Yet the phil. says that there is a something upon which exp. rests.

What follows from *esse est percipi*? B.e.'s thinking of the indiv. mind. But see section 6, for a further suggestion. The whole world as ensemble could not exist apart from a mind. So he gets to the notion of an eternal spirit. Matter apart from mind is unintelligible. But he seems to mean only finite minds. When I do not see a thing either it does not exist, or it exists in the infinite mind. This is worked out in his later work called "Siris". Here he gets an objective idealism. His early work was subjective idealism. Later he modified it materially.

The cause of our perception is spirit, infinite spirit, or God. God is the direct cause of all our perceptions. Thus matter is the *tertium quid* which we can get rid of by saying God gives us ideas directly.

History of Philosophy March 23, 1903.

Hume

"A Treatise of Human Nature".

"Dialogue on Natural Religion".

"Essays".

"Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding."

"Inquiry Concerning Principles of Morals".

Hume is the representative in mod. Phil. of thoro-going scepticism. All we can know is exp. and exp. consists of impressions and ideas. The only principles of knowledge are those of the association of ideas. We know nothing of any substances. Locke and Descartes had three subs. Berkeley got rid of one. Hume is more thoro-going and gets rid of all. Our stock of kn. is our ideas. These are impressions and ideas. The first are the originals of the ideas. They are just what is first in the mind and has no reference to their origin. Of the origin we can know nothing, whether from the mind itself, from God, or anywhere else. We just have them and must deal only with them.

But we can ask how are they related? We find that the idea is always a copy of an impression. So if we do not have the impression we do not have any copy, or ideas. All our simple ideas are copies of impressions. These are distinguished only by the force and vivacity. The idea is exactly a copy of an impression but is more forceful, vivid, or lively. So memory is more vivid than the imagination. So when ideas or images are vivid we mistake them for impressions or memories.

If 2 impressions are distinguishable they are different, i.e., separate. So in their essential nature they have nothing to do with each other. They have separate individual existence, just as atoms. Each is itself; they are loose and disjoined from each other. Then how do they get joined? What is the prin. of connection. How can we even go from one exp. to another? How do we infer. from one experience another experience? H. examines a number of relations. 1. relations bet. ideas. 2. Those which connect matters of fact. Notions of the circle are relations of ideas. Math. gives us relations of ideas. Cause and effect deals with relations of matters of fact. From impressions of sense we infer other impressions. That is we here go on the prin. of cause and effect. Reason by causation gives us relations of fact. The prin. of resemblance will not carry us beyond the present impression. But the prin. of cause will lead us to the understanding of another exp. Causality is what carries us to other effects, from the facts which are now present. So causality is a prin. of connection. Causality is the great problem for Hume. H. finds contiguity. Constant conjunction bet. cause and effects. A. and B are always found together. But if we say A produces B. then where do we get the idea of production? For every idea must have a previous impression. We see effect follow cause, but we do not see the agency, the potency, which produces the effect.

But there is more than contiguity and constant conjunction. There is an idea of necessary connection. The effect must follow the cause. So what is the source of the idea of necessity here. There is no objective necessity. A and B furnish no

idea of connection in themselves. We moreover do not think they must go together until we have seen them together a number of times. The idea of necessary connection is a subjective fiction. It is a necessity of the habit of the mind.

In detail, we have an impression of .. We think immediately of a cause of .. which we may call .. It means simply that the .. is so forceful that we believe in it. He is thinking always in terms of psychological content. Belief is a lively idea which is associated with a present impression. But where does .. get its force and liveliness? The idea which has force is ipso facto believed in. We have had A and .. connected in our exp. many times. So that by association : gets some of the force which belongs to A. So religious relics actually present to us help to strengthen our belief. All the early philosophers define truth as (psych. clearness) intensity of the idea, and it depends upon the atomic theory of exp. Now we insist more upon the connectedness of ideas as the def. of truth.

For Hume, reasoning is a species of feeling, the ideas have great force and liveliness. So cause means a vivid connection of vivid ideas. These are the facts of reasoning. But it is merely psychological. Because they are vivid in feeling, there is no warrant for objective judgment of connection. For Hume of course, with his ideas as "distinct" there is no need for logical connections. H. makes all connections matters of subjective grounds. There is no warrant for any logical connection among things.

Is there no warrant for the prin. of the uniformity of nature? No, says Hume, so far as any logical prins. are concerned, they may not be connected in nature. So with H. connection is merely subjective.

All proofs of causation, says Hume, have begged the question. In all of them the prin. of cause is assumed. So they are *petitio principii*. But where do we get the idea of causation? From the constant conjunction in experience we put up a subjective fiction. H. goes on to show (Part. IV and VII.) that personal identity does not work. But from what impression is the idea of the self derived? This is his great argument for all things. H. says he can't find the self.

Mich 25, 1908.

Hume's doctrine of personal identity. There is no personal identity to be found in experience. Nothing can be found out perceptions, love, hate, pain, pleasure, etc. H. personally, can find no self or soul. So the soul is nothing but a bundle of perceptions which succeed each other. The mind is a theatre where perceptions are always passing. There is no simple substance, as the scholastic thinks. We cannot think of a place, or a substance in which the soul or perceptions in here. He finds as the psychologist of today only a succession of states. The indiv. is nothing more than this passing bundle of states. But the psych. of today does not say that that is all that can be said of the soul. But to treat the mind as a stream of states is all that concerns the psychologist, he leaves the question of soul open. Yet some psychs. claim that there must be some permanent self to explain the psychic phenomena. H. cannot find the self, can find only sensations, passions, etc. so the idea of the soul is illegitimate. Since the idea of the soul is a fiction, just as the idea of causality is a fiction, Hume proceeds to explain it. We get the idea from the habit of identifying certain sensations with certain objects. But the object is not the same for two different experiences. So we identify our experiences with a certain supposed experiencing subject. But he says, Show me the self. And it is not to be found.

Here we are introduced to an important metaphysical problem. The soul cannot be regarded as a ont thing among the multiplicity, but it must be thought of as a universal, as including the particulars. It is thus independent of space and time. We cannot think of soul as substance, but must regard it as rather subject, that which as a universal principle, remains unchanged throughout the changes of the parts.

So we may take a living organism. If we break it up we cannot find the principle of life in any particular place. But it is that yet which maintains the unity among the parts. So we see that the nature of a universal is such that it cannot be thought of as a thing among other things. We have to regard that after all as real which is yet ideal.

We must think of God as the identity which persists through change. And here would be the objection to such a theory as Hume's. H. has only particulars - and he looks for the self, or God, as particulars. This however, will never explain the interrelatedness of experience, nor will it ever give any explanation except on the mechanical principle of explanation. There must be a logical warrant for belief, cause, identity, etc. So Hume is as thoroly sceptical as the early sceptics.

As a diplomat, historian, etc. he had as he confessed, to act as if things were thus and so. He did not as Kant afterward did, distinguish between the quid facti, and the quid juris. He had to live as others and believe as others, but on logical grounds there is no reason for one belief more than another.

H.'s phil. of religion and his ethics cannot be understood apart from the history of thought in England. Hume is the destroyer of rationalism in religion. Religious thought of this time is called Deism. These are the rationalists in religion.

Lorde Herbert of Cherbury about this time, finds that the fundamental basis of religion is ethical. And that the justification of religion is in making it conform to reason. Toland, Anthony Collins, Matt. Tindol, T. Chubb; Thos. Morgan, all these given in Leslie Stephens. "Eng. Thots in 18th Century." These men seek for a few principles of reason upon which theology must be based. These are the Deists. The principles of reason are all demonstrable, so religion is fundamentally rational.

History of Philosophy, Apr. 8, 1908.

The tradition which succeeded Hume. His empirical principles were retained, but his scepticism. First, the Mills, Bain, etc., were the authors, and their school is called the Associationalist school. They attempt to explain all kn. on the basis of the association of ideas, Their complication, etc. They make nothing of the mind's fashioning of the materials of experiences: They are psychological.

Along with this school grew up the Scottish school, which insists upon the common sense view, retains certain innate ideas, etc. They insist upon the limitations of the powers of the mind, as is given in Pope's Essay on Man. There are questions which the human mind must not ask. Kn. begins with exp. which is limited. Yet they insist that here is a certainty in kn. and this must take the math. form. They were rationalist, insisting on reason always. All ideas must be traced to their impression for their validity. They did not have the Historic sense, i.e., they could not conceive of anything as growing. They insist on the mechanical explanation. They do not have faith in the more obscure and perhaps profound.

Hume in his Rel. works thinks to refute all Rel. both natural and revealed. His own view is not easily seen. His argument is bet. Demean, who represents the old Mysticism, Cleanthes, the Deist, and Philo, the one who most closely resembles H's own.

He reviews the arguments for the existence of God. The a priori argument, the ontological, the moral, etc. For the first, he has no use for he easily disposes of God as substance. For the physical argument, the argument from design gets most attention. This argument that the world as the work of a rational being, strains, as H. says the analogy to the work of man; as a watch maker. This would prove God as Kant says not a creator, but only the architect, who did the best he could with the materials at hand. Again the imperfections of the world argue against it. Again, thought is only one of the phenomena of the world, then why say the world is the product of thought. We might better say that the world is an animal with an active principle.

His essay "On a Particular Providence and a Future State" takes up the moral argument. This is an absolutely fair and open investigation in the grounds of belief in Providence. His conclusion is Agnosticism.

His "Essay on Miracles" received the most attention. He does not discuss the a priori possibility of God and the future state. They may be possible so far as we know. Hume removes the question from the realm of possibility a priori. He does not argue from the position of logic, but considers it as a question of fact. And in questions of fact men have been mistaken, and their evidence is always uncritical. We have never made a complete induction, and it is as easy to show human mistakes as to give valid evidence of miracle. It is more probable that our observation of uniformity has been mistaken, than that a miracle has occurred. It is easy to make out a case against Hume, with his doctrine of causation, which has no logical basis, and under which anything might happen.

Again, any miraculous event may be due to some unknown law of nature. So on this ground it is not valid to say that a thing may occur. But yet it must be shown that an event which interferes with the laws of nature has happened, whether it could happen or not. Of course, our laws are not ultimate and final, they must perhaps be changed, but this has no relation to the doctrine of miracle.

If we retain our sanity we cannot believe in miracles, for that would reduce the world to irrationality, and this would be postulated an irrational mind. So far as a priori evidence is concerned, no one who thinks at all can believe in miracles.

When it is made a question of fact, the question of evidence must be investigated. How much evidence do we need for belief in miracles or anything else?

Hume's "Natural Hist. of Religion" is important. Here he shows the genesis of religion - that religion does not rest on logical grounds, but arises from certain psychological conditions. He shows that religion grows up in our feelings, fears, emotions, desires, rather than from reason. The early form of religion is always polytheistic and arises from psychological conditions. Men create the Gods from their fear of the future. From polytheism, one God becomes the most important and receives the universality. In many respects polytheism is better, for in their local character they are closer to the indiv. than a universal God.

Hume destroys the Deistic conception. The Deists had reduced rel. to its minimum, of God, morality, and immortality. He pushed farther to thoro-going scepticism.

Apr. 8, 1908

To pass to the French Illumination. This is a great movement, as culminating in the Revolution, but philosophically it is a minor period. Except for Rousseau they gave no new ideas. They simply carried English ideas to their logical extreme in practical matters. All was enthusiasm for reform they attempt to put in practice all ideas of progress, development. Man is not by nature bad. What is bad comes from external sources. So gov't. etc. must be so changed as to give man an opportunity to make of himself all that his nature intended in him.

This mov't is dogmatic in that it assumes that the rational Philosopher has all the kn. necessary in a few formulae. The problem is to apply these. Their principles are taken bodily from England. Voltaire and Montesquieu both lived in Eng. in their youth. Montesquieu, "Esprit de Lois" shows him leaning toward politics. He bases everything on the political theories of Locke. But he realizes that the historical spirit must be recognised, i.e., he sees that laws and gov't grow.

Voltaire is better known for he is more versatile, is a broader mind. He spends all his energies in behalf of humanity. He is therefore of the old order, of church and state, of oppression and bigotry. (There are evidences of littleness and meanness in him.) Yet in a large way he does stand as the champion of freedom. He makes basis on the Newtonian philosophy. Newton (Principia) completes the mechanical construction of the celestial world. Before, men had thought that dif. principle applied to the upper world. But as Newton showed that the phenomena of both worlds

are subject to the same laws and principles, the whole world was brought under the mechanical scheme. This machine was made and run by God. But he seems to hold that the machine is not perfect, for it contains elements which must be eternally reinvigorated by God. It was this scheme which Voltaire presented to the French. He wrote also "Letters on the English" and "Philosophical Dictionary", He creates nothing; but writes always of phil. ideas.

He refers finally always to the phil. of Locke. But he does not like Locke's dualism. He regards matter as perhaps capable of thought and is happy to find the suggestion in Locke. He proves God as the builder of the world and the immortality is a postulate of morality. If God did not exist we should have to invent him. Early, he was optimistic, but of the Lisbon Earthquake, and other catastrophes he backs out on the optimism. He finds the only safe position is Manicheanism. God is not omnipotent; there are evil principles in the world. He is sympathetic with the French reformation, but so in an intellectual sense. He is above all, and tries to be clear headed. He condemns everything which is mystical and hopes for salvation through intellect. He is an intellectual aristocrat, and has no use for a philosophy as good for ignorant people.

Contemporaneous with V. there are other Frenchmen who carry out Locke's sensationalism to its logical extreme, i.e., materialism. Of these the first is La Mettrie who writes "L'Homme Machine". Descartes had given us a machine, but he had a duality, so it is attempted to show that the basis of life, consciousness is in the conditions of the body. For him the mechanical principles are explanatory of the whole world.

Later were two more important men: Condillac and Helvetiars. The First is great in Psychology. His first principle is that all comes from sensation. Even the higher forms of judgment etc. are refined sensations. Locke held these as "operations" of the mind, but Condillac shows that these higher powers may arise from the mere presence of sensations. He takes the example of a statute which has only one sense - smell, later others arise, so that when touch comes, it for the first time becomes conscious of the ext. world.

Helvetiars is concerned in the practical experiences of men. Everything is reduced to pl-pn. All acts are egoistic - seek what will give pl. or avoid what will give pain.

The best work of the period is that of Von Holbach "System de la Nature". This is an absolute naturalism and materialism, and is a result of the sensationalist doctrine. Diderot and others helped to write it. It is a diatribe against the old order. Its bete voir is the appeal to spiritual causes. There is nothing dead. Matter and motion account for all that is. Spirit is the result of certain motions in the brain, just as life arises from the assimilation of food. Diety is natural - it is a question of prudence and foresight. He is naturalistic entirely. He is eternally "agin" the spiritual interpretation of anything. All Spiritualism leads to superstition and fear. Materialism removes all these evils. It gives men time to think of their affairs in this world. The gods are the invention of the priests who wish to keep men in ignorance and subjection. As the Deists destroyed Positive religion as represented by the church, and Holbach would destroy natural religion as represented by the Deists. The whole movement is narrow and dogmatic, has no use for anything but "clear ideas".

For this movement see John Morley's "Voltaire", "Diderot" etc.

Hist of Phil. April 13, 1908.

The best work of the last 1/3 of the 18th Century was the Encyclopaedia (1751-1752). - the editor was Diderot assisted by Delambert. The idea was taken from Bacon's idea - All the advanced authors of the day were contributors to it, but they were all French, Helvetiars, Diderot, Delambert, Condorcet, etc. He (Diderot) was at first a naturalist, and degenerated into a thoro-going materialism. These contributed

nothing to the Hist. of Phil. but they did much to disseminate the new learning.

Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1712-78. He belongs to the new mov't, rather than to the 18th cent. He is the precursor of a new mov't. The first mov't. was belief in ideas, enlightenment, belief in perfectibility of humanity so that all is needed is an opportunity to develop. The evil and restraint comes from the institutions. Man is naturally good and the institutions responsible for the evil. The enlightenment brings evils: what is good comes rather thro the feelings. He insists on the "Return to Nature", i.e., the life within the elementary feelings. Not by clear ideas as was maintained by the enlightenment but in the practice of the homely virtues, the regard for the simple emotions.

R's personal history is remarkable. Born in Geneva, and after a vagabond life went to Paris, where he supported himself by copying music. He began his lit. career by a prize essay, which he proposed to the "Academy de Digon". He takes the position that progress makes men worse rather than better.

Later he writes a Discourse on the inequalities among Men". Man is by nature good. Society has ruined him. The life of nature is the life of the simple passions. Egoism is not a natural idea, but comes when man reflects. When we live by instinct, we are living the life designed by nature. The "amor propre" is a product of reason. The enlightenment has to acknowledge the amor propre as the principle of human action. But if we go back beyond the state of reason to the life of instinct we find that the life of instinct is altruistic. Civilization has brought the evils, as property, which makes the luxury of wealth and the misery of poverty. The care for these evils is the Return to nature.

In the Social Contract 1762, He finishes his arraignment of all gov't. Yet he is more rational than in the earlier essays. He recognises that we cannot return to nature, we must have gov't. He gives the germ of the modern ideas of gov't. In the 18th cent. the indiv. was regarded as the logically prior element. The state is the aggregation of these indiv. But R. makes the indiv. secondary to the state. With Aristotle, he recognises that the universal is prior to the indiv. The whole is an end in itself and is necessary to the completeness of the indiv. He finds that in the state of nature there are necessary evils. And that these evils will drive men to a social contract. He differs from Hobbes and Locke. The indiv. does not transfer his rights to the sovereign (Hobbes) nor to the legislative body (Locke). What he means is that the indiv. surrenders to the sovereign people, i.e., the spiritual organization of the whole peopel. The indiv. is at once a subject and a sovereign. This unity of the people takes the place of H's sovereign but it is yet absolute. The indiv. is completely subject to the state. But they have representatives only for a limited time. The state must be so small as to permit the whole people to meet, and in this case the will of the whole people is final.

R. approaches the organic conception of the state. He thinks of the state a unity, not as an aggregate but the general will. This is not a sum of the indiv. will but is a universal idea which is prior to the wills of the indiv.

This is all mysticism to the wisdom of the 18th cent. They would ask, show me the general will. But there is an ideal unity, which the people all want, but which they are not able to recognise.

In Education and in Religion he preaches a revolt against the enlightenment. He here insists on education according to nature. Allow the children to grow up spontaneously, after his own instincts. His own interest will show the direction in which he should be educated. As in the "Emile", the individuality must develop naturally. The individuality must be respected.

R. is correct in that he insists on the instincts and emotions, as we would say today the, interests.

In religion, he is essentially a Deist. He believes in a God, immortality, but with Voltaire, he believes also in an evil principle. But as the Deists insisted

on the reason, R. puts emphasis on the emotions. Faith is spontaneous and is as natural. We believe in God before we attempt to prove his existence. He looks upon the church theories as immoral, as giving God attributes of cruelty, etc. He points out what later becomes clear in Kant, that the doctrines of religion are not to be proved, but are postulates of the practical reason, arising from the interests and feelings of the indiv.

To the enlightenment R. was looked upon as all sorts of fools, but he held out after the enlightenment had gone down.

R. brings the social question to the fore.

Apr. 15, 1908.

For some time we have been dealing with a popular phil.

The best book on Eng. thought in the 18th cent. is Leslie Stephen's "History of Eng. Thought, and his Book on Eng. Utilitarians.

On the French phil. see John Morley, for Voltaire, Diderot and the Encyclopaedists, and Rousseau. This is valuable as literary reading.

We turn now to German phil. So far we have seen only Leibniz. The German phil. is a product of the latter half of the 17th and the 18th cents. From Leibniz to Kant is more than half a century. This is referred to as the Enlightenment. (Aufklarung). Up to this time England had lead the way. But now Germany takes the lead and it takes a different turn. The enlightenment was an eclecticism, which was a complex of rational ideas of Leibniz, and empirical ideas from Locke.

Christ Thomasius was a common sense, superficial phil. of the Enlightenment. He first used the Ger. lang. and estab. the first learned periodical.

Wolff, 1679. Prof. at Halle was a popularizer and systematizer of the Leibnizian phil. He adds nothing to the hist. of phil. but was a great disseminator. His phil. was adopted by Protestant universities. Lessing and Kant were taught Wolff. Wolff came in conflict with pietism. This insists that religion is an affair of the heart rather than of reason. Pietism thru the King of Prussia banished Wolff. But Fred. the Great recalled Wolff from Marbourgh where he had taken refuge. W. lectured at Halle where he died in 1754.

It is Wolff's phil. which Kant calls dogmatism. His phil. is Leibniz's system with the speculation removed in the interest of system. He gives up the monad but insists on the indiv. Pre-Est. Hor. means nothing except in case of mind and body.

The law of identity is fundamental and from it the law of contradiction is derived. This is taken from Aristotle who insisted that consistency is the principle of nature or experience. The prin. of identity with L. is the law of logical deductio. But there are other facts of experience which will not reduce to the law of identity. The empirical law of causality is such a law. This is necessary through the law of sufficient reason.

Wolff uses both laws, i.e., of identity and of sufficient reason, to construct two parallel series of sciences. In any one of these sciences one ought to be able to derive the content from the fundamental concepts, e.g., from the concept of soul, we should deduce its characters. He has a rational psychology here. Also he has an empirical psychology. He has thus a rational and an empirical physics. In the rational, he starts from concepts, and in the emp. he starts from exp. So there may be a rational and an emp. theology. We have a science only where we can use demonstration. A science is possible only when we have universal and necessary laws. And these laws must be a priori for exp. cannot show that these laws must be true. Exp. only says that we find such and such, not that it must be. The rational sciences are higher than the experimental. Deduction from concepts is the method of such a science. Thus from the necessities of thought we can deduce the principles of theology. Nature is a machine but one directed by God in the interest of man's hap. and

good.

Ultimately, everything is derived analytically. Thus in psychology, we start by analysis of soul, and we find from the analysis all the characters. All the attributes are necessarily deduced from the concept of soul.

Thus immortality may be deduced from the soul as simple. These prins. are universal and necessary because we deduce them from the concept. Empirically we get only particular propositions, i.e., this iron sinks in water.

There are other tendencies in the period of Enlightenment. Wolff was too formal so from the Eng. Phil. Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, gave Ger. thought new life. There came also a new aspect of thought. Hitherto study was all theoretical, or speculative. But the aesthetical element here enters, and Tetans proposes that emotion may be a dunamental division of mind along with the intellectual, and the volitional. This was brought out more definitely by Kant. These three discussions comes to us from Tetans and Kant.

There are many brilliant thinkers in this period, the greatest is Lessing, but he is not a phil. He combines the old rationalism with the new historical view, that development is fundamental. He is teleological, as a thought of Providence guiding the race to its perfection.

We come now to Kant. Born in Kovigsberg in 1724. Was the son of a poor sadler. But thru the interest of a pietist preacher he was able to get an education. He grads. and tutors 9 years. He later comes to Kovigsberg as prof. where he teaches up to 1800 when he resigned and died in 1804. Kant was born and educated and spent his life in his own province. He was systematic in everything, even in his conversation and exercise.

He lectured as privatdocent on math. phys. and phys. geog. and was perhaps the first to give lectures of phys. geog. He got this kn. from conversation and reading travels. The best book on Kant is by Paulsen. Im. Kant, his life and phil.

Hist. of Phil. Apr. 17, 1908.

Fr. Paulsen: Im. Kant: Hist. Life & Doctrine

W. Wallace: Kant (Blackwood's Phil. Class)

J. Watson: Selections from Kant.

J.H. Stirling: Text Book to Kant

Max Muller: Translation of Kritik.

Abbott: Kant's Ethics.

Bernard: Kant's "Kritik der Ur." (trans.)

Kant began to teach in the Univ. in 1755. The Critik of Pure Reason. 1781. Critik of Practical Reason. Critik of Judgment. The Prolegomena is a popular version of the Kritik. Before the period beginning in 1781, was the pre-critical period. There are many investigations showing that he was never dogmatic. Secondly, Hume influenced him to scepticism. His "Dreams of a Ghost-Seer" is sceptical refutation of Swedenborg. He turns from this ghost-seer to the other ghost-seer - the metaphysician. In 1770, with the "Inaugural Dissertation" beguise the critical period. He makes the distinction between the sensible and intelligible worlds. Also here he regards space and time as forms under which we perceive the world. They are not real. But over against this is the intelligible world of things - in themselves, which the senses cannot touch.

The Critik (11 yrs. later) he says reason can tell us nothing about the intelligible world. The only world we can know is the world of phenomena or the space - time world - the world of possible perception. But we are obliged to believe in the existence of the intelligible world.

We have given the negative side of K's phil. It tells of the limits of kn. He says we can know nothing about transcendants objects. Wolff had Rational, Psych. Rational Cosmology, and Rational Theology. These treat of the soul, the world, and God. But these, says Kant, are pretended sciences, for they go beyond the range of

possible experience. Kant may be thus described negatively; that may have been his purpose to show the limits of kn. But he says his purpose is to throw over pretended knowledge, in the interest of rational faith. There is besides cognitive exp. another kind, practical experience. Positively he has done service by showing that certain experiences rest on a dif. basis to sci. kn.

The Critik:

1. Trans aesthetic - Perception
2. " Analytic - Understanding
3. " Dialectic - Reason.

Transcendental is different from transcendent which means beyond possible exp., i.e., God is a transcendent object. Transcendental, means certain elements in exp. which are necessary to it, but are not derived from any external source.

Leibniz's nisi ipse intellectus, is the basis of Kant's critical Phil. He means to inquire into the inner conditions of exp. and tries to show from the nature of mind how exp. is possible. There are two sources of exp. 1. The empirical kn. comes through sense, but (2) the mind contributes something to exp. So what elements in exp. come from the mind, what comes from the mind will be transcendental principles. Exp. is confirmed to certain prins. Of the mind, there are transcendental principles. He also calls it ia Critical Philosophy.

Aesthetic has nothing to do with the beautiful. But it applies to sense perception. What is there in sense that is transcendental? The obj. gives us the sensation but the mind gives us the forms of space and time, these are the transcendental elements.

But we do not have exp. except as we think. It is not thrust upon us, but we put it together and make a consistent whole of it. We do not have a chaos of impressions, but there is organization. This organization is due to our thinking impression into relations. Exp. must involve thought. The faculty that enables us to organize is the Understanding. This relates and interprets organizes, and arranges. It has certain plans of its own which K. calls categories. These represent points of view taken by the Understanding, as we compare things after their qualities, so quality is a category. Causality is another such category. The chief categories are quality, quantity, and Causality. Exp. is possible because we have these categories or points of view. The nature of the mind is such as it must take exp. under these for us.

Another faculty is Reason, and this faculty is a source of illusion. It attempts to go beyond all possible experience, and thus oversteps itself. The Dialectic is an attempt to find in what the Reason leads us astray. Kn. has two elements, 1. the activity of the mind, the form, and 2. sense. The reason tries to get on by the form alone, without any content. "Perceptions without conceptions are blind: but conceptions without perceptions are empty." Genuine Kn. is a combination of sense perception and thought. The mistake of reason is that it tries to get on by thought alone.

Hist. of Philosophy Apr. 20, 1908.

Schopenhauer. Lect. by Thilly.

p. Danzic, a son of a banker, and a novelist. His father was insane. He had been designed as a business man, but he did not like that. Studied at Berlin, science, Phil. and Buddhism. The men he studied were Plato and Kant. Became a privat docent and taught from 1820 to 1831. But he failed because he lectured on Hegel's hour and was obstinate. He left the Univ. and got not at the professors. He railed at fame but sought it to 1860.

- Works, "Fourfold Root of the Prin. of Sufficient Reason".
 "The World as Will and Idea" 1819- "The Will in Nature". 1836
 "The 2 Fundamental Probs. in Ethics". (1840). Wallace.
 K. Fischer. for Schopenhauer.
 Zimmern

He is a splendid writer, has a great style.

He thought himself a true child of Kant. Kant had taught that "the world of my idea", that it is only phenomenal. This pheom. world is known a priori because the mind arranges the world according to its own nature. We read the forms into the world.

Schopenhauer is a Kantian idealist. Schopenhauer has only one category or rather three, space, time and causality. But is the world only my idea? Kant says yes. But what is it? What is the true reality which appears to the mind. We don't know and can't know, says Kant. The real world is nominal, as that which appears, and that it exists is all I know. K. says it is timeless, spaceless, causeless. S. differs here from K. If I were only a knowing being I could not know the real, but by looking inward I see the true reality - a real thing in itself. I am directly cons. of the reality as my own will. All my desires, actives impulses, etc. is the original timeless spaceless causeless reality.

I become aware of myself as a phenomena also. I can by sense get a perception of myself as body but body is not real but phenomenal. And by inner view I get the real in myself as will. All reality is interpreted in terms of my own will and this is the type of the universe. I see the will in myself but in you I see only body.

The world is fundamentally will when I look at it from the pt of view of cognition we get an idealism but I find the real in will. This will gets expressed in bodies and we can argue from the body to the will.

In nature we find gradations. In the stone we see will as force, or in myself I see the same will but as conscious, gravitation, crystallization are forces analogous to what is in me will. In the vegetable kglm. we see will as striving. The tree top seeks the light, the root the ground. Potatoes in a cellar sprout toward the light. Climbing plants make efforts. In the animal, will decides the actions. The goat butts, because he wills to butt, and the will is prior to the horns. The will determines the organization of the body.

In the man will becomes self conscious. The will creates intellect as its servant, it is the light which shows the will the way. Will creates brain first (materialism?) no the will is behind the brain. This is the seat of the intellect. In man, the will becomes conscious. It is the instrument of preservation, i.e., the intellect, but the will is behind it. The will guides perception, memory, etc. We see what we want to see, etc. The will influences our judgement.

Going downward the persistent element is the will. Intelligence goes out first, in the child impulse is strong. In the animal intelligence goes out nearly but will remains. In the mineral kglm., there is no intellect.

But will is not intelligent God but is a blind force. It is the principle of individvation. It manifests itself in constant gradations, in immutable types, which is contrary to evolution, and with Plato he calls them Ideas. Types never change but indiv. die. The types form an ascending scale from mineral to man. Then will is the prin. of the world. The fundamental part of will is immortal. The form will change, but the will does not change.

Idealism and Voluntarism characterize his metaphysics.

Morally, he is pessimistic. The will is the cause of all the trouble in the world. The constant struggle shows the world be bad. In the world it is the nature of will to be bad. It is of the nature of desire to be painful. When I satisfy desire, there pops up another desire which is painful. Even death will not end the trouble for we will run the gauntlet again. Another cause of unhappiness is civilization which increases desire. Besides man looks before and after and has trouble in retrospect and in anticipation. Man has also the trouble of sympathy.

Besides, the world is bad. Man's aims cannot be more than create others like him. The world is full of murders, lies, etc. Virtues are simply attempts to get personal satisfaction.

If an act is done through sympathy, pity, or true altruism. Sympathy is behind all morality. But moral acts are few. The will is the source of all trouble. To get happiness we must negate the will. Thus we may do this in the pleasure of aesthetics. We may lose ourselves, forget our wants, and thus drown the will. The phil. may find pleasure in contemplation.

Also another way to overdo the will is to spend the time in pity for others. But the best way to get away from the will is thru asceticism. For this reason he likes the Catholic and the Buddhist religions. Poverty, chastity, obedience may give us escape from the will. The saintly life is free from desire and will, it ends in a quitive rather than a motive principle.

Hist. of Phil. Apr. 22, 1908.

Kant (We will take up Schopenhauer for discussion later). The "World as Will Idea" is translated; also his Essays. See W. Wallace "Schopenhauer", in the Great Writer Series.

There will be one more paper, and we may choose our subject.

The Critique of Pure Reason

- I. The Trans. Aesthetic (The world is given Sense-perception).
- II. The Trans. Analytic - Understanding
- III. The Trans. Dialectic. Reason

Transcendent goes beyond possible exp. Transcendental means the organizing principle within exp.

For Kant there are two elements of exp. They are sense-perception and the other the mental for ins. They are the material and the formal. This suggests Aristotle with his "eidos". Transcendental means necessary to exp. but not having its source in sense. Transcendental elements in sense-perception are space, time. These are the forms of our percept of exp.

In the Analytic he deals with the forms of the understanding, and thus finds the categories, quantity, quality, modality. We deal here with exp. as thought. In the aesthetic, he speaks as if we could have exp. merely thru sense.

Perception without Conception is blind; Conception without perception is empty. In the statement just quoted Kant combines the empirical with the rational points of view.

Understanding is the faculty of organizing exp. But reason is a faculty of illusion; it tries to go beyond exp. and interpret everything in terms of ideas. The Dialectic points out the fallacies of reason. But reason where properly employed can add something to exp.

Kant raises the question: What does the mind contribute to sense-exp? The ans. is space and time. They are thus subjective not objective. Proof. Space and time are not real as determinations of the object, but belong to the nature of the mind. Space and time are presuppositions of experience. Without these exp. is not possible. Space the form of external perception of objects. Time the form of all exp. Space is an a priori perception. Time is the universal persupposition, and space is likewise. We do not learn space and time by exp. for exp. presupposes space. Leibniz said our space-time representation is simply a confused conception. But Kant calls it a perception. A concept is a universal derived from many particulars. We have space as a whole. The parts are in it, not logically under it.

But Kant proves the ideality of space and time by mathematics. In math we can form synthetic judgments a priori. Math. is a perceptive science and in this science we form props. a priori, and also synthetic, i.e., we can't get the pred. by analysis of the subj. Nor does the props. depend on exp. Exp. can only tell us what is. It cannot give a universal proposition. But math. does give univ. judgments. Wolff had made math. analytic, that is it deals with identities. But for Kant math. judgments are synthetic, i.e., universal. A must be B. But how is this possible? Because I am not telling about objects in the world, for here I could say only I find it so. But math. says that its prins. must be so. So then I am determining the forms

or conditions of intuition, so space belongs to my mind.

Again I can make my math. calculations in the abstract and when I apply them, e.g., navigation, surveying, etc., I find the math. prins. confirmed. Another proof comes from the astronomies. When I try to think the world as in space, or space as a determination of objects, we get into contradictions. Thus we cannot think the world as either infinitely extended or as infinitely divisible. We cannot think the world as limited in space or in time. But we can overcome these puzzles if we put the problem rightly. We must say that the space and time are for us of mind and are not determinations of objects. What is said of space holds for time. Kant insists that he does not do away with space and time. They are empirically real, while transcendently ideal. Here comes the famous distinction between phenomena and things in themselves. Things as we know them and things as they are.

Hist. of Philosophy Apr. 24, 1908

Perception is the experience through sense perception. But there are added to these by the mind the forms of space, time, etc. By sense alone we get the chaotic manifold. The understanding puts order into the manifold. It is the function of synthesis by which things get together.

In the analytic we deal with the categories or principles by which the Understanding organizes the materials of sense. Thus we think of things under the form of qualities, quantities, cause, etc. These are merely for us which the mind follows. Categories are then mere principles of action for the mind.

Space and time are not categories for they are individual concepts of sense. But he here makes too strict a difference between perception and conception. He afterwards finds it necessary to make the distinction less sharp. Reason attempts to go beyond possible experience.

To come to the Trans. Analytic - The question is, What are the categories? What are the forms or principles upon which the ind. organizes the sense-impressions. He finds his clue in the table of judgments. Thinking is judging. Aristotle dealt with the forms of judgment. What we want is a criterion of the content of judgments. Aris. had qual. quan. modality, relation. Thus as to quality we have positive and negative.

Taking the table of four divisions Kant gets for each three categories.

Thus Quantity

Unity - one

Plurality - the indiv.

Totality - the many as one.

From Relation

A is A Substance.

A is B Cause and Effect

A is B or C Reciprocity.

From Modality (they are unimportant.)

The most important of these cats. are those of quan. qual. and Relation, the latter especially in science. Thus we regard the world as an aggregate of substances. Also we get things together by cause and effect. We also go on to reciprocally acting causes, as the world as made up of a number of reciprocally acting and reacting parts. This conception is evident in the conception of organism but K. thinks of it in the way of mechanical causation. His deduction of them is artificial, and the number of them is not necessarily 3 for each group. The cats. are the prins. with which the mind approaches exp. These forms are not isolated principles, but they all find their unity in the nature of the mind. They all find their unity in the Prin. of Self-Consciousness. They represent the way in which Self-cons. represents its relations to the world. They all represent the unity of Self. Cons. Ego, and so differs from Hume, but he does not believe in it as a substance after Locke and Descartes. It is not the Empirical self which Hume tries to find. Nor is it the psych. Self as the series of impressions, etc. It must be a unity. The representation of the Ego

must accompany the experience it is that which has the experiences. It is what he calls the Transcendental or synthetic unity of Self. Cons. or Apperception. My exp. are all mind. So there must be a something to which the exps. belong.

This Self, or Apperception is the presupposition of exp. - but it is not an element in exp. There must be a unity of exp. else there would be only a series of states, but you cannot find it in answer to the question "Show me". It is transcendental in that it is not given in, but presupposed for exp. Again, it is a universal principle. I am I throughout all my experience. But any fear anger, etc. is particular. It is universal as presupposed by exp. It is therefore independent of time. Again, K. regards the Self as impersonal. It is over and above the self if the self is thought of as exp. elements. It has the attributes of universality. It belongs to all rational beings. The self is universal as the basis of each and every rational personality, and unites us with our fellows. It is Emerson's Over-Soul.

This is not a psychological inquiry but we ask after the conditions of consciousness in general. We may call the Self the Principle of Rationality. So a truth for us as rational beings is a truth for all. The Self as the fundamental unity is the source of the Cats. it is the source and principle of knowledge, as of action also.

The Self is not a substance, nor a psych. series of states. This Prin. of Rationality is the foundation of Ethics and Religion. Man is a universal being, a person.

We have these two factors: the Subject and the Objective World of Phenomena. The two are bound up with each other, they are correlatives. We see the world in the light of the Self. The two must be known - together. This unity of thought makes a unity of the world.

The unity of self-cons. is not already achieved - it is possible only as we know the world as one. The unity of one demands the unity of the other, and neither has meaning as part from the other. There could be no world except as it is known in relation to our inner unity, which makes the world a unity. The two things are each the presupposition of the other.

The first criticism accused K of being a Berkeleyan idealism. How then do we get objectivity for Kant? The world of things-in-themselves can only be thought by us, we can never know it. The world we know is the world of phenomena. How does it get its objectivity? In its relatedness by universal and necessary laws. In a sense the ind. makes nature; but not yours or mine, but Understanding in general, it is intelligence, as such. So we get a world the same for everybody and is all the objectivity we need.

Hist. of Philosophy Apr. 26, 1908.

Kant's criticism of Hume is on the atomistic psychology. Hume regarded perception as distinct and separate impressions, but K. says that, although this is all true, yet the mind makes of the manifold a synthetic whole, and thus gets the manifold together. The means by which the manifold gets organized are the categories, and the organizing unity which does the work is the conscious self. The synthetic unity of apperception - it is the transcendental Ego. There is the empirical self which is the self at any moment, as compared of the whole of perceptive experience at any particular moment. The transcendental self is a universal principle in so far as all have the same general form of mind. The differences in the selves are to be found in the empirical self. Kant here makes the distinction too sharp between the two selves. This tendency is common to all his work.

The question of objectivity. It has been said in obj. to K. that he regard the understanding as producing nature. And he does talk as if the mind determines the object, instead of the mind conforming to the objects of nature. This could be criticized as Berkeleyan idealism. But he takes pains in the refutation of idealism to show that he does believe in the reality of the objective in nature. This the kn. of events in nature is the condition of the kn. of the self. Idealism (Berkeley's)

says that the world is the series of representations in some particular mind. But K. would say that that which is, is objectively real and is organized in nature. With this view, nature can be what is universally valid, that which is real for all rational beings. Yet it is still phenomenal objects and it known by all as the same. This universal law and realm of law as Science and is the result of cons. in general. It is not merely subjective but can be contrasted with anyone's knowledge. So that the objectively real of science is a point of reference for anyone's particular Kn. Yet K. keeps insisting on the two worlds which are separate. The conditions of mind seem to obscure the real thing and this real thing is the source of our impressions. It is the Ding an sich. Kant makes the difference bet. the form and matter of exp. This Ding an sich is that which furnishes the matter of exp. The mind itself gives the form. Here he is inconsistent in that he makes the Ding a cause operating within experience, whereas the Ding is according to himself, independent of the category of causality. The cats. apply only to the question of experience and if the Ding is out of exp. then the cat. cannot apply to the Ding. Yet we would have to say that there are things which are incapable of being perceived by the senses. The objects of thought are the phenomena, which cannot become objects of knowledge. An object may be an obj. of kn. if it hangs together with a phenomena in exp. even if we cannot perceive it by sense. Thus we have to say there is magnetic matter from the fact that it hangs together with experience, for we see it attract the iron filings. And if we had senses acute enough we could actually perceive it by sense. Thus that which is consistent with the system of knowledge is real. If it is consistent with our intelligence it is real, and this world of exp. is a world of law. All phenomena are thus connected with all others. Then the causa sui contradicts the conditions of our kn. But this only applies to the object of sci. of Kn. We may yet say that there is an obj. of thought which is free.

Hist. of Philosophy Apr. 28, 1908.

Kant.

A Phenomena is anything which may be given to us in sense; so if a thing has never been perceived, if it is so connected with what is given in exp. it is yet a phenomena, i.e., we may say that the other side of the moon is a possible object for us. Now there are things which tho they do not appear to us in sense or as a possibility of sense, are yet regarded as real, tho we may not hold them in the hand, as the soul, God, etc. which we call nonmena. The atom might be regarded as phenomenal for it is necessarily connected with experience. The nonmenon is a negative possibility derived from the concept of phenomenon.

Efficient and necessary causes. This comes to the question of what are the conditions of experience. Thus exp. like ours is possible when space and time belong to the mind. Again exp. like ours is possible thru the categories - the table of twelve for K. - and among these are those of cause and effect. That is nothing in exp. can be isolated, it is infinitely connected with everything else. So this chain of cause and effect is indefinite. There is no first cause nor any last effect. So this notion rules out all indetermination, all free will. For to be known implies determination by something else. This is the concept of nat. sci. which must regard the law of cause and effect as universally valid. So free will is in absolute contradiction to the absolute and universal law of science. But the way of science, is only one way of looking at the world, and it is conceivable and necessary another way of looking at it. Thus we may look at the world from the point of view of the intelligible world. We cannot say that the free will comes in at any point to modify the law for if it comes in at all, it is possible at any time to convert the world into an incalculable chaos. This is only a subterfuge and can never explain the question of free will. From the point of view of the Practical Reason we can justify free will, tho we can't demonstrate it.

So K. has replied in the Analytic to Hume that causality is a necessary category of the mind. There is an objectivity in exp. and that an objective system of kn. is possible. In the Dialectic K. tries to show that the old sciences of the supersensible are pseudo-sciences, and that they were off when they attempt a science of supersensible objects. For kn. implies that we have sensual perception of its object.

It is the understanding that operates in the sphere of possible kn. Thus with the question of space or of time we cannot get the world as a whole, for under these forms we get only an indefinite. So with cause we can't stop with A and say it is the first cause for a first cause is unthinkable. Reason is yet unsatisfied with this limit: so it imagines to itself complete systems, it asks for first causes, to know the world as a whole, etc. We want to know the soul as a unity, which we can't get from the soul states. But reason here is mixed up in illusion - the thoughts of Reason are here Ideas - objects which transcend all possible exp. Thus it seeks the Soul, God, the World, the Purpose of the World.

Kant has knocked out the Rational Psych. of Wolff. This psych. starts from the Soul as simple substance, and then tries to deduce from the concept the other qualities of soul. One of these qualities is Immortality and thus this phil. is scolasticism, as working in the interest of theology, (the fallacies here are Paralogisms) just as mediaeval phil. We can't take the soul as an object and here is the error of the Wolffians. All we know of soul is that it is a presupposed principle of experience.

So with the Wolffian cosmology. This takes the world as a definite object and finds and describes certain qualities of it. Here comes the antinomies of pure reason. In these (there are four) there is a thesis, and an antithesis, and both can be proved with equal conclusiveness, e.g. The world has a beginning in time and a limit in space; and again, the world has no beginning in time, nor no limits in space, and both propositions are proved. The solution: (They are proved by the arguments already hinted at). that is, we can't settle upon limits, nor can we be satisfied short of limits. The proofs of all them are simple and derived from the simple props. of logic. Solution: We get into this trouble by taking space and time as belonging to the world, whereas they don't. And we solve it by saying that space and time do not apply to the thesis or antithesis either. We must look to another view of the world.

Hist. of Phil. May 1, 1908.

Questions: What have you as students been doing? Been reading any on the assigned authors? Should read as we are giving the lectures, so that the lectures and the readings may supplement each other.

So Write an essay on Kant's Philosophy. Try to bring together the different aspects of the system.

Logically, Kant destroyed the old proofs of the existence of God. Men do not now look for a God whose existence is demonstrable - the definition of God has changed, we do not now say that we have the complete and perfect concept of God but we are trying to define what we mean by the ultimate reality. If we found that reality in the notion of force or matter we perhaps would not call it God.

As to the "What can I know, what should I do, and what may I hope?" then if we know little we ought to do little, and may hope little.

The antinomies of reason are conflicts of reason with itself. The first two relate to the space and time world. But if we remember that space and time apply only to the forms of the mind and not as belonging to the nature of things themselves. So both the antinomies are invalid because the space and time conception does not apply to the world at all.

The third antinomy relates to the question of freedom or determinism. There are four antinomies to correspond artificially to the four forms of judgment,

quantity, quality, relation, judgment. In the first two antinomies neither the thesis nor the antithesis is valid. But in the third, both freedom and determinism may be true. There is determination in the phenomenal world and there is freedom in the intelligible world. The will as an object of psychology is subject to the law of causation and is determined just as everything else. But from the other standpoint than natural law, we may look at the will as free, where the only law is the law of freedom. So there is a nonmenal world, where freedom is possible. But here we will not insist on this world of nonmena but will just leave the possibility of it open for other considerations. But the sharp distinction between the two worlds is unfortunate, and Kant certainly does not mean two worlds which are fundamentally different, but rather we may explain it as two different ways of looking at exp. For instance, we may take the view of natural science, which puts all objects over against the mind and considers them externally; again we may take the logical view and consider the significance of it in terms of life. In this case the "object" has ceased to be subject to the law of causation. It is a thing of worth, it has a meaning, and the only determination of them is in reference to my life - my inner self - which is independent of cause, space and time. It is a whole of meanings. A synthesis of purposes, and not a phenomenon, but yet is real. So things may be looked at from these two pts. of view, rather there must be these two points of view. The naturalistic way must regard life as under the law of causal determination.

The Rational Psychology. God cannot be a valid object of Kn. for such objects must be at least possible to perception. God is a transcendent concept.

The Proofs of God.

1. Ontological.
2. Cosmological.
3. Physico-theological, or Teleological.

None of these are valid, says Kant. The first argues from the thought or idea of God to the existence of God. It would not be a perfect idea if God did not exist. But the idea is that of the highest, most perfect being, so there must be an object corresponding.

But existence is not an ordinary predicate which can be got from the subj. by analysis. And the thought may be perfect without there existing any object corresponding. (As the example the idea of twenty dollars).

The second proof depends on running the causal series back to an uncaused cause. But there is no possibility of stopping at any particular member in the series. For our category of causation can apply only to the empirical world, then a first or transcendent cause would not be a cause.

The most respectable argument is that from deism; the teleological. But this argument could never show God as more than a contriver or an architect. Besides, it is taken from analogy to man, and this analogy will not hold. The world is not like a mechanism, for as Hume says it is also very like an animal or plant. So the analogy is not great enough to risk. Hume here is better than Kant.

History of Philosophy May 4, 1908.

The call for questions.

The paper is not an essay, but an attempt to put the notes in a manageable shape. The other essay may be written about Hume, Schopenhauer, Kant or anyone else, or a comparison of any two.

The thing in itself is that outside of exp. but somehow a condition of exp.

The nonmena is the possibility of another kind of knowledge, than comes to us thru the sense-perception. Here thing in se may be looked upon as a cause of sense-perception. But nonmena refers to another kind of reality - the realm of values, where, soul, God, etc. are objects.

The intelligible world is the world of thought or of values. Objects here are nonmena. In the Pure Reason, K. means only to vindicate the possibility of such a world. Its justification is left to the Practical Reason.

K. is fundamentally critical. But his system turns out an idealistic system. If the Law were Heteronomous, (other imposed from without, we might ask why should I obey the law. Even in case of God, we could ask why should I. And here this would put the question on a hypothetical basis. It would mean only Do it, or be punished. Or if we say society commands the duty we could here ask, why should I do it?

But as myself, the expression of my own nature, I must obey the moral law.

The question of freedom is settled on the moral ground. How is a categorical Imp. possible? So from the ought which I acknowledge, But this "ought" implies a "can". I ought therefore I can. Freedom is then a necessary presupposition of morality. I can be obliged to do only what I can do: and recognition of the obligation proves (practically) the freedom of the self or will. Not a theoretical proof but a practical postulate. My acknowledgement of the moral ought or obligation, presupposes (proves practically) the freedom of my will. But I cannot say "proves" for this term is valid only in theoretical considerations.

From these considerations K. arrives at the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. Thus: The Moral Law demands perfect fulfilment of the demands of the law. "Be ye therefore perfect". But perfection demands that we only approach it. We as finite beings cannot attain the perfection we can only indefinitely approach it. But the law commands the perfection unconditionally. So we must have the infinite time to attain the infinite task - i.e., we must as souls be immortal. Life as an indefinite progression is infinite.

K. proves God in a similar way. The moral law has nothing to do with hap. It just commands and we must obey. An act is not moral unless done in pure respect for the law, and against inclination. Yet the highest end of man must be the synthesis of virtue and hap. The good man must be happy. But how get them united. Only if we suppose a wise governor of the world. Hap. and perfection can only be brought together by the infinite God.

History of Philosophy May 6, 1908.

To finish Kant and criticise him.

The Ethics has been barely treated. His central question is what is the law of duty. From this follows (are practically assured to us) God, freedom, and immortality. They are assurances of faith, convictions of our moral life.

As to the content of the moral law. The universal ego is the source of the moral law, so the law is universally binding. Its content is its universality, it gives the form of all moral action, but does not give any concrete particulars. The law demands formal consistency with itself. We must act so that we can conceive the law as a universal law. Deceit could not be possibility, for general deceit would destroy the law. What we can will is the law as binding on all rational beings.

The formula is empty, but it is good as insisting on universality.

Again, we must regard humanity as an end in itself and never as a means. This does not define our duty specifically, but this notion of ends in themselves is certainly the condition of morality.

He also approaches a social conception in his doctrine of the Kgd. of ends. By this he means that the relations between persons are not spatial, or even economic, but moral. Our ends are the same and the common ideal make us persons associated for an ideal purpose. Here he approaches the social and teleological conception. These formulae are meant to give the content of ethics.

Kant's rigorism. The moral law prescribes unconditionally. The prevailing theory of morality was hedonism. That is, pleasure-pain was in the last resort fundamental to morality. It pays to be moral. This is the fundamental idea. There is much of truth in these ideas. Happiness as an end of morality is a strong argument. The teleological moralist belongs to the same school. For he expects pl. pn. either here or hereafter.

K. was early influenced by this hedonist conception. And his rigorism is perhaps a reaction against this, which he threw over along with English empiricism. An act may be externally right, i.e., legal, when it merely conforms, but it is moral

only when done out of respect for the law. And this law must be respected and followed even in the face of natural inclination - we must do what we don't want to do, if we be moral. It is thus an approach to asceticism. K. makes the Christian distinction of the law of the flesh and the law of the spirit. This asceticism comes out too boldly, but there is a good deal in the rigorism, witness the stress laid on conscience. K's early training, pietism, is largely responsible for his rigorism, but his revolt from English empiricism and hedonism.

It is perhaps not possible to say in detail what definite things ought to be done. But what we expect in the universal characters, or form, of the law. To apply the law requires judgment and experience.

Kant's objection to happiness is partly given up when he comes to prove God's existence. For Virtue or the highest good is not absolutely possible without some notion of happiness. But since we can't see any necessary connection between virtue and hap. yet there is or must be a synthesis of them. So a God is necessary to put virtue and happiness.

Yet in the early part of the treatise K. is insisting that hap. must not enter into our motives to action. Later he is looking at it from the point of view of the end. The change of point of view may remove the seeming inconsistency.

We perhaps universally demand with Socrates that nothing evil happen to the good man. But we may expect this from the constitution of things. Morality must be built on principles that are eternal, the universe must contain the ground of morality. From these premises Kant proves God's existence as an absolute guarantee of the unity of things.

Criticism -

Kant's tendency to make sharp divisions is an objection. But his own method is responsible for this, and the same method afterward destroys these very distinctions. He is always working back toward the fundamental assumptions.

A very sad distinction is between the Theoretical and the Practical Reason. The first is confined to objects given in perception. He only knows and this knowledge is very limited. As a Practical being he acts, does not simply know. Yet he has an assurance which, tho' safe, is not the same as his assurance in Theoretic affairs. But there cannot be this sharp distinction. Experience has the various sides, but no one side is utterly separate from the rest. Pragmatism lays too much stress on the practical - action is the test of truth.

In the theoretic, there has been a too sharp distinction among perception, Understanding, and Reason. But K. finds later that one without the other is not good. Again, he looks at the perception and Understanding as alone valid in results, while Reason is "illusory". But reason turns out to be valuable as a guide, it gives us "regulative principles".

Finally, there is the distinction bet. the phenomenal and the thing-in-itself. Yet he later breaks this distinction. Is there so sharp a distinction between objects of kn. and nonmena.

Hist. of Phil. May 8, 1908.

Kant has a strong tendency to make hard and fast distinctions, e.g., that between the sensible and intelligible worlds; phenomena and nonmena; the faculties of the mind as perception, understanding and reason: Pure reason and practical reason. (Practical reason is will, i.e., reason with regard to what we ought to do.)

Reason is illusory in the theoretical field, but it is heuristic, i.e., a guide in the practical field. Here it is the source of moral certainty; its deductions are legitimations. In the theoretical field reason attempts to transcend - seek the unconditioned.

But the distinction between reason, as the cognitive faculty, and will, is too sharp. Even knowing has its volitional aspect, we must will to attend, e.g.

We don't know cause and effect, etc., as objects. But the possibility of our knowing objects is that there are these conditions under which we must know them.

We know these as presuppositions, as shown by the transcendental proof. Similarly, he might say that we know God, freedom, etc., as presuppositions of morality. But he regards the two kinds as different kinds of certainty. It is evidence that the distinctions are too closely drawn. There is no separate field of will, or of cognition. Experience is an organism.

Again, the table of 12 cats. seems a system of separate factors, even when he says they all relate to the unity of the self-consciousness.

Later idealists try to show the mind and its various cats. in organic relations. The cats. merely show the mind in its different stages, or in its different evolutionary steps in its development.

The distinction between phenomena which we can know and reality which we cannot know. This is referable to the question of what is experience, what and where and how do things appear, and what does it mean to appear.

The real world is not made of the various phenomena just as they occur, but this world is full of contradictions and you must go on to a world where you find a unity which includes all. Our world will advance in complexity it develops continually. Where are we going to stop? K. seems to think that phenomena constitute a perfectly definite field of exp. But our interpretation and our knowledge translates and transmutes the phenomenal in such a way as to make another world. By our translation we may be compelled to accept a teleological view. How far must we go? Until we get the world intelligible. We will reinterpret the world until we can understand it, and as soon as one interpretation is found inadequate, we will use another. But it is the same world, and what we find, we find in it. If purpose or God is our category, then the world is explicable on them: if these cats. won't do we will use other

But it might be objected that cause, substance, etc. are presuppositions of exp. at all. That is, our cons. cannot get on theoretically without them.

K.'s phil. of criticism worked a great ferment in Germany. The Critique of Pure Reason is the greatest influence in German Idealism. The subsequent names are Fichte, Schelling; and Hegel. In literature there are also descendants of Kant as Schlegel, Novalis, etc.

We go on to Fichte. He is an enthusiastic reformer, full of moral earnestness, as well as logical capacity. John Gottlieb Fichte - son of a poor worker, of Scandinavia - descendent of a cast off soldier of Gustavus Adolphus. Was educated by a noble man. Left on his own resources, he went to tutoring and had a varied career. In this tutoring he attempted to teach Kant to a pupil. He had been a follower of Spinoza but an unwilling one, for he did not like the Spinozian determinism.

He wrote the Critique of all Revelation, specially for Kant. It was published without Fichte's name and passed as Kant's work. This book won for him the professorship at Jena. He was followed by Schelling and Hegel.

He got into trouble about religious affairs, with the administration. Fichte took very high ground, insisted on his freedom. Goethe as the secretary of the Duke tried to compose matters. He went to Berlin, where he delivered some addresses to the German Nation, on the question of notional unity and morality. This helped to bring on war again with Napoleon in which Fichte took part.

In 1810 the Berlin Univ. was established with F. as rector. Born 1762, died 1813. Fichte never wrote a definite and clear statement in a book. But the "Wissenschaftslehre", is best. There is the "Sittenlehre" and "Rechtslehre". Besides a number of more popular essays trans. by William Smith. "Vocation of Man" Open Court.

Hist. of phil. May 11, 1908.

On Fichte, and German Idealism Generally

Seth: From Kant to Hegel.

J. Royce: Spirit of Modern Philosophy.

R. Adamson: Fichte (Blackwoods.)

E. B. Talbot: The First Principle of Fichte's Phil.

Fichte: Vocation of Man. (trans. Open Court).

Essay on the Characteristics of the Present Age.

Fichte begins with the Pract. Phil. of K. which he thinks he completes and unifies. His attempt is to make phil. "all of one piece". Yet he modifies K. especially with the Ding an sich which he says K. himself never put much faith in it. Phil. cannot depend on the thing in itself. He insists on putting the forms and cats. of the mind into some unity. He will begin with the Transcendental Unity of Apperception, or the Conscious Self. From this all the facts of exp. should be deduced. The form of exp. and its matter cannot be separated. So our principles must explain both. Both must depend on the principle of the Ego. In the interest of unity we must see how the Pract. and the Pure reason are one. We must find the relation between them. He tries to bring them into relation. In a word he tries to show that experience is unitary. Only on this supposition can we get a system of Phil. otherwise we get only an aggregate of fragments.

Fichte thinks he is completing the Critical Phil. of K. He wished to systematize K. and unify him. In 1797, K. repudiated Fichte and insisted on his distinctions and his Ding an sich. After this F. ceases to refer to K. so often. The Spirit of Kant's work is wiser than the man himself, says F.

Fichte's place in Phil. depends on his relation to K.'s critique and his attempt to unify it. There are only two systems of Phil. says F. They are Idealism and Materialism. This latter is dogmatic for it goes outside the cons. to find the ultimate. There can be no system of Pluralism, for if there are two prins. we have to say how they are related. One must depend on the other or both upon a third. So Phil. must be a monism, ultimately. Materialism explains the world by taking the Non-Ego, Idealism, the Ego. Neither can refute the other. If we begin with one we can't go to the other, for they are not relatable. The kind of phil. we choose depends on what kind of man we are. The idealist is the one that lays the emphasis on the felt dignity of the self. Materialism can't explain the world for it breaks down. But Idealism can explain the whole. His prin. is the Ego, the Unity of Apperception; which he makes universal. From this prin. comes not only the cats. as the forms, but also the matter of exp. He often speaks of it as the Absolute Ego, as an Om indiv. Ego, which manifests itself thru the indiv. Each indiv. has within him the prin. of the Abs. Ego.

The Ego posits itself. Reflection on exp. shows us its unity in a self-cons. The Finite finds its self confronted with the non-ego; there is an external world. Fichte speaks of this relations as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. The thesis is the self positing itself and is fundamental. It is not a fact but an activity of the ego. For so long as you begin with a particular thing you can have no prin. You can then ask on what does it depend. Its being "there" as a particular thing. But we must begin with a free act, which is the beginning of Phil. As Goethe says "Im Anfang war die that". But the reflection on the primal act finds a not -we, a non-ego, which determines the ego. This is the antithesis. The Synthesis will write the two and say that the I is partly free and partly determined. But this does not sufficiently explain matters. To find the explanation of this synthesis was the work of Fichte, but he did not succeed, - Hegel fixed it up perfectly.

It all means that there is in cons. a dual relation of the ego and non-ego. There is always an object. But the object is always object for cons. So their relation is not coordinate but the subject overlaps the object. The subject in some sense must include the obj. for it is the thing which is known to you. This duality must be transcended in some way, so that the relation exists for me, i.e., comes to be known for me, then there must be a synthesis in the self cons. Thus the obj. is explainable thru the subject. The ultimate explanation is then contained in the Absolute Ego. So in the very nature of the knowing thought even the finite there is something of the Absolute Thought, since it is universally found in all men. So far K. could not object. Fichte goes yet further. We are conscious of ourselves as free, and also cons of as in opposition to the object, this opposition leads to the cats. of space and time and causality. So these cats. are necessary from the

subject-object relation, and its transcended perfection in the Absolute. From the nature of the Pure Ego Fichte tries to deduce not only the form but also the material of exp. through that which "objects", checks or limits the subjective activity.

The free activity of the self is limited by a something and this limitation affects our freedom of knowing, but from this objective "thereness" we get to know the object. We know it as that which checks our free action.

Theoretically Fichte does not succeed in deducing all from the Ego. For it was conceived as a merely logical basis. It is that from which we may explain theoretically the possibility of km. He goes back again and regards the Ego as Will as well as Reason. It is for him even the fundamental thing. That is, the Practical is the important being. Theoretical affairs are subordinate to the Practical, and are explicitly made so by Fichte. We are essentially moral beings, and as a condition of morality we must have the object.

Hist. of Philosophy May 13, 1908.

Fichte - Greatest work the *Wissenschaftslehre*". This is an epistemology, a doctrine of Knowledge. "The Vocation of Man" a popular statement of his philosophy. The fundamental point is the doctrine of freedom. He had been a Spinozist, but by studying Kant, he adopts the doctrine of freedom as the principle of the universe. Man is free - freedom is the fundamental point in his phil. He begins with K's transcendental Ego which is, of course, a universal Ego, from this everything must be derived. From the intellectual pt. of view, we can only derive the forms. But we must take the pt. of view of will, and derive the moral law from the Ego. He insists that the practical is the fundamental interest: At bottom man is will, striving. His active nature is deeper than finite individuality. I am means that I demand that something be realized. The indiv. is a demand that the moral law be fulfilled.

In order to realize these ends, there must be an object over against him. This object is the material of my duty. Those upon which my will works. This is the famous practical deduction of the external world. Things have being in that they have relation to a will. Or we may say, The world does not exist as independent things, but as a series or system of values for wills. Value judgments are the ultimate facts about the world. This is of course not that things exist in relation to an indiv. will; but for wills universally. A thing in nature has being in relation to a will, but therefore to wills; that is purpose is universal. The world is there as the object upon which the moral life works. So the world cannot be a fixed entity. It is constantly being transformed. Each may construct his world according to the demands of his moral nature. It is not once for all these, and does not determine the spirit. The free indiv. makes his environment. We make the world after our own purposes. So there is change as the condition of the development of moral life. The environment is what you make it by your own free act. This is a good opposite to the naturalistic doctrine that the world is there.

Schelling - 1775

Educated at Tübingen and Leipzig. Theology and nat. science. Was influenced by Fichte and published "Ideas for a Phil. of Nature". Taught w. Fichte at Jena, later Hegel came. Left Jena 1804 for Munich.

Leaving Jena his phil. importance ceased. As a very old man he got called to Univ. of Berlin. It was supposed that he could save religion from Hegel's attack. A brilliant young man who petered out. His best work, "A System of Transcendental Idealism". Fichte and Schelling fell out. S. did not like F's treatment of nature as having only moral significance. For this takes nature as a lump and forbids any detailed treatment. S. who was an artist, wanted a treatment of nature in and for itself. So he teaches that nature is itself ideal. It is a living organism having one great prin. of life. It is analogous to man's life and reason. Everywhere we see nature analogous to the life prin. in man. He looks at nature from an evolutionary point of view. It develops finally into man, who is the issue

of nature. He begins with inorganic nature and shows that development is purposive. There are various stages of nature, and man is the highest stage. Nature is a series of forms. Yet he does not think of it as a historical development, he is yet regarding nature as more or less static in kind. Nature is all of one piece with man. And nature gets a dignity of its own.

His handling science has been criticised. His method is arbitrary and a priori. He does not merely describe nature, but interprets it in the light of his own thesis. Yet his point of view is suggestive. For he insists on the system and order within nature. His spirit is different from Fichte's. Fichte was a moralist. So he tries to interpret the world in moral terms. Schelling was an artist, more genial, humorous less moralistic than F. "See Royce Hist. of Phil". They the Romanticist's thought F. took things too seriously. Schelling thought the world explained by intuition, and can be explained thru artistic vision. The Absolute character of man's mind seemed to intoxicate the Romanticists. They insist on the dignity of the indiv. mind. This had influence in America which produced a lot of genius in Boston. In New England we call the movement a transcendental one.

Schelling says it takes genius, insight, to see the system of nature. He cannot be called on to prove things, for his insight is higher than logical proof.

Mind and matter are fundamentally the same. Both mind and matter are ideal and neither are ultimate, but are both referable to a third something. Mind and matter are the two poles of the Absolute, which can be understood only by the genius.

From this poetic flight Hegel called philosophy, b. 1770. He insisted that phil. must be reduced to science. His main interest was in historical and social phenomena. In 1800 he joined Schelling at Jena thinking that he was then in sympathy with S. But their differences came out. H. stayed at Jena until the Univ. was destroyed 1807 by the battle of Jena.

He held various positions - the last at Berlin.

Hist. of phil. May 15, 1908.

Encyclopaedia of Phil. (Logic, tr by W. Wallace.
 Phil. of Nature: Phil. of Mind; tr. by W. Wallace.
 Phil. of History (Bohn Lib. tr. J. Sibree)
 Hist. of Phil. tr. J. Haldane.
 Phil. of Law. (tr. by Dyde.)
 Phil. of Religion (Eng. trans.)
 Phil. of Art (tr. B. Boranquet).
 E. Caird (Blackwood's) (Best)
 Mackintosh - The Phil. of Hegel.
 W. Wallace - Prolegomena.
 J. Stirling - The Secret of Hegel. (Bad)
 J. C. Hibben - Hegel's Logic.

After going to Berlin he became the central figure in Phil. Hegelianism was the prevailing phil. He had a large influence personally. H. says no one ever understood him.

Began as a colleague of Schelling. Was a subordinate of Schelling. H. diverged widely from Schelling. S. had broken with Fichte on the question of nature. Fichte was all together a subjectivist. H. follows S. in insisting on the objective validity of nature. Truth does not come through the intuition but depends on the hard thinking of logic. The Romantic method is too easy. But thinking and log. methods are necessary.

Truth must be won by hard thinking, and not by intuition. The intuition of the genius will not do to depend on. So for H. logic is a fundamental part of his system. He criticises S. for his abstract conception of unity. Taking the relation of body and mind. S. takes the position that the absolute in the indifference point, in which both we manifest. Hegel says that this is obtained by abstraction of the

differences of both body and mind. This abstraction does not explain anything. It is unity without difference, so does not explain anything. It is the night in which all cows are black. This absolute only obscures and covers up the reality. But we must have a concrete universal, a concrete unity. For a real explanation must include the differences and yet form them into a unity. The abstract is a mere sameness, but we want a unity of differences. An abstract view of the Ego would abstract from it all differences and leave the pure ego, the soul substance which has no relation to experience. We must have a unity of the one and the many, we want a totality, the unity of the many in the one. Some such a view we must take of all our notions, e.g., of the church, if we abstract from all the individuals we get a meaningless form. But a universal or a unity that is concrete will include all the indiv. differences within a unity. A mere one does not mean anything. Being without change is meaningless. Parmenides had such a blank one, a pure being. Heracleitus goes to the other extreme and says there is nothing but change. But Heracleitus has a unity after all. Hegel has a unity, but not a static unity, it is the unity of process. We must find some way to unite differences, must get the differences, even contradictions together. Indeed the indiv. has a meaning only when it is regarded as an opposite of something else.

Hegel's significance is in his historical conception, his insistence on the notion of process. We must take a genetic point of view. Hegel perhaps gets his conception from the study of history from the development pt. of view. Hegel has in a great way influenced historical sciences. He insists that we see how things that are came to be what they are. Was he an evolutionists? Yes and No. He was not an evolutionist in the Darwinian sense, but he thinks of things constituting a series. Things are related not temporarily necessarily, but he gets things in processes. In history he is genuinely an evolutionist. His account of development is given in his logic. It is an account of the different functions of the mind. He shows that all has happened through contradiction or opposition, negation. Historically, thought that thought advances through contradictions and their solutions, and this is called the dialectical process. Its parts (of the method) are:

Thesis - Antithesis
Synthesis

Thought and experience go on together. In exp. we find contradictions to thought which we must explain - our explanation will be in terms of synthesis. But this synthesis becomes a thesis again, and it has an antithesis, the two resulting again in another synthesis; and so on. So the very antithesis of thought drives us to progress from one thesis to another, and so long as there is thought there is the contradiction. We have thus the dialectical method consisting of affirmation, negation, and synthesis. All experience is a process of these three parts. So the negative is the impelling force which drives us on in the process of thought. For the negation forces us to go beyond it, to a solution of the contradiction which it states. In a finite process of thought the contradictions never all get solved.

Hegel tries to use this triadic movement as a key in every possible and impossible interest of thought. Thus the Hist. of Phil. is shown to show the process of thesis - antithesis, etc., but Hegel gets all too fond of his own formula. He gets to forcing the facts into the form.

Hist. of Phil. May 18, 1908.

Hegel

Phil. of History
Logic - Science of Logic
Hist. of Phil.
Phil. of Nature
Encyclopaedia (1) Logic, (2) Phil. of Nature, (3) Phil. of Mind.

H. emphasized logic. Kn. must be gained by reason, and must be a science. We have no immediate sense of kn. Jacobi emphasized faith or belief, and Hegel combatteed him and the Romanticists. Jacobi's was an attempt to modify the agnosticism of Kant. What is real is rational, what is rational is real, so reason must find the truth. He insists on the objectivity of nature and is thus a common sense thinker. Kant did not pass beyond the subjective. Nor did Fichte. (See his Introd. to the Smaller Logic for a criticism of Kant).

Fichte insisted on the Ego, but this is the subjective standpoint Schelling objected to the subjectivism of K. and F. and H. is following S. pretty closely. Cons is a relation to reality, to be in relation to the real world. Idealism does not mean that the idea is the only reality - not even Berkeley, for he had outside realities as, God, etc. And later he came closer to an objective point of view.

Phil. has two questions which are foolish.

1. To prove that the world exists.
2. That life is worth living.

We may prove that this or that in the world is real, or valuable.

The world is once for all here, as Lotze says and we are busied about its explanation.

The world has meaning for mind and the categories are simply the mind in its dealing with the world. And as K.'s view is evolutionary we must look at them in their relations to each other. The cats. are mind in its application of reality.

We must look at the mind in its process of development. Genesis is a point of view. We get in H. a systematic development of the nature of the cats., the development of mind. Since mind is a relation to reality then the explanation of mind will be an explanation of reality. Thought and things are of the same fundamental nature. Things are for a mind, mind has a reality in its relation to reality. So the explanation of thought is also the explanation of reality. The more developed our minds, the more full and complete the world.

There are three stages in mental development: First, as a limit - merely mind. Second, as mind apart from itself, as objectivity, third, the coming together of mind with itself in a final synthesis. Ho. does not raise the questions, whose thought, but considers thought in general. Where there is thought there will be the same reason which is one. He is thinking universally of thought as the race or is the world develops. The world history is progress in the cons. of freedom. It means thought coming into cons. of itself and the world. Freedom must be a rational freedom.

The logic is not a psych. in indiv. thought but a discussion of thought in general. There are 3 parts.

1. The phil. of Being.

The undeveloped cons. tries to develop the notion of the world as Being. Just as it everlastingly is. This is the standpoint of unreflective common sense. Much as a child or the early philosophers. Each thing is what it is. The cats. here are quantity and quality, the latter is earlier and more unsophisticated than the former quantity requires reflection. This latter cat. leads out of the simple notion of Being for it implies comparison, and this demands going beyond Being.

2. Essense (Relativity).

The standpoint of science. It is the antithesis of the notion of Being which may be regarded as the thesis. This thesis says A is A, everything is what it is. But the antithesis says nothing is, but what it is in relation to everything else. Thus everything is also what it is not, i.e., is what it is in relation to its opposites, or contradictories. The cats. are such as cause and effect, substance and accident, force and effects. This is also the standpoint of necessity. Everything is determined by everything else. Substance leads to causality as its antithesis. We swing from substance (permanence) to change and causation. But both the contrad-

ictory positions are necessary. How is it possible to have the one and the many, the determined and the free, etc. The very contradictions here lead you on to a set of cats. which will solve the difficulties. These we may call cats. of consciousness. All previous cats. were inadequate, and force us to go forward to other cats. But in taking this point of view of the notion (teleologically) we find the world an expression of a definite rational principle.

We can't think of reciprocity so long as the reciprocal entities are external to each other. We can't exp. A and B in relations to each other so long as the two are external to each other. We must include both within a principle of reason. So long as we explain one in terms of another we have an external explanation. But we must refer them to a rational prins.

Hist. of Phil. May 20, 1908

By the means of the dialectic K. passes from the cats. of science to those of oration, or those of teleology. In the point of view of Science, everything is determined by everything else. Yet everything has a self and a one prin. that is permanent thru all changes. The highest view of science is a reciprocal system - where everything influences every other. When we try to think through the notion of reciprocity we are led to the conception of wholeness, the one life prin. which is a self-determining unity. Thus the external determination of Sci. turns out to be the determination of the self by the self under the notion of organic unity. This is true of every real thing, and of the universe as a whole. This universal is not something apart from the parts, but it is the ideal unity within the parts. It is the ideal unity within the parts. Looking at the world - unity we have the concept of God. It is an ideal unity, a univ. prin. Determination is not external, but internal. The proof for the existence of God is found in the whole process of the Logic. For we must think of the unifying prin. as a self-conscious entity. God cannot be just "another" as a part; but the highest prin. in and thru the whole. God must have a meaning for himself, that is, he must be a self-cons. being. But God is not "over against" the world. He is the unity in the world. But what becomes here of the indiv. and his freedom if God is everything? This does not differ much from Spinoza, with whom God is everything. S. is right in that there must be a one something. But S. held that the absolute is a substance, but H. holds that the absolute is a subject. The unity is ideal. Thus we can reconcile the unity within the differences. The unity is the unity in difference, and thus can include the indiv. within itself even as individuals. God is real in a sense as different and "other" from the indiv. Thus man is just as essential to God as God to man. God "differentiates" but only to come an ultimate unity with himself. This ultimate unity will include all the indiv. differences. The Abs. thus realizes itself through the individuals. God or the absolute is immanent in man. In man the unity of the whole manifests itself and realizes itself. The development of self-cons. is just the identification of the self with what we first recognize as opposed to us. The world first seems alien to intelligence, and seems to dominate all activity. We must come to the facts and study them but only to develop our active prin. We realize our self only as we do so by means of the objective. But we go out of ourselves only in order to come home to ourselves.

We find the world stubborn and hard but it is thus our opportunity. A self-conscious finite being can realize itself with the abs. and the prin. which operates in the world is not external, but is identical with the indiv. The events of the univ. are the expression of reason. What appears foreign is the most rational thing in the world - the "other" is not the irrational.

Kn. is developed through opposition of mind with the objective world. The indiv. mind finds its objective in the state, church, etc. and finds his liberty in his relations to the social whole.

In the indiv. there 3 stages in the development of the indiv. (1) morality is external, the authority is from without. The law seems to come from the without. (2) The moral law is recognized as within us. Here the indiv. asserts himself - and stands on his own reason. This is Kant's stage of the Cat. Imp. It is the age of autonomy, as opposed to Heteronomy. (3) The stage of social morality. The Indv. has identified his own law with the external law. The inner law is only form and needs the external. We must harmonize the external with the internal law. The question is not what is abstractly right, but what is right under the circumstances.

Hegel is a reaction to 18th cent. rationalism. H. yet insists upon reason, but not as a subjective prin. but as an objective prin. Then what is, is rational, what has come to be has come to be through reason. So the reformer may be wrong in opposing what is. What is has historically developed. To oppose it would mean depending wholly on a merely subjective prin. There is reason in what is, we must admit this, and the indiv. who opposes them is taking a narrow point of view, for he is a product of what is. H. goes too far here for he almost says whatever is, is right. So he upholds the Prussian constitution, and he is perhaps personally impatient with the reformer.

In religion he claims that Phil. and religion are identical. Phil. and theol. have the same end in view. But theol. represents in pictorial terms the nature of the world. Phil. tries to explain these in logical terms. (See the smaller Logic for the Fall of man). The fall is the becoming aware of the contrast between itself and nature. But this opposing nature is the condition of the "rise" of man. The pristine holiness is the period before the cons. of the contrast. Where there is no law there is no sin, i.e., there must be the opposing other; but this is the very condition of progress. Without this we would have remained in the state of childish innocence, with no chance at progress. The fall is necessary to our higher development.

Hist. of Philosophy May 25, 1908

Kant's tendency was to make distinctions. He did good service in that. Hegel attempts to get things together, even all differences are brought together in a systematic unity. His monism is not easy-going, it emphasizes the differences, but gets them together in a concrete unity. His universal is a concrete, instead of an abstract universal. An universal unity is a mere identity, it is the dead sameness which leaves out all indiv. differences. But Hegel is as analytic as Kant in that he finds and insists on differences, but he goes on to insist that these differences can and must be brought into synthesis. Reason for Hegel is the speculative faculty that relates things which have been sundered by the Understanding. It goes beyond the cats. of science, yet it cannot get on without the facts of the Und. Reason does not deny the facts of science but it interprets them. The higher cats. do not deny the lower, but they are denied as being the absolute truth. The Reason for Hegel is the source of truth, and not an illusion as Kant supposed. The very problems of the Und. make it necessary that the reason go on to find the syntheses of things. These are not simply four antinomies, but all thought is in a sense contradictory, and Reason must go on to see the unity within these differences.

(Pantheism is a perfectly vague and indistinct term, nobody knows just what it means.) Yet Hegel undoubtedly believed in a personal and separate existence of God. But God as outside of humanity cannot mean anything.

The question of free-will is fundamental in Hegel. H. believed he had left room for indiv. freedom. The real is Subject, and not substance. The indiv. is the fundamental element in H.'s phil. But the indiv. is real in relation to God. The relation is personal - between persons. The indiv. is not given up in the insistence upon the validity of the existing institutions, what he deplors is the whims of the would-be reformers. His History of Phil. as showing the development of thought, while very artificial, is very interesting.

After H's death the Hegelian school split on the question of the freedom of will and the personality of God. There were the Hegelians of the Right, as Conservatives. They tried to show the identity of H. to theology.

The Hegelians of the Left applied the doctrine to the natural sciences and show God as the world prin. The best known are Strauss, Life of Christ, Fevrbach, Karl Marx. Out of Hegelianism grew the Theol. school of Tubingen. There grew up also great interest in natural science. Idealism was replaced by materialism. Buchner, Moleschott, etc. This is the tendency to materialistic naturalism.

Next the cry was "back to Kant". Out of this grew the notion of the limitation of the cats. of nat. sci. Now it seems that the Germans are going back to Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Hegel is being reborn.

The objection to Hegel was that Hegel's whole method was a prioristic. They took Hegel to mean that one could start with the simplest thought and deduce the whole business of Kn. Hegel did say that his method was a priori but by this he means simply that you can't pick up a cat. anywhere, but they come out of the synthetic relations within thought. There is no mind or object apart from each other. For him, thought is the whole of experience. Everything is rational, everything is intelligible. The world is akin to mind. This is rationalism. Hegel is rationalistic. Reason is the final reality. Schopenhauer is irrationalistic. The world for him, is blind will which just goes on. Yet the will becomes conscious of itself. But will is not rationality.

History of Philosophy May 26, 1908

Schopenhauer.

The prin. of the universe is will. This will is blind and irrational. While it becomes conscious in man, yet it is the mere instrument of will. Psychologically, pain is positive and pleasure is negative. Why does S. decide that the world is bad? Because there is no pleasure to be attained. Thus the standard is hedonistic. But there may be a higher standard. If we say that we endure pain for the sake of a higher pleasure, then that places the hedonistic standard higher. But when we talk of lower and higher, we really get the standard above the hedonistic. J. S. Mill recognizes this. The question of the sum of pleasures and pains cannot be determined for there is no unit of computation. We can't settle upon a universal unit or standard. The subjective pleasure of the indiv. does not get an objective standard.

The question whether life or the world as a whole is good or bad is not a question for phil. We must take what comes and try to understand it. Nor can S. identify will, activity, etc., with pain.

Salvation may be attained in two ways. 1. One, we may negate the will to live, by ceasing to have wants or desires. It is Nirvana. The first form is permanent. It is the life of asceticism. 2. Second, we may temporarily overcome the will to live through the contemplation of art. We are in this state carried beyond the problems of will and life, but this attitude is only temporary and a momentary relief.

Auguste Comte 1798-1857

A reaction against liberal ideas and the critical method.

Joseph de Maistre denounces the whole period of criticism, and demands that we go back to authority. But in Comte's phil. and Saint Simon there is an attempt to reconcile the destructive forces of the critical period. Comte and Hegel try to do the same thing - to find a prin. of social unity.

Saint Simon tried to effect this unification through socialism, which he based on the old theological Utopias, but he says science should now take the place of religion. Comte was a pupil of Saint Simon. His ed. was completed in the Politecnic institute.

His best work is the Cours de Phil. Positive, trans, and abstracted by Harriet Martineau. Comte is interested to apply science to society. He invented the word "sociology".

By Positive it is difficult to know what he means. First he says Kn. is only of phenomena and their relations. We must simply take things as we find them. Pos. Phil. means the phil. of phenom. and their laws. Again Pos. means established, certain, scientific knowledge. Again, Positive means useful.

His formulation of the law of the three stages. All human life passes thru 3 stages; The Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive. In the first, there are the various forms of anthropomorphism, animism, fetishism, Here comes absolutism in personal powers. It's the stage of militarism in society.

The next stage tries to explain phenom. by referring them to some metaphysical, occult, principle we refer everything to a metaphysical principle. This is also the stage of dissolution, or criticism. He remained a staunch Catholic and looked forward to a time of unity. In society, this is the juristic stage. The different classes of society are always in trouble which must be settled by laws and judges.

The third stage is that of Positivism. Here we study facts and find the general laws according to which these facts take place. We will find thus a positive basis of ideas and society may base its action upon it.

This law of the three stages compares with Hegel's three cats. and his notion of the development of the mind.

This prin. gives C. a basis for the classification from abstract l. Math. phys. chem. biology, sociology.

This order shows the order in which the sciences have become positive and passed thru the other stages. The merit he claims is in establishing sociology. He includes all the mental sciences under Sociology. It is interesting to study J. S. Mill's Inductive Logic.

Hist. of Phil. May 29, 1908

Edw. v. Hartman - The Phil. of the Unconscious. The pessimism of Schopenhauer and the idealism of Hegel combined. Nietzsche - an apotheosis of the will, the strong man. An iconoclast, who insists on a reversal of values. All is sacrificed for the Over-man. It might be called a form of pessimism. N. is a failure from the historical point of view. He is "agin" all convention, and here he approaches the truth. Much of the present social conventions must give way, but N. is an exaggerated tirade against what is. It is an apotheosis of mere strength. It is found in Carlyle, Browning, Kipling, and our own doctrine of the "strenuous life". It is sensational, without any rational inquiry as to what is worth while.

Herbart important in psych. and education. He is a reaction against the idealism, and insists on the real. The doctrine of the "Reals". Lotze is an Hegelian, more cautious but less consistent than Hegel. He (Lotze) insists on the freedom of the indiv. His obj. to show how universal is the extent of the category of mechanism but how subordinate is its significance.

Comte - interest in society, but finds the basis of things in the study of nat. sci. He sees the organic character of society, and tries to interpret society as an organism. This is opposed to the Hegelian 18th cent. mechanical society.

He denies the possibility of any absolute laws. All that can be done is to correlate facts, and find laws universals. But is the finding of the law merely a process of description? Do we not go beyond the facts in the formation of the law? We are in any way going from the seen to the unseen. What is the appearance anyway? Is it not different for the plain man, the scientist, and the philosopher, or the artist. How far we go with our explanation depends upon our purpose. Comte is a protest against absolutism, in phil. and in theol. But as he went on he felt the need of a something to take the place of the Abs. which he rejects. The Abs. is to be found in the society or in humanity. The object of worship must be humanity, especially in the person of the great benefactors. Those who like Napoleon, have injured humanity are objects of dislike.

Thus the Positivism which begins with mere scientific facts, becomes a kind of mysticism.

The followers of Hume were Hartley, a priestly, Utilitarian preacher, J. Mill, J. S. Mill, Alex Bain. The prin. is the association of ideas. This is the Eng. Associational Psychology. Corresponding to this is the theory of ethics, the whole business of Utilitarianism. See J. S. Mill, J. Mill wrote the Analysis of the Mind. This is done in the idea of atomism. J. S. Mill departs slightly from the psych. of his father, also from the Benthamite Happiness Theory. He was raised on these two theories. J. S. Mill goes back on the quantitative idea of pleasure. Bentham tries to make a hedonic calculus. But J. S. Mill makes differences of quality a criterion also. There are some pleasures which we would not swap for any quantity of other haps. When we insist on qualitative difs., and dif. kinds of pleasures, we are abandoning the hap. theory.

The Bentham theory had a great and good influence on legislation. The greatest hap. to the grt. no. had much inf. on Eng. legislation and the reform of law. The men of this school were great as reformers. Their organ was the Westminster Rev. Ed. by J. S. Mill. Spencer, G. Eliot, Leslie Stephen, were members.

There is in England also some important systems philosophically. The Scotch rationalists and the Empiricists had a great trouble, which culminated in J. S. Mill's "Examin. of Sir W. Hamilton's Phil".

So far German ideas had not much influenced Eng. thought. True Coleridge had tried to introduce Ger. thought. So did Carlyle. Both did little more than insist that there is another reality besides the mechanical. Carlyle is always "cussing" the Profit and loss Phil. but could not construct.

H. Stirling tried to study Hegel. T. H. Green. See Introduction to Hume. Green is the man who woke up idealism in England. After him came Bradley, Branquet, Pringle, Pattison, etc. These are Kantians and Post-Kantians. The New England Transcendentalism comes from German Idealism. Previously, here, the phil. had been Empiricism and misunderstood Scotch rationalism. It woke up a great literary movement. We are largely German in our phil. The Eng. Neo-Hegelians have developed Hegel and we get it from them.