

Oct. 1, 1907

Types of Metaphysical Theory. Creighton No Text
 But Get: A. E. Taylor (Elements of Metaphysics, Macmillan)
 The Nature of Metaphysics and its problems.
 Read: Taylor Introductory Cop.

F. H. Bradley Appearance and Reality intro. cop.
 H. Spencer - First Prin. Part II Cop. 1.
 Encyclopediæ Britannica

Metaphysics, a name for the most central problems of Phil. Probs. which lie beyond the sciences and are assumed in sciences. It aims at an ultimate theory regarding the nature of reality.

The assumption is that the real world is a connected world. Reality a unity of interrelated parts.

What is contradictory must ultimately be untrue.

Meta. attempts to disc. what is really true as distinguished from what appears. This distinction of real and appearance is as old as science.

Ex. The seeming movements of the heavenly bodies and stability of earth. Science is continually making the distinction. Phil. is making the distinction between a real world and the ideal worlds; and there seems no bridge between the two.

Kant and Spencer say we can never know the ultimately real - so we must deal with phenomena. Prof: This distinction is too hard and fast for there are two kinds of exp. Phil. must attempt the ultimate reality.

Metaphysics and Sciences;

Sciences are special, limited. He may use other sciences as tools.

Metaphysics takes the world as a whole, must correlate, harmonize the results of the special sciences, which are often contradictory, as the fatalism of mechanical law and the freedom of the will.

By bringing to light the hypothesis under which the Sci. is working, it sometimes happens that the sci. does not look at its hyp. as categorical. Ex. Psych. says: if you take this view point, these seem to be the facts. 2. The Standpoint of Metaphysics differs from the Sci. in the degree of ultimateness.

Each sci. adopts hyps. from common sense. Ex. they say there is an obj. world independent of mind.

Ex. Phys. adopts concepts of space and time naively and in a sense special for that science.

Metaphysics gets its facts from sciences but may question the hyp. behind the facts as well as the facts themselves, examines the hyps. of the sciences.

Yet we must not transform the scientific account into a metaphysical. Metaphysics overhauls the results of sci. and gives them a higher reality. In order to unify them into a world. Metaphysics does not at all care as to the nature of the special facts, does not discover any new facts.

Metaphysics divided in two parts.

1. Problems of Being
2. Problems of Knowing

The ultimate question is what is reality? and along with it how is reality related to our minds? i.e., the nature of the process of knowing i.e., the epistemological problem.

Ontology - the science of Being. There is a tendency to equate the names ontology and metaphysics.

It is true that Epistemology and ontology can not be separated - as Locke and Kant assumed.

But Epistemological can neither be separated from either.

So

Epistemology
 Metaphysics - Ontology

Types:

There are two attitudes to the world.

1. That of the outside spectator. The world is all objective, it is all over against me. This is the position of the natural sciences. Everything is phenomenal and I must describe them critically as I can. Assumes independent existence of the phenomenon, The world of description. See Royce, Spirit of Modern Phil. 387.

2. That of the interpreter or appreciator. I know my friend when I recognise and appreciate the relations between him and me, this I usually do by a comparison of his and my own purposes. We should know the world in this same way - to know its meaning by reducing its relations to terms of our own inner self.

Objects not alone ideas but objects of desires and aversions. Metaphysics must begin with exp. and interpret the world in terms of exp. The rel. of the world to me, and what is the world in itself.

Sci. gives an external view of the world, while agrees with scepticism in that it gets rid of baseless preconceptions, but differs with scepticism (which is dogmatic) in its critical method and its definite moral purpose.

5. Metaphysics difficult, (a) because of the simplicity and generality of its problems. Just what its subject matter is, is not easy to say. It deals with an aspect of everything, but is not a name for the sum of the sciences. (b) because there can be used no figures nor diagrams, but demands sheer, hard, continuous thought.

Metaphysics interprets the world.

Ex. energy must be brought into relation with the mind, it must become interpreted in terms of ideas.

(See Royce)

Ormond's (Ormond's Princeton man) Concepts of Philosophy

Munsterberg - Psychology and Life Cop. 1

Royce - Spirit of Mod. Phil. 387 pp.

Oct. 8, 1907

Metaphysical reality not dif. in prin. to the reality of the sciences.

The reality is not without exp. but we may yet inquire into the nature of exp.

Phil. often gives sci. its most fruitful concept. To begin today with some

types. Monism vs. Pluralism.

Is the world one or many. If we adopt monism it seems that we are either materialists or Idealists.

See Paulsen - Introd. to Phil. Cop. 1.

Haeckel - Riddles of the Sphinx.

Hist. of Mod. Phil. Hoffding.

As a reaction against Romanticism where the idea was everything, Materialism is most violent; with it matter is the only thing in existence.

Grew out of the enthusiasm for science, with the points of view which the theory of the conservation of matter and energy furnished. The theory was supposed to constitute a complete world conception.

Materialism claims to be nothing more than a systematization of the logical consequences following from science. Upon matter can be based ideas and the conduct of life. It is child-like; intuitive, and is easily popular.

German's Karl Vogt, and Jakob Moleschott, made contributions to Science. Louis Buchner, clear, pleasing description. Its merit, that it popularized kn. also opposed its dogmatism to the dogmatism of orthodoxy. Acknowledges the highest ideas and feelings, but regards them as products of material forms or happenings.

Vogt: The brain the seat of cons. and thought is a function of the brain. Thought to the brain as gall to the liver.

Moleschott - prefers to build on the conservation of matter - the circular process of nature. Phosphate of lime digged out of the earth, the peasant manures his fields with it, and thus the nourishment of the brain produces thought.

Life circulates through the world, with life thought, from thought the will to make life better. We should then supply the brain with the best matter possible. The social question solved with the right distribution of matter, with the thought and will it carries. "Matter is endowed with spirit and it may be called a spiritualistic conception". It is living-matter.

Buchner - Thought is a radiation of motion through the grey matter.

Heinrich Czolbe - both sensation and self consciousness are motions in space. But the statement is convertible; and we can say, where there is motion of a certain intensity and in a certain form there is consciousness, which means that Nature is animate throughout. So the theory goes beyond itself. Later he postulates several fundamental elements.

Ernst Hackel - b. 1834 - A monism which insists upon the unity of Nature. There is no such thing either as mind or matter in the ordinary sense of the words, but only something which is both at once.

The physical one of the original elements of the universe, and exists in very different degrees from the soul of atoms to the soul of the highest organism.

His animation theory sometimes appeals to soul in exp. of organic movements, instead of a scientific exp. Monism leads to the Highest conception of God.

Classification of Systems

Monism. It seems that any other system is more or less unsatisfactory. For with more than one price, there is difficulty of relating them.

Monism

1. Materialism
2. Idealism

3. Neither Material nor Ideal (No good) This latter is of no use for it cannot be formulated, called Parallelism. It amounts to dualism. This is the system of Schelling. Hegel says it is like the night, when all things are black.

Materialism - mechanical law and matter and force. Is Schopenhauer materialistic Idealism must assume the real world. The world is something more than matter, nor can the processes of the world be explained as mechanical laws. Nor is there anything disconnected or out of relation, but everything belongs to a plan or rationality, which is not the succession of events.

Paulson: shows we have Idealism and Materialism and have always had since Plato and Democritus. There has been little change in Mat. Since Democritus. All that exists is atoms and the void. Motion is the result of impact of atoms upon atoms. Soul is matter of the finest most mobile atoms.

Mind is the product of matter; but this is as much as to show that mind is matter for how does mind come from matter, which is essentially different from it.

See Paulsen for the Biological, Cosmological, etc. proofs.

Ernst Hackel - The Riddle of the Universe

Get Hackel - The Riddle of the Universe. At end of Cop. I, see 12 props. and first 70 pages. The first 5 cops.

Force and Matter - Sir Oliver Lodge, this is a reply to Hackel.

Materialism - Baldwin's Dictionary

That Metaphysical theory which regards all the facts of the universe as sufficiently explained by the assumption of body or matter, conceived as extended, impenetrable, eternally existent, and susceptible of movement or change of relative position.

Matter in motion is held to be the fundamental constituent or ultimate fact of the universe; and all phenomena including the phenomena of consciousness, are reduced by

the theory to transformations of material molecules. As Paulsen points out, the reduction of physical processes to physical is the special thesis of materialism.

The first form of materialistic system was that of the atomism of Lencippus and Democritus. All the pre Socratics were materialists but this is due to the fact that the contrast between matter and Spirit had not yet been realized. (Usually called Hylozoism).

Even the "finite, spherical, motionless plenum" of Parmenides, abstract and idealistic as it may seem, implies the identification of being with sensible reality. The characteristic features of the system of Democritus are; (1) the reduction of all qualitative differences to quantitative, namely, to dif. in the size, form, arrangement and the situation of the indiv. atoms, and (2) the denial of intelligent purpose or final cause. The origin of the world-structure is due to mechanical necessity; motion is equally primordial with the existence of the atoms themselves.

Epicurus adopted the atomism of Democritus, but modified the prin. of natural necessity by ascribing to the atoms a voluntary power. The Stoics, with their pantheistic doctrine of world reason, stand at the opposite extreme from the pure atomism of the Epicureans, yet both are completely materialistic. For the Stoics, the qualities, forces, and relations of things are bodies; and the creative reason is a "warm breath" which penetrates all things and constitutes their active principle.

Hobbes declared; "all that exists is body; all that occurs is motion" "But with him phil. deals only with phenomena, and outside its scope are God and the matters of faith.

Hartley and Priestley with their theory of association, and their notion of brain movements are materialistic.

In France in the 18th cent. took place the development of philosophical materialism, with Lamettric and the Encyclopedists. Baron d'Hohlbach is the greatest writer. In Germany there were Moleschott, Vogt, and Buchner.

Modern study of science has given a materialistic coloring to speculation. Materialism has lately given way to scientific Monism.

Paulsen Intro. to Philosophy

Materialism and its Arguments - We call that ontological theory Materialism which answers the question relating to the nature of Reality as follows: Reality as such is body; its attributes are extension and impenetrability; its primary and essential form of activity is Motion. These prin. can and must explain all processes in reality, in particular also the so-called states of cons. This last point is the real thesis of materialism.

Arguments:

1. Exp. shows that psych. processes occur only in intimate connexion with physical processes. Cons. belongs only to organic, or rather animal bodies, and seems connected with their nervous systems. Psych. processes are to be regarded as functions of the nervous system.

Common sense has given another answer; that animals possess a special something; a force or an essence that effects these phys. processes. But this is unscientific and primitive much like a mythical doctrine. Just as the ancients conceived of a thunder god so we conceive of a soul which presides over the body.

2. Science explains phenomena by connecting them with other phenomena, not by means of essences and powers, so, instead of looking for a psychic principle, we should study the physiological processes in the brain and nervous system. Scientific psychology is physiology. Physical states are physiological processes; for which the

I. Logical proof;

The highest prin. of all mod. sci. is the prin. of the consv. of energy. The sum of real motion and of motive force is constant. Movements are introduced into the nervous sys. from without, which proceeding to the centres produce sensation.

The contraction of a mus. fibre causes movement; the contraction is caused by impulse from the centre, the psychis accompaniment of these is the physiological process

For could an idea break into cause as phys. motion, what would become of the consv. of energy. An idea might transpose mountains or turn the moon away.

II. Biological:

There is a thorough going parallelism between the development of the nervous system and soul-life. Throughout the animal world size and complexity of brain structure is parallel to the stage of animal life. Man heads the list with the largest (relative) brain.

Within the races the largest brains are the highest lives. So, the soul is the brain. With injury or removal of parts of brain, there is loss of certain mental powers. Mental disease is brain disease; so the brain is the soul.

III. Cosmological:

When no organic life existed on earth, there were no psychical states, no so-called states of cons. The planets formed from nebula by revolving and disruption. The parent mass being the sun and our earth one of the disrupted fragments. By cooling of the earth, and the formation of water, the conditions were right for the formation of organic life. First in protoplasmic particles, which assuming structure, were able to propagate by means of fission, and to develop systems. Along with or out of the animal life thus developed, grew man, who acquired a supremacy over the rest, so when he began to reflect on his descent, he sought a more distinguished origin for himself. But natural sci. has destroyed this dream. Such was the past. The future? Life and mind have had a beginning; they shall also have an end. The heat of the sun is not infinite so must finally be exhausted. A slight diminution of the sun's heat (the source of all life and movement) will destroy organic life. The earth will be a rigid, motionless mass.

As a loaf of bread covered with mildew which springs up for a day and manifests that wonderful phenomenon of phosphorescence, as it were, which we call self-consciousness - a brief moment in the life of the immense universe.

Matter and motion are the realities.

Oct. 17. Note the nature of the "one substance".

The Riddle of the Universe - Ernst Haeckel

Cosmological Theorems - "derived from the cosmological perspective of our monistic system:"

1. The universe, or the cosmos, is eternal, infinite, and illimitable.
2. Its substance, with its two attributes (matter and energy) fills infinite space, and is in eternal motion.
3. This motion runs on through infinite time as an unbroken development, with a periodic change from life to death, from evolution to devolution.
4. The innumerable bodies which are scattered about the space filling ether all obey the same "law of substance; while the rotating masses slowly move towards their destruction and dissolution in one part of space others are springing into new life and development in other quarters of the universe.
5. Our sun is one of these unnumbered perishable bodies, and our earth is one of the countless transitory planets that encircle them.
6. Our earth has gone through a long process of cooling before water, in liquid form (the first condition of organic life) could settle thereon.
7. The ensuing biogenetic process, the slow development and transformation of countless organic forms, must have taken many millions of years - considerably over a thousand.
8. Among the different kinds of animals which arose in the later stages of the biogenetic process on earth the vertebrates have far outstripped all other competitors in the evolutionary race.
9. The most important branch of the vertebrates, the mammals, were developed later (during the triassic period) from the lower amphibia and the reptilia.

10. The most perfect and most highly developed branch of the class mammalia is the order of primates, which first put in an appearance, by development from the lowest pro-
 ariata, at the beginning of the Tertiary period - at least three million years ago.
11. The youngest and most perfect twig of the branch primates is man, who sprang from
 a series of man-like apes towards the end of the Tertiary period.
12. Consequently, the so called history of the world - that is, the brief period of
 a few thousand years which measures the duration of civilization - is an evanescently
 short episode in the long course of organic evolution, just as this, in turn, is
 merely a small portion of the history of our planetary system; and as our mother-earth
 is a mere speck in the sunbeam in the illimitable universe, so man himself is but a
 tiny grain of protoplasm in the perishable framework of organic nature.

- I. Pure Monism rejects neither matter nor spirit.
 II. Matter cannot exist and be operative without spirit, nor spirit without matter.
 The two attributes of universal substance are matter and spirit. Matter infinitely
 extended substance; and spirit or thinking substance.

Types of Metaphysical Theory Oct. 22, 1907

The concepts of the Law of Substance are necessary presuppositions, constructed
 by the necessities of thought and not arrived at by scientific observation.

The world is a unity, and if that is so a law must provisionally explain it so,
 but the law will not say what it is that constitutes its oneness. Oneness cannot
 come from matter; even Haeckel's law of substance is prior in thought to his matter.

There could be no unity in a mass. But there must be an internal prin. of indiv-
 iduality which makes it one. An organizing law is necessary, but the law is not phy-
 sical being.

Haeckel puts into the cell a will but denies it to the multi cellular organism.
 Man is, in every sense, determined.

He admits cons. but allows it no efficiency; rejects teleology which makes him
 materialism.

Mechanism when it appeals to the structure of the brain is hard to refute.

Yet it is not comprehensible that mind should not be given a place, and a deter-
 mining place in determining what is. The appeal to your own life is proof enough of
 teleology, and of the priority of experience considered in the subjective sense.

Where could meaning or truth come in, in a mechanical view? Theoretical interests
 as well as moral interests revolt against mechanism. Theoretically, we demand meaning
 in experience, and it could not come in from a blind mechanism. A hypothesis, if it
 comes into my head, comes by virtue of the blind action of matter and force. Haeckel's
 book comes to us by virtue of physical and chemical laws.

Haeckel is honest in his attempt to show that the world is one, that God is not a
 big man, that there can be no miraculous in-breaks into the world order. He is a pro-
 test against the hide-bound theology of his youth. Perhaps it is well that Haeckel
 jumps upon present day theologians for holding on to old workout anthropomorphic views.
 For this reason Haeckel has done well. Theology must be changed by stress from outside.
 Yet he could have done this without his final conclusion of mechanism.
 Read Taylor, Book III. Cosmology.

Oct. 30, 1907

Haeckel's Idealism, in his Ethics and Religion. He believes in progress and Truth.
 From a practical point of view he is Idealist.

Materialism may be practical as well as theoretical.

The practical regards everything as determined by physical or material wants.
 Taylor, Royce, and Ward practically agree.

The Introd. cop. points out a dif. bet. Phil. of Nature and experimental sci. Science does not give an idea of reality, its conclusions have no ontological significance. Sci. finds formulae for the handling of facts - "atoms," "forces", etc. are useful but there is nothing said about their reality. The emphasis is placed upon the difference of purpose of Science and Phil. Sci. analyzes, explains, etc. also helps to control and predict events for the benefit of our own purpose. Metaphysics has to interpret the world - is the process of Interpretation or Appreciation. Science has the business to Describe. Yet the mere descriptions which Science gives seems to be a part of reality. They have some ontological significance.

Phil. Review. Methodology and Proof - Creighton 1897 (?).

The Internat. Jour. of Ethics. "Analogy" - Taylor. The Subjectivist has no possible way of getting at objects of the real world.

Best to say: to have ideas at all means to have relations to a world of objects and persons. The more you know of the ext. objs. and persons the more mind you have.

We know other peoples existence as soon as and in the same way as we know ourselves. The indiv. comes to know himself through persons and things. The kn. of the self is in no way prior. Nature consists of societies of sentient experiencing beings.

Read the next Cap. on the Character of Psych. Sci. Also Munsterberg, Psych and Life. Psych. and Physiology - 2 Cops. Grundzunge der Psychologie. Copl. Psych. Review-1906 Jan. or Mch - Miss Adkins.

Psych. must be regarded from 2 pts. of view, the psych. proper as sci. and appreciative or teleological. Much like Structural and Functional Psych.

.. Metaphysical Theories Nov. 19, 1907

Treating the "mind" and "body" as abstract conceptions, for working hypotheses, has come out in the last ten or 15 years. What is new is the relativity of scientific hyp. to the purposes of the scientists.

Pragmatism is an insistence on this practical side of affairs in science. The word came into use from James but was first used by Peirce, who asked in 1878 after the practical.

Peirce - Metaphysics is to be cleared up by the following maxim: Consider what effects that might.....

The question is what will it do? What results? James - The whole meaning of a doctrine expresses itself in practical consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or exp. to be expected, if the theory be true. Meaning is altogether in terms of consequences.

The Will to Believe - 1897 comes after the Pierce articles. See Essay The Will to Believe. But see Reflect Action and Theism. Later an address; Phil. conceptions and Practical Results.

Last year - Pragmatism - Longman's this the last and best.

The same insistence on practical results comes from other quarters. Oxford especially, and See F. G. S. Schiller, The Oxford expression in literary.

Prof. Dewey has given the most important expression to the doctrine. He differs from James - who says the meaning is the results. Dewey connects the conception with its antecedent conceptions. A conception is an instrument used to explain a problem. What is the genesis of a conception. For this genesis largely determines the nature of the conception. Dewey and James both insist on the reflex arc

Theorizing
Conception

Sense Movement

These are not separate elements, but the unit is the triad. Each of these is continuous with the others, thought, conception (not an end in itself, but is an instrument to determine action. Our ends are not theoretical but always practical in their nature.

Thought in the interest of our volitional nature. Destroy the volitional interests and no excuse for the brute order of exp. exists.

Rationalization of chaotic exp. is motivated by our internal interests and purposes. Our purpose is to conceive and to foresee. Our ends are of what we call science. From this point of view God is a useful concept.

We easily delude ourselves about the middle stage. Thought only defines the direction which our activity shall take. What differences can thought alone make? What consequences can it have; the conception without results can mean nothing. What can God's aseity do? (It can occur to us how can the indiv. tell what it might mean;)

Will to Believe - Int. Jour. Ethics 1899. "The will to believe and the Duty to Doubt". by Miller. Phil. Rev. 1899. crit. of the Calif. address.

Pragmatism is rather a theory of the nature of exp. rather than a meta-theory. Reality must be defined in terms of experience. James says it is Radical Empiricism. Every concept must be shown in exp. to get its cash value. Dewey insists on experience they all criticize trans. experience. It is a criticism of Mod. Idealism. They war on the idea of the Absolute. They say the abs. is something static, fixed. But everything is for something else. Then reality is relative to the purpose it subserves. They say the Abs. is a static. The reality is there, the world is. Exp. comes and goes but the world is there. Reality which is exp. is relative, it is becoming.

This Phil. (Dewey) is a functional phil. everything is development. Everything is because a part of development in cons. There are no ontological realities, but functional distinctions which fall within experience itself. Our conceptions are instruments which tend to be invented for practical needs. Psych (1896) Rev. Dewey. "The Reflex Arc Concept". He insists on the integral relation among the parts of the arc.

"Studies in Logical Theory" - Dewey and Colleagues. See the Volume.

Metaphysical Theories Nov. 21, 1907

The fundamental question is, what is action? What is the practical? The Pragmatist would say that action would include the action of thinking, everything. Then the theory is not so different from other ways of thinking.

Oxford - Personal Idealism - Henry Sturt

Idola Theatri

1893 Humanism - F. G. S. Schiller

1906 Studies in Humanism.

Mind - 1900 - W. Caldwell - Pragmatism

" - 1904 - F. H. Bradley - Truth and Practical

" - 1904 - James - Humanism and Truth

" - 1905 - Hoernle - Pragmatism and Absolutism.

" - " - James - Humanism and Truth

" - 1906 - A. E. Taylor - Truth and Consequences

" - " - Dewey Experimental Theories of Truth

" - 1907 - Bradley Truth and Copying

Psych. Rev. 1904 - Jim Baldwin - Limits of Pragmatism

" " 1905 - James - Exp. of Activity

Phil. Rev. 1907 - J. Seth - Utilitarian Estimate of Kn.

" " J. R. Angell - Rel. of Struct. and Functional Psych. to Phil.

" " King - Prag. as a Phil. Method

" " - 1904 - Royce - The Eternal and the Practical

" " - 1904 - Creighton - Purpose as Log. Category

" " - 1905 Taylor - Truth and Practice

" " - 1905 A. W. Moore - Prag. and its Critics

" " - 1906 Dewey - Beliefs and Realities

Phil. Rev. - 1906 Exp. and Obj. Idealism
 " " 1906 Rogers. Prof. James Theo. or Kn.
 " " - 1906 Creighton - Exp. and Thought

See also Monist.

In one point of view, Prag. is a method. Truth is interpreted in reference to its practical consequences.

Another by Dewey insists of looking at the genesis of thought for its significance. This is more important. - Cr.

Both insist on purpose - teleology, as a category for the interpretation of kn. which hitherto has been too abstract, and unrelated to indiv. purpose. Truth is in exp. and as absolute is unmeaning, so Kn. is instrumental to a result, it comes as a means to an end. This is true of Reality for there is no reality beyond exp.

In our needs and purposes we find the interpretation of kn. and exp. Prag. is the foe to absolutism, is the phil. of the modern spirit.

Thought is a particular function or an activity within exp; not the universal element. It comes from an antecedent exp. which is not thought and goes into an exp. which is a need. As long as our ordinary conceptions work we don't think about it, but a variation calls for thinking. Thought is not the whole of experience. It is a particular element in exp.

Thought has a definite locus, it comes from an experience which requires it and ceases with the solution of its problem. Thought is true if it solves the prob. Thought has no ontological reference beyond exp. It is a reconstructive function of exp. It thus works in the service of exp.

So, Dewey there is no problem of thought in se. No reality that thought can reach in itself. But what validates this particular thought?

Thought is always specific, always has a definite locus - arises as a means to an end. When a new circumstance arises then thought comes into being. We don't think about things in general but about particular problems. See Dewey - Studies in Logical Theory.

Kn. is a means to and end, in thus far pragmatism has a strong point. So, practical needs have led to the developments of kn. another point.

Or we may deal with kn. as will and cognitive, with emphasis of the conative interests. These interests which relate to the will are fundamental to kn. and also arise from our practical affairs. This suggests relation to the will to believe, i.e. a choice in believing what we wish among alternatives. There is no reality but what is within the life and exp. of the indiv. and this life is directed by conative elements. From this idea and action get united.

The biological view - Dewey. Thought is a function of life in general, it appears as a favorable variation. A particular function of the psych. phys. organism. It is a tremendous help in struggle for existence. This makes thought a function, which is perhaps a legitimate way of looking at the question. Thought is a function among other motion, etc. This is a point of view which works well for Biology, but not so well for Phil. Science is always dealing with objects, its laws of connection, etc. For Psychological states are looked at as external objects, related by the prin. of causality. But Phil. looks for the internal meaning of these mental states, as related to the concrete life of the subject.

Is thought just one function among others of mind? Perhaps it is the basis of all the processes of conception, judgment, etc. Is not mind a single something of which these processes are differentiation?

See Dewey.

Metaphysical Theories Nov. 25, 1907

Pragmatism has come as a criticism of idealism what they call absolutism. So it is hard to say what it is aside from criticism.

Dewey - Judgment the basis of knowing. Kn. appears as a function within experience. Reality is dynamic or self evolving.

If we are to call judging thinking we must remember that it comes from a previous experience and runs into an immediate exp. In this im. exp. there is no appreciation of value.

Logic akin to functional psych. Logic is an historical account of experience in some of its phases. Logic not concerned with genesis but with value. Yet there is a fundamental dif. between genesis and analysis. Thinking a response to a situation or we must look upon it as an instrument for transforming exp. All biological processes have to be treated as an instrument to adaptation to a particular environment - meaning, character, value are interpreted in this way.

We approach the thing in trying to understand its situation to see the thing in its association or environment. We must know the preceding and succeeding events. On this scheme logic would be a part of functional psych. Logic makes experience over, reconstructs exp. for it in the first case has certain inconsistencies.

Judgment is a process in which reality is transformed. Reality is dynamic, not static. It is being made in the process of experience. Thought is a function of exp. it comes when it is needed. No thought in se. Only exp. undergoing transformation there is no reality in se, something we may call truth in se.

The older idea was how the thought can copy the reality; but how can thought in se know reality in se which is in some way "over against" it.

The opposition we find in exp. are distinctions made within exp. itself as thought and thing, subj. and obj. they are not ontological realities. These have a meaning only in their rel. to exp. The datum - sensation - is not an entity, not there, but is given to thought as a problem for thought. The perception of datum is the starting point of the thinking process, conception the process of reconstruction of exp.

Page 13. Dewey. The problem of Logic. How does the.....

Page 24. The theory is developed by and through the criticism of Lotze.

The standpoint of Dewey is helpful in that it objects to our making hard and fast distinctions.

The later exp. is the standard for the earlier. He means that exp. runs on continually. The process is habitual, but when a problem arises, there is a difficulty. There is conflict, tension, there must be a reinterpreting of experience, a transforming of exp. There is no thought except on the doubt-inquiry experience.

When the tension is relieved or the problem removed then there is no need for thought. So exp. may be defined in terms of habit and reconstruction. With all adaptations made life is mechanical. The solution of a problem is the fundamental idea of exp.

Metaphysical Theories Dec. 3, 1907

Dewey's lectures are criticisms of Lotze. See Jones - Logic of Lotze. See p. 79 at top, a protest against thought as merely formal.

Thought is a process of transformation of experience material. The tool is organically a part of the product (see the figure of scaffolding) The actual tool is the action of erecting the building.

We do not have external experience given in a lump, and then thought working upon it, but we have the process of reconstruction of exp. in which thought is instrumental. Thought comes as a response to a need in a problem. This however, does not commit one to pragmatism - all idealists of the last 25 years will insist upon the same point. Pragmatism comes in viewing thought as a particular kind of an instrument

among others, a particular function and not the all-inclusive one.

Dewey insists there is no thought in itself. Thought is a function within experience, dealing with the nature of the real world.

Thought uses what means it can. It is the one continuous function throughout all exp.

Development of thought does not mean that it merely the unfolding or unrolling. Thought eliminates what is merely possible. It is thought that develops from beginning to end. In one sense thought is a particular function; in another it is the universal function. Prag. the motive of thought is always practical - to solve a particular problem, to loosen a tension in experience.

But the motive of thought is a motive of thought itself - i.e., a logical motive. Can a practical interest call out or evoke thought? Must not thought call itself out for the sake of its own problems. Practical interests must be transformed into logical problems before they are problems for thought. Practice does not even always indirectly evoke thought.

The pragmatist calls everything practical which is related in any way to our want and desires.

The prag. conception of thought is very narrow. It is one of purely reflective nature, judgments, etc. So there can be an "antecedent experience" which can be prior to thought in that sense. Thought comes as a need due to "calculation" in a case of tension. Ordinary experience is not a thought-experience, but a kind of bare immediateness, this will include our emotional, etc. experiences.

The test is that it works. The truth of a concept is shown by its practical results. Experience is a life experience not necessarily a thought-experience - thought only comes in as a side issue - as a kind of tool to help along the experience.

The ethical judgment arises a social-indv. tension, and is good if it works. Dewey has written on the ethical notion. See "Mind" for Taylor and Caldwell's discussion. See also, Creighton - Phil. Rev. "More replies "Prag. and its Critics". If the practical means the ordinary sense of the term, then it is easy to show it won't work. If practical means everything, then pragmatism has the whole cheese.

Pragmatism appeals to the social conception of thought. The social is the proof for everything. All is flux. Everything relative.

Metaphysical Theory Dec. 5, 1907

Today Prof. Creighton is following Royce in the relation of the indv. purpose to the objectively real and the Absolute. The pragmatic attitude is subjective and is due to a psychological view of things. But there is in us really two minds, our merel. everyday mind, and that which is rational, which seeks the connectedness, objectivity and rationality. This is our universal and general relation to the universe. Our need is our demand for conscious relation with the eternal. As opposed to the indv. psych. and subjective. We as indv's can agree upon a common element so we agree that there is an eternal element which determines our indv. attitudes.

The Pragmatist retreats when he appeals to the social mind. He thus has an ontological entity which he rejects in .

Metaphysical Theory Dec. 10, 1907

Pragmatism and kindred movements. The instrumental view is similar to Pragmatism on this view. Thought does not copy reality, but our conceptions are instruments in getting hold of exp. Conceptions are tools, which enable us to control experience, to predict the future etc. Concepts are economical, practical means to an end, the control of exp. the solving of definite problems.

Pragmatism - Thinking is a process of attaining an end - and this is a merit. It emphasizes the purely cognitive activity, that kn. does not stand apart from exp. Knowing yet implies will, is bound up with active attention. It emphasizes the concreteness of mind.

Exp. is represented as fluid, or dynamic, i.e., it is continuous, all interconnected, it is a moving process as a whole. It has helped us to see the meaning of sensation, idea, self, others, and their mutual relations. These distinctions are not onto logical but merely functional within exp. itself. Yet there are distinctions which are presupposed for exp. Function is emphasized as opposed to being as static or fixed. Funct. psych. is regarded as the equivalent of the whole of phil. This includes the disciplines of logic, etc. This is a fruitful way of looking at exp. What work do our activities do? Also we must ask what is the relation among the psychic's acts. Prag. helps us to value of the conceptions we have - what they can help us in the way of further experience. Our conceptions must make a difference, must have a bearing on other parts of experience. But we cannot say what the consequences are at once. There may be consequences which are hidden as yet, and will come out after centuries. But it is a healthy attitude to ask for results.

We must read the parts in their relations to each other. Look at thought and exp. in an evolutionary way to see how it has become. This was emphasized as strenuous by Hegel as late thinkers. Hegel's language is a bit different, from the present, but it means the same. Hegel's followers did not see all he meant. Pragmatists think that Darwin has revolutionized even logic. But evolution in logic had been made use of for more than a century before Darwin.

There is a protect against Absolutism. This is a fundamental point of pragmatic criticism. Truth is always to be defined in terms of a concrete situation. It is concerned with the solution of a definite problem. So there is no eternal truth, nothing true in se. Reality is the process of exp. so the same can be said of reality, not real in se. The notion of a real, as once for all there an eternally given, is unmeaning. The real cannot be defined as in and for itself. They say that there is a system of reality as it is to the Absolute mind. This is made up of your exp. and mine, while there are for us changing, they are for the eternal mind timeless and changeless. To this the pragmatist objects as unmeaning. The only experience we know is the one we know. The very conception of the Absolute is impossible and meaningless. A cons. that is not changing, developing, is unthinkable. For all the cons. we know is flux. So the absolute, as an objectified consciousness, which must be static and fixed, is not a conceivable thing. Prag. is often right in criticising the idealist who tends to use the Absolute as a key for all problems. Our troubles must be explained in terms of our own exp. In this sense idealism is wrong and it must find a better definition for the absolute. Prag. thus has its lesson for us, but the lesson is found in Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, etc. There is doubtless a tendency to over-abstractation, and this is well criticised by Prag.

Prag. has certain limits. It works inside a framework of Absolutism. It is good as far as it goes. Prag. is good when it works.

Nobody will say that my exp. is the real, for solipsism, but in speaking of our exp. we presuppose a system of reality which is more or less beyond and independent of our kn. This is suggested by our purposes and ends. We must have either a subjectivis or else a world system of reality. Prag. is a method of kn. It works as a criterion of conceptions. Yet the fundamental distinction between knower and known is already there, is ontological and presupposed by prag.

Thought is an instrument. The indiv. has an exp. which is a series of tests, trials, ventures, will. It talks of the will as if it were the maker of the world. Exp. is so much a matter of wish, choice, we postulate what we want and do; it is. But what can you do with what we can't control? Can all be subject to subjective control. The whole world is not subj. to my will. Yet there is a point here for prag. in that it kn. is active and selective, but this can be carried too far, There is an outer control. The world is largely what we find it to be, not altogether what we select it to be. The world often is the vegaion of the subjective interests. We have to recognise the blind and irrational in the world. Prag. is right on emphasis of will but not my will. We must distinguish between kn. as purposive and kn. as my interest.

Metaphysical Theories Dec. 12, 1907

Dewey:

The distinctions of exp. grow up within exp. and come not from without. Attention is made focal when there is a disturbance in exp. which habit cannot care for.

The habitual is the material - that which is apart from thought. In case of tension what was physical may become psychical.

The Limits of Pragmatism.

1. It presupposes an ontological situation.
2. The limits of subjective control. How far is there an objective control. What of experience is due to object, and what by subject? Most pragmatists are complete subjectivists. The world is what we make it. All is fluidity. Reality must conform itself.

There is a distinction between the purpose of knowledge and the purpose of the individual self, as expressed in such psych. terms as interest and attention. If kn. is a volitional process, an end seeking process....In ordinary have an idea of what we are aiming at. Our representation is the thing we want and then we proceed to realize it. But when we want kn. we can't tell in advance what it is we want. But we will the truth, whatever it may be, whether welcome or unwelcome to us. We know what we want, i.e., our desire, but not what will answer our want. The Prag. says kn. and truth mean nothing apart from a definite situation. But the truth must in advance have such characters as will fit this situation. We must accept it when we find it, and must recognise it when we see it.

"Thinking as having a locus and situs". Dewey. But these definite problems have no meaning apart from the larger whole, they have meaning in that they are parts of a larger whole. This ad loc reference of thought is a false way of putting it. Begin to think and you can't tell where you are going to stop. Yet I see far enough to see that I must act. The problem of ad loc grows on our hands, so we can't cut the thinking process off at any definite place. You can't say to thought; here you have solved your prob., so avaunt but the process is a continuous one.

The cognitive process learns by seeking its own objects, there is an element of compulsion in the processes, we can't think what we will, we are obliged to think what we can.

Ordinary cases of will mean the attainment of satisfaction of a want or desire. But thought, truth, as the obj. of desire, is using the term in a dif. sense. We can't say truth belongs thus to us as indivs. but is universal in its application. We don't appropriate truth, but truth uses us. Satisfaction refers to indiv. want; but truth is universal. We seek kn. but the result is not a private good, it is a universal good. In seeking truth, we are not playing any private indiv. part, but are acting in our universal capacity as intelligences. We must distinguish the two capacities of experience in virtue of our being a rational being we have this higher universal capacity. To be rational is to seek universals, or over-indv. ends. This is the presupposition of truth and morality and all forms of rational life.

But this seems to transcend the personal life? It depends upon our interpretation of personal life. A life is rational in that it can, and in so far as it can, assume this universal capacity. In each of us there are two minds; 1. the rational mind (immanent, I hope) the universal aims, and 2, our subjective, private ends, which distort and disarrange our rational aims. We can abstract from these personal, psychological conditions and find a universal kn.

Borancuet . Proc'd'gs. Aristotelian Society (1900)

The logical process is the psych. process in its explicit and self consistent form. The psych. process is broken up, the logical is continuous.

In willing the truth we are carried beyond the personal point of view, it is not a private end that leads us. To go on with objective Idealism. Such as Taylor,

Bradley, its roots in Kant and Hegel. Worked out in Eng. by the Neo-Hegelians, Neo-Kantians, such as Caird, Bradley, T. H. Green, Harris, Royce. This is at once Idealistic and Realistic. But the world is interpreted in terms of mind or ideas.

Metaphysical Theories Dec. 17, 1907

Objective Idealism.

Does not deny the existence of the real world. It is realistic in so far as it recognises the existence of an objective world, whether there be a reality is an absurd question. But in what terms can we think of this reality. We all appeal to experience. But there are difficulties in thus appealing to experience, can we go to exp. as to a wood pile? What we shall regard as facts depends largely on our point of view. We can't make theories without facts, nor can we find facts without some theory. Each is necessary to the other.

In interpreting exp. we must look at it from the inside. We must look at it as a subject not as an object. Yet it is conscious that there is something over against the subject, which the subj. is explaining. We must put ourselves inside of exp. to see what function it has. In trying to understand exp. it will be necessary not only to take a cross section of it, but to take a lengthwise view, to look at its development. We must see how the parts of exp. cooperate with each other. Also we must know something of the genesis of exp. To know a things functions we must know something of the thing's genesis. There is a theory that the genesis of a thing does not exhaust its value, or what it is. This is the question of origin vs. validity.

But there are more ways than one of genetically accounting for a thing. We might account for a thing in terms of a value evolution. A genetic account may be entirely in terms of end. There was in the beginning implicit that which we now regard as the value.

So there are different genetic accounts. Before we can give a genetic theory of exp. we must have a theory of the nature of exp.

Exp. is (1) a conscious, internal process. It is the process of a subject. What is involved in it? A subj. that experiences, and an object which is experienced. When we look at processes from the outside (psych), we regard them out of relation to the self or Ego. Yet we can't have an experience as distinct from or out of relation to a subj. In the earliest exp. there is not the distinction between the subj. and obj. but this distinction occurs with a progress of exp. Late in exp. the subj. sets our against itself the obj. world. The development of exp. may be called the development of the self. The two are correlates of each other. So to know the self is to know the world. Yet early in exp. there is no such dualism, where exp. is more or less distinctionless. Yet they say that these distinctions are implicit but if they are not there for the subj. they are not there at all. Yet we can say the distinctions are made when they are not recognised. The mind uses prins. without being cons. of it. The distinction of subj. and obj. is implied in cons. Tho the distinction is not known in early exp. yet they must be thought of as present. For experience, we must think (1) of a cons. and (2) of something apart from the cons.

To have a mind, to be a mind means to be in relation to objects. These are objective content for the apprehensive mind. We must begin by saying that cons. is essentially a judgment or an act of apprehending content. This content is not states of cons. but realities. The mind does not perceive, there is no sensation, in the early exp. it is an immediate experience of objects. To be a mind means to be in relation to reality. In later exp. we distinguish our ideas from things. In the early exp. there is no sensation, no state of cons.

The doctrine of states of cons. is responsible for many of our epistemological difficulties. It comes from the phil. of Locke. He insists the relations of ideas are correspondent to the relations of things.

So Berkeley could say that if we can know only ideas, there is no objective reality.

If we begin by saying that what we know is in our cons. we can never get to external reality. Perhaps Kant and Fichte never did get out of the subjective. Hegel and Schelling had to break out of this subjective circle. So exp. is a twofold exp.

There is one function of exp. Its development is the development of this function. To be cons. is to think, to think is to judge - to know. All the later processes, reason, mem., imag. etc. are all forms of this judgment, yet the process as a whole is one. Yet judgment is ordinarily taken to mean a highly developed stage of a process. Yet we should see them all as one.

Phil. Rev. Vol. XII. The nature of exp.

Metaphysical Theories Dec. 19, 1907

It is claimed that exp. is distinctionless. An utter togetherness. But an utter immediacy loses itself in a mystical nothingness. Cons. is a making distinctions, however vague. We never know a mere blur - yet there is a chaotic state, but this has distinctions.

The given is never a mere given, without some activity on the part of the mind. The mind does not discriminate its own acts from the content to which it attends. It does not recognise itself as distinguishing. Exp. may be defined as a becoming self cons. but it also becomes cons. of the objective. The further we think the more objective does the external become. Yet there grows the conviction that the relation between the subj. and obj. is close. There is no such a thing as mere sensation, mere feeling. We can distinguish the passing from the homogeneity to the heterogeneity from incoherence to coherent. Spencer's prin. will work applied to the prob. of kn. But exp. is never absolutely chaotic. There is always some distinction of relation but there may be no cons. of the distinction. This is a difficult thing to maintain that a thing is functionally present and yet not cons. recognised. It is the fallacy of arguing the "implicit".

The process of thought is a process of making distinctions, of integration. Thought is at once a process of analysis and a process of syntheses both coexisting. Creighton calls this whole process judgment; it seems what I mean by the knowing process. But there are difficulties in using judgment in this sense. The prelogical stage of kn. is sometimes called simple apprehension, or awareness. But there is in using these various terms the danger of getting the process of cons. broken up into parts. Ex. Jevons distinction bet. term, judgments, proposition and syllogism. This is a mechanical way of putting the case. We are rather judging all the time even in the case of the "term" or simple apprehension. A simple concept is the result of a judgment. Ex. "iron" is a judgment worked out in experience. Judgment is the subject's interpretation of the real world. The separation of subj. and obj. results in mere abstraction. Berkeley's ideas had to be referred to an external and final reality in the mind of God.

Kant goes farther and universalises the ideas. The real is the universally valid. He assumes a given element in the cons. So then thought is from the first reflective, it analyzes this given element. It makes judgments about this given, thought seems external to the given. Synthesis for Kant is a kind of process of manufacture. The given is the raw material, thought being in some way external to the given.

You can't make a valid concept of God or a supersensible, because we don't have the material out of which to make it. (Kant)

But thought is inside the object, it is the relation between the subject and the object. It is the mind interpreting the world which it finds itself closely with.

See Hegel's Criticism of Kant. Wm. Wallace - Hegel's Logic. The attitudes of thought to objectivity. For Hegel thought is a holding on to the object, our self cons. relation to the objective. Thought shuts us in with things.

Metaphysical Theories Jan. 9, 1908

See Royce - World and Indv. Vol. II. Cop. III pp. exp. X.

Ward - Naturalism and Agnosticism

This refutes Naturalism. He makes use of some of the methodological principles. He in gen. vindicates a teleological view of nature as opp. to a mechanical.

Obj. idealism assumes the obj. world. The question is what sense does it exist in? The method is to start from some system as realism, etc. and find it inadequate. From science we are ultimately let to metaphysics. So metaphysics is not silly but is an attempt to go further than science.

Metaph. tries to find props. which are true categorically. So far as science is concerned we never get a self determined whole, things are only explained in terms of each other. So we are forced on from science to ideal interpretations. We want to see things together - see the connections between the facts and this can only be done by referring things to their ideal aspects. Their connections are not accidental or external but internal and ideal, the interconnectedness is a world life. Not a thing is ideally interpreted means that it is conceived as a teleological part in a teleological whole.

We do not mean to give up the scientific explanation, but we must use it to transcend it. To give it up is to appeal to ignorance as Spinoza says. The ideal explanation is giving the world whole in its meaning aspect - seeing purpose in it.

We must assume from the scientific pt. of view, that there is a structure, mechanism, that there is a uniformity, yet our rational prin. may furnish us a clue to the explanation of scientific events. Teleology must be a universal prin. must underlie the world as a whole, it won't work if admitted ever to be broken. Ex. God's will does not intervene with a miracle to break the general teleology.

The notion of world organism must arise from the insufficiency of scientific mechanism. It leads to inner determination.

We arrive at it too from our notion of inner unity. Unity of the world is a result of our unity of self-conscious life. Of course the two things are correlative. We are unity because the world of exp. is unity. Finding law in the world is finding order in our own mind. Our exp. shows that the world answers our questions it realizes our purposes, it is our own "other". We discover ourselves thru other persons, but the objective order is my "other".

The part played by the speech and language in the development of intelligence. The Crusoe man would not be an intelligent being. We are rational only in and thru our direct and indirect social relations.

Reason implies our looking abroad into the objective. Also practically we get confirmation from our relations with others for our own reasonings. In the same way the whole objective order is our rational complement. The objective must have a meaning in itself, of its own, if we ever find a meaning in the objective. We find in the world a kinship to ourselves.

There is an order in the world a cons. life, yet in most objects it exists as an unconscious life and comes to itself only in our own reactions upon the world. The ultimate question for metaphysics is whether the world life is cons.

In rel. we do not any longer use the old proofs for the existence of God for this is assuming a particular being whose particular attributes were preconceived.

See Hume - Natural Religion. The question is, in what terms can you explain the world - is it energy, matter uncons. will, God? Is the world working blindly?

Is there purpose? or only blind "go". Has the world any relation to our morality? Do good and evil belong to the world?

We must say that the Abs. is self cons. a persons, or something more than person.

Metaphysical Theories Jan. 14, 1908

For Objective Idealism See E. Caird - Commentary on the Critical Phil. of Kant.
 Edw. Caird - Hegel - in Blackwood's Phil. Classes
 " " - Evolution in Religion.

Berkeley is always asking what do you mean by the existence of matter - a dead and unintelligent thing. We never get it in experience for objects always have relation to minds.

Our exp. shows the world as organized. That is it is ideally related throughout. From the notion of inner, immanent purpose - all this leads up to, if it does not logically prove an absolute mind for which it exists. Yet to get this absolute in the world, is a difficulty. The structural and functional sides of the world suggest the general prin. of life. But is not the prin. of life just the fact that things are organized? This is a troublesome question for idealism. If we posit an ultimate rationality in the world as an absolute, we must find the relation of the indiv. existence to it. Is the indiv. an illusion?

The Absolute.

1. is unknowable. This is stated and upheld by Kant, all we can know are phenomena. But we always go beyond sensible exp. and interpret things in higher terms. Even the child's exp. is in some sense true of reality, if we accept the conception of degrees of reality. We always, as a matter of fact, go beyond our sensible experience. From our friend's action we interpret a reality, his mind.

2. We can only know the relative, Spencer, or the Conditional (Sir W. Hamilton). To know is to bring into relation. So what is out of relation cannot be known. This is true if the absolute means that which is out of all relation. But the absolute is not a prin. apart from the world, but just the prin. which we must assume to make the world an intelligible whole. So we cannot get the absolute and the relative entirely apart. Spinoza's substance was an absolute of this independent kind.

The relative as such, is not intelligible, does not exist, says Abs. idealism. The Absolute is the prin. which makes the relative intelligible.

If you interpret another person from his actions, you get the idea of him from yourself. So what we interpret in the universe, we get from our own experience. Now the only exp. I know is finite. Of Abs. mind I know nothing. So if we use the conception it is unmeaning. Spinoza objects to the religious conception of God. He can have neither intelligence or will for these are limitations. That he may know implies that something is unknown by him. If he wills, he desires and is not thus complete.

Royce and Bradley conceive of an exp. which is complete, and absolute. It is much as Aristotle's God. But A. gets out of his muddle by saying God moves things thru their attraction for him.

But this conception of finished seems to destroy all possibility of consciousness. If God is the totum simul, there can be no change which is necessary to consciousness. So the notion of Absolute Mind seems a contradiction in terms. These objections are difficulty.

We must grant that our notion of mind comes from our own exp. We must grant that we never find in exp. an absolute. Yet, don't we find within our own exp. some hint of absoluteness. Our minds show themselves as having elements of absoluteness in them by demanding the complete and finished, it demands the absolute.

For Kant, the mind has two parts. 1. the Understanding, which deals w. phenomena. 2. The Reason which is always going beyond into the realm of the absolute. This suggests that we have some element of absoluteness. The presupposition of kn. is that there is a real - this is a claim of our mind. When we seek to know we seek that which is perfect and will answer our questions.

With arguments like this we can the justification for the absolute mind.

Metaphysical Theories Jan. 16, 1908

There is in all our experience a notion of the absolute. An element of absoluteness in the experience of the finite which carries it beyond the finite. It is that we partially fulfil our purposes, we partially reach the reality, and always feel there is more reality for us. This kn. of the "other" is an intelligent system toward which we tend in development.

Mind is the potentiality of all things. Man is rational in so far as he participates in the universal, as he aims the universal aim. He must find his purpose identified with the purpose of the whole of reality. One's private interests, not must be stifled, but must be clarified by fitting into the interest of the whole. Does not morality, or relations to others, lead necessarily to the religious life, i.e. a relation to the whole of the univ. The aesthetic experience is much of the same order. The standard of beauty is not set by our senses or by others judgements, but is ideal from the ideal of the aesthetic exp. We can argue to the absolute. Yet we cannot definitely picture this to ourselves.

The relation of the absolute to the time idea. It is easy to think of a non-spatial world. But time is harder to explain. It seems to be bound up with our exp. Yet in a sense we can transcend our exp. Altho our exp. contain the time relation, they also contain other (as the logical) which seem more necessary to the intelligibility of exp. Of course, we could talk of exp. as a mere time-sequence, but usually we think of exp. as being logically all bound up. The logical relation is the more important. This is why the "association of ideas" is not satisfactory. So when we see exp. as a unified whole, as all bound up, we have transcended the mere time-sequence. We get a musical melody all-as-a-whole and not as a mere sequence. This is Spinoza's *sup specie aeternitatis*, seeing things under the form of eternity. The time order is in a way real, but it is not the final reality. We need the time-idea for teleology - the progress from this to that state., i.e., the idea of change, which is necessary to consciousness. There are two elements of cons. (1) the element of change, and (2) the element of conservation, or the summing up and preservation of what has taken place in the mind. Our cons. at any moment is not merely gaining new ideas but also it holds together what has been got before. The cons. holds together the truth which it has obtained. Thus, God for Aristotle is always contemplating.

The relation of the absolute to the finite. The absolute is the universal, but the universal of the finite. There can be no life as separate from the whole system of life. But how are the many included in the One. Not exactly the relation of whole and part. - the abs. not a gen. name for the whole. Nor is the abs. existent in the system as a part of it. Any system must be both monistic and pluralistic. It must insist on the unity, but also must provide for the parts. Is it pantheism? This says God is everything and everything is God. In this there are no degrees of being, but divinity is equally present in all.

Absolute idealism insists on these degrees of reality. Now, getting a rational organization into things is best done by means of the concept of purpose. So God expresses the whole purpose of the universe, and we can say that there are degrees of reality, all do not necessarily stand upon the same teleological basis, there can be differences.

From the anthropocentric idea we can say that man not only exemplifies the purpose of God but he comprehends it, or has the capacity to comprehend it. He is in a sense, free, he can will, and can determine himself in accordance with a purpose. If a man can have a purpose he is necessarily free. The prob. of free-will has practically ceased for phil. Our difficulty was in trying to explain things psychologically i.e. by relations among the cons. states. But psych. cannot be an ultimate account of things. The Ego announces itself as a new element, which psych. cannot account for.

Metaphysical Theories, Jan. 21, 1908

Objections to Obj. Idealism are the "New Realism", Natural Idealism, Pragmatism. There is a mistaken notion that Obj. Id. denies the obj. world. But Obj. Idealism insists on the teleological aspect of the world.

The question of the one and the many, or the relation of the relation of the Absolute to the individual. But we can get the Idealistic view which will leave room for the indiv.

Spinoza insists on the One Substance and gives no existence per se to the particular. If the stone were cons. of its fall it would feel itself free. Obj. Idealism is Hegelianism. He says the Abs. is not substance but subject. This means that the substance is the undifferentiated unity, exists in and for and by itself. The finite is a mode or apart, outside, unessential to the Abs. But if the Abs. is a mind his reality and indiv. is a purpose. The relation of Abs. to finite becomes then that of purpose to purpose. One purpose included in the other.

Man is not determined by the Abs. purpose but shares in it. This gives meaning to the indiv. life. If indiv. were mean thru which the Abs. determines its purpose they would have no significance for themselves. They would be fulfilling a purpose outside themselves.

Man has the capacity for freedom. Freedom means, (1) self determination, or absence of ext. restraint, (2) absence of restraint by phys. or social obstacles, i. e. capacity to realize one's own purposes.

Teleological action is freedom, if we can determine our ends and act toward them, we are free. If we say (psych.) that the end is only the strongest motive, then as ends change we are unfree.

An end is something consciously adopted more or less deliberately. There are degrees of freedom or of teleological action. If the end is all-inclusive, we are most free, our minor ends are included in the ultimate end. Complete freedom would mean no external constraint, and that our purposes are rational and harmonious with themselves and with the nature of things. They are determined by the completeness that is necessary to their realization. This would not be a merely private purpose - but coincides with the world purpose. The more rational one becomes i. e. the more he harmonizes with men the more he enters into the world purpose, he here finds what he means and is free. The harmonization of the indiv's purposes with his fellow men's is also their harmonization of them with the will of God. The working out these purposes is the process of self realization. This does not mean determination of our purposes by God, but the finding our purposes through trial and error. He finds his good not as a private good but as coinciding with the purposes of other rational beings and with the absolute.

We must transcend time and think these concepts in purely logical terms. You might think of God after the analogy of the social leader. The indiv. determines his plans to those of the leader, but they are free because they find that his plans are what they really want. When they identify themselves with the higher purpose they find their freedom in this self-determination. We are likely to construe the will of God as harmonizing with our own.

We may compare the Abs. to the Father in the family. One finds that his own individuality is not entirely his own, but is bound up with the life of others.

Hegel. 1 Moral law or the Godd seems to be external, an arbitrary set of rules representing whim or caprice. 2. We discover the moral law within us, we find the law of right within us. But this is over subjective, a (1) was over objective. (3) Shows us in the synthesis that the moral law is external and internal. Our law in us is the same as the external law.

But to maintain our monism we must emphasize the unity of the absolute. Yet the indiv. if he maintains his individuality, will be hard to get into the Abs. The Abs. must represent all the indiv.'s yet the indiv. realizes his own freedom.

There are difficulties in any meta theory. The question is how are we to state the question, and in what terms?

For me teleology seems to be the best explanation of the world.